THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN BOLIVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100080004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

1ease 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A004100080004-7
2 August 1963
OCI No. 0291/63C
Copy No. - - - 78
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN BOLIVIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
?~9CF~Ifi~:C~F
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS,. If marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.
9
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2 August 1963
The tense situation in Bolivia is largely an out-
growth of the approaching showdown between President
Victor Paz Estenssoro and Vice President Juan Lechin
over which is to be the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement's (MNR) presidential nominee next year.
Lechin's political power is based on Bolivia's well-
organized union movement and particularly the tin
miners' union, dominated by the far-leftists, which
is carrying out sporadic strikes to thwart President
Paz' rehabilitation plans for the mines. This may
be the result of instructions left by Lechin as he
returned to his ambassadorial post in Rome in mid-
June. Lechin probably was aware that Paz, with strong
US backing, was preparing to carry out a mine reform
program designed to weaken the ability of the mine
unions to interfere with the state mining corpora-
tion's management decisions. Furthermore, Lechin
reportedly instructed other unions to agitate for
excessively high wage increases in order to pre-
cipitate a general strike by early August. The vice
president then apparently planned to return to Bolivia
in September or October as a peacemaker, hoping to
harvest the political benefits of a settlement.
Background
The Paz regime periodically
has encountered the defiance of
ambitious and opportunistic local
political leaders backed by armed
civilian militia forces. The
civilian militia, the most im-
portant units of which are those
of the peasants and those of the
miners, has enjoyed a privileged
position in Bolivia because it
is credited with playing the
major role in the MNR defeat of
the army in the 1952 revolution.
This paved the way for the coming
to power of the present MNR re-
gime in that same year.
Units of the militia vary
considerably in size, training,
and weapons. Militia units at
the tin mines are considered
the most effective in part be-
cause of their access to ex-
plosives. The civilian militia,
with a strength of over 16,000,
is larger than the 12,000-man
army and police force of 3,500
combined, but the militia is not
a unified force. Militia weapons
generally consist of rifles and
possibly some old light machine
guns--1932-1935 Chaco War vin-
tage--which are nonetheless
serviceable.
The principal cause for
outbreaks of violence in the
past has been the desire of
individual militia leaders to
dominate provincial areas. Con-
flicts between rival peasant
leaders have frequently resulted
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Puerto
Maldonado;
Moquegua WsA-1, .
Pintados
Collaguass
Oyahue
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Metillones-
Antofagasta
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1 Dominador
GLOSSARY
lago lake
ro,rfo---------- _------ er
salar------------ salt flat
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
!i
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
BOLIVIA
-??- International boundary Selected road
National capital Railroad
*Corumba
f i
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in serious disorders in the Cocha-
bamba Valley in central Bolivia
and in the Achacachi-Coroico area
northeast of the capital of La Paz.
The principal centers of strength
for the miners' militia are the
larger tin mines of Catavi, Huanuni,
and Milluni.
Since early March 1963, Pres-
ident Paz Estenssoro has been suc-
cessful in supplanting a number of
pro-Communist or Communist peasant
leaders in the Department of La
Paz. He also has been successful
in garnering the support of some
influential leaders in the Cocha-
bamba Valley and in the eastern
Department of Santa Cruz. There
are still peasant leaders in the
rural areas, however, who are anti-
regime and probably pro-Communist,
and who have a potential for dis-
ruptive actions against the gov-
ernment. The pro-Paz leadership
of the National Peasant Organiza-
tion, which claims to represent
all Bolivian peasant groups, is a
force which has been used by the
government to carry out its campaign
against the extremist peasant lead-
ers. This organization augumented
by government security forces is suf -
Ificient to preserve relative order
and foster proregime sentiment
in the rural areas.
Current Developments
The miners' militia, espe-
cially the armed miners at Catavi,
is the single --most important threat
to the stability of the government
at this time. The Catavi miners
are led by two Communist-Trotsky-
ists, Federico Escobar and Ireneo
Piment 1. A report reparedE
In October
1962 places the strength of the
Catavi militia at over 2,000.
The leaders at Catava and at the
other nationalized mines in Bo-
livia are focusing their militant
opposition on the government's
desire to carry out mining re-
forms to end the uneconomic oper-
ations in the mines in accordance
with the recommendations of the
Triangular Plan.
The Triangular Plan is a joint
undertaking by the US, West Germany,
and the Inter-American Development
Bank to rehabilitate Bolivia's tin
mines. The goal is to strengthen
Bolivia's economy by decreasing
the state mining corporation's
high costs and increasing the
government's foreign exchange
earnings, thereby making economic
diversification more feasible.
The Plan has been a main target
for Communist opposition, be-
cause its success probably could
lead to a large measure of growth
and stabilization of the Bolivian
economy.
Work continues only sporadi-
cally at Catavi, the country's
largest tin mine. Locals of the
Lechinist, pro-Communist-led Fac-
tory Workers' Union have struck
in Cochabamba and at a key flour
factory in La Paz. The army has
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been placed o
he Boliv-
1-1111 rnm n it neces-
sary to request US Special Forces
assistance in order to maintain
internal security. He indicated
that this might be necessary if
open conflict breaks out between
the miners' militia and government
forces. No further mention of
this matter has been made, however,
by any Bolivian military or govern-
ment official.
Unless the negotiations be-
tween the miners' union and the
state mining corporation (Comibol)
arrive at an "adequate solution"
to the mine rehabilitation problem,
the union threatens to call a gen-
eral strike in all the Bolivian
tin mines. Because of the political
loyalty to Lechin of most of the
unions in Bolivia, many of which
are led by Communists or extreme
leftists, such a strike could
spread to other industries. In
addition, those peasant groups
whose leaders are still of an ex-
tremist inclination could possibly
be expected to join in the general
strike.
The unrest at Catavi is likely
to come to a head in early August.
The government reportedly has sent
some 200 agents to the mining area
with instructions to "get rid of"
the Communist union leaders. This
and other government moves could
provoke violent reactions from the
miners. Violence may also result
if the miners' militia acts on its
threat to publicize its cause by
a demonstration procession to La
Paz.
The government's current se-
curity measures are apparently de-
signed to isolate the key area of
Catavi. The agents sent to the
Catavi area are to try to prevent
a march on La Paz. If violence -
breaks out at Catavi, Paz may send
regular security forces or possibly
army troops, and may declare a
national state of siege.
The government probably will
be successful in preventing a march
on the capital, and the rather iso-
lated miners' militias probably
will be kept from joining forces
among themselves and with such out-
side forces as sympathetic peasant
groups. If the government can
"seal off" crucial areas such as
Catavi, the withdrawal of wages
and the stopping of normal Comibol
supplies to the local mine com-
missaries will probably be suffi-
cient to bring the miners to a point
of capitulation. Nevertheless, the
situation is such that an open con-
flict between the miners' militia
and government forces could be
touched off should an incident de-
velop to sufficiently inflame the
miners. (SECRET)
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