FRANCE'S AFRICAN PROTEGES GROWING MORE RESTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500030003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

12 June 1964
OCI No. 0335/64B
Copy No. - 54
SPECIAL REPORT
FRANCE S AFRICAN PROTEGES GROWING MORE RESTIVE
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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FRANCE'S AFRICAN PROTEGES GROWING MORE RESTIVE
The 13 former French territories in Black Af-
rica which have maintained, since independence in
1960, close economic, political, and cultural ties
to Paris,now seem more inclined to turn away from
their former metropole. This desire is discernible
not only in Congo (Brazzaville) and Dahomey, where
revolutions last year brought more nationalistic-
minded regimes to power, but also in countries, like
Chad and Ivory Coast, which are still headed by pro-
French "first generation" leaders. The moves to
loosen ties with France appear to be both a response
to pressure from younger elements, who regard de-
pendence on France as neocolonialism, and a reac-
tion to continuing French meddling.
Leaders of most of these countries remain bas-
ically pro-Western in orientation. They are turn-
ing first to the US and other Western sources for
economic aid in order to reduce their dependence on
France. There is increasing evidence, however,
that they intend to seek aid from Communist coun-
tries as well, especially if their requests are not
satisfied by the West.
Scope of the French Presence
France's presence and in-
fluence in its Black African
protege states have remained
pervasive since De Gaulle sanc-
tioned their accession to for-
mal independence in 1960. Each
of these states signed economic,
cultural, and military agree-
ments with France, for the most
part either just before or
shortly after independence. In
effect, these accords preserved
almost intact the comprehensive
ties which France had developed
with its African territories
during the colonial period.
The continuity has been
most striking in the economic
area. As'they did when they
were colonies, all these coun-
tries have received large amounts
of French public and private as-
sistance. All of these former
colonies benefit from association
with EEC--achieved through Paris
--and most are recipients of di-
rect French budgetary subventions
as well as of French price sup-
ports for their primary products.
They also receive technical as-
sistance through which thousands
of French specialists and ad-
ministrators are continuing to
serve in Africa. All are full
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A ISII
RA
NEOAL ~f
Tf''NJSIA
L I (i Y A UNITED
ARAB
a REPUBLIC
1.14ER' VOtra)'7
IVORY
COAST
ENTRAL AFRICAN `,.
RF~IR~IC.
(1MEROOA
REPUBLIC
RWAN[A
OF THE
France's African Proteges
45301
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
9,OUTH-
REPUBLIC
OF C u
POPULATION
(est. in millions)
Cameroon
4.3
Central African Republic
1.3
Chad.
3.0
Congo (Brazzaville)
.8
Dahomey
2.1
Gabon
.5
Ivory Coast
3.5
Malagasy Republic
5.9
Mauritania
.8
Niger
3.3
Senegal
3.2
Togo,
1.5
Upper Volta
4.5
Estimated cost of maintaining
French Air Force Personnel
in this area. TOTAL
34.7
7
50.0
5
11.0
11
20.0
4
9.0
9
6.0
1
9.2
9
41.0
38
55.5
10
8.0
7
4.0
20
35.0
1
5.5
2
18.8
.10
Military Bilateral Nonmilitary*
TANGANYIKA
and ZAl'JZIBAR
ANNUAL FRENCH AID FRENCH TROOPS
(est. in millions of US dollars) Now Present
1,000
1,300
3,000
1,700
900
350
1,200
7,400
2,500
1,500
7,900
* These figures represent estimates of aid supplied through the offical agency, Fonds d' Aide et
de Cooperation (FAC). They probably are appreciably lower than the value of the total public
and firirate nonmilitary aid effort, however, because of the considerable amount of indirect
assistance provided outside official channels.
** Small administrative detachments for military aid.
;j AHOMEY
TO
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members of the French franc zone
and are thus assured of access
to otherwise unavailable foreign
exchange reserves. As a result,
none of these countries has ex-
perienced the acute economic dif-
ficulties encountered by the two
ex-French colonies--Guinea and
Mali--which refused to go along
with the new French "system."
In the military sphere, all
13 countries have entrusted
France with training--which in
most cases means actually di-
recting--their national armies
and police. All but one--Up-
per Volta--have some type of
agreement providing for close
collaboration with France in de-
fense matters. Under these ar-
rangements, Paris maintains some
28,000 troops of the French
Overseas Army distributed among
11 of the 13 states, and major
land and air bases in Senegal,
Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the
Central African Republic, and
the Malagasy Republic.
In addition, France has
special secret agreements with
six countries--Chad, Congo, Ga-
bon, Ivory Coast, Niger, and
the Malagasy Republic--under
which those states can request
French help in preserving in-
ternal order. Such an agreement
provided the legal basis for
the intervention of French troops
in Gabon to restore President
Leon Mba last February, after
he had been overthrown by a
coup d'etat.
On the cultural side,
French is the official language
in all these countries. French-
men predominate as instructors
in the schools, where the French
system of education has continued.
The African leaders of these
countries have taken on French
mores and become "Frenchified."
Paris attaches great importance
to perpetuating these cultural
links and has generally resisted
any foreign--especially "Anglo-
Saxon"--inroads.
In addition to the official
relationships, a relatively
small community of private French
businessmen. generally controls
the commercial life of each coun-
try. Some of these businessmen
have resided in Africa for many
years, acquiring extensive po-
litical influence over local Af-
rican leaders and, in some cases,
in Paris as well. The archtype
of these "colons," whose unre-
constructed attitudes and be-
havior are particularly offensive
to African nationalists, is prob-
ably Roland Bru, long a power
behind Mba in Gabon. Bru is re-
ported to have played an impor-
tant role in influencing the
French decision to intervene
there.
The. Revolutionary Regimes
Under the prodding of its
leftist labor and youth elements,
the Massamba-Debat regime which
took over in Congo (Brazzaville)
after conservative President
Youlou's ouster last August has
taken a sharp turn to the left
away from Paris.
The new government has been
under rising pressure for many
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months to demand the withdrawal
of the French troops based in
the country. Last March, the
leftist-dominated national as-
sembly formally called for re-
vision of the military accords
with France, more rapid replace-
ment of Frenchmen by Africans
in government departments, and
Congo's withdrawal from the Af-
rican and Malagasy Union (UAM)
--the Paris-backed grouping of
French protege states plus
Rwanda.
Moderate President Massamba-
Debat, mindful of the vital im-
portance of continued French
economic support and of the sta-
bilizing effect of French troops,
evidently intends to drag his
feet on these recommendations.
Even the more radical prime min-
ister, Pascal Lissouba, has ex-
plained to the assembly that the
government would not be able to
act "at least until the end of
the year."
Nevertheless, Massamba has
implemented a vigorous and posi-
tive "nonalignment" policy to
the point where his country's
international posture now is
more akin to that of the African
radicals than to that of the
moderates. Since February the
regime has shifted diplomatic
ties from Nationalist to Commu-
nist China and has established
relations with the USSR, Czecho-
slovakia, and Cuba. France and
the US have been the targets of
several sharp official attacks,
although new economic aid com-
mitments have been sought in
Washington as well as in the
Communist world. Within recent
weeks Massamba has even been
actively promoting a special
relationship, including military
aid features, with the radical
regime in Ghana. All this points
to a further decline of French
influence and slippage to the
left in the Brazzaville regime.
The government which came
to power by revolution in Dahomey
last October is much more moder-
ate than its Brazzaville coun-
terpart, but is also appreciably
less French oriented than its
predecessor. As in Brazzaville,
anti-French sentiment becomes
particularly evident in Dahomey
whenever the new regime considers
itself in any way threatened.
In March, a revolt by northern
tribal partisans of ex-President
Maga brought immediate charges
by Premier Ahomadegbe that "for-
eign enemies"--unfriendly French
elements were clearly in mind--
were aiding the insurgents.
There were reports then that
the Dahomeans were considering
asking Paris to remove its troops
from the country, but no such
demand materialized.
It appears that the leaders
of the new Dahomey regime, nota-
bly President Apithy, who has
long been partial to the conti-
nent's radical nationalists, ra-
ther desperately want to assert
their independence from France.
However, they also are aware of
the close mesh of French influ-
ences, and hesitate to act
rashly. Moreover, the regime
is not, at this time, subject
to the same degree of pressure
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from volatile leftist elements
as are the Brazzaville moderates.
The Conservative Regimes
The most dramatic example
of official restlessness among
the conservative French African
states is in Chad, where Presi-
dent Tombalbaye gave official
sanction to a sharp anti-French
campaign. In a speech on 7
April, Tombalbaye denounced "bad
Frenchmen" and in particular a
certain "impenitent colonialist"
businessman who had been expelled
three days before. Three weeks
later, Tombalbaye returned to
this theme in a second speech
which he subsequently privately
labeled Chad's "declaration of
economic independence from
France."
After these speeches a unani-
mously approved assembly resolu-
tion demanded the evacuation of
all French military bases "as
soon as possible" and the rapid
Africanization of top positions
in the Chadian Government. Tom-
balbaye has not acted yet. Since
his first speech, the President
has been careful to distinguish
between "bad" and "good" French-
men. The former category in-
cludes neocolonialists and ad-
vocates of Cartierism--a doctrine
which holds that French foreign
aid money could be better used
at home. "Good" Frenchmen are
those who follow the liberal
policies of General de Gaulle.
The anti-French noises sub-
sided last month, while Chad was
negotiating new aid and military
accords with Paris. Recently,
however, the attack resumed--
13 French nationals have been
expelled from Chad and more will
probably follow. Tombalbaye
also dispatched an aid-seeking
mission to Western Europe, the
US, and Canada in an effort to
reduce his dependence on France.
Upper Volta's President
Maurice Yameogo has pursued
much the same approach. Last
April, he accused four French
Army training officers of at-
tempting to turn Upper Volta's
army against the regime. At a
party congress in early May,
Yameogo reportedly denounced the
activities of private French
businessmen, the French Roman
Catholic clergy in Upper Volta,
and colonialism in general.
The Yameogo government also
has announced a friendship mis-
sion to central and eastern Eu-
rope "in line with Upper Volta's
policy of. nonalignment." The
country has no diplomatic or sig-
nificant economic relations with
any Communist countries--indeed,
Yameogo has in the past insisted
he would have no Communist rep-
resentatives in his country--but
this latest expression of in-
dependence could portend a policy
shift. Undoubtedly Yameogo also
would welcome opportunities to
reduce Upper Volta's economic de-
pendence on France.
In neighboring Ivory Coast,
internal and external criticism
of total French domination of the
local industrial and commercial
sectors has kept pressure on the
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government to Africanize. Since
last August several unrecon-
structed Frenchmen were expelled
from Abidjan. The French-domi-
nated Ivory Coast Chamber of
Commerce was revamped in May to
allow for 50-percent African
membership, and the government
intervened to block the re-elec-
tion of the previous president,
an "ugly Frenchman" of colonial-
ist mentality. The government
also reportedly plans a compre-
hensive revision of its import
policies, including commercial
agreements with France, to per-
mit greater freedom of imports
from EEC countries and the US.
It appears doubtful, however,
that any really active campaign
to break the French hold on the
local economy is about to be
undertaken.
In Mauritania, President
Moktar Ould Daddah since 1960 has
been seeking wider recognition
of his country's independence--
disputed by Morocco, which
claims sovereignty over the area.
Special efforts have been made,
to the annoyance of Paris, to
curry favor with the UAR and Al-
geria. Partly to enhance his
regime's image in the eyes of
such radical governments, Moktar
recently renounced French budg-
etary support and launched an
austerity program to compensate.
Mauritania has also announced
its intention to send a good-
will mission to Moscow, indicat-
ing at the same time a desire
to "intensify" relations with
the US.
Cameroon President Ahidjo,
while not directly attacking
the French, has indicated a de-
sire to broaden his base of eco-
nomic support. A Soviet trade
mission was recently established
in Yaounde, and shortly afterward
an agreement to establish diplo-
matic relations with the USSR
was announced. A Soviet embassy
will probably be opened this
month; and the opening may be
marked by a token aid offer from
the USSR. Cameroon repeatedly
indicates that it wants greater
US aid, presumably as a means of
lessening dependence on France.
In Niger, a number of re-
cent speeches attacked the role
played by the French colonizers
and ignored the substantial French
contribution to the country. Niger
recently signed a cultural agree-
ment with North Korea and report-
edly expressed its hope that eco-
nomic and technical agreements
will follow. Central African Re-
public President David Dacko also
recently attacked "bad Frenchmen"
at a National Assembly session.
Even Malagasy Republic Presi-
dent Tsiranana who is fervently
pro - De Gaulle, has reportedly
sent a mission to negotiate trade
agreements with Poland and the
USSR, and possibly with Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.
Only Senegal, Togo, and
Gabon offer no recent evidence
of official restiveness in the
French embrace. In the first
two of these states the absence
of the syndrome arises from the
fact that the elements most in-
clined to strain at the bonds
were excluded from power or ren-
dered ineffective some time ago.
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Gabon a Special Case
As a result of France's
military intervention in Gabon
last February, the regime of
President Mba now is totally
dependent on French support and
popular feeling is presently
more inflamed against France
than anywhere else in de Gaulle's
African preserve. The French
in their anxiety to check spread-
ing instability in French Africa
and to preserve access to Gabon's
rich mineral deposits, seriously
underestimated the amount of
anti-Mba sentiment which had de-
veloped among the Gabonese, es-
pecially the young educated ele-
ments.
A temporary calm is being
maintained by the conspicuous
presence of French Army troops,
while Mba tries to rehabilitate
his regime. However, his politi-
cal foes will almost certainly
again attempt a new move to
oust him, confronting the French
with another intervention di-
lemma. It seems likely that
any successor regime, and es-
pecially one including the po-
litical elements suppressed in
February, would have a basically
anti-French cast.
Regardless of local varia-
tions, there appear to be some
general, basic, sociopolitical
conditions responsible for the
over-all trend. The desire to
move away from France is already
strongest among the growing num-
ber of younger, more nationalist
elements, some of whom occupy
high government positions. These
"young Africans" are evidently
convinced that national develop-
ment demands a "nonaligned" or
at least a less French-aligned
policy.
France's intervention in
Gabon has made the presence of
French troops on African soil
even more difficult to accept.
However, the Gabon affair has
made the young and ambitious ele-
ments aware that Paris, if it
chose, might be able to maintain
the existing conservative re-
gimes in power almost indefi-
nitely. While this may induce
caution in some, it sharpens
the frustration of others.
The present African lead-
ers of these countries appear
to be acceding to public pres-
sure. The responses range from
Brazzaville's real break with
essential features of the rela-
tionship established in 1960,
to Ivory Coast's symbolic ges-
tures. The leaders are also
well aware of the dangers in-
herent in being placed in Mba's
present position--which appears
to be secure only as long as
French troops patrol Libreville.
Chad's President Tombalbaye first
blessed French intervention to
restore Mba, but has now come
to regard it as "unwise."
Discontent over poor eco-
nomic conditions, which are
endemic in this area, is another
basis for anti-French sentiments.
The overwhelming French presence
in the economic sphere leads
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some elements, particularly
those with a higher horizon of
expectations, to regard this
presence as the cause of eco-
nomic failure.
Economic conditions also
have contributed to domestic po-
litical unrest. In reacting to
this, the African leaders have
generally moved to consolidate
their own positions by establish-
ing one-party states and a sin-
gle government-controlled trade
union, and in general by sup-
pressing opposition. Where this
suppression utilizes direct
French support, as in Gabon, it
directly reinforces anti-French
feeling. Aside from dramatic
interventions, the very degree
of French interest and presence
continually exerts influence on
a day-to-day level. The meddling,
both by the French Government
and particularly by private
Frenchmen, is deeply resented
by the young Africans, and in-
creasingly also by the older
pro-French leaders themselves.
External criticism of the
conservative regimes for their
French-oriented systems and pol-
icies has had its effect, too.
The conservative leaders have
been castigated by the more
radical African governments,
and at times by Communist coun-
tries, as French puppets and in-
struments of neocolonialism.
The formation last year of the
Organization of African Unity--
the "universal" African politi-
cal organization measurably in-
creased pressure on these lead-
ers to cast off their French
ties. The subsequent dissolu-
tion of the African radicals'
"Casablanca" grouping and the
rival "Monrovia" bloc of moder-
ate states left the relatively
close-knit Afro-Malagasy Union
exposed to charges of "sabotag-
ing" African unity. Now, in
the face of such pressures and
internal rivalries, the UAM,
too, is in the process of dis-
solution.
French Reaction
France's public reaction
to these rumblings in the protege
states has been generally re-
laxed. For the most part, French
spokesmen have either ignored
anti-French moves entirely or
else minimized them as harmless
gestures to be expected of new
countries anxious to emphasize
their independence. Except for
a long-planned reduction of
French military forces in Africa,
now under way, no major policy
shift by Paris appears to be
in the offing. Reaction to
specific situations will appar-
ently continue on an ad hoc
basis.
Privately, however, offi-
cials in Paris have exhibited
considerable concern over the
growing threat to the French
position and have taken some
steps to halt it. Although
Paris maintained that it was
"officially uninformed" about
the Chad assembly's resolve to
remove French troops, there is
good evidence to suggest that
in early May Paris advised
Tombalbaye that an "official
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communication" of the assembly
action would be "incompatible"
with the imminent commencement
of aid talks. Yameogo's casti-
gation of the four French train-
ing officers also provoked sharp
expressions of French displeas-
ure.
On the other hand, Paris
now seems genuinely resigned to
a drastically reduced role in
Brazzaville. It reportedly has
decided to remove all its troops
from Congo by the end of 1965.
France has, however, given no
indication that it plans to
change its economic aid policy
toward Brazzaville.
A more general French ap-
praisal of the situation was
voiced recently by the director
of African Affairs at the French
Foreign Ministry,who told a US
official that the policy of
"nonalignment" which is spread-
ing throughout former French
Africa is not necessarily dis-
advantageous. It was this of-
ficial's view that if the pres-
ent African governments do not
contact the East, their domestic
opponents will.
At least some elements of
the French Government have
charged that the US is behind
France's problems in Africa.
In Gabon, local French elements
have been involved in anti-US
activities, and there are in-
dications that an effort may
be made to link US Embassy per-
sonnel to the abortive February
coup.
Outlook
The conservative French
African leaders still retaining
power do not appear inclined
to do anything which would seri-
ously jeopardize their French
aid. Their actions will in the
main be symbolic and not in-
tended to disturb the French posi-
tion to any significant extent.
However, domestic pressures
for a more independent posture are
already increasing, spearheaded by
the growing corps of nationalist-
minded--and in some cases Commu-
nist-influenced--educated younger
leaders. More and more of these
"second-generation" leaders will
eventually come to power, one way
or another. All will assert
greater independence from France,
although particular circumstances
will determine the pace and the
scope of the changes they will seek.
?The actions of Congo (Brazza-
ville) may well become the pattern
which others will eventually fol-
low, especially if its developing
relations with the Communist world
should result in significant in-
crements of economic aid. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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