THE GROWING STRENGTH OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500090010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 26, 1968
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/10/03: CIA-RDP80RO OR000500090010-3
?6 March 1968
a?/_ _1MORANDUM FOR: The 1lonorable Walt W. Rostow
rppecial Assistant to the Fresident
JD:JL. ',`. . The Growing Strength of North Vietnamese Army
1, orces in South Victnarn
1 , 1: 1 response to the President's reques we have taken a fresh look
at our data on North Vietnamese Army (NVA.) strength in South Vietnam and the
ates of North Vietnamese infiltration over recent months.
force Levels. During the past three or four months there has been
a dramatic increase in tire movement of regular North Vietnamese Army units
i to South Vietnam. This Agency now believes that last fall (1 November) there
were over '/0, 000 North Vietnamese soldiers fighting in South Vietnam. The
neimber has risen rapidly in the past five months and today may be over 100, 000.
):.s increase in N VA. strength in South Vietnam has been achieved despite the
t zousands of casualties suffered by the North Vietnamese in the intensified combat
o the past two months.
The following tabulation shows what we believe to be the relative
strengths of 'VC and NVA Main and Local forces as of 1 November 1967 and
;'i March 1968, without adjustment for casualties:
G.3-i. NV.A, units
In VC units
Fe -?'o r ce s
November 1967
25 March 1968
61,000
88, 000
10, 000
15, 000
!1, 000
103,000
'n'000
61,000
14:Z,000
164,000
't)b 97--68
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1
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4. The above tabulation shows that the relative strength of NVA forces
probably increased from 50 percent of total Main and Local force strength on
1 November 1967 to 63 percent as of late March 1968. The relative strength
of NVA forces is even greater when these figures are adjusted for the extra-
ordinary casualties of the Tet offensive (30 January-21 February 1968). We
have made a very rough and preliminary estimate that the bulk of these
casualties were sustained by VC Main and Local forces (including guerrillas
upgraded and attached to Local force units). We estimate tentatively that the
infiltration of NVA fillers has been more than adequate to maintain NVA force
levels at their pre-Tet level of some 100, 000 troops. VC Main and Local force
strength has probably declined to a level of about 45, 000-50, 000 troops.
5. Thus, we estimate that today there may be nearly two times as many
North Vietnamese regular army soldiers in South Vietnam as there are VC
regular (i. e., Main and Local force) soldiers. In the I Corps area, NVA units
account for 80 percent of the enemy forces. On a country-wide basis North
Vietnam now has nine divisions, consisting of 26 regiments, plus an additional
16 independent regimental equivalents deployed in South Vietnam. This compares
to a VC Main and Local force strength of two divisions of three regiments each
and. an additional 22 regimental equivalents. Perhaps a third of what we carry
as the "VC" force is actually composed of North Vietnamese Army personnel.
6. Infiltration. During the past four to five months, we believe Hanoi
has moved at least two infantry divisions (the 304th and 320th) plus additional
replacement or "filler" personnel into South Vietnam.
7. Official figures indicate that at least 5, 600 North Vietnamese soldiers
arrived in South Vietnam during November and December 1967. (This figure
eriod in 1966.) Most of last
same
th
l f
p
e
or
is almost identical to the tota
25X1
November and December's infiltrators were probably replacement personnel
for forces already in South Vietnam (both NVA and VC).
November and December 1967
Durin
8
g
.
that two entire North Vietnamese divisions (the 304th and the 320th) were moving
toward South Vietnam. Components of these two divisions began to arrive in
December, but neither are considered to have become operational in the south
until January 1968. Each division probably had a strength of at least 8, 000
men -- which accounts for most of the troops in MACV's infiltration total for
January of 19, 400 men. The remainder of this total was probably composed of
miscellaneous groups of replacement personnel.
SC No. 05497-68
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25X1
9. The picture for the past two months, February and March, is much
less clear, but it is one of a marked increase in the usual indicators of infil-
tritinn suanestinr significant movement. As of 8 February, the number of
groups moving south. We are not sure of the personnel s tre
groups, but there is indirect evidence that they each approximate battalion 25X1
strength -- about 400 men.
In addition, we have had unusually good evidence)
in the month of March that battalion size groups are deploying
southward through the central section of North Vietnam. More than 20 such
groups have been noted in the period 2-25 March. Some of these groups may by
now have progressed far enough south to be reflecte
25X1
11. We cannot provide firm figures for infiltration in February and
March, but the evidence suggests that at least about 4, 000 NVA troops entered
South Vietnam in February and at least some 8, 000 will arrive during themonth.;
of March.
12. In sum, we believe that something on the order of 35-40, 000 NVA
personnel have been infiltrated into South Vietnam since 1 November 1967.
ndicates that the entire
1' urthermore,
infiltration apparatus is under heavy pressure to accomplish a major deployment
in the near future. While we cannot confidently estimate the size of this
additional deployment, the available evidence suggests it could be on the order
of magnitude of two division equivalents.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
SC No. 05497-68
Copy No.
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