CRIES AND WHISPERS- WASHINGTON LEAKS ALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 31, 1982
• Content Type: NSPR

STAT
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : R099499q 29993
Obi
i'y Les Whetten14.
Sprctal to the Washington Post
HE SCREECH of the
White House'-Aeak plug-
gers is abroad in the land:.
I can remember its pecu-
liar timbre all the way back to the
Truman days. Real old-timers still
hear-its echoes from the Hoover ad-
ministration.
Thee leak seekers never learn..
They'. are the kind of people who
wear--Gucci shoes and natural-
shoulder, hand-tailored suits, but
they keep epaulets under their pil-
lows:--
They don't understand the leakers
because they don't' understand the
public's love-hate affair with the
newspapers. Leakers are like ear sy-
ringes. The more pressure one puts
on them, the more they squirt into
our ears:
For - 30 years now, my cam have
been awash with leaks, with Jack
Anderson, but also with the Hearst
newspapers, The Washington Post
and others. Where most people hear
ringing in their ears after they pass
50, 1 hear whispering.
President Reagan and his ma-
houts are baffled by the psychology
of leaks. Reagan complains- .that.
leaks are at "a new high here -
leaks that are destructive of the for-
Assistant Defense ` Secre
Henry E. Catto Jr. huffs. about "the-
principle of the thing . the expres-
sion of minority [policy] opinions via
leaks." White House-spokesmen
David R. Gergen and Larry Speakes
try to explain why practically every
agency head from. the CIA to Fish-
and Wildlife wants hunt-and-destroy
missions against leakers.
ing sight of Deputy De~tW'Tecie
tary Frank C. Carlucci volunteering
to take the first li-detector' test to
THE WASHINGTON POST
31 January 1982
prove he. didn't leak secrets
from a
men,,oa his own or at the request of
[H.R1: ialdeman ..:'
The document goes on:
"After the California primary,
Nofziger sent _a person. from the
Committee to Re-Elect the Presi-
dent,-into the California McGovern
offices - in an attempt to find ai'
form which purportedly told McGov-
ern-:' olunteers how to get on wel-
fare. -k1ad.Nofziger's ingenuity paicy
off, which. it didn't, he would surelyti
have leaked it to a friendly reporter. i
Indeed, he generally was more}
successfub.:In another caper before
he joined the Reagan White House,'
he pse I- a chain of friendships to l
squeeze documents from the oft tee of
a rival presidential candidate- {
Ta his delight, they showed that,
:the .seemingly prim and proper as-
pirant pirant had misused federal funds.
-Nofziger leaked the documents to al
reporte'r.. The story made the can-j
didate .look like a hypocrite and',
probably was a factor in his dismal;
primaries showing.
Nofziger is anything but unique.;
Leaking in Washington is good bust-C
ness. Richard L. Strout of the Chris-,
tiian . Science Monitor, who calls it
the ;Capital of Leaks," recounts howi
an irate President Kennedy once or-
dered his press man, Pierre Salinger,
to root out a teak Salinger gleefully
reported back that Kennedy himself
was- the culprit.
More. ominously, ',abby _ Ken-
nedy's Justice Department went to;
considerable lengths to ruin what;
was left of Jimmy H_ offa's tarnished.1
reputation. When the Teamstersi
boss. was arrested for slugging a
weaker aide, a Justice official leaked,
meeting he chaired.
Why do leakers leak`? They do it
for a variety of reasons.- Presidents
do it-to--get their thoughts across
without having to take responsibility
.'for them. `Or. as. trial balloons. Or
sometimes, they, being no more de-
cent than the rest of us, use leaks to
destroy their enemies. .
Cabinet members and agency
heads tend to follow the presidential
psychology . on leaks. While lesser
folk may leak 'out of friendship, ide-
alism,. even whimsy, at the top level
the motive is more often self-
interest-malice and aneer. Whatever
it is, it is Washington free enterprise
in action.
- Leakers come in many archetypes.
There. are the Idealists, the Aveng-
ers, Friends and Mad Bombers.
At its most artistic, leaking is a
form of expression that can rival the
grands jets of Baryshnikov, the ca-
denza of a Chopin or the brush
stroke of an El Greco. `Capital of Leaks'
The master of the leak-qua-art id-
Lyn Nofziger, 'the waggish - Tih Eu-
lenspiegel . of. this otherwise self-
important administration. It is worth
noting that he just jumped ship with
a.. remark about his rat-like pre-.
scie;ace.
Nofziger understands that" hang
ing-- leakers may require a two-
branched gibbet and one of the
branches may be the present exec-'
utive branch. Nofziger knows his his-
tory. He lived it.
After. all, a Watergate document
informs us that "Whenever possible
Nofziger" - then a high Nixon of-
`_s~,a '98
out--the news even before the polico'
reports were typed up.
The beat reporters at Washing-'
ton's Metropolitan Police headquar-,
`e 00901 RNW% jQ1 -do see a herd of
political reporters arriving at the;
booking desk on a story they them-
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C ; I C ;G-;) S -?'r 'S
30 Ja ,liar-,
core talk ~'O 'loose lips' danger
The Reagan administration; besides running Casey: Yes.
lie-detector tests against leaks, is supporting a Hatch: How many do you have, Mr. Direc-
drive to roll, back the Freedom of Information tor?
Act, the law that helps you know what your Casey: I don't know. W? certainly don't
tax dollars' are, doing. have them all. You quit because of a variety
. Intelligence agencies especially suffer under of reasons.:.. .
the- act, the adminstration says. Pressed for DeConcini: Can you tell us how many? Six?
specifics, It begs oif. Citing case histories A dozen? Three.dozen?
would violate security, It says. + Casey: i really can't tell you. I would be
Perhaps members of the Senate Constitu- guessing. . .
tion subcommittee expected more from CIA, DeConcini: But you know firsthand having
Director William J. Casey when they ?c ~'(Ied`,}talked to some?
him in for a -secret session last,December. The Casey: No,-no..I get this as hearsay in the
testimony-.was classified, after. all, and could organization.
be released only after experts- determined it Hearsay? Later in the same session:
wouldn't give away any of America's secrets. Casey:. , . In the last couple of months we
It has now been so declas'sif'ied--though it have had two instances where very produc.
does reveal one thing: The administration tine agents in very important countries have
seems to be talking through its hat. Here's asked to be taken out on the basis that they
some of the Q-and-A among Senators Orrin felt Insecure. ;
.G. Hatch (R-Utah), Dennis DeConcini (D- Leahy: Because of FOIA (the Freedom of
Ariz.),. Patric'k Leahy (D-Vt.) 'and Casey; ' -information Act]?
Casey: Our, agent .network Is... placed la--- Casey- I can't say that. I can't say FOIA..
jeopardy. Good agents decide they cannot The general atmosphere of insecurity and lack
entrust their careers, their- lives, their reputa- of confidence In the ability to keep secrets..-
tions to work for us-because.3hey.just don't:. Geneal,:"insecurity"..is ahorrible. thing
have confidence that= we can-keep-secrets.:.uh et x.you.re. a. secret agents-beat also a
Hatca: YOU have-pinpolnte&' sorne3 agents thou bie raison for changing, a law that, ha
;who '[lave quff 'for'd a `reason?" ?" provr nits forth tat;'more t in'Ith ^fiarm p''
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r :T Apo~
THE WASHINGTON POST
C.
Rowland Evans and .Robert Novak
Clark Moves to Rea
President Reagan picked up his White House
telephone early last week for a long and friendly
discussion of his administration's foreign policy,
It call remarkable only for the fact that the man
he telephoned across the continent in California
was Henry A. Kissinger ' w L
Coupled witirtnlL risein th&White-House of
William Patrick Clark, the renewed Reagan-
'Kissinger contact contains-the-seed=?of newt
cad petition- for Secretary.. bf States Alexander
?laig's unquestioned policy dominance in the
wake of Richard- V. Allen's. dismissal as Na
iTonal Security Council assistant:-.'""_
Reagan bad just finished reading'Kissinger's
sharp criticism of N.S. foreign policy in two
New York Times articles Jan. 17' and 18. What
struck .him was Kissinger's warning that the
"disarray of the Western alliance" and "indeci-
sion" in Washington following the Dec. 13
crackdown in Poland threatened "a decisive
turning point in Western history.
Far from taking offense, Reagan wanted to
know more. What Kissinger had written re-
flected his own growing concern..The presi-
dent's concern has been the topic of intimate
Oval Office strategy talks arranged for Rea-
gan with increasing intensity. by Clark. Allen's
successor as the president's NSC assistant.
At work here is no planned cabal to cut
down Al Haig. Haig's sensitivity to intrusion
on his turf is well known in the White House,)
first felt there way back on Inauguration Day.
Nevertheless, the substitution for -Allen by
Clark is?a portent-of utmost significance for
Reagan, Haig and U.S. foreign policy. Moving
slowly. and' conferring :frequently. with Kiss-
inger and other.outsiders, Clarleis combining
his amiable personality and iron loyalty to
Reagan to push. the president into the center-
of rational security policy. ,z.., l+-,,.,:; _
That conflicts with the fashionable view of
Hai,-'s new dominance. With. Clark, his former
State Department deputy, in control of machin-
ery in the White House and non-political pro-
fessionals' installed at the top of his State. De-
partment, Haig's dominance is said to be com-
plete. The contrary is closer to the truth:
Clark's insistence that policy will now follow
the instincts and ideological convictions of his
old California friend may weaken, not strength-
en, Al Haig.
Clark's move to the White House coincided
with the deluge of Reaganite and neo-conserva-
tive attacks,.ont-the administration's post Po-
Mize _r orei
land reactions. These have centered on what
Kissinger (no Reaganite or neo-conservat.ve)
called ."sanctions of marginal significarce"
against Moscow and "eagerness to'continue all
negotiations" with the Soviets- '-~
Even before - Kissinger wrote- those words,
Reagan had privately decided?(with' no dissent
from Haig) to cancel the second day of. the
Haig-Andrei Gromyko Geneva talks and ignore
strategic arms talks. Clark knows that Rea an
has been at least. one step ahead of the State
Department ? on wanting . punitive actions
against Moscow. White House insiders say h e is_
quietly pushing the president to assert his uwrt.,
will with greater force, well aware that if post-
Poland policy follows Reagan's instincts the
hue and cry from the right wing will diminishh:
Clark is not alone in wanting to convert hard-
line Reaganites from enemies of administration
foreign policy to active allies. White House
chief of staff James Baker III, closely.tuned in
to conservatives on Capitol Hill, had a hand in
vetoing Haig's choice of Robert D. Hormat 4 to
succeed Myer Rashish, fired for unknown _ ea-
sons by Haig as undersecretary of state fora co-
nomic affairs. An ideological neuter, Hormats
has long been on the right-wing hate list-
With the Hormats veto apparently sealed,
Clark is eyeing Dr.. William Schneider Jr.; a
tested Reaganite hard-liner and nowiassociatet
director for national security in the Office of`
Management and Budget, for Rashish's job.
Schneider's move to State's key economic
policy post would give Reaganites what they
have lacked since Clark's departure: the eyes
and ears of a White House insider at Haig 's
State Department.
Without intending any affront to Haig
Clark's effort to Reaganize administration for-i
eign policy to the point that precisely fits I lea;
gap's convictions is transforming the NSC ap:
paratus. In his early-morning intelligence b?ief-i'
ings for the president,,- Clark brings alorg
varying menu: Haig one day, Secretary of De4
fense Caspar Weinberger the next,-CIA Direr'
'tor William Casey on another, sometimes NS
senior staffers.
Clark is engaged in opening Reagan's eye-s to
a wide spectrum ,of opinion-all the way tot
'Henry A. Kissinger. His purpose is to encourager
,Reagan's own tendencies, not subvert Haig. Butt
in six months Al Haig may took back. to the
Dick Allen regime with nostalgia. '
0
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29 January 1982
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nr :C a ="rl ll
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 January 1982
U11011
By Ronald J. Ostrow
Central In tell igence,Agency Director William J."
Casey has ; proposed that ,,Congress..'shield CIA
agents from criminaLrosecution :whiles they are:
on legitimate missions,' a proposaI`that'Depart
ment of Justice, intelligence experts fear would..
sanction lawbreaking, it was learned yesterday.
Casey made the proposal in a letter last month
to Attorney. General William French Smith, who
has not yet:. decided whether to incorporate it.iri;
the administration s-eftor : to- revise the federal:
criminal. code
But the Justice Department's office of intelh--_
pence policy review has. stroiagiy recommended
against= ;supporting : Casey,,; saying his props sal-
would permit CIA agents to"freely engage" in oth-
er*,vise illegal activities without authorization or
On the others hand, CLX 4ficials said the pro-
posed change ~void3 give:the agency na more tat- I
itude than it already enjoys under, current law, and
that it wanted only to "maintain our capabilities
to do the kinds of things we do ab"road ,.
Ca.4ey s proposal would add this language to the
federal criminal code:
' iothing in (federal criminal law) shall be con
strued to create criminal. liability for the conduct I
of intelligence activities by a tederal public. ser-
vant that are authorized and conducted in actor
dance with theConsiitution arid . applicable fed--:
eral statutes,-executive-orders,~prstdential dares :
tives and department or agency regulations which
regulate the conduct: of intelligence activities
As an example of ' the kinds. of ' violations this
could lead to, according to Smith's intelligence;
policy review office, a CIA' source authorized: to
collect foreign intelligence outside the United,
:States might .participate in an international nar-1-1
cotics transaction.or.bribe a-.foreign official _to I
maintain his cover.. h i' -
Under Casey's pr
not. he punished in t
The timing of Ca
its coiitrovertiv. It
after President. Read
restrictions on the nation's intelligence a;t:ncies
aiidwhen- the CIA is under scrutiny 6),r possible
involvement' of some of its operatives and ex-
agents in-training Libyan, terrorists-
Staniey.Sporkin, the CL4's general coaan,el. said-
:that, hP regarded the proposal as. a. technic d, legal
matter,'and not"a policy change. "it has, not. been
expressed tn me that any branch of the ,overn--
.:meat: has a concernf-wit?h this, _ Sporkn' sai,I
But Richard K. Willard; formerly Srnith i coun-
set tot intelligence'policy, was said to have warned
the attorney general that Casey's proposal would
be misinterpreted-by: the p.ibhc and Congress. Ac-
1. cording to colleagues, Willard said that the Casey
proposal:would sow the seeds for serious t.ad con
tinumgmi5understarKling:,between the l)epart-
a ent'ot `Justice sod'the CIA
Sptiiltin said that the CIA's legal" staff drew up
the pr06osal.in response to legislation pending in:
Conti ess'to-revise the-federal criminal code: The
legislation woad expand the extraterritorial juriA-,'j
dictrorro?` the United States.
Casey. said in his letter to Smith that the trim
trial code revision legislation lacks "a. c'etinitiv
statement on the relationship behveen ;.he code
;arad the:concfixtof intelligence activities- {
The-'.absence of such a statement combined
with the expanded extraterritorial -federal.jurisdic-
ytion that the legislation provides creat
perhaps the most significant:.: test'
that the United States, as leader of
the West, has encountered in a de-l",
cads.
The failure' was `conceptual. and.'
operational. By succumbing to its
preoccupation with the American
economy, the-Reagan, administration 1
wes ill equipped to. cope, with aan un-_
pracedentecl diplomatic-economic
efor handling the Polish problem-
1
ever was devised that might;.through
the use of economic assistance and
diplomatic leverage,: have for'estalled'
the final crackdown.
Instead, the United States relied
on piecemeal aid infusions': and oc
casional warnings to Moscow ,,. while,
Without any imaginative ..lead"
from- the United States, the-West as
a whole floundered, through - the
idarity movement and the Polish.
- government inescapai#pricelb"l
over the preservation.. of communist
rule. in that nation:b.~
The Reagan administration 1s jus-
-tified-in asserting that it did foresee,
even ' though'. some ranking officials
did' not, that. the Polish crisis was
unlikely to . explode - in accordance
with the single-track contingency
plan of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organizations-a frontal invasion by
the Soviet Union and its. Warsaw
pact allies.
In the judgment of many of its
own ' specialists, however,'. ",'that
foresight only compounded the fail-
ure of `the ',West to agree on any
otl er-course of action before the cur-
tain clanaed' down on Poland Dec.
13.
At least by the middle of last
June, it was widely recognized inside
the State Department, the National
Security Council and the CIA, that it
would require a heroic effort of west
;ern leadership to salvage the auda-
cious Polish experiment:.
The - order of magnitude for such
an effort needed to be comparable in
concept--although not in actual out-
lay of American funds--to the post-
World War II Marshall Plan' for the
reconstruction of Western Europe.;
At stake- in Poland, a pivotal ria-
tion' in the Soviet design in Europe,
were consequences ` transcen
those of the crushed Hungarian rev-
tolution ' 'of 1956 or Czechoslovakia's
obliterated "Prague Spring",of 1968.
For Poland had produced the first
authentic, nationwide 'workers revolt
against orthodox communist rule,
inside a system which claimed, above
all, to represent the dictatorship of
the proletariat.:. ==--
ceived by specialists was that the
r Rel'*9#eWft5P6At 8D:R 19#W
could not be simply in terms of tra=
ditional foreign aid to a nation in
Instead, it was argued? the pre-
servation of ' a unique measure of
freedom in Poland could be seen as
a security priority for the United
'-States comparable to. the adminis-
tration's plans to spend billions' of
dollars on military hardware. With
this criteria, activists maintained,
the United States should measure
what it stood to gain, or lose, on the i
same scale, as MX missiles, B1
bombers and Trident submarines.
The choices were expressed blunt-
ly in the internal debate:
get Poland backto wiere it was? R
Ten billion dollars?'.-Twenty billion
dollars? If you formulate the ques-
tion this way, the answer is compel-
ling about what we should do?"
But the answer obviously was not
coming enough.
It is unclear on the public record
whether _ the' questions ever' were
President Reagan, or even before
such influential advisers as counselor
Edwin Meese III, chief of staff
James A Baker III, deputy. chief of
staff Michael. K ' Dea-ter,.' TreasuryI
Secretary Donald T. Regan and Of-
fice of Management and Budget Di-
rector David A Stockman.
The idea that the United States,
and especially a right-of-center Re-
publican -administration 'transfixed
by commitments-to fiscal solvency,
should consider spending anything
on the order of billions of dollars "to
prop up a failing comn-'unist regime,".
as it was characterized, to quote one.'
insider, literally was "laughed out of I
court'
901 ROW4 OO"Ir succeeded in'
engaging their attention," one dis-'-'
: mayed ?:. spedalistG ruefully-: recalled--
STAT
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ARTICLE Aa`F-FEA RL' D
01.1 P < tx>~_._._ &L
By John M. Goshko
and Martin Schram
SYavhington ?od Start NMter7
President Reagan. plans to in,
crease greatly the power of his na-
tional security affairs adviser and is
expected to move Deputy Secretary
of State William P. Clark. into that
job as replacement fors- Richard V,
Allen.
This shift, which would put Clark
at the top levels of White House de-
cision-making, still is technically de-
pendent on a decision by Reagan
about whether to retain-Allen, who is
on admirustrative; -leave. He was-
cleared last week by the Justice De-
partment of allegations of illegalities
in his past business dealings, but is
still awaiting a final White House
review of the propriety of his con?
duct..
However, senior -Whits..-: House
sources said yesterday that now that
Reagan has decided-to upgrade the
pational security adviser's post, it is'
very unlikely that Allen will be re-
tamed, + i a
Clark, zn~ old f r i e n d and- Rolitical-
associate of w a s , in Palm
Springs, Cahf.,:_with.;:the, president
yesterday and could:-not be reached
for comment; . According to.: the
sources, though,--a decision on the
change could be= made by the time
the president returns here Sunday
and is likely to be - announced early
next week.
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 January 1982
The sources 'said the move was
motivated not only by the notoriety
surrounding Allen's legal difficulties
but also by a consensus in the White
House top echelon that the national
security apparatus had not- worked
effectively. during the- first year of
Reagan'a presidency. Allen, who re,
ported to' Reagan through -.White
House counselor Fdwin Meese lilt
was far. more circumscribed in his
authority than previous ocxupants of
Meese; who earlier- had originally
resisted suggestions that. the national
security position: be elevated, recoru-
mended the upgrading of the advis-
er's job in a conversation with the
president this past week, according
to a senior White Houseofficial, and
Reagan issaid. to have agreed. The,
president was. also said. to ..have
agreed with Meese's recommenda-
tion that, if Allerr is to-be replaced,
his successor should be Clark.
White House chief of staff James
A. Baker III and deputy chief Mi-
chael K. Deaver, who -with Meese
run the White House staff, report-
edly had come to the same conclu-
sions. _ > .
Meese made his recommendation
to the president after conducting a
study of the National Security Coun--
cil staff's operations..
The official said Meese concluded
that national security policy-making
had been plagued by "confusion". and
lack of coordination because : there
was "no single focal point" in the
White House for contact. with top
officials of the State Department,
the Defense' Department- and 'the.
Central Tntelligenca Agency'
'The person who is the national.
.security adviser must have direct
.access to-the president,". said the
senior official. "And just as impor-
tant, he must have the perception of
direct access in the eyes of State,
Defense and the CIA."
This position represents an about-
face from the administration's orig-
inal publicly stated desire to avoid
the concentration of power in' the
national security adviser's job by
subordinating him to Meese
In previous administrations, this
concentration of power' had caused
frequent embarrassing conflicts be-
tween such occupan s of the job a.3,
Henry A. Kissinger and Zbignie
Brzezinski and Cabinet officials.
Under the new system, the na
tional security adviser will have "di
rect day-to-day operational respon
sibility," _ according to the senio
presidential official He will meet
daily with the president, and will
deal directly with Secretary of Sta
Alexander M. Haig sr.,,Defense Sec'
retary Caspar W. Weinberger and
CIA Director William J. Casey.
Although Meese 'viii retain overall
responsibility: for . ;policy- coordina-
tion, the practical effect of the new ff
division-of responsibilities will put
the national security adviser more or .
less on a par with the White House's
controlling staff' triumvirate -of
Meese, Baker and Deaver.
Meese- is known to have main-
tained within the White House staff'
that he never warted to supervise
'day-to-day natonai security coordi-
nation but was forced into that role l
because "personality conflicts"- devel-;
oped from the outset between var-
ious officials, notably Haig and Al-
len.
"it got to the point where we had
Al Haig talking w--th Jim Baker or
Mike Deaver or Ed 'Meese, but there
was no single focal point at the !
White House," , the senior official
-noted..:
The hope of improved future co-i
ordination apparently was a major
r
factor in turning to Clark. ?.
Although the former. California-'I
Supreme Court justice had no expe-i
rience J n foreign policy; when' he
came to Washington, he has carved
out an important niche dining: his
months at the -State Department
-through his -ability to mediate effec-
tively between the often mercurial
Haig and the White House-
Clark, 50, did this by winning
Haig's trust and confidence, while;
retaining his credentials as-a mem-.I
'ber in good standing of the group
that has been Reagan's pollticall
inner circle since :cis days as govern--
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ry
RED
is =-- -~'~-? `~~~,~
psi'1.1r
COMMENTARY
January 11.382
Reagan the Russians
Walter Laqueur
T is a sensible custom to suspend judg-
merit about the policy of a new admin-
istration. Six months have passed and another six,
and in a press conference Presir'-nt Reagan has
provided an interim assessment of his own: "Our
accomplishments with regard to foreign policy
have been astounding." The word "astounding"
has various meanings and connotations, but not
even President Reagan's arms-reduction proposals
of late November can redeem the impression that in
foreign policy? 1981 was unfortunately not an
annus mirabilis. Evidence for this conclusion lies
all around, in the Middle East and Asia, in Latin
America and Africa, but perhaps nowhere so sal-
iently as in the main arena of international affairs,
U.S.-Soviet relations.
1r , ERRORisvt was the first international
A issue on which the Reagan adminis-
tration took a strong stand. Welcoming the Tehe-
ran hostages back home, President Reagan an-
nounced that there were limits to American
patience; in the future, our policy would be one of
"swift and effective retribution." In his first news
conference, the very next day, Reagan stressed that
a lot of options were open to this big and powerful
nation; terrorists would no longer go to bed at
night in the certain knowledge that nothing unto-
ward would happen to them before morning.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in a press con-
ference the same week, accused the Soviet Union of
training, funding, and equipping terrorist groups
as part of a conscious policy, and said that the
battleagainst international terrorism would be this
administration's way of securing human rights.
Haig himself, it should be recalled, had been the
victim of a terrorist attack while serving as NATO
commander-in-chief. Soon after taking office,
President Reagan was also shot at, albeit not by an
international terrorist. There was every reason to
think that out. of the experience and beliefs of
these men some energetic action would flow, or at
the very least some damaging revelations about the
links between the Soviet Union and the errorists.
But what happened in fact was short of sensational.
A plan was discussed to merge two Stat? Depart-
ment working groups to deal with the prc blem; the
new body was to be headed by a deputy undersecre-
tary or even assistant secretary rather than an
ambassador as in the past. The message 'gas clear:
an upgrading of effort in bureaucratic t 'rms, but
nothing to sow panic in the ranks of terrorists.
Then in May the State Department held a confer-
ence to which academic specialists on terrorism
were invited, along with some governmer t experts.
However welcome such meetings, the f