STATEMENT BY W. E. COLBY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 16 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82B00871R000100070006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 16, 1975
• Content Type: SPEECH

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(Advance for Release on Delivery Scheduled for 10:00 a.m., EDT, on
Tuesday, 16 September 1975)
Statement
by
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
before
United States Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
16 September 1975
STAT
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Mr. Chairman:
This hearing typifies the difficulty of modernizing our approach
to intelligence in America. We are resolved that intelligence operations
be conducted in America in conformity to our laws and Constitutional
procedures. This does not mean that intelligence can have no secrets --
we have many secrets in America, from grand jury proceedings to the
ballot box, where secrecy is essential or the process will not work.
We are engaged, in these investigations, Mr. Chairman, in resolving
the dilemma between the necessary secrets of intelligence and the equally
necessary exposure of our government's workings to our people and their
representatives to ensure that they respond to the people's will. In
former times, this contradiction was resolved in favor of almost total
intelligence secrecy, which is at the base of President Kennedy's remark
that intelligence failures are trumpeted, while the successes go unheralded.
As we lift this veil to open intelligence to the kind of public review
and control we Americans want today, we have two problems. One is how far
to go, on which we must jointly develop some guidelines and understandings,
or we risk seriously and unnecessarily injuring our intelligence. The other
is to ensure that our people have an accurate perception of what modern
intelligence really is. Without this, an individual act is seen as the
norm, in application of Aesop's fable of each blind man describing a whole
elephant as only an extension of the part he perceives.
To this Committee, and Its staff to date, we have tried to present
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the whole of intelligence today, and not just its parts. I hope this whole
will be the basis for the decisions we will reach as to the guidelines and
supervision we want to establish for intelligence tomorrow. I thus ask
for a suspension of final judgment until the whole picture of intelligence
can be presented in its true proportions, good and bad, while we respond
to your requirement of public exposure in this hearing of one portion of
it. With other government functions like our Army or our welfare services,
the whole is pfceived and the individual act and even mistake is seen in
proportion. In intelligence, we must modernize our perception of its
whole contribution to our country while we ensure that it conforms with
the standards we Americans expect. I hope we can do both jobs.
The specific subject today concerns CIA's involvement in the develop-
ment of bacteriological warfare materials with the Army's Biological
Laboratory at Fort Detrick, CIA's retention of an amount of shellfish toxin
and CIA's use and investigation of various chemicals and drugs.
The relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory
at Fort Detrick as an activity requiring further investigation surfaced
in late April of this year. It resulted from information provided by a
CIA officer not directly associated with the project in response to my
repeated directives that all past activities which might now be considered
questionable be brought to the attention of Agency management. Information
provided by him and by two other officers aware of the project indicated
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that the project at Fort Detrick involved the development of bacteriological
warfare agents, some lethal, and associated delivery systems suitable for
clandestine use.
A search was made for any records or other information available on
the project. This search produced information about the basic agreement
between the Army and the CIA relating to the project and some limited records
covering its activities from its beginning in 1952 to its termination in 1970.
After the discovery of these project records, verification of the dis-
position of a stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick
for possible Agency use became a major concern. It was not known whether
or not these materials had been destroyed along with the Army's BW stock-
piles in response to Presidential Directives of November 1969 and February
1970. The records indicated that the question had been raised and it was
the impression of those who were familiar with the project that the material
had in fact been destroyed, although no records confirming it could be found.
In the course of the investigation, CIA's laboratory storage facilities were
searched and about 11 grams (a little less than half an ounce) of shellfish
toxin and 8 milligrams of cobra venom were discovered in a little-used
vaulted storeroom in an Agency building.
The White House was notified as soon as the existence of the materials
became known and was kept informed as the investigation progressed.
The Chairmen of CIA's four oversight committees were briefed immediately
after the discovery of the toxin. Records and reports were exchanged with the
Defense Department as it began its own investigation of the matter. This
Committee was notified
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of our investigation of the program in mid-June and has been provided all
project files and reports of the investigation.
CIA association with Fort Detrick Involved the Special Operations
Division (SOD) of that facility. This Division was responsible for
developing special applications for BW agents and toxins. Its principal
customer was the US Army. Its concern was with the development of both
suitable agents and delivery mechanisms for use in paramilitary situations.
Both standard BW agents and biologically derived toxins were investigated
by the Division.
The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May 1952
through a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical Officer
for the performance of certain research and development in the laboratory
facilities of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological
Laboratory at Fort Detrick. The initiative for establishing this relation-
ship was a belief that the special capabilities of the Fort Detrick group
and its access to biological materials of all sorts provided the Agency
access to research and development expertise and capabilities which were
appropriate to its function and not otherwise available. The need for
such capabilities was tied to earlier Office of Strategic Services World
War II experience, which included the development of two different types
of agent suicide pills to be used in the event of capture and a successful
operation using BW materials to incapacitate a Nazi leader temporarily.
Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became
better defined. Thus a project approval memo of 1967 identified four
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functional categories of project activity.
a. Maintenance of a stockpile of temporarily incapacitating
and lethal agents in readiness for operational use;
b. assessment and maintenance of biological and chemical
disseminating systems for operational use;
c. adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbio-
inoculator (a dart device for clandestine and imperceptible
inoculation with BW/CW agents) for use with various materials and
to assure that the microbioinoculator could not be easily detected
by later examination of the target, and
d. provide technical support and consultation on request
for offensive and defensive BW/CW.
In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintain-
ing a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.
From its outset the project was characterized by extreme compart-
mentation or a high degree of secrecy within CIA itself. Only two or three
Agency officers at any given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick
activities. Though some CIA-originated documents have been found in the
project files, it is clear that only a very limited documentation of
activities took place.
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A major early requirement of the Agency was to find a replacement for
the standard cyanide L-Pill issued to agents in hazardous situations during
World War II. Work on this problem was done at Fort: Detrick and ultimately
centered on the coating of a small pin-sized drill with shellfish toxin.
In the course of this work shellfish toxin was stored in our laboratory
for the purpose of conducting stability tests. A considerable amount of
work was done in developing concealment schemes for the drill or pin to
be used in the event suicide was necessary. The only application of this
effort, was in the U-2 flight over the USSR in May 1960, during which Gary
Powers carried such a device concealed in a silver dollar. In the Powers'
case the grooves of the drill bit were filled with shellfish toxin. He
obviously did not use it, and was not instructed to do so; it was offered
to him to provide him with the option. The Powers' flight was the only
time we are aware that the toxin was provided for operational use, although
the L-Pill was made available for earlier flights.
The primary Agency interest was in the development of dissemination
devices, to be used with standard chemicals off the shelf. Such dissemina-
tion devices as a fountain pen dart launcher and an engine head bolt
designed to release a substance when heated appeared to be peculiarly suited
for clandestine use. Available records do not indicate that all specific
items were developed exclusively for the CIA, as work on similar devices
was also done for the Army.
A large amount of Agency attention was given
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to the problem of incapacitating guard dogs. Though most of the dart
launchers were developed for the Army, the Agency did request the develop-
ment of a small hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs.
Work was also done on temporary human incapacitation techniques.
Technical support elements of CIA received continuing requests for safe,
effective and rapidly acting, incapacitating devices. These related to a
desire to incapacitate captives before they could render themselves in-
capable of talking or terrorists before they could take retaliatory action.
Work was done in trying to develop the dart system for such purposes, but
success was never achieved, since a larger amount of an incapacitating
agent is required safely to inactivate a human than of a lethal agent
required to kill him.
Work was also done by or for the Agency in the development of materials
for sabotage of various materials and facilities. This is clearly related
to the Agency's mission. Discussions with those involved indicate that
hand-launchers with darts loaded with dog incapacitant were delivered for
use in Southeast Asia. One such operation involved the penetration of a
facility abroad for intelligence collection. The compound was guarded by
watch dogs which made entry difficult even when it was empty. Darts were
delivered for the operation but were not used. The guard dogs ate some
meat treated with dog incapacitant which was offered by the entry team.
Our records indicate that some of these materials were prepared for one
operation, but we are aware that that operation was not in fact completed.
Beyond these, however, no record can be found that these materials or
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devices were used for lethal operational purposes.
By the late 1960's, a variety of BW agents and toxins were maintained
by SOD for possible Agency use. Varying amounts of these materials ranging
from 100 grams (about 3.5 ounces) to 100 milligrams (about 3 thousandths of
an ounce) were maintained. Though specific accounting for each agent on
the list is not on hand, Department of Defense records indicate that the
materials were in fact destroyed in 1970 by SOD personnel, except for the
11 grams of a substance in small medical bottles labelled shellfish toxin,
(plus the 8 milligrams of cobra venom) which were found on 20 May of this
year.
At the time the toxin was found the officer responsible for the pro-
ject in 1970 stated he had no recollection as to how it got there. On
30 June, discussions were held with the retired Agency officer who had
provided the initial lead. This man, who had been the GS-15 Branch Chief
in 1970, stated that the toxin had in fact been moved from Fort Detrick
and stored in the laboratory. This was done on the basis of his own
decision after conversations with the responsible Project Officer. He
further stated that he made this decision based on the fact that the cost
and difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it
simply made no sense to destroy it, particularly when there would be no
future source of the toxin. The current branch chief believes this
explanation is correct but still does not recall the actual act of
receiving the material from Fort Detrick. Both of these middle-grade
officers agree that no one, including their immediate superior, was told
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of the retention of the shellfish toxin.
The former branch chief recalls that subsequent to the delivery of
the shellfish toxin to CIA, he was told by his chief to inform Fort
Detrick personally that destruction of CIA materials should take place.
He did so but did not include the shellfish toxin, then in CIA hands, in
his instructions.
Discussions with Mr. Helms, Director of Central Intelligence and
Mr. Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans in 1970, have
established that both were aware of the requirement that such material
be disposed of. They recall that clear instructions were given that the
CIA stockpile should be destroyed by the Army and that, in accordance with
Presidential Directives, the Agency should get out of the BW-business.
II.
With the discovery of the shellfish toxin, a complete inventory
of the vault in which it was found was taken. The inventory consisted
of a stock of various materials and delivery systems accumulated over
the years, including other lethal materials, incapacitants, narcotics,
hallucinogenic drugs, irritants and riot control agents, herbicides,
animal control materials, and many common chemicals. The small size
of the vault, about 8 by 10 feet, and the few shelves limit the extent
of this stockpile. The materials are for the most part the residue of
a number of different CIA programs. These involved CIA's effort to
keep a close watch on emerging technology -- in this case pharmaceutical
technology -- to insure that we did not encounter an unanticipated threat
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from hostile intelligence services with which we could not contend. We
also wished to capitalize on new advances which should substantially
assist us in our efforts to collect foreign intelligence or in a wartime
situation. The narcotics in storage related to CIA's overseas efforts
to collect intelligence on the narcotics trade, to help in countering It.
We have also supplied tear gas and mace to our officers overseas for use
in defensive situations where firearms would not be appropriate.
The threat as well as the promise posed by newer types of drugs,
particularly the hallucinogenic drugs, made at least exploratory research
on them essential. You will recall our concern over the possible role
of drugs in the apparent brainwashing of American POW's in Korea, and
the haunted eyes of Cardinal Mindzenty as he "confessed" at a Communist
trial I might add that we believe that a drug was administered to one
of our officers overseas by a foreign intelligence service within the
past year. Those responsible for providing technical support to clan-
destine operations felt it necessary that they understand the ways in
which these drugs could be used, their effects and their vulnerabilities
to countermeasures. In pursuing such concerns as these, many different
materials were obtained and stored for provision to contractors who did
the actual scientific research involved. This concern also led to the
experiments which led to the unfortunate death in 1953 of Mr. Frank
Olson.
In this regard, CIA does very little in-house research. Our
laboratories are limited and are principally used to test developed
equipment and to tailor it for specific operational uses through
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concealment or special packaging. We do not have, nor have we had, the
facilities to produce or experiment with such lethal materials as the
shellfish toxin. For example, we relied upon Fort Detrick to perform the
actual work of coating pins or darts with toxin or with dog incapacitant.
In similar fashion, we relied on other laboratories or contractors to
support us in other fields. Most of the materials held in storage in the
vault were kept there for possible issuance to contractors engaged in
various kinds of research.
III.
One of the major results of these investigations of the CIA has been
to impress upon our employees and all of us involved in intelligence the
fact that decisions about our programs must be made in the light of today's
world. As you are aware, in mid 1973 we tried to identify all questionable
activities. We did so for what I believe to be most of them, and issued
internal directives to ensure that CIA remain within the bounds of law.
Repeated emphasis on the importance of this did lead to the identification
of our association with Fort Detrick as an activity to be reviewed before
we were aware that one of its products had been improperly sequestered.
The controls involved in the shellfish case seem to have existed
but not to have been applied. The controls that would have prevented or
discovered this act were principally those which are the kind of management
we must have for the intelligence business. I am confident that this
management will exist as a result of the changes we are making in our
approach to intelligence, to ensure its conformity with American values
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and standards. These will include a better public appreciation of
modern intelligence, better guidelines for its proper activities and
better supervision externally to stimulate better supervision internally.
With these, I am confident that such episodds as the shellfish toxin
will not be repeated.
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