THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE'S NON-COMMUNIST LABOR UNIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100080003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 August 1963
OCI No._0291/63B
Copy No. 77
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE'S NON-COMMUNIST LABOR UNIONS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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2 August 1963
France's two major non-Communist labor confed-
erations are working toward closer cooperation, but
a merger is unlikely. By working together they hope
to increase their ability to cope with possible gov-
ernment attempts to dominate the labor field as well
as to combat the Communist-led labor confederation's
effort to win control of the non-Communist unions
through an intensive campaign for labor unity. Never-
theless, Communist overtures for joint action will
probably be increasingly successful, especially if
the government follows up its mid-July antistrike
legislation by further moves to weaken the unions.
Relations With the Government
Both the Socialist-oriented
Workers' Force (Force Ouvriere
--FO) and the Roman Catholic-
oriented Christian Workers'
Confederation (CFTC) are uneasy
over the possibility that the
De Gaulle government may be
planning to weaken the unions
and reduce their role in col-
lective bargaining. Under the
Fourth Republic, these unions
had established relations with
political parties, parliamen-
tarians, and ministers on a
special-interest or pressure-
group basis. In the Fifth Re-
public, Parliament is no longer
the key political factor and
hence is unable to fulfill its
old function of protecting the
special interests of important
elements in the community.
Thus the importance of extra-
parliamentary pressure groups
like the farmers' associations
and the trade unions is poten-
tially greater. In practice,
however, the unions have had
great difficulty in making their
influence felt.
but a rumor current then al-
leged that De Gaulle would sub-
sequently use the strike as a
pretext to curtail the unions'
power. His long-term intention
was said to be the replacement
of existing labor organizations
with a syndical movement as-
sociated with the Gaullist
Union for the New Republic,
thus preventing organized labor
from emerging as a major force
capable of influencing decisions
when he disappears from the scene.
The specific policy which
the government intends to pur-
sue vis-a-vis the unions is
not clear. While De Gaulle
might envisage reforms which
more closely associate the unions
with the government, there is
no firm evidence to indicate
his intention to break the power
of the unions. Labor leaders
are concerned, however, about
the possible integration of the
unions into the machinery of the
state, the implications of eco-
nomic planning for the labor move-
ment, and government domination
of wage policy and collective
bargaining.
Labor showed its strength
during the spring coal strike,
A government-sponsored
bill to regulate wildcat strikes
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FRANCE'S MAJOR LABOR CQNFEUERATI(INS
% OF VOTE IN 1902
?
MAJOR UNIONS
FOUNDED
ESTIMATED
MEMBERSHIP
ORIENTATION
CON ENTRATION
SOCIAL SECURITY
EI EC~IO S
,SECRET 4R I?RAL
General Labor
i ctnfederatian (CGT}
1093
1,000,000
Communist
Basic industries
44.E
Bonott Ftoc}ion
Wgrkers'Force
{CGT-F4}*
1447
450,000
Socialist
Civil Service,
w7
Robe t Bathereau
CT7r tt{9~ 1Norkert`
White Collar
Confederatissn {CFTC
1919
430,000
Catholic
Basic Industries
20,9 =
Eugene Dessdmps
'*elca away from the COT in protest against growing domination of that SECRET
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in the public services was given
its third and final vote in the
National Assembly last week.
Labor leaders regard the bill,
which requires a 5-day notice
prior to striking and loss of
pay for strikers, as a basic
attack on the right to strike
and have said they will "chal-
lenge" the government on it in
September. The extent to which
the non-Communist unions co-
operate with the Communist-dom-
inated confederation in opposing
the bill at that time will de-
pend in part on how strict the
government is in enforcing the
law.
The CGT's Campaign
for Labor Unity
The Communist-dominated
General Labor Confederation
(CGT) has for years subjected
the non-Communist unions to
pressures for unity of action.
In recent months, several de-
velopments have encouraged the
CGT to intensify this campaign.
In the December 1962 social
security elections, only the
CGT registered a percentage gain
in the popular vote and an in-
crease in seats. Since only
about a fifth of those eligible
to vote in these elections be-
long to unions, the results do
not directly reflect the numer-
ical strength of the unions,
but they do confirm that in
strictly economic matters the
CGT is regarded as the most ef-
fective defender of workers'
interests.
Joint action on the labor
front was encouraged also by
the Socialist Party's tactics
of supporting Communist candi-
dates in the second round of
the November 1962 parliamentary
elections. When its June national
congress endorsed coordination
of defensive tactics with the
Communist Party, cooperation
with the Communists was given
an aura of respectability. The
Communist Party has complicated
the situation by taking the
public line that differing posi-
tions on such issues as member-
ship in the Atlantic Alliance
are not an obstacle to rapproche-
ment with the Socialists.
Perhaps the most important
development favoring the unity
campaign was the six-week coal
strike this spring, when joint
action extended as far as the
merger of strike funds. The
CGT's posture of relative moder-
ation and its willingness to cede
primary leadership to the free
unions during the strike were
designed to assure them that
its objectives were economic
and not political. Under these
conditions, the miners' success
in defying the government and
in maintaining a united front
demonstrated the benefits to
be derived from labor unity.
At its national congress
in May, the CGT made an out-
right appeal for a single labor
organization. Its attempt to
obscure its role as a tool of
the French Communist Party,
however, was not successful.
Although membership on the CGT's
governing Confederal Bureau was
increased to provide equal rep-
resentation for the so-called
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non-Communists, it was apparent
that the bureau continued to
be dominated by the Communists.
Pressures on the FO
Much of the CGT's propa-
ganda on labor unity has been
directed primarily toward the
Workers' Force. Changes in
the CGT's tactics, coupled with
the feeling on the part of many
younger FO leaders that FO's
present position is both rigid
and stagnant, have made the
FO more susceptible than for-
merly to the CGT appeal. This
is especially true at the local
level and among the younger
workers, who are little con-
cerned about ideological issues
but very concerned about the
need for a united front to ob-
tain labor's economic demands.
A growing number of middle-
level FO leaders are also
tempted to cooperate with the
CGT.
The CGT's success in ap-
pealing to these elements is
apparent in the "unity" reso-
lution adopted in January by the
FO's General Union of Government
Employees, the backbone of FO's
membership. Although this call
for reunification was qualified
by references to respect for the
principles of democracy and for
"divergent tendencies," it has
provided the CGT with ammunition
for its propaganda barrage aimed
at the FO as a whole. Informal
meetings between the FO's govern-
ment employees' union and the
CGT are reported to have taken
place following the resolution.
The majority in the FO,
including most of the younger
national leaders, remain firmly
anti-Communist. These leaders
are dissatisfied with FO's present
status, however, and seek to
reorganize it, drawing closer
to the CFTC as a counterweight
to the CGT. They realize FO
might lose ground to the CFTC
once the CFTC broadens its ap-
peal by dropping religious
references from its title and
statutes. FO leaders hope to
soften the traditional competi-
tion between the two unions and
obtain a close working arrange-
ment with the CFTC before this
change occurs.
FO Secretary General
Bothereau is reported to have
stated recently that a fusion
of the FO and CFTC must take
place within two years if FO
is to avoid absorption by the
CGT and that preparations should
begin at once. He is reported
to have discussed the problems
with his CFTC counterpart in
May.
In addition to threats
from the CGT and the CFTC, FO
leaders face possible losses
to the National Educational
Federation, an independent con-
federation of teachers' unions
with 225,000 members. This
federation reportedly is at-
tempting to woo the FO govern-
ment employees into its ranks
in a grouping which includes
civil servants and teachers.
Such a merger, or sizable de-
fections of government employees
to the teachers' organization,
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could deal a damaging blow to
FO. The teachers' group has
a long record of unity of action
with the CGT and about 30 per-
cent of its membership is com-
posed of the Communist-infil-
trated teachers' unions.
When Bothereau's resigna-
tion becomes effective this
fall he is expected to be re-
placed by Andre Bergeron, who
is likely to be equally firm
in opposing CGT overtures on
labor cooperation but more
flexible in dealing with the
CFTC. If the FO continues its
present policies while the CGT
becomes more flexible and the
CFTC drops its religious con-
nections, the FO may disintegrate
--with a large segment returning
to the CGT, small elements
joining the CFTC or teachers'
federation, and the rest re-
tiring completely from union
activity.
Pressures on the CFTC
The CFTC's problems are
similar to those facing the FO:
it must determine its relation-
ship to the other non-Communist
unions and to the CGT and rec-
oncile internal minority ele-
ments. The nature of the reso-
lution of both of these problems
will depend in part on the de-
cision the CFTC reaches on
changing its name and statutes
to play down the religious af-
filiation, which offends many
anticlerical workers.
There is basic conflict
over leaving out the "Christian"
in the union title and modi-
fying the statutes to eliminate
references to the evangelical
mission of trade unions. After
much debate at the June national
congress, the CFTC directed a
commission now studying this
problem to present a report
in 1964 which would provide a
basis for resolution of the
question by January 1965. Al-
though left-wing leaders are
pushing for quicker action, the
majority in the CFTC's Confed-
eral Bureau doubts it can be
achieved before 1965.
Even if the CFTC makes
these changes, it still must
reconcile with the Socialist
confederation its differing
view on cooperating with the
Communist union. FO leaders
are hostile to the CFTC's "op-
portunistic" policy of cooper-
ation with the CGT. Although
CFTC leaders hold that political
domination of the CGT by the
French Communist Party renders
long-range cooperation impos-
sible and are wary of CGT dom-
ination of joint action, they
do not rule out cooperation on
the local level to achieve short-
term economic objectives.
The CFTC is becoming in-
creasingly concerned, however,
that the CGT's campaign for
unity of action with the FO may
succeed. CFTC leaders realize
that if the efforts of either
the CGT or the teachers' con-
federation are successful, the
CFTC will find itself isolated.
In view of this, certain ele-
ments in the CFTC leadership
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are intensifying their efforts
toward achieving some kind of
understanding and closer co-
operation with the FO.
There is a long history
of FO-CFTC antagonism to over-
come, but for the first time
a stage has now been reached
where the CFTC Confederal Bureau
majority is working toward
closer cooperation and the pro-
spective FO Confederal Bureau
under Bergeron is not expected
to be hostile to this. There
is no certainty that the CFTC
will alter its statutes and
title or that the FO would con-
sent to a merger if it did.
For the present the ties between
the two unions will probably
be limited to informal but
closer working arrangements to
achieve economic objectives.
Outlook
While there are still major
barriers to a merger of the two
non-Communist unions, there are
definite signs that their leaders
recognize a growing necessity
to work more closely with each
other in the face of the CGT
labor-unity campaign. Important
elements in both unions remain
hostile to fusion, however, and
probably only the possibility
that one or the other of the
unions would succumb to
the CGT's efforts would
hasten their reconciliation.
A merger between the Com-
munist and non-Communist unions
is only a remote possibility as
long as the CGT is openly dom-
inated by the Communist Party.
Although there has been a small
increase at the local level of
those favoring closer ties with
the CGT, the tendency has not
reached the confederal level.
Only very serious disaffection
with the government's economic
policies or an open attempt by
the government to break the
power of the unions could bring
about close relations.
There will, however, prob-
ably be increasing unity of
action among the three con-
federations on both the local
and the national level, par-
ticularly if the CGT concen-
trates its efforts for joint
action on genuine economic
issues. The extent of cooper-
ation between the free unions
and the CGT will depend in part
on whether the government can
undercut the CGT's appeal by
satisfying genuine economic
grievances among the workers.
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