STATUS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500180009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 3, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
OFF, CE OF THE Approved OF Re2eW % :IA-RDP
DATE: June 3, 1974
TO: The Director
FROM:
SUBJECT: Status of North Vietnamese Forces in Laos
Attached per your request is a memorandum
on the status of North Vietnamese forces in
Laos and the reasons why Hanoi has not with-
drawn its troops in accordance with the Lao
peace agreement.
The basic inputs to the memorandum were
prepared by OER and OCI and coordinated
within the Agency.
B. E.. Layton
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Southeast Asia
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 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
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June 3, 1974
Status of North Vietnamese Forces in Laos
during which all remaining foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Laos.
Since early April, all U.S. and Thai forces have withdrawn, but less than
24 hours before the June 4th deadline, North Vietnamese troops on Laotian
soil number an estimated 47,000*, more than three-fourths of which are
located in southern Laos (see table below). Of the total, 18,000 are
combat troops -- including those in 6 infantry, regiments -- and about
1. The Laos Provisional Government of National Union was established
on April 5th, 1974, marking the beginning of the stipulated 60 day period
29,000--are logistics.: personnel
Order of Battle of North Vietnamese Forces
iii - Laos
ADMIN
SERVICES 29
* Includes personnel in antiaircraft units.
* Since the February 1973 Laotian cease-fire our knowledge of Communist
forces in Laos has steadily deteriorated. The volume of all source
intelligence has dropped off significantly and as a result, we no longer
have a timely and complete picture of Communist forces in Laos. Thus, it
is possible that some North Vietnamese units may have withdrawn undetected.
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South Laos
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2 At the time of the Laos cease-fire, Hanoi had some 83,000
troops stationed in Laos, with most (61,000) committed to the protection
and support of the North Vietnamese logistics system in the Panhandle.
Since then, about 36,000 North Vietnamese military personnel have with-
drawn from Laos to North Vietnam or to Communist strongholds in South
Vietnam, reducing the strength of both combat and administrative services
personnel by more than 40 percent. These withdrawals included the entire
316th Infantry Division from northern Laos, three infantry and nine
antiaircraft regiments rom the panhandle as well as 17,000 engineer
and other logistics personnel.
a permanent basis. Nevertheless, in the next month or so the Communists
probably will temporarily withdraw additional rear services.troops from.
the-Laotian Panhandle as the rainy s!asoa takes full effact and logistic
activity is-reduced
3. There have been tenuous indications that other North Vietnamese
logistic units in northern Laos may he withdrawing, but the moves could
be part of a traditional rainy season drawdown. In southern Laos, there
has been no recent evidence of impending North Vietnamese withdrawals on
n any event, Hanoi probably will maintain a sizable military
revealed North Vietnamese troops in the province will be permanently
stationed there -- disguised as Pathet Lao (PL). In southern Laos, the
logistic corridor is still an integral part of overall North Vietnamese
capability to support their forces in South Vietnam, and it is almost
certain that Hanoi will not abandon it. The continued maintenance of
this system will require a large, permanent manpower commitment.
Yhy the North Vietnamese Remain in Laos
5. There are several reasons for Hanoi's determination to keep
substantial numbers of its troops in Laos. The bulk of the North Vietnamese
forces serve to support the Communist effort against South Vietnam -- Hanoi's
number one priority in Indochina. Hanoi has spent the past year assiduously
improving its road and infiltration system in the Lao panhandle, and there
is little likelihood of Hanoi abandoning this area as long as the fighting
continues in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
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6:, In northern Laos, the North Vietnamese presence enables Hanoi
to exercise considerably influence over the PL. It also serves as a
hedge against potential rightist military moves against the areas controlled
by the PL or the new coalition government-itself. Hanoi evidently plans
to continue training, advising, and to some extent logistically supporting
the PL until the North Vietnamese are convinced that. their Lao clients
can hold their own against the Lao Army and do reasonably well in future
general elections.
7. For their part, the PL have shown no interest in having the North
Vietnamese leave. For the time being, at least, a continued North Viet-
namese presence is probably welcomed by the PL as protection for their
political and military interests in the new coalition government.
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