SOUTH VIETNAM, SEPTEMBER 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500050022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

SECRET
Approved Fef Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B0
SOUTH VIETNAM, SEPTEMBER 1974
- I was in Vietnam ten days. In addition to discussions in Saigon
I visited and talked with Vietnamese and U.S. officials in Can Tho, Chau
Doc, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Kontum, Qui Nhon, Danang, Hue, Huong Dien, Chu Lai,
and Quang Ngai.
- Among the Vietnamese the atmosphere can be described as one of grim
realism and concern.
- The grim realism was a reflection of their recognition that they
must make do with levels of military aid which they believe represents less
than their essential needs.
- Their concern is a concern for the future when faced with the next
all-out NVA offensive, an offensive which the RUN is certain will come.
Their only question is when.
- There are an almost endless number of questions which may be asked
about Vietnam's present condition and future prospects. I tried to focus
on a handful of them which I feel are the crucial issues.
- The state of the RVNAF. The state of the armed forces is essentially
sound. It is unlikel that it has ever been better.
- It has demonstrated flexibility of response and the employment of
new tactics during the heavy fighting of this summer and early fall.
- In talking with commanders one obtains straightforward, non-equivocal
responses to hard military questions which reflects that they are on top of
the situation.
- More surprisingly, RVNAF commanders provided frank criticism of. the
shortcomings of some of their less effective combat units.
- As to the concerns of the military leaders, not one commander I
queried expressed serious concern over problems of maintenance and spare
parts. Their principal military worries related to the availahil;ty of
ordnance, POL, and the nW mbPr of halicc ter tiour-s allotted them.
- Their other overriding concern was t_imoact gf inflation upon
their soldiers. General Lahn of the RUN Marine Corps expressed it quite
succinctly. The price of a daily ration of rice plus one egg equals a
Marine private's salary. In consequence, General Lahn encourages his
troops to write home for vitamin supplements.
--- In sum, while not dismissing the fact that there are both
strong and weak outfits in the regular armed forces, on balance, the
RVNAF is;.sound.
Approved For Release 20 P80BO1495R000500050022-1
S E C R E T
 S E C R E T
Approved For Releaae 2005/11/23 : C
- The Capability of RVNAF to Defend RVN. The RVN's regular armed
forces are the equal of the NVA/VC. By the nature of the war, i.e., RVNAF
defending SVN while the NVA/VC select the targets to be attacked, the Com-
munists will continue to experience local headline-catching successes.
However, these initial successes will be rectified by RVNAF counteractions.
An example of the kind of action and response which can be expected in the
future was seen in the recent military operations in Quang Nam where this
type of scenario was played out.
- There is one qualifier to this assessment of the South Vietnam reg-
ular forces. Hanoi retains six divisions in North Vietnam. Should they be
deployed to South Vietnam, it is unlikely that the RVNAF will be able to
contain them Without U.S. air support.
- The State of the Regional and Po
ular F
Th
p
orces.
nnditin of -the
RF and PF ro ram is de lorabl The concept simply is not
etti
ff
h
g
ng o
t
e
grown i a few notab e exceptions
the RF and PF
,
are not willing or
able to resist the encroachments of either regular or guerrilla forces.
- The effectiveness of the RF/PF program is crucial to the future of
RUN. There is no way that the handful of RVNAF divisions can maintain
order and stability in South Vietnam without a rigorous RF/PF to control
the countryside and suppress local insurgent efforts.
- Breathing new life into the RF/PF program must be one of the GVN's
highest priorities. The GVN is aware of the problem and some pilot pro-
grams to put more fibre into the RF are being undertaken. Examples of this
are General Nhuts' (2d ARVN division) plan to integrate an RF regiment with-
in his division and General Lahn's (Marine Division) interspersing RF ele-
ments among his Marine units to give the former more fibre.
- But these are "quick fixes." The RF/PF program needs much more than
- Will Hanoi Conduct a Major Offensive in 1975
f
h
o
t
e Same or Greater
Intensity than 1968/1972? Arm-chair strategists take various positions on
this question. That element of the RVNAF mil itar__leaders-hio located
closest to the point of the sword shrug their s ou ers and say they sib
don't know.
- This is not a reflection of their disinterest in the question. Rath-
er, it is a measure of their realism.
- In effect what they are saying is that they know what the Communists'
military capability is -- they can commence their offensive tomorrow. How-
ever, they are unable to answer the questions concerning intentions because
the indicators are not yet present.
- My judgement is that Hanoi has not yet made up its mind. The pur-
pose of the Communist attacks of the past three months has been to test and
attrite the RVNAF.
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2005/11/2 : CIA-RDP80BO 495R000500050022-1
 RR FF 25X1
Approved For Release 200k/11/Z3T IA-RDP80B01495R000500050022-1
Based upon their after-action analysis of these battles, the North
Vietnamese will make their decision.
- Conservatism has long been a hallmark of the NVA. Considering the
outlook of the Super Powers, it is unlikely that Hanoi will undertake its
next big offensive until it has a high degree of confidence in its success.
Thus, the. strength (or lack thereof) of the RVN response to the Communists'
summer-fall operations will weigh heavily in the coming decision by Hanoi.
- What Will be the Ke Intelli
ence Indicators Which Will Signal
Hanoi's Decision to 0 t for a "Ri War" Strate ? The consensus judgement
is that there will be two crucial indicators. These are: (a) detection
of the southward movement of the North Vietnam's strategic reserve divisions;
and (b) a shift in the objectives of COSVN as expressed in its directives
and resolutions to its cadre in South Vietnam.
- Will the U.S. Intelli ence Communit be Able to Give Forewarning of
Hanoi's Intention to Shift to a "Bi War" Stra_ om? My judgement is 25X1
very probably --_yes. 25X1
Vietnam and Thailanc j?s both in
- The one Alin erin dQ express
genc ed by several members of the intelli-
e community concerne i IS initi the forces already in in South Vietnam and movinglt11'' o
heireL-nsive strategichre-
ININ s e on a e en ive had commenced. Thus, the indicator consider-
ed to be crucial, i.e., movement of Hanoi's strategic reserve, would no
longer have significance.
- My judgement is that while this represents a NVA capability, it is a
course of action that Hanoi is unlikely to pursue. It still takes 21 days
to move a division-size force from NVN to RVN's NR-3 without any interdic-
tion of LOCs. The NVA would run a grave risk of failing to meet its time-
table if it opted for such a course of action.
- Conrarnin
and laps, the likelihood e1
f
munists must prepare their cadre in advance of
arplanned1offensive.rheSuf-
ficient time must transpire to insure that instructions are passed from
COSVN to the district, village and hamlet cadre.. I judge that the time re-
quired to accomplish this will give us adequate warning time.
25X1
Approved For Re"eC2005/171/24 : CIA-RDP8013011495R000500050022-1
 Approved For Releae 2005/11/23 : OIA-RDP80B01495R000500050022-1 I
- What Will be the Outcome Should Hanoi Opt for a Major Offensive in
1975? Given the assumptions that the North Vietnamese 0111 employ their
strategic reserve and that the United States will not provide air support,
the outcome of such an offensive for the Republic of Vietnam will be grave.
As a minimum, I would expect the loss of the balance of Quang Tri and Thua
Thien Provinces in MR 1, Kontum, Pleiku and most of Binh Dinh in MR 2, Tay
Ninh and the northern tier provinces of MR 3, and a sharp reduction in ter-
ritory and population control in the Delta.
- What is the Condition of RVN's Economy and How Crucial is the Problem? It is easy to paint a bleak picture of South Vietnams
economy. Inflation continues to run at high annual rates. Unemployment
in urban areas is a serious problem. Various efforts to initiate new busi-
nesses and industry are moving slowly (fish processing, fertilizer, sugar
mills, and milk products plants are examples). At the same time, to over-
state RVN's economic problems is to ignore the strengths of what still is
essentially a subsistence agricultural economy. In sum -- economic prob-
lems in RVN are serious but not crucial, and the military confrontation is
the key to the economic health of South Vietnam.
Approved For Rele s& 2b~5/T1/2
25X1
 S E C R E T
Approved F Release 2005/ 806014 5R000500050022-1
CAMBODIA - SEPTEMBER 1974
- The atmosphere in Cambodia in September 1974 was one of war-weari-
ness.
- While it is difficult to construct an evidential basis, one senses
a tacit acceptance by the GKR that the war is unwinnable.
- One FANK general staff officer expressed it succinctly. When quer-
ied as to who would win the war, he shrugged his shoulders and responded,
"All depends on super-powers."
- While the Cambodian war may not in fact be winnable, it is unlikely
that the war will be lost in 1975. Expressed another way, there are no
signs that the FANK will collapse.
- On the contrary, the conclusion I drew was that the FANK, is every
bit the equal of its KC adversary.
- To list the shortcomings of FANK is both a lengthy and tedious ex-
ercise. It is also not particularly germane.
- The important question to ask is, --- how effective is the FANK com
pared to the KC?
- When this comparison is made, the view of the FANK changes markedly
and perspective improves, for the KC army is no model of military efficiency.
- The KC's weaknesses have been ill ted very clearly during'the
fighting of the past year. Their princi le ailures are four:
- inability to conduct effective operations above the battalion
level.
inability to effectively employ combined arms.
inability to sustain combat operations,
- inability to exercise adequate communications security.
- The FANK, for its part, has had few successes and its offensive
capabilities are severely limited.
- However, the FANK has been stubborn defenders as has been noted at
Kompong Cham, Kompong Seila, and in the environs of Phnom Penh.
- Concerning FANK morale, no one will tell you it's good. The over-
riding problem is, of course, the inflationary spiral. The FANK soldier
and officer simply cannot make ends meet. This results in the selling of
HKI
Approved F Sr Release E 2T005111113 m P80B01495R000500050022-1
 S E C R E T
...~... 251"
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-r DP80BO1495R000500050022-1
military equipment, weapons, MOGAS and AVGAS, "flower" soldiers,
soldiers -- even the selling of close air support sorties. "phantom"
lack - However, KCthmorale no means sky-high.,, Frustrated by their.
of any difficulty maintaining tight controltoverbtheerank are file. increasing /
- On balance, FANK will lose individual battles, make much publicized
mistakes, but so long as there is no major influx of North Vietnamese men
and material it will continue to be a match for the KC.
- The question -- "Will there be a "big" offensive in Cambodia in
1975? -- was repeatedly posed.
- It is characteristic of today's Cambodian environment that there has
been only limited consideration of that question made by U.S.
.
in Cambodia representatives
- As was the case in the story of "Peter and the Dike," they are much
too interested in keeping their fingers in the worst holes to worry about
whether there will be a tidal wave a few months hence.
- Generally speaking, however, it seems that a "big" war in 1975 in
Cambodia is unlikely.
- Hanoi continues to call the tune in Indo-China. For a number
of
reasons, it is not in North Vietnam's best interests to terminate the war
in Cambodia. Without increased support by Hanoi the KC cannot overwhelm
the GKR.
- However, there is much concern within the Phnom Penh based U.S. com-
munity concerning the adverse effects upon the GKR of an unfavorable vote
in the UN..
- They view the UN issue with much greater alarm than the Washington
intelligence community. Some consider an ousting of the GKR from the UN
will be the straw that will break the GKR's back.
- As was alluded to earlier, another problem is inflation. There is
hope that regardless of the initial upset which the increases in the price
of rice and POL in conjunction with the doubling of military and civil serv-
ice salaries have brought to Cambodia that in the longer run these measures
will help.
- However, there are few economists who view it as anything more than
a stopgap measure to hold things together.
- U.S. Political analysts see that the time is ripe for reopening se-
rious negotiations. They argue that the FANK/GKR plight will likely be-
come worse rather than better in the coming year.
Approved For Release 2005/1T1/2
25X1
 S E C R E T
Approved For Relevae 2005/11/23: CIAl
- The stumbling block to negotiations continues to be the same --
who or what group would represent an acceptable team of FANK/GRUNK -
GKR/FANK negotiators, i.e., without Lon Nol and Khieu Samphan?
- In sum and as usual, the view from Phnom Penh continues to be
very serious. There is every likelihood, however, that the GKR will
last through 1975. However, few analysts believe that in the long term
time is on the GKR's side.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release Z0P05Ft11T/2 : CIA-RDP8 BB 1495R000500050022-1
 S E C R E T
D
Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01~4
THAILAND - SEPTEMBER 1974
- The atmosphere in Thailand is one of r1ervous uncertainty. V
- The nervousness is engendered by the present Thai government's com-
mitment to "the experiment in democracy." No one is quite sure how it will
turn out.
- Among the U.S. community there is definitely a split vote on its out-
come. Some believe Thailand will stumble forward into some form of parlia-
mentary democracy. Others are confident that it will lapse into the more
traditional form of Thai leadership of the past forty years -- a quasi-
.military dictatorship.
- By and large, the old hands see little likelihood that the experi-
ment will be truly successful. Among younger heads there is more expression
of belief that there is a reasonable chance of success..
- All agree, however, that the October 1973 student revolt which led
to the Thanom/Praphat outster was no momentary aberration. It was a real
Thai historical watershed.
- One of the principal questions raised concerns the sincerity with
which the RTA supports the Sanya government.
- Clearly the single most powerful element in Thai society, without
the army's support the Thai government cannot function.
- To date, KRIT SIWARA has supported both the king and the Sanya gov-
ernment. Whether he will continue to do so depends on several "ifs" the
principal ones being
- if the Thais are.able to put together a constitution in a
reasonable amount of time.
- if the Thais are able to form a reasonably responsible and
responsive Parliament.
- if the new Thai Parliament acts with restraint towards the
military, i.e., does not endanger the latter's perquisites and po-
sitions within the corporate structure of Thailand.
- Regardless of the government's success or failure in responding
to these "ifs, Thailand is embarked on a new course.
- While the military may, and likely will, exercise more overt con-
trol than it does today, things will never go back to the Phibun, Sarit,
Thanom type leadership.
20 Approved F Sr Release
C R E T 05111113 m Ch 0B01495R000500050022-1
E
25X1
25X1
25X1
 S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RnPRnRniaa-f;Rnnn-f;nnn-f;nn77-i
- In the very near term, there is a good deal of concern over the com-
ing 14 October ceremonies -- marking the first anniversary of the student
revolt, the cremation of the martyrs of that struggle will take place at
the end of a three day national student holiday. Students from all over
Thailand are expected to converge on Bangkok.
- Elaborate security measures are being taken by the army and police
to monitor these ceremonies. However, most important is the fact that the
King is expected to attend them. Due to the reverence with which monarch
is held by all Thais, his presence will likely go far in keeping the situ-
ation in hand.
- Still, the potential for violence is clearly there. The students
have had a taste of power and it is pretty heady stuff.
- The insertion of 18 year old right to vote clause in the new draft
of the Constitution by means of street demonstrations needs heeding. It
is the likely harbinger of more to come.
- No one can tell what will happen on the fourteenth of October.
Given the numbers involved, there is every likelihood of disorder. The
question is less if there will be disorder but of its scope and intensity.
- The police, of course, would be the most likely target. Bearing the
principal blame for the deaths of last October, at least in the eyes of the
students, this is where the spark may touch the tinderbox.
- While the presence of U.S. forces on Thai soil is not a crucial prob-
lem to Thailand, the political attractiveness of the issue for dissident
elements is almost irresistible.
- For this reason the likelihood that it will become an important prob-
lem for United States foreign policy makers in the next few months is great.
- We have long counted upon the essential conservatism of the Thai rul-
ing elite to insure support for continued U.S. military presence on Thai
soil. It would be unwise to bank on this too strongly in the future.
ment toASEAmongisthfade the gi nothig judgement that U.S. commit-
likely to fight those elements in Thailand who wishathemU.S. mili~tal
rss
pres-
ence to disappear. y p- At the same time the Thai leadership recognizes the continuing dang-
er which the PRC represents, regardless of the present atmosphere of detente.
And on the short term, they recognize the danger implicit from NVN if the
latter can establish hegemony over all of Indo-China.
- What the Thais really would like is the best of both worlds. They
would like assurance that the U.S. would defend them but that this defense
would somehow take place from somewhere other than Thailand --- from Indo-
nesia or the.Philippines for instance.
Approved For Release 2609/1T1/23 : CIA-RDP8001495R000500050022-1
25X1
 S E C R E T
Approved For Rele p 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1495R000500050022-1
lliw
- These varying factors related to our military presence in Thailand
lead this viewer to one conclusion. If the United States fails to force
the Thais to focus on the problem, i.e.,.to determine what they really
want for their future, a decision may be reached on the basis of expedi-
ency driven by internal Thai politics which may not be in that country's
best interests.
- Making public a U.S. decision to withdraw our forces from Thailand
at a specific but not precipitous rate would likely best define this po-
litical issue for Thailand.
In this regard there is wisdom in the view of the former West Point
and Yale football coach Herman Hickman who once said -- the mark of a suc-
cessful coach is one who, when being run out of town by a mob, makes it
appear that he is leading a victory parade.
- The Communists' insurgency in the north, northeast and south, is
one of the least electric issues in Thailand.
- Yes, there is an insurgency. Yes, some increase in the numbers of
insurgents and the incident rate is observable. And no, it is not viewed
as an important problem by the Thais.
- I am persuaded that the Thai view is correct. In the north the
principal issue is an ethnic rather than a ideological one - not dissimilar
to South Vietnam's inability to cope with their Montagnards. Land control
among the Meos and the Thais is far more important than Communism. In the
south it is primarily an ethnic and social problem of Muslim/Malay conflict
with the Buddhist/Thai. In the Northeast, the issue is poverty and neglect
by the central government. In all three cases there is little likelihood
that the problems which feed the insurgency will go away..
- On the other hand, given the levels of support that Hanoi and Peking
are providing, it is unlikely that the problem will magnify in the next few
years.
V - Two almost diametrically opposed views of the Thai economy have been
presented.
- One reflects a pessimistic view of these facts: (a) Thailand is for
the first time about to feel the effect of their population explosion; (b)
new arable land is almost gone; (c) the Thai farmer employs the least ef-
ficient agricultural practices in all SE Asia; (d) the timber industry is
declining; and (e) there is expanding expectations among urban workers for
advancement of their quality of life which continue to be unfulfilled.
- That Thailand has economic problems is undeniable, but it is a rare
corner of the globe which does not have its share of economic difficulties
in 1974.
- However, the key judgement is the Thai economy is basically sound.
Most important, it is capable of resolving most if not all of the problems
25X1
Approved For Relea?eE2q,0,W1g/~3I: CIA-RDP80BO1195R000500050022-1 .. 25X1
 Approved For ReleWe 2005/11/237 CI41-RDP801301495R000500050022-1 I 25X1
set forth above. As one measure of its basic strength, Thailand has in-
creased its level of foreign reserves in a year in which it had to meet
the costs of a tripling of the prices of their essential fuels.
- The degree of economic upset in Thailand next year will be more
apparent than real.
- The next year will.likely see continued economic unrest in Thailand.
It will center about demands being made by urban workers who for the first
time have become aware of the benefits of united action.
- In summary, whatever the uncertainties are concerning the future, it
is clear that October 1973 made certain Thailand would never be quite the
same again.
- The coming year will continue to reflect the nervous uncertainties
growing out of that event. There will be more disturbances in the coming
year, more conflict between the Establishment and those who would wish to
move perhaps too far and too fast in the experiment in democracy.
- However, the Thais remain an essentially conservative people. In
all likelihood September 1975 will find Thailand's economic and political
situation not much different than it is today. The military will likely
wield somewhat more power than they do now and there may be a substantially
reduced U.S. presence.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 :I CIA-RDP80B0~495R000500050022-1 25X1
S E C R E T
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000500050022-1
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000500050022-1