THE EFFECTS OF BOMBING PETROLEUM STORAGE TERMINALS IN NORTH VIETNAM SINCE 28 JUNE: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100160002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 10, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

 Approved For Release 2003 JR 9 78SO2149R000100160002-1
THE EFFECTS
OF BOMBING PETROLEUM STORAGE TERMINALS
IN NORTH VIETNAM SINCE 28 JUNE:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS*
Summary
Attacks on North Vietnamese petroleum storage facilities
have made continued operation of the economy and prosecution
of the war in the south more difficult and costly. Bombing
which began on 29 June has denied North Vietnam: (a) nearly
50 percent of the pre-raid capacity in principal bulk petroleum
storage facilities; (b) the use of certain of the facilities at
Haiphong, the only important terminal for receiving ocean-
going tankers; (c) the use of the entire Hanoi facility, the coun-
try's second largest petroleum storage center and most impor-
tant hub for internal distribution; and (d) some 50 to 60 thousand
tons of petroleum products.
Sufficient petroleum storage capacity and stocks remain,
however, to permit both civil and military operations -- in-
cluding infiltration -- to continue for more than 5 months at
the estimated level of 1 April 1966. Additional imports of
petroleum and reduced use of petroleum by non-essential con-
sumers would extend this period.
As long as the jetties and some storage capacity remain
at Haiphong, some use of this terminal is possible. To the
This memorandum was produced by the Office of Research
and Reports and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intel-
ligence and National Estimates and the Special Assistant to the
Director for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and conclusions
represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence
as of 10 July 1966.
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extent that sufficient supplies cannot be imported through
Haiphong, other means of distribution can be employed,
including, principally, delivery to South China and transport
from there by rail, truck, or coastal shipping to the re-
maining storage sites in North Vietnam.
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The bombing which began on 29 June resulted in the loss of
nearly one-half of the total capacity (165, 000 tons*) at the principal
petroleum storage terminals in North Vietnam (see the table and the
map). The North Vietnamese not only suffered the loss of about 77, 000
tons of storage capacity, but also are now denied the full use of the
facilities at Haiphong, the only import terminal for oceangoing tankers,
and Hanoi, the largest and most versatile terminal in North Vietnam for
internal storage and distribution. Moreover, some 50, 000 to 60, 000
tons of petroleum products, with an estimated value of US $1 million
to $1. 5 million,*" probably were destroyed. This loss of petroleum
represents about 100 to 120 days' supply at consumption rates estimated
for North Vietnam as of 1 April 1966.
The extent to which the damaged Haiphong facility cannot accept
deliveries of petroleum from oceangoing tankers will determine the need
to switch to such alternative import procedures as (1) delivery by tanker
to China and thence by rail, (2) import of petroleum in drums on cargo
ships, or (3) delivery by rail direct from the USSR through Communist
China. Substitute procedures will increase significantly the unit cost of
petroleum imports. Moreover, North Vietnam must now accept higher
costs for internal distribution of petroleum resulting from the loss of
certain bulk storage facilities and the consequent need for increased
internal distribution in drums and other small containers.
b. Residual Capacity
Despite the serious loss of property, equipment, and petroleum,
North Vietnam has sufficient petroleum facilities and supplies to main-
tain its economy at an adequate level, although at greater cost than be-
fore the bombings. Approximately 88, 000 tons of bulk storage capacity
at principal storage sites remains undamaged. Moreover, dispersed
petroleum storage capacity had been prepared, presumably in anticipa-
tion of bombing.
Metric tons are used throughout this memorandum.
Based on the price of gasoline and diesel fuel oil f. o. b. Singapore.:
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Storage capacity and stocks of petroleum remaining after the
raids is estimated as follows:
Storage Sites
Storage Capacity
(Tons)
Inventory J
(Tons)
Principal storage sites
88,000
66,000
Small dispersed storage
sites
10,Q00 /
7,500
Storage at airbases and
at other military sites
6,300
4,700
Total
l04,300
78,200
a. Tanks are estimated to be 75 percent full on the
average.
b. Based on the fact that not all of the identified
sites, having an estimated total potential capacity of
about 12,000 tons, are completed or filled and a few of
the sites have been damaged by armed reconnaissance
strikes.
In addition to these stocks, there are in the possession of consumers,
both military and civil, an indeterminate but presumably large number
of 55-gallon drums, some of which undoubtedly are filled. North
Vietnam also has access to additional supplies from
(1) 10, 000 tons of diesel fuel aboard the
Leningrad, which was diverted to Shanghai prior
to the bombing, and
(2) 10, 000 tons of gasoline and diesel fuel
(in approximately equal quantities) aboard the
Kostroma, which was moved to Fort Bayard in
South China after the bombing.
Disposition of the cargo remaining aboard the Komsomol, which
was at Haiphong prior to the bombing, is not known. The Komsomol
was reported to have departed Haiphong on 5 July for Vladivostok.
The inventory shown in the above tabulation -- 78, 200 tons --
represents an estimated total of 156 da.ys_ of supply in North Vietnam.
These days of supplies are based on the consumption rate of 500 tons
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North Vietnam: Capacity of Principal Petroleum Storage Installations
as of 28 June and 9 July 1966
and Percent of Capacity Destroyed or Damaged as of 9 July 1966
Storage Capacity
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Location
As of 28 June
As of 9 July
Percent of Capacity
Destroyed or Damaged
Haiphong
72
38
47
Hanoi
34
0
100
Vinh a/
2
2
0
Nguyen Khe
13
10.4
20
Phuc Yen a/
14
14
0
Bac Giang
6
3.6
40
Do Son
4
0
100
Viet Tri
4
4
0
Phu Qui a
2
2
0
Duong Nham
14
14
0
Total
165
88
47
a. Not attacked in the June July bombings.
per day estimated for the level of activity as of 1 April 1966. Of this
total, about one-half is required to support military operations, includ-
ing support of infiltration through the Laos corridor. North Vietnam
could eliminate or reduce certain less essential petroleum uses and
thereby sustain military and civil activities for a significantly longer
period.
Considering the small absolute demand for petroleum, the
volume of supplies which survived the bombings, and the alternative
possibilities for imports, it is concluded that North Vietnam will have
adequate supplies to permit continued operation of the economy and
prosecution of the war in the south. The bombing, however, has
created additional problems of supply and has imposed higher costs.
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2. Possible Alternative Import, Storage, and Distribution Measures
The remaining bulk petroleum storage capacity, described above,
can be used to accept imports delivered by tanker or by rail tank car.
a. If, as now appears probable, some tanks and the oil jetties at
the Haiphong terminal are usable, and temporary piping and portable
pumps could be installed, tankers could discharge cargoes into the re-
maining tanks, or, through the tanks, into rail tank cars. Alternatively,
tankers could discharge in the outer harbor into barges which could pro-
ceed to the jetty at Haiphong for discharge, or to any other storage point
where bulk deliveries could be accepted. <
b. Tankers with cargoes destined for Vietnam could discharge at
alternative ports in China, such as Fort Bayard or Shanghai, and the
petroleum could then be transshipped by rail to Vietnam. A standard-
gauge railroad runs from Fort Bayard via Li-tang to P'ing-hsiang on
the China/ Vietnam border. The capacity of this line is more than 6, 000
tons per day, or more than 10 times the estimated North Vietnamese re-
quirement of 500 tons of petroleum per day. The number of tank cars
required in continuous use to move the tonnage would be about 1 percent
of the current inventory of tank cars in Communist China. At P'ing-
hsiang, China, near the North Vietnamese border, all tonnages must be
transloaded from the Chinese standard-gauge to the North Vietnamese
meter-gauge railroad. The meter-gauge railroad from the border to
Hanoi via Lang Son has a daily capacity of at least 3, 000 tons, or more
than six times the estimated requirement for petroleum. There is a
petroleum storage facility at Ping-hsiang with a capacity of about
2, 000 tons, and this installation could be used to even out the flow of
petroleum traffic on the railroad. North Vietnam has about 200 tank
cars and might have access to at least 150 of the meter-gauge Chinese
tank cars formerly used in the transit trade through North Vietnam.
c. North Vietnam has been developing a widely dispersed system of
bulk petroleum storage installations in anticipation of the possible loss of
its principal storage terminals. These dispersed installations consist of
varying numbers of small cylindrical tanks, each having a capacity of 8
to 11 tons, which are placed in excavations and covered with earth for
hardening and concealment. As of 30 June, about 50 such installations,
with an estimated total potential capacity of about 12, 000 tons, had been
Six oil barges of indeterminate capacity have recently been observed
unloading tankers in the outer harbor.
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identified as completed or under construction (see the map). Approxi-
mately 30 sites are located north of the 20? parallel, which would in-
clude Hanoi and Haiphong and the heavy concentration of the rail net
including the Dong Dang - Hanoi - Lao Cai system. Moreover, many
of the sites are located on or near this rail system. The pattern of the
location of these sites will facilitate their resupply by rail through
China. A few of these very- small- capacity installations have been
attacked by armed reconnaissance in recent weeks, but no estimates
of damage are available.
d. If North Vietnam is prepared to accept the risk of future bomb-
ings, now oil storage tanks might be built in the vicinity of Haiphong.
The USSR has developed pre-fabricated oil storage tanks which are de-
livered in a coil and which probably could be shipped to North Vietnam
and erected within 60 days. The USSR also has developed portable
pipelines, complete with pumps, which probably could be made avail-
able for use with the pre-fabricated tanks to provide a whole new storage
and distribution system for Vietnam. Apart from the question of vulner-
ability to re-attack, however, it is unlikely that North Vietnam would
replace all the tankage that existed at Haiphong.
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3. Damage to Individual Petroleum Storage Terminals
a. Haiphong Storage Terminal -- Bombed 29 June and 7 July
Examination of post-strike photography of the 29 June raid (see
the photograph) indicates that almost one-half of the pre-strike capacity
of 72, 000 tons had been destroyed or damaged. Field interpretation of
photography of the strike of 7 July suggests that no substantial additional
damage to tankage was inflicted. Support buildings were damaged in both
attacks, and the later bombing reportedly destroyed the main pumphouse.
The three oil jetties remain undamaged. Despite the loss of the pump-
house, the facility probably could accept cargoes via the jetties by using
the pumps aboard a tanker or barge. Transferring petroleum within and
out of the terminal, however, will require substitute piping arrangements
and pumps. There is no evidence of damage to the rail sidings which
serve the terminal.
b. Hanoi Storage Terminal -- Bombed 29 June
Examination of photography of 30 June indicates that the Hanoi
storage terminal -- the most valuable storage and distribution hub in
North Vietnam -- was completely destroyed or irreparably damaged
(see the photograph). Although some of the tanks appear to be still
standing, evidence of buckling of steel plates and other damage from
fire and shrapnel indicates that none can be used or repaired. Support
buildings -- warehouses, pumphouses, drum-filling sheds, maintenance
shops, and administration buildings -- have been destroyed or severely
damaged. The rail spur used for box cars (presumably to move petro-
leum drums in and out of the terminal) and some rolling stock have been
damaged. The rail spur used for tank cars and the tank car loading
rack have been destroyed.
Restoration of the Hanoi terminal would require complete re-
construction, including removal of debris, cleaning of the site, prepara-
tion of bases for new tanks, and, most important, resupply of tank steel,
pipes, fittings, and pumps. Such materials and equipment probably
would have to come from the USSR.
C. Nguyen Khe -- Bombed 30 June
Good post-strike photography confirms pilot reports that the
only damage to this terminal was the destruction of one tank, which
probably was empty (see the photograph). Three large steel tanks in-
closed by concrete sheathing, and nine large buried tanks, remain
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undamaged. Except for the one tank that was destroyed, this terminal
probably is usable at its pre-strike capacity.
d. Bac Giang Storage Terminal -- Bombed 30 June
Usable post-strike photography of this site was not available on
8 July. The fire and smoke in available photography tends to confirm a
pilot report of destruction or damage to at least 40 percent of the tankage.
The fact that approximately 21 bombs fell in the target area suggests that
extensive damage probably was inflicted on the buildings and piping within
the compound. The small oil jetty which serves the terminal appears to
be undamaged.
e. Do Son Storage Terminal -- Bombed 30 June and 3 July
No usable post-strike photography of this small facility, which
consisted essentially of only two tanks, is available. Reports of the
bombing indicate direct hits on both tanks but no evidence of any explo-
sions or fire. We accept these reports as accurate and consider the
capacity at Do Son to be unusable, but can make no estimate of the
possible loss of petroleum products or of the recuperability of the site.
f. Viet Tri Storage Terminal -- Bombed 30 June
There was no damage to the storage tanks.
g. Duong Nham Storage Terminal -- Bombed 1 July
No post-strike photography is available of this site. A pilot
report of 6 July indicates that there was no apparent damage to the tanks
but that support buildings were destroyed or damaged severely.
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PRE STRIKE
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NORTH VIETNAM
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MSN: UE/RT 979F DATE. 30 JUN 66 FRM: LLS 008
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NORTH VIETNAM
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PRE STRIKE
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MSN: UE 979F DATE: 30 JUN 66 FRM: ON 30, PAN 16, LV 5
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