THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF CHENLA II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100139-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 139
• Publication Date: December 11, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Intelligence MeMorandum
C 4/0C/a /03/71
The Political Consequences of the Collapse of Chenla II
C
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Secret
73
11 December 1971
No. 2103/71
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 December 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Political Consequences of the Collapse of Chenla II
Summary
The collapse of the Chenla II campaign has had
important political reverberations in Phnom Penh.
For the past ten days, there has been considerable
and sometimes acrimonious debate in the highest po-
litical circles in the capital about what went
wrong on Route 6 and what changes need to be made.
Army leaders are being blamed for recent military
reverses by both high-ranking civilian leaders and
thein own junior officers, but most of the dis-
affection has centered on the figure of Prime Min-
ister Lon Nol.
As the prime mover behind Chenla II, it was
inevitable that the prime minister would be criti-
cized when it failed. But the bitterness and po-
tentially serious nature of the attack on Lon Nol
stem not only from the Chenla II collapse but from
long-standing displeasure with his capricious con-
trol over battlefield tactics and what is evidently
perceived as his faulty grasp of the realities
facing Cambodia. The current flux in the leader-
ship situation in Phnom Penh is similar to that of
last spring, when Lon Nol briefly stepped down.
There was then widespread disgruntlement over
Lon Nol's deficiencies as a leader, but there also
proved to be no other individual who could rally
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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sufficient support to run the country. The im-
patience and sense of exasperation of people like
Sirik Matak, Cheng Heng, and some military staff
officers seem to be somewhat deeper this time, and,
in contrast to last spring, the cutting edge of the
discontent is a deteriorating military situation
over which the Cambodians have only limited control.
Moreover, Lon Nol himself appears to be dealing with
criticism differently than last spring, when concern
over his health led him to agree to turn over the
government to others. This time he seems to be full
of fight, denying that his management of the war
has been counterproductive and telling his critics
that in effect he intends to continue to do business
the same way.
Lon Nol's intransigence and the apparent strain
of irrationality currently manifest in his thinking
create a volatile situation, for feeling appears to
be running high among those who believe that some
changes in his duties are essential. Sirik Matak
is the most prominent and, because he is a resource-
ful, independent and strong-wil.~.ed individual, the
most important of Lon Nol's critics. A man who
stood up to Sihanouk, Sirik Matak might carry through
on his threat to quit if Lon Nol does not delegate
more authority. If he did so, a governmental crisis
would ensue that at a minimum would mean that Lon Nol
would have to rule from an even more circumscribed
base of power.
But power still seems to rest with Lon Nol.
For all of his ina3equacies, he still commands the
affection and respect of most of his critics. There
has been serious erosion of his power base in the
army, but he probably can still count on the support
of some key troop commanders if there is a showdown.
The odds are that Lon Nol can face down his critics,
if his will does not waver and there are no other
major military setbacks like Chenla II that com-
pletely undermine his authority.
He may be able to muddle through for several
more months. No matter how the current power strug-
gle comes out, the longer range prospect for polit-
ical stability in Cambodia is not bright. Aside
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from Lon Nol, who is clearly slipping badly, no
.other political figure seems capable of either
winning the support or emasculating the importance
of th
i
e var
ous factions without a struggle of. pos-
sibl
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