NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010041-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: December 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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December
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 24, 1975
CONTENTS
LEBANON: Plans to restrict
flow of arms to warring factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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CUBA: Havana's involvement in
Angola and elsewhere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
LAOS: Soviets begin airlift to
alleviate shortages in Vientiane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
PORTUGAL: Military to
continue political role . . .
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USSR: Communications satellite
placed into stationary orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 24, 1975
Syria and Lebanon may have agreed, during Prime Minister Karami's visit to
Damascus on Monday, to take more forceful action to restrict the flow of arms to
the warring parties in Lebanon.
Generally reliable press reports say that the plan to limit the flow of arms is
part of a wider understanding that includes plans for implementing the cease-fire,
resuming high-level negotiations on olitical reform, and holding a meeting of Syrian
and Lebanese heads of state.
President Franjiyah has been hoping that President Asad will invite him to
Damascus to meet with Saudi King Khalid tomorrow. Franjiyah probably calculates
that such a meeting would help him politically, even if it did nothing to end the
fighting in Lebanon. A Lebanese official has said that Palestine Liberation
Organization chairman Yasir Arafat may also join the group.
Franjiyah and Asad have not met since January, before the troubles of 1975
began. A meeting of the two has been under consideration for some months as a
possible means of stimulating progress in the endless political negotiations.
Asad may abandon any plans to meet with Franjiyah, following allegations by
Lebanese Christian leaders this week that Syrian or Syrian-controlled Palestinian
forces have joined in the fighting in Lebanon. Both Damascus and the PLO have
denied these charges.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 24, 1975
Cuba's involvement in the Angolan civil war is not the only
activity abroad although it is b far the est
Cuban subversive efforts in this hemisphere declined sharply after the debacle
in Bolivia in 1967 when Che Guevara was killed. Havana's interest in Africa-already
evident in the early 1960s-became more apparent in 1965 when Guevara led a
group of some 100 men conducting guerrilla warfare in Zaire (then
Congo-Leopoldville) from bases in Tanzania.
fill -t..M+or!
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nature of the Cuban assistance changed
as new leftist governments came to power in Africa in need of the kind of assistance
Cuba could give. The number of Cubans rose as they took on a new range of
responsibilities-from technical and economic tasks to political and administrative
duties. Still, in many cases, they continued to perform military or paramilitary
chores.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 24, 1975
In the Far East, the Cubans have given assistance to the communist regimes in
Vietnam and Laos. During the war, a number of Cuban military men were in North
Vietnam Others sent to
Hanoi included doctors, nurses, medical ec i , an construction workers.
After the war, a dozen or so of the medical personnel were shifted to Laos, and
the number of Cuban construction workers in North Vietnam was increased to
about 500 men and women.
Cuba's commitment in Angola differs significantly from these other Cuban
efforts abroad in that the Cubans in Angola include troops sent to take part in direct
combat. In the only other occasions when Cuban troops were sent abroad in large
numbers-to Algeria in the early 1960s and to Syria after the outbreak of the
Arab-Israeli war-they were not sent to the front lines but were used in rear areas to
free locals for combat duty.
The Soviet Union has begun to airlift food and petroleum from Hanoi to
Vientiane to help make up shortages caused by the closure of the Thai border. An
AN-12 made its first delivery to Vientiane on December 22. Soviet officials in
Vientiane say that the airlift will continue as long as necessary.
The Soviets had hoped also to move supplies by air from Bangkok to Vientiane.
The Soviets had apparently claimed that these supplies would be used by their
embassy. Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai, however, on December 22 told the press
that he would permit such an airlift only after the border is reopened. Chatchai said
that the border could be reopened after Thai and Lao officials meet to discuss the
continued influx of refugees from Laos, the smuggling of arms into Thailand, the
smuggling of commodities from Thailand into Laos, and "other problems."
Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Phoun Sipraseut on Monday
publicly ruled out any talks until Thailand reopens the border and "sincerely
displays a friendly attitude of true neighborliness." He admitted that the border
closure had caused serious economic difficulties in Vientiane, but added that several
socialist countries had agreed to transport fuel, milk, and sugar to Laos. Phoun said
that a convoy of Vietnamese vehicles had already delivered some fuel and other
supplies and claimed that new deliveries from and through Vietnam will enable the
Lao to cope with shortages.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 24, 1975
PORTUGAL
New appointments to Portugal's all-military Revolutionary Council appear to
complete the purge of leftists from the highest levels of the armed forces, while at
the same time serving notice that the military does not intend to abandon altogether
its political role.
The vacancies on the Council resulting from the dismissal of two leftist navy
officers following the military uprising on November 25 have been filled by two
navy officers who also serve as cabinet ministers. An all-night meeting of the
Revolutionary Council that ended yesterday morning confirmed commanders
Almeida e Costa and Vitor Crespo and approved the economic austerity measures
adopted by the cabinet earlier.
Both officers are staunch anti-Communists, but their appointments are
otherwise seen as maintaining the balance on the Council between the so-called
political officers, who are led by Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, and the
"professionals," who seem to be gravitating toward newly appointed army Chief of
Staff Eanes.
The "professionals" tend to put more emphasis on the need for strict discipline
in the armed forces and dedication to their military function. The Antunes group,
on the other hand, seems intent on carving out a continuing political role for itself.
These differences have already resulted in some heated discussions in the
Council and will probably continue to do so as the officers seek to work out a new
pact with the political parties on the military's role in government and politics.
There is increasing talk among the more professionally oriented officers that
members of the Antunes group should be made to choose between a political or a
military career, although the consensus seems to be that the decisive confrontation
need not come before the parliamentary elections expected some time next year.
Differences between the two groups appear, moreover, to be largely a matter of
degree; even the "professional" officers are unwilling to give the civilian politicians a
free hand. The point of divergence comes on whether the military should lead the
nation to "democracy and socialism"-as Antunes maintains-or should merely
provide order and stability and let the people decide whether they want socialism.
The recent squabbling among politicians will help to confirm the officers in
their belief that the military must continue in at least a limited role in government
anything is to be accomplished.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 24, 1975
In his holiday address to the nation last night, Azevedo underlined the
important role the military plays in arbitrating disputes in the government. The
military cannot return to the barracks, he said, until political parties achieve greater
"political maturity."
Quarrels among the political parties over representation in the cabinet have also
risen again. Popular Democratic leader Sa Carneiro told a party rally on Monday that
the proposed reorganization of the Azevedo government, which would give the
Socialists four ministers, the Popular Democrats three, and the Communists two,
was unacceptable because it would double Communist representation.
The Socialists as well as Foreign Minister Antunes have no argument with
Communist representation. They contend the Communists should participate in the
government in order to share the blame for the economic austerity measures that
must come. Most reports, ho ever. have indicated that party representation would
remain essentially unchanged.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 24, 1975
On Monday, the Soviets launched a satellite with the international designator
Statsionar 1. The spacecraft, also called "Raduga" by the Soviets, was placed into a
stationary orbit over the Indian Ocean. According to a Tass announcement, the
satellite will relay uninterrupted 24-hour telephone, telegraph, and both color and
black and white television signals.
Since 1970 the Soviets have planned to place a geostationary communications
satellite, Statsionar, in orbit over the Indian Ocean to relay domestic
communications and TV programs. Statsionar 1 may in fact be this satellite. Earlier
this year, the Soviets announced plans to launch three additional geostationary
communications satellites in 1975-76; Statsionar T, 2, and 3, to be located over
Africa and the Indian Ocean. These satellites are intended to provide
communications and TV broadcast services to Eastern Europe and the USSR.
The Soviets have also recently announced further plans to implement a global
geostationary communications satellite system providing telecommunications
services similar to those of Statsionar 1. Although that system will bear some
resemblance to the 91-nation International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization network, it will not have comparable performance.
Soviet objectives with respect to the use of this system are unknown. This
series of Statsionar launches would take place between 1978 and 1980 and would
consist of seven stationary satellites positioned over the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific
oceans. This would be an ambitious undertaking, and judging from the Soviets' oast
track record, may not occur on schedule.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 24, 1975
ARGENTINA: The settlement that ended the air force rebellion on December
22 reportedly calls for a limit on President Peron's tenure, possibly as short as 30
days. Although the rebels' only confirmed success was the forced retirement of the
air force commander, their move has apparently united the military in working for
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