THE THREAT OF WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020033-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 21, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 August 1951
Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: The Threat of War between India and Pakistan
Ireported that Pakistan would attack in Kashmir on
1 October unless the Constituent Assembly plan was called off
1.6
There have recently been a number of developments which
suggest the possibility of an early outbreak of war between India
and Pakistan. In mid-July the Indian Army concentrated the bulk
of its available forces near the Pakistani border in the Punjab,
with Indian Army leaders asserting hat the Army had 25X1
definite "proof" of Pakistan's intention to take forcible steps to
prevent the selection of Tndfan-sponsored Kashmir Constituent
Assembly in Septembero 25X1
ugu ,
the New Delhi Communist-line newspaper BLITZ published a
Markedly similar (though considerably more detailed) account
of alleged Pakistani plans for a short campaign. against India.
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Full analysis of the war threat is in process in NIE -41,
"'Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of
1951," being prepared on an urgent basis. A preliminary
analysis follows.
ao US and British observers are extremely doubtful
that Pakistan is now prepared to initiate a war,
and the alleged Pakistani war plan -- which
Pakistan has officially repudiated may well
prove to be a contingency plan. not finally approved
by the Pakistani high command, a document prepared
without official sanction by Pakistani Army officers,
or a fabrication. Until further information is avail-
able, however, the possibility cannot be excluded
that the alleged plan is both genuine and an accurate
reflection of Pakistani intentions, for the following
reasons:
(1) The alleged plan is plausible from a military
standpoint. Pakistan could probably achieve
temporary tactical success with an attack on
Srinagar. Pakistan military leaders, who tend
to belittle the quality of the Indian Army, may
well overrate their capabilities for delaying
an Indian advance in the Punjab and retaining
their gains in Kashmir until such time as the
UN intervenes a
Iflood conditions in the Punjab, where n a s
principal counterattack would presumably take
place, are such as to preclude military operations
there for the next six weeks.)
25X1
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CONFIX NTIAL
(2) There are strong reasons for, as well as
against, a Pakistani resort to force. The
approach of the Constituent Assembly
elections and the UN's failure to check
preparations for these elections confront
Pakistan with a serious danger that, its
chances of loosening India's grip on Kashmir
will be sharply reduced, It is true that Pakis-
tan would incur grave risks in launching an
attack, India's forces are numerically superior,
and Pakistan, might well be subjected to loss of
East Pakistan if not to total defeat. The UN
might be slow to halt the fighting, particularly
if Pakistan were the aggressor. The fact remains
that the present may appear to Pakistan to be
its last real chance of saving Kashmir. Although
Premier Liaquat All Khan may have been bluffing
in a recent assertion that Pakistan would be forced
to fight if India were permitted to go through with
the Constituent Assembly plan, the Pakistanis
may consider that Kashmir is worth the risk.
b. There is as yet no evidence, other than the troop move-
ments themselves, of an Indian intention to launch a
deliberate attack on Pakt3tan. In this connection the
following points are pertinent.
(1) India has given no indication of planning
$9 preventive ware'
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(2) India's actions could easily be aimed at
forestalling any Pakistani interference
with the convening of the Kashmir Con-
stituent Assembly, From the meagre
evidence thus far available, it is quite
possible that India's military moves were
undertaken in direct response to the alleged
Pakistani war plan. India's actions might
also be designed to: (a) divert world attention
from the Graham mission, which is generally
expected to reach conclusions unsatisfactory
to India and (b) divert the attention of the
Indian public from its own economic troubles
and from the current crisis in the ruling
Congress Party.
(3)
Throughout the dispute time has been on India's
side. It is questionable that India would feel
it necessary to abandon its program for
peaceful absorption of Kashmir at a time when
the most ambitious part of that program -- the
establishment of a Kashmir Constituent Assembly
is about to be implemented.
c. Even if both governments are now opposed to starting
a war, there is a danger that the situation may get out
of hand.
(1) Although both governments now appear to
have firm control over the internal situation
and to be in a position to suppress inflam-
matory statements, public opinion might
become sufficiently inflamed to force one or
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the other of the two governments to go
to war, particularly in the event of civil
disturbances in Kashmir itself or communal
rioting in Bengal.
(2) The current crisis in the Indian Congress
Party might lead to adoption of a war policy.
Various leaders involved in the present
struggle for power might advocate the use
of force against Pakistan in a bid for popular
support. If Nehru should lose control of foreign
policy to Tandon's right wing Congress Party
group, India's future course would-be uncertain.
Although the right wing group is closely allied
with conservative business interests, which
would probably be reluctant to undertake
military adviantures, many of the right wing
leaders have a strong affinity for the violently
anti-Moslem and anti-Pakistan doctrines of such 25X1
organizations as the Hindu Mahasaba.
WILLIAM L. LANGER
Assistant Director
National Estimates
CONFIDENTIAL
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