CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 13, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Chinese Affairs
53
13 November 1973
No. 2253/73
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This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the moaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the
US Code, as amended, Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or
receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law,
PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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Anli?('onfucius C'IUnpaign M1Iny be
Alined al Leaders iii Current Leadership
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The ('Rinses are Iollowiiig closely a political canlpail,11 that holds serious
implicatlons for (he future oI' one or More (11' Chino's leaders, The campaign jokes
the form of.ul attack on ('onfucitis :Ie;itl these 2,400 years, hilt still a cultural force
hl ('hina, Lin I'ioo, who is of course .1 figure front the recent past, is being accused of
having been a "Coil I'll ciallist," a chal'ge that is being interpl'eted, both wltll'll ('hills
and without. as an attack on so111eelle in (he Current Ieadet'shil), Indeed, 11c1w that
Liu has been openly named a traitor, (here is no reason to attack hint so indirectly,
Available evidence suggests (hunt both ('boo I?n?lai and Chiang ('ping are somehow
involved in the campaign, but the problem is to identify (he target, This is a game
the Chinese hove to play, and palrticip;ln(s in study sessions all around ('him are
doing their own guesswork on the suhject,
The time got under way on 7 August with an ;article in People's 1)iiil,1' written
by a prol'essor in ('.ulton. The campaign I';Ided during the party congress. but picked
up again i n Inid-Sei lenlher. I t is now being vigorously fro o ed h y Illy 111viloll ill
PA. 01111!7-
Vie canlpatt:n a rest y resent m es [lie ;ill r- _In mo~snlel o
early I 972 and the attack or. the "May 10- group in 1970.
As is always (lie case when :ilt icks are conducted by historical analogy, the real
issues arc seen imprecisely, as through a veil. Nevertheless, the argument pub
forward, particularly in the central media, is sitrprisint,ly straightforward and rela-
,ively sophisticated. Confucius and his followers are being berated as reacti:maries
who resist change, obstruct progress, and seek to restore ancient, outmoded ways.
They are accused of' championing irrelevant and archaic "rites," thereby pcrpst-
uating divisiveness in Chinese politics, Above all, they are said to be reactionary in
Marxist terms because the policies they espouse are not rooted in the more advanced
elements of Chin:-'s economic base. Those opposed to C'onf'ucius, on the other hand,
are portrayed as reformers who persistently advocate "progressive measures" in the
interest of creating (lie "new society" and of modernizing and unifying China. These
people ;'re depicted as the handmaidens ofcconomically advanced forces in Chinese
society. As the campaign has developed, the central media in particular have linked
these "progressive" anti-Confucian forces to the towering, if'ruther menacing, figure
of the initial unifier of China, Chin Shih liming-ti. an unmistakable reference to
13 November 1973 Chinese Affairs
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tluo, ('frill BLitt !luentg-II is said to have motlernii.ed ,atd unified ('hind by adopting
the programs of the anti-('onI'll cianists,
The supposed opposition of the Confucianisis to "new things in (lie Current
Context, a reference to Imlicies adopted toward the close of the ('olloral Revolu-
lion and thelr Interest In "restoring the old" and returning retired officials to office
have led nnuty ohs. rvers to believe that time role of Confucius is being assigned to
('hou lot this scenaurio, C'hou's success in reinstating officials and policies Ilan
were prominent before the (Iollural Revolution prornptetl ('hieing ('hint to launch
the all ti-C'oul'ucius drive in an effort to defend and preserve Cultural Revolution
policies and to discredit Chou.
A strong case can also he made that, in the Context of the anti-Confucian
campaign, those who want to "restore the old" actually want to return to the
Cultural Revolulion, and that the "reformers" are people like ('bon who recognize
the need Ior change and see the policies of time Cultural Revolution as obstacles to
progress and modernir,alion, In this interpretation, the objects of (lie attack would
be Chiang ('Icing and Yao Wen-yuan, the two Politburo members who cling most
stubbornly to Cultural Revolution policies.
Several pieces of evidence ;;eeni to support the latter view. Confucius is
attaacked for wanting to "restore families whose line of'succession had been broken,"
Both Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, and Yao, who is thought to be Mao's son-in-law, lost
ground at the recent party congress. Although the two would doubtless like to
regain the prominence they enjoyed during the Cultural (revolution, Chou En-lai
warned onnamed cadres al the party congress that they must accept either higher or
lower posts. ('eking issued a document earlier this year explaining that the succession
is not a "father-son" affair. At study sessions in Canton held in mid-Septemher,
when the anti-Confucius drive was gathering steam, cadre reportedly were told that
high-ranking officials are chosen on merit, not because they are related to the leader;
that, in fact, those related to the leader may be disloyal or incompetent. The
anti-Confucius articles contain pejorative references to "hereditary nobility" and "a
family tree."
An article in the October issue of Red Flag claimed that Chin Ship Iluang?ti
(the Mao figure) was convinced by his "premier" (probably Chou) that it was
necessary to break the Confucianists' "monopoly of culture and education." ('ul-
tural developm''n!s, the special purview of Chiang Ching, have been at a virtual
standstill since the Cultural Revolution despite periodic efforts, under the nabric of
letting "100 flowers bloom and 100 schools of thought contend," to induce Chinese
artists to start producing again. The Confucianists are portrayed as "removing" the
100 schools of thought and "honoring only the teachings of Confucius.." Cultural
fare today is dominat':d by the plays produced under Chiang Ching's tutelage;
several of the plays have a woman, possibly representing Chiang Ching, as the main
character and the symbol of political rectitude.
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The an ti-Confucius ctunhaign is still In its Pliny states, Its Inn-pose Is ahh'Irenlly
to tliscrcdiI, 'Intl imrhatps purge, file leafier under attack. The articles on this
question particularly the early ones--are sttb.iect to ciifferInlt interpretations, and II
is tutssihle that each side is trying to turn the caanpaittn against the other, In any
rase, it appears that leading Chinese personalities. -most likely Chou Vii-tai and
('IdLrttg (' , he latest reflection ol'which is this
ranthaign
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Ilousin for fit ' eller
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The Chinese press has peen showing considerable interest in the pace of' urban
housing constrtuctloll, ('Itinese spokesmen recently stated that enough units were
built luting the Third Five-Year Phut (,96O-I97()) to house about 15 million
occupants, antl that the average floor space is 4,14 square meters per occupant. This
is only about two thirds of the total constructed during the First Five-Year Plan
(1953.1957) and an average of less than hall' the floor space built annually during the
late 1950s,
Floor Space Construction
(In nnl/Nont .-clrcarr r?tcvcrs)
I'eriotl 'T'otal Average Per Year
1954-57 94.5 18.9
1958-59 52.3 20.2
19(,O-70 02,0 12.4
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The current rate of' urban housing construction, while above that of the late
1960s, probably is still substantially lower than during the Tate I9 50s. Costs of
construction have increased from about 45 yuan per square meter during the First
Five Year Ilan to an estimated 70 yuan-;t jump of' more than 50 percent. The size
of China's urban population would make any program to provide adequate housing
an expensive undertaking requiring massive diversion of' resources from high priority
proj%cts.
The shortage of housing in the cities is one reason that China periodically sends
large numbers of' urban dwellers to the countryside, liven with these transfers of
population, the iv . N 'r is about 20 percent less than
in the early 1950s.
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China's Leaders Compete for Support of DisalTcctcd Youth
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Leaders at opposite ends of the political spectrum appear to be Vyint, I'm tile
support of ('hilla's disaffected youth. The reinstatement of higher academic stand-
ards has alienated sonic young people, and many others are embittered by their exile
to rural areas, 't'he leftists are trying to exploit this discontent by supporting those
who want to relax educational criteria. Moderates are trying to mend fences with
rusticated youth by promoting pleasures to improve their living conditions. Some
leaders are also conrtint_; the Red (itlards, an orllallizutioll now limited to secondary
schools which offers young people an alternative to the more tightly controlled
Young Communist League.
People's Daily on 19 October pihblished an article from Shanghai that argued
strongly for allowing students to copy front one another, The article described the
plight of' a IRed Guard middle school student whose test paper was not accepted
because he was caught copying from another Red Guard. What the students called
"consultation" and "inspiration" was dismissed by the teacher as "cheating." The
issue was debated in big character posters, and it was decided that teachers who
refuse a test paper because of' "cheating" are oppressing the students.
This judgment has not been widely accepted. Accompanying articles in People's
Dale said that students may consult each other in some tests, but must work
independently in others. The issue is nevertheless gaining national attention.Teach-
ers in Kwangaung reportedly met io late October to discuss tih^ Shanghai incident.
Leftists are apparently trying to capitalize on the momentum built up since last
summer when they successfully forced a rcireat from the use of' college entrance
examinations. a move that was probably applauded by down-to-the-countryside
youth. By continuing to snipe at policies designed to promote academic excellence,
the leftists are looking For allies among students whose scholastic performance is not
up to par. Mediocre students were a major source of' leftist support during the
Cultural Revolution.
A new appeal to youl:g people that tells them they are being oppressed in
school and mistreated in the countryside could wol! find a receptive audience,
especially with a politically active Red Guard group to lead the way. The students
involved in the recent shouting match in Sha nghai, as well as an earlier incident in
Sinkiang, were Red Guards, and the leftists seem to be brandishing the Red Guards
as a threat. Unlike their disillusioned predecessors who answered leftist calls during
the Cultural Revolution only to be banished to the rural areas once the revolution
was over, the new generation of' IRed Guards is politically inexperienced and still
idealistic. As such, they are a potential source of' leftist support. The moderates last
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summer tried In I)rcvcnt this support Train developing when, I'm the first limn ill five
years, Peking commemorated the Itctl (iuur(I winiversary, Peking praised the Iced
(;cards I'm their past achievements, but cautiously refrained from contnrenting om
thei-? I'utur?c role in Polities.
The moderates are nroving l'orcel'ully to defuse another Potential trouble
shot (lie growing numtaer of restless youths in the cotutlryside. Prodded by Mao,
the ('enh?aI Committee issued a series of instructions designed to in Drove the lot of
these young people and to punish officials who abuse them. Some local officials
have resisted the move to improve conditions of the young people, Partly because of
the financial burden. In response, the party leadership has reportedly issued a(I(li-
tiona! instructions, in the Form oI' a report by Chou I:n-k i, to (teal I'irntly with
ol'I'icials who fail to follow Peking's orders, Urban youths who have been rounded up
in recent weeks for relocation to the Coll ntrysi(Ie are accompanied by local urban
officials charged with seeing '!rat rural areas comply with Peking's instructions.
The Current nuuteuvering will probably be 11'1'ecte(l by the alit i-('onfucius
campaign now ill Progress. The drive is being most vigorously promoted in those
areas where youth problems are the greatest -in the universities and in study sessions
on the (lows-to-t hC-Countryside program. The campaign is clearly aimed at someone
in the top leadership; Current speculation focuses on Chou :n-1.1i or Chiang Ching.
The two are obviously at odds_ and each is ccektna the allegiance of C'hin's youth.
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('lima is deniunstratinl! concern over tising tensions in I'akistapi. Afghanistan,
mid to a lesser extent Irani, The new Uauud guvernnurnl's support I'm an intr,
pendent state of 1'11slilitn has strained AI'ghaut relations with I'akisl;tn, and I)aoud's
enc'uiual!etuenl of dissident Italichl Irihesnien has ca,ised trouble with Iran, As a
result oI' recent horder skirmishing, both Afghanistan and Irvin have reinforced their
forces on the Al'gh;ut?Iranian frontier, i'akistam has mewed regiihi troops to tilt
border acid has alerted Its ail' force; K;ihul reportedly hots also increased Its military
preparedness,
('pitta has close ties with Pakistan rout a wau'rninl! friendship with Teliram.
('eking mule strong commitments to 11akistami territorial integrity following Paki-
stan's disnwmbernrent In late 197 1, in part to discourage external support for tribal
separatists.
Chinese leaders appear to he convinced that tensions in the region are at direct
result ol, tilt aggressive Soviet altletitpt to Improve Moscow's strategic pusitit-li ill
South Asia, The Chinese have catalogued these Soviet sins to a long list of I'c-reign
officials, Chinese ol'I'ic~ahs Claint that the Soviets intend to grain influence in the area
;rid establish permanent access to the Arabian Sea, that they engineered Ile coup in
Afghanistan this summer, and that they actively support separatist operations Chou
Ion-tai reportedly went so far as to tell that Mosco',.intends
to unite Italichi tribesmen living in con iguous areas o -e three countries with
those in the USSR to l'orni a new stale dominated by Moscow,
Although I?eki:'r's assets in the region are Ifmited and the situation along the
frontiers semis tar short of open conflict. the Chinese continue to make representa?
tions to senior foreign diplomats acid officials and to urge Iran and Pakistan to
establish closer relations. Peking also is supporting Tehran in its aims to consolidate
the primacy of Iran over the I'ershin Gull' in an effort to curb Soviet influence. In
addition, the Chinese made a quite friendly gesture to Turkey when Chou himself
recently ittentld I Turkish National tray reception in Peking.
In the interest of main tarni'ig, a rough regional power balance. Peking may well
have privately welcomed the entry of'a US naval task force in the Indian Ocean area
as a restraining influence on Moscow. The Chinese public reaction was tepid and
indirect. It amounted to replaying a Tanzanian protest and a Ceylonese article
protesting the presence of both Soviet and American warships ill the Indian Ocean.
A reported Soviet arms grant to Kabul could further complicate Peking's
position. Although the ill-trained Afghan army would be no match I'or Pakistan,
substantial Soviet arms shipments could trigger a Pakistani request for aid that
Peking would find difficult to turn down. A Chinese grant to Pakistan, in turn, could
damage prospects for an early Chinese rapprochement with India and possibly head
to an Indian request Ior matching aid from Moscow.
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Sinn-Jnpttnese Neguliallunr in Slow Motion
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The Chinese are still pushing the Jap;nlese to cnnelude a civil avlallml ;11!ree-
nlenl. the Most irllpt-rt;tnt anti rmuOst Lruuhlesunte o1' the four hilateral agreements
now being! neguliated. Aftt'r making tough demmnds a t the outset of the negutiatiuns
earlier this year. Peking!. h.u mw reduced its retluirements it) two: that 'T'okyo force
'T'aipei to change the n:u m of China Airlines and That the planes cease Plying! the
Nationalist flag. The Japanese are prepared to set up a dummy firm. ostensibly to
replace Japan Airlines I'Iigllls Io Taiwan,
Acceptance of these demands would allow (lie .substance of Japan's lucrative air
Ir'al'h ' to continue, alterinr only the I'urnl of the interchange. In fact, China may
believe Its dcnlamis are so reasonable that 'T'okyo could reject them only at the risk
of appearing! inflexible,
The Japanese have gone through the notions of accepting! Peking's proposal
and have presented it to Taipei. Here. ul' '0Urse, is tlse sticking point. Taipei refuses
to accept this arrangement for the same reason that it appeals to ('eking: Taiwan's
international Mattis would he reduced yet another notch. Convinced that Tokyo is
more interested in the immediate profits from its air links with Taiwan than any
long-range gains from new ties with Peking, the Nationalists have told the Japanese
that they will break off all present flights rather than charge the name of their
airline or flag on its planes.
The Tanaka government is concerned that if it twists Taipei's arm, the pro-
Taiwan faction in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party would he roused to active
opposition. (riven Tanaka's many miter domestic problems. lie is unwilling to go
all-out at this time to get .111 air agreement with Peking. In fact, the Japanese have
asked Peking to understand their "delicate" position, and the Chinese have not
pressed Tokyo as hard as they might have.
The result is continuing stalemate. In September. Peking proposed an exchange
of visits between Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers before the end of 1973. In
the circumstances. even it' such visits come off, it is difficult to imagine that an
aviation agreement could he concluded. It is more likely that a trade agreement
would be concluded.
The lack of urgency in Sino-Japanese negotiations is in large measure a result of
the relative satisfaction of both sides with the present arrangement. China's key
diplomatic goal was accomplished Past fall when 'Tokyo broke off' ambassadorial
relations with Taiwan and recognized Peking. Neither Peking nor Tokyo is displeased
with time level of' economic interchange. Despite the absence of the formal accords
foreseen ill 1972, trade between the two Countries will ex land to over $2 billion in
1973, over twice the amount of the previous year
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28 Oct-3 Nov Chinese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Sha Deng al tends
celebration of 50th anniversary of 'l'urkisli Republic In Ankara,
(l1)
Sudanese Foreign Minister Mansur Khalid ends visit to the I'RC, 25X6
(U)
British parliamentarians arrive in ('eking, (U)
Chinese delegation led by Still So-chang ends visit to Argentina
without signing trade agreement. (U)
3 Nov Vice Foreign Minister ('hiao Kuan-hua returns to Peking after
heading PR(' delegation to annual UN General Assembly session
in New York. (U)
3- 7 Nov Chinese aircraft transport Pathel Lao to Luang I'rahang as part of
implementation of Lao settlement. (11)
4-0 Nov North Vietnamese delegation headed by Premier I'hant Van Dong
stops in Peking en route to Ilanoi from Eastern EuropegrLeted
and feted by Chou I~n?lai; seen oil' by Yell Chiell-ying. (U)
h-10 Nov ('resident Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone visits ('eking. (U)
8 Nov Delegation of the National Council for US-China Trade, which
arrived in Peking on 4 November, is received by Vice Premier Li
Ilsien-nien on 8 November. (U)
8 Nov A photograph, taken at Mao's request, shows Wang Ilung-wen on
Mao's right with Sierra Leone President between them and ('hou
on Mao's left. This is the first time Wang has been given such
prominence in a photograph. (U)
9 Nov Khmer insurgent envoy long Sary feted by Chou Fn-lai at ban-
quet in Peking before n.turning to Cambodian interior. (U)
10 Nov Secretary Kissinger arrives in Peking for three-day visit. Received
by Chou Fn-lai and Mao. (U)
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