ENEMY STRENGTHS AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS IN SVN (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200160003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 17, 1966
• Content Type: MF

SECRET t O FQ "~EiGN D;SS&MM
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DEFENSE, INTEi_.LIGE i\]CE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
C 0 P Y 17 November 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS) ATTENTION: COL MOORE.
SUBJECT: Enemy Strengths and Logistical Requirements in SVN (U)
1. (S/NFD) This is in reply to your requests of 4 and 8 November 1965,
that an estimate be made to determine the size, composition, and logis-
tical requirements of enemy forces remaining in South Vietnam if the
following were withdrawn:
a. All NVA Regulars.
b. All North Vietnamese infiltrators who have been integrated into
Main Force VC units.
c. All South Vietnamese who have gone to North Vietnam for training
.then returned to South Vietnam and integrated into NVA units and Main
Force VC units.
d. All South Vietnamese who have gone to North Vietnam for training
and returned to South Vietnam and integrated in non-military roles in
the VC infrastructure and NLF.
2. (C) The total current strength of VC/NVA forces in SVN is reported
by MACV as follows (figures include the strengths of confirmed/probable
and possible units):
VC Combat Personnel in units: 62,955
.NVA Combat Personnel in units: 45,630
VC Irregulars:
100 - 120,000
Admin Support: 18 - 19,000
Political/Military Cadre: 40,000
TOTAL 265,335 - 287,585
DIA review(s) completed.
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3. (C) Since 1959, over 118,000 infiltrators are accepted as having
entered SVN. This figure is considered conservative. Prior to mid-
1964 the vast majority of infiltrators are considered to have been
former Viet Minh or returnees. How many of these returnees remain
in VC regular or irregular units is not known but it is logical to
assume that many of them hold positions of leadership. Others have
been killed, rendered medically unfit, discharged because of age or
are serving the Viet Cong in Admin Support or Political/Military
Cadre rolls. A few may have gone back to NVN and some have defected
and deserted. Losses among the ranks of the returnees have taken
place due to a variety of reasons not necessarily directly a result
of the fighting.. These losses as well as combat losses cannot be
established with any degree of confidence. Thus no reliable figures
for the number of returnees now in SVN can be determined.
4. (S/NFD) Since we have no reliable fix on the number of Viet Cong
returnees to South Vietnam and since no evidence exists to indicate
how many of them are still present in the Viet Cong organization,
estimates of these personnel strengths are based on an analytical
judgement and can only be regarded as approximations. It appears
logical, however, that from 20 to 30 per cent of VC in Main Force
units are returnees. It is'also felt that some 80-85 per cent of
the Political/Military and perhaps 60-65 per cent of the Admin Sup-
port troops are hard core Viet Cong or North Vietnamese who, under
the criteria., of this paper, would be candidates for withdrawal.
It is likely, however, that the Communists would find a way to dis-
perse many, if not most, of these troops within the remaining Viet
Cong Main Force units and irregular forces or among the population
to permit them to continue the insurgency.
5. (S) The number of NVA personnel who have infiltrated into SVN. as
cadre and filler/replacements for VC or NVA units is not known. These
people initially provided some of the leadership and key personnel
for the VC organization. Since 1964, when the number of NVA initially
became more plentiful, they have provided fillers and replacements
for both VC and NVA units, probably filling the ranks of VC units in
the northern provinces of SVN where manpower is scarce to a greater
extent than in the south. Conversely, VC recruits have helped fill
the ranks of NVA units and there has been a great deal of such inte-
gration in Communist units operating in the northern provinces. If
all NVA troops were withdrawn, the ranks of VC units in the northern
provinces would diminish somewhat, but to what extent cannot be judged
and the effect would vary with the unit involved. Undoubtedly the com-
bat effectiveness of each VC unit involved would diminish for a period,
but if a return to small unit actions were to take place along with a
decentralization of the VC command and control system, the need for
NVA fillers might also diminish. It is conservatively estimated that
some 10-15 per cent of VC unit strengths are NVA infiltrators, most of
whom are replacements in VC units in the I and II Corps.areas.
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6. (S/NFD) 11ACV presently holds VC irregular strength at between
100,000 and 120,000 personnel. This figure is considered by MACV as
conservative and studies are underway which may raise the total to
200,000 or more. Current CIA studies indicate that Communist irre-
gular strength in South Vietnam might be from 250,000 to 300,000.
Undoubtedly, some of the leadership of the irregular force is pro-
vided by the returnees who literally came back to their homes in the south when they infiltrated. How many of the returnees are in
the irregular forces is not known, but among the active Leadership,
they are conservatively estimated at 10-15 per cent. Many of these
have families settled within guerrilla areas. The Communists would
almost certainly leave behind the majority of guerrilla leaders who
are returnees to pursue the war as insurgents. For the purpose of
this paper, however, this group will be considered as candidates for
withdrawal.
7. (S/NFD) If the assumptions in previous paragraphs are applied to
present strength figures the following would result:
a. Returnees presently serving in VC combat units - 12,591 - 18,887
(62,955 x 207 - 30%)
b. Returnees and NVA serving as Admin Support Personnel - 11,000 - 12,025
(18,500 x 607 - 65%)
C. Returnees and NVA serving as Political/Military - 32,000 - 34,000
.Cadre (40,000 x 80% - 85%)
d. Returnees serving in VC irregular forces - 11,000 - 16,500
(110,000 x 107 - 15%)
e. NVA infiltrat:ors serving in VC units 6,296 -___9_,4/42__
2955
1
x
07 - .15%) ,
Total returnees and NVA to be withdrawn
Total in NVA units to be withdrawn
Total to be withdrawn
72,887 - 90,852
45,630- 45,630
118,517 136,482
8. (S/NFD) The total number of enemy personnel remaining in SVN under
the conditions expressed in paragraph I is estimated at between 147,000
and 170,000, including irregulars. This number would probably be fur-
ther reduced by surrenders and desertions related to the withdrawal.
The ratio of RVN troops to VC would be approximately 4.5 to 1, a situa-
tion which would still tend to favor the guerrilla tactics of the Viet
Cong. Thus, the VC forces could be expected to place more emphasis on
small unit actions which would chip away at government forces and
terrorize the people under government control.
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9. (S) The logistic. requirements of the VC under the conditions des-
cribed would be considerably reduced. It is estimated that, at roughly
present levels of combat, approximately 6 to 9 STPD would be required
from outside sources to sustain remaining VC Main Force Units (probably
some 40,000 to 45,000 personnel).
10. (S) MACV estimates that Viet Cong recruitment in SVN numbers some
3,500 per month. It is generally agreed by the Intelligence Community
that the VC have been capable of recruiting or conscripting enough men
to replace their losses and add steadily to their strength. It is also
agreed that the VC/NVA have the current capability of recruiting and
training from 7,000 to 10,000 men a month in South Vietnam. There is,
however, no information available which accurately assesses the number
of men recruited and undoubtedly this figure has changed considerably
through the years. As the need for replacements is increased, the VC
capability to provide them will probably be severely taxed and infil-
tration will either have to increase or the VC will have to scale down
their military effort.
BURTON R. BROWN
Brigadier Genoral, USA
.Deputy Dirdctor for
Intelligence Prcd:Nctio;f .%
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