1. LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VIET CONG/ NORTH VIETNAM ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200100013-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REQ

4/3-ao
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1. LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAM ARMY
THIS PRESENTATION ON VIET CONE/NORTH VIETNAM ARMY LOGISTICS
WILL UPDATE THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED EXTERNAL RESUPPLY
REQUIRE- NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS OF THE REGULAR COMMUNIST
FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS HAS BEEN NECESSITATED BY THREE
ELEMENTS (1) INCREASED COMMUNIST TROOP STRENGTH, (2) INCREASED
LEVEL OF COMBAT AND (3) IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE.
THE INI'TIA'L DIA STUDY ON VIET CONG/NORT,-I VIETNAM Ake
EXILRNAL LOGISTICS RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS WAS COMPLETEO ON
3 MAY 1965. A DIA BRIEFING TEAM TOGETHER WITH AN ACSI
REPRESENTATIVE, WAS SENT TO. CINCPAC, USARPAC, AND MACV TO
OBTAIN THE REACTIONS FROM THE FIELD ON T-IE METHODOLOGY,
RATIONALE AUJD VALIDITY OF THE STUDY. THESE COMMANDS GENERALLY
AGREED WITH THE DIA POSITION. MACV SUGGESTED THAT THE CLASS 1
SUPPLY FOR PORTERS AND INFILTRATORS BE'INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL
REQUIREMENT. THIS WAS DONE.
TO APPRECIATE THE METHODOLOGY USED IN THE COMPUTATIONS,
IT IS NECESSARY TO BEAR IN MIND FIVE BASIC ELEMENTS:
FIRST - STRENGTH DF FORCES. THIS IS BASED ON MACV
ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ELE!_~`;
THE STRENGTH It, THEN REDUCED TO BATTALION EQUIVALENTS IN 61"J"i
TO ARRIVE AT A "BATTALION SLICE" OF THE TOTAL SUPPLY
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AND A POUNDS PER MAN/PER DAY REQUIREMENT AS OUTLINED IN
FM 101-10.
AN IMPORTANT POINT HERE IS THE MARKED INCREASE IN VC/NVA
REGULAR FORCES SINCE MAY OF 1965. AT THAT TIME COMMUNIST
STRENGTH WAS ESTIMATED AT ONLY 65,000 MEN.
SECOND - THE LEVELS OF COMBAT. THE CURRENT LEVEL IS
DEDUCED BY RESEARCHING MACV REPORTS ON TYPE AND SIZE OF ENEMY
UNITS CONFRONTED BY FRIENDLY FORCES. THIS PRES' SHOWS
.A MARKED INCREASE.
THIRD AND FOURTH - THE BASIC LOAD OF WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION. THESE STATISTICS ARE TAKEN FROM A MACV RELATIVE
FIREPOWER STUDY AND NORTH VIETNAM ARMY TABLE OF EQUIPMENT.
FIFTH - THE ESTIMATED PROCUREMENT AND EXPENDITURE
OF VARIOUS CLASSES OF SUPPLY - THIS DERIVED FROM AVAILABLE DATA
HERE AND IN THE FIELD, AND LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
VC/NVA ARE ABLE TO PROCURE MOST OF THEIR SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS,
THROUGH THEIR SYSTEM OF TAXATION, LOCAL PROCUREMENT, EXTORTION,
AND PRODUCTION OF FOOD BY ORGANIZED UNITS.
IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION-EXPENDED IN
A BATTALION SIZE ENGAGEMENT, EXPERIENCE'DATA CONTAINED IN
FM 101-10 WERE USED AS A GUIDE'AND VERIFIER FOR ESTIMATEN T11F
BASIC LOAD EXPENDITURE I N EACH E*.-,AGEMENT. USING 7.9 T(-M'.
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A STANDARD MEASURE FOR AMMUNITION BASIC LOADS FOR VC/NVA
BATTALIONS,. I T HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT EACH DAY A UNIT I S I N
ACTION IT EXPENDS ABOUT 1/3 OF ITS BASIC LOAD OF AMMUNITION.
THE COMSAT FACTOR USED I S THAT OF AN ATTACK OF A FORTIFIED.;
PUSITiON.
A COMPARISON O F VC/NVA STRENGTHS ARE SHOWN ON THIS
SLIDE. WE AGREE WITH THE MACV ESTIMATE, THAT A TOTAL FORCE
OF 155 COMBAT 'BATTALIONS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY THE END O,= 1966.
IN THIS NEXT SLIDE, WE HAVE ESTIMATED THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THREE LEVELS OF COMBAT:
THE CURRENT LEVEL OF COMBAT IS ON IN WHICH THE
VC/NVA FORCE IS ENGAGED IN COMBAT I DAY OUT OF 30 DAYS AND
THE LOGISTIC RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FROM OUTSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM
ARE ESTIMATED TO BE E1-8 SHORT TONS PER DAY.
THE RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS WHEN THE ENTIRE FORCE IS
ENGAGED IN COMBAT 1 DAY OUT OF EVERY 15 DAYS IS ESTIMATED TO
4
BE -SHORT TONS PER DAY.
THE RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS WHEN THE VC/NVA FORCE I S
ENGAGED I N COMBAT 1 DAY OUT OF EVERY 7 I S ESTIMATED TO BE 101
SHORT TONS PER D 4Y. MACV ESTIMATES THAT THIS .LEVEL O F COMBAT
WILL BE REACHED BEFORE THE END OF 1966,
3.
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 A COMI'ARI SON BETWEEN CURRENT AND PROJ7-CTEO EXTEk
RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS ARE SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE.
ALTHOUGH WE HAVE PROJECTED A NEED FOR 138 TONS AT
HIGHEST LEVEL OF COMBAT AND PROJECTED STRENGTH, THIS FIGURE
COULD BE MUCH LARGER BASED ON MANY INTANGIBLES. FOR EXAMPLE,
THE LOSS O F STOCKAGE, THE IMPACT OF AIR STRIKES AND AIR
INTERDICTION, INCREASED FORCED MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY,
WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT SUFFICIENT I Nr iIMAT I ON
TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENT IS LACKING. THE ESTIMATE OF
THE CURRENT LEVEL OF COMBAT IS ESPECIALLY TENUOUS AND WOULD VARY
AS MUCH AS 20-30 PERCENT. THEREFORE AVAILABLE INFORMATION I S
TEMPERED WITH MILITARY JUDGMENT TO PRODUCE THE BEST ESTIMATE
POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCE.
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