SPECIAL MEMORANDUM: WHAT NEXT FOR RHODESIA ?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 15, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
What Next for Rhodesia ?
Secret
15 November 1968
No. 21-68
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8-E-O-R-E-T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
15 November 1968
SPECIAL MBIORANDT?M NO. 21-68
We think the chances are better than even that Rhodesia
and the UK will reach a settlement by which Ian Smith 'e white
minority "rebel" regime is legitimized. Black Africans,
sensing ouch an outcome, have already served notice that they
will try to block any effort in the UN to remove the e3onomic
sanctions against Rhodesia, and are likely to instigate more
fireworks in the UN and elsewhere. Some may stage angry
demonstrations against the UK, break relations, or drop out
of the Commonwealth. Other nations, including the US, which
have implemented the UN sanctions decree would then face
difficult decisions on how to treat a "legitimate" Rhodesia.
oup
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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S-E-C-R-E-T
I. Background
1. Three years ago this month Ian Smith defied Britain
and the world by proclaiming the independence of Rhodesia under
white minority rule. The resulting dispute between Rhodesia
and the UK has centered around the terms of Rhodesia's
constitution, most of which date from 1961, when a complex
parliamentary electoral system was devised to ensure white
control. It has been a strange rebellion in many ways.
Harold Wilson almost immediately ruled out a military response,
thereby losing the sympathy and arousing the suspicions of many
black Africans. Wilson's subsequent avowal of NIBMAR (no
independence before majority African rule) partly assuaged
African members of the Commonwealth, but widened the gulf
between him and Smith. In the course of sporadic discussions
with the Rhodesians, Wilson edged awey from NIBMAR, but took
a stance almost as unacceptable to the Smith regime.
2. The conflict was broadened and became more intractable
when Wilson In 1966 got the approval of the UN Security Council
for international punitive measures against the rebellious colony.
The Security Council, applying for the first time Chapter VII
of its charter, declared Smith's government a threat to world
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peace and imposed specific mandatory economic sanctions. Again
in the spring of 1968 the Security Council invoked Chapter VII
in setting more stringent mandatory sanctions. The US, UK,
and others have implemented the successive UN resolutions by
their own declarations. Despite increasing pressure from sanctions
and ostracism from the world community, white Rhodesia with the
connivance of Portugal and South Africa has survived by import
substitution and clandestine trade. Until the last few weeks,
the prospects for any settlement, or even any meaningful
negotiations appeared exceedingly bleak.
II. Recent Developments
3. Most of the recent moves in the direction of a
settlement have been initiated by Wilson. He arranged the
constitutional talks with Smith aboard HMS Fearless in Gibraltar
Harbor in early October, and offered a more generous package
than any presented previously. Wilson has long since dropped
NIBMAR, if indeed he ever really believed he could bring it off.
Nor is he now talking as he did in 1966 of imposing au interim
British rule in Salisbury while arranging the terms of a multi-
racial constitution. Rather the current exchanges are keyed to
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ways of *testowing legitimacy on the Smith government without
actually violating the terms of the Six Principles which were
announced as minimum British demands before Rhodesian
indep-;; ndence .
4. We do not comprehend why Wilson at. this time is pushing
tow,