SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: AN INTEROFFICE PROJECTION BASED ON QUANTITATIVE METHODS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000400060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 26, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Sino-Soviet Relations
An Interoffice Projection Bared on Quantitative Methods
Secret
RP 77-10181D
25 July 1977
Copy No. 10
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OFFICE OF REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
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Progress Report No. 23 25 July 1977
This project consists of three quantitative approaches to Sino-Soviet relations.
A team of analysts, drawn from various components of the CIA and concerned with
different aspects of Chinese and Soviet affairs, examines on a continuing basis all
relevant intelligence items. The first part of this project is to consider the effect of
this evidence on the possibility of one or another level of Sino-Soviet hostilities. The
analysts' numerical assessments of the likelihood of such hostilities, calculated
according to the Bayesian formula of probabilities, are presented in the graph on
page 2. The second part of the project is an application of the same Bayesian
technique to scenarios of improved relations. The third part of this project is a chart
of Sino-Soviet tensions, based upon subjective overall evaluation by the participants.
Progress reports are published on a periodic basis by the Office of Regional and
Political Analysis.
Principal Trends:
border-river navigation talks, the Soviets have yet to respond [item 91.
Evidence reported during the last two months (5 May - 7 July) shows that the
probability of hostilities within the next six months remains very low (page 2). Both
sides, however, continue to assail one another through public media [items 1, 2, 5, 7,
8, 11, 12, and 14]. Although the Chinese have expressed a desire to resume the
The likelihood of significant improvements in Sino-Soviet relations also remains
low (page 3), and the overall level of tension between the two countries increased
slightly (page 7).
NOTE-Comments on these reports will be welcomed b
o A, who are coordinating this project.
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A Bayesian Analysis of the Likelihood of
Sino-Soviet Hostilities
I)
The Soviets will undertake a
nuclear strike against Chinese
strategic or nuclear targets
within six months.
Probability ?o
10
0
May Jul
20
1
The Soviets will launch a large
scale conventional attack
against China within six months.
10
1-/
Either side will launch a
localized cross-border attack,
with limited objectives, on a
scale larger than the 1969
incidents, within six months.
Either side will undertake a
deliberate policy of provocation
on the border short of cross-
border attacks designed to or
bound to increase tensions.
Average figures for Soviet analysts
- - Average figures for Chinese analysts
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A Bayesian Analysis of the Likelihood
of Improvements in Sino-Soviet Relations
Probability %
G There will be an effort to
settle the border dispute 50
within six months.
'
0
M
ay Jul
There will be an effort to
significantly improve economic
50
relations within six months.
0
.---
May Jul
0r--
May Jul
There will be an effort to
K hold a meeting of Politburo- 50
evel representatives within
six months.
Average figures for Chinese analysts
- - - - Average figures for Soviet analysts
There will be an effort to
restore party-to-party relations 50
within six months.
There will be an effort to 50
issue a joint statement about
mutual relations within six months.
0L.
May Jul
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ITEMS OF EVIDENCE CONSIDERED IN
THE REVISION OF 7 JULY
1. A series of authoritative statements from Moscow in May and June,
including an "I. Aleksandrov" Pravda article and a foreign ministry protest note,
have accused Peking of intensified "preparations for war" and slander against the
Soviet Union. Although these statements appear designed primarily to isolate China
in world opinions and do not directly evoke a military threat to the Soviet Union
itself, a Redstar article at the end of May commemorating Border Guard Day called
for heightened vigilance on the Sino-Soviet border.
Soviet delegates to a US-USSR Conference on Asia held in Berkeley,
California, in May lobbied hard against any US military-related assistance to Peking.
Chief of the Far East Section of the CPSU's International Department, Kovalenko,
warned that such action would severely jeopardize US-Soviet relations. Sinologist
Boris Zanegin affirmed that the Aleksandrov article was aimed at preventing the US
from "playing its China card" after the SALT impasse in late March. Zanegin_alleged
that Moscow had decided that Western anus sales to Peking were a real possibility
and acknowledged that the USSR was trying to head off the prospect.
3. The Soviet delegates to the Berkeley conference claimed that the Sino-Soviet
border was quiet, but expressed pessimism about the border negotiations. One
official acknowledged that during the recent round of talks the Chinese were even
tougher in their positions than they had been in the past. The Soviets admitted that
they had hoped for some softening after Mao's death, but, now that the Chinese
seemed even more antagonistic, were uncertain about what to do next.
4. Politburo member Chi Teng-kuei told visiting Japanese on 15 May that
Sino-Soviet border talks have been under way for 7-1/2 years and more than 80
sessions have been held, "but not even one agreement has been reached because the
USSR is basically insincere."
5. A 17 May signed article in Kwangming Daily denouncing Soviet
anti-Chinese propaganda reiterates Peking's willingness not to allow differences of
party principle to impede normalization of relations between the two states on the
basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The article warned, however,
that such normalization will be impossible if Moscow "indulges in vain hope by
resorting to military might or uses 'un roved relations' as an excuse to subvert our
dictatorship of the proletariat.'
I
6. In early June, Peking announced the appointment of its new ambassador to
Moscow. Wang Yu-ping. Wang is not a Central Committee member nor was his
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predecessor. [Ambassador Tolstikov is a Central Committee member. Thus the
Chinese continue the practice begun in 1970 of keeping their top diplomat in
Moscow at a rank below Central Committee level.]
7. On 6 June, Li Hsien-nien accused the USSR, in his banquet speech for
visiting Sudanese President Numayri, of using propaganda and "a diplomatic note"
to slander China-actions that "extend to state relations the difference on matters of
principle between the two sides.'
Senior PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, in a 6 June banquet speech, denounced
Soviet insincerity in seeking improved Sino-Soviet relations since the death of Mao
Tse-tung. Li stated that Soviet tactics since Mao's death have been intended merely
to entice or force Peking into abandoning Mao's antirevisionist foreign policy. He
pledged that China will continue to follow Mao's policies and will not be intimidated
by Moscow's new hard propaganda line.
8. On 16 June a strongly worded People's Daily commentator article elaborated
on Li Hsien-nien's 6 June remarks. The article declared that Peking is impelled by its
responsibility to the world's people and by its Marxist-Leninist principle to expose
the USSR as "the most dangerous source of world war," to unmask Soviet
"neo-colonialism" in the Third World, and to repudiate the Moscow leadership as
the "worst renegades" to Marxist-Leninism. The article stated that Soviet
propaganda depicting Peking as a danger to world peace is intended to divert world
attention from Moscow's own expansionist plans and pledged that Peking will carry
its struggle against the Soviet revisionist renegades clique "through to the end."
9. A Chinese official in Moscow told
that the Chinese have proposed the resumption ot the Sino-Soviet border
river navigation talks. He said that Peking, as always, is interested in improving
state-to-state relations and pointed to this proposal as an example of Chinese efforts
in response to the Soviet gestures to Peking after Mao's death. He also said that the
Russians thus far had not made a serious effort to address the real issues.
10. On 22 June, the Standing Committee of China's NPC sent a telegram to
Brezhnev stating that: "On the occasion of your election to the post of chairman of
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, we send you our congratulations." [The
message was sent by Radio Peking in Russian. It is most likely that it did not appear
in Chinese internal media.] On 23 June, TASS reporting on congratulations received
from abroad on Brezhnev's ne post. listed the Chinese message first in its rundown
of congratulatory telegrams.
11. On 13 May, a People's Daily signed article stated that the Soviet Union
"never ceases brandishing nuclear weapons at the Chinese people" and declared that
China would survive "even if the Soviet revisionists unleash an aggression against
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China and drop their hydrogen bombs on her." The article recalled Soviet "nuclear
blackmail" against China during 'r crisis in detail unprecedented since
1969.
12. On 19 May, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev delivered a strong protest note
to the Chinese charge in Moscow. It complained about Peking's stepped-up
anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, and stressed that Chinese accusations are
"incompatible with the elementary norms" between countries having diplomatic
i
relat
On 26 May, Soviet media publicized a bitter protest note which was delivered
to Peking on 19 May. The note castigated Peking's intense anti-Soviet "campaign,"
Chinese "demagogical tricks," attempts to interfere in Soviet affairs, and Chinese
opposition to detente, and charged the Chinese leaders with "assuming a great
responsibility" in continuing the campaign. Publication of the note was widely
attributed to Soviet anger at Peking's continued bitter polemics, frustration at the
lack of progress since Mao's death, and an effort to warn the West and Japan against
13. The Chinese charge in Moscow told a diplomat there that he had rejected
the protest note handed to him by Ilichev, describing it as "slanderous," and that a
"heated argument" had ensued. The previous Soviet note to the Chinese in protest
of anti-Soviet propaganda was delivered on 29 January 1976, but the May 1977 note
was the first ever publicized by the Soviets.
14. The CPSU Central Committee's theoretical journal, Kommunist, signed to
press on 23 June, carried a strongly anti-Chinese article justifying Soviet resumption
of polemics against Peking on the basis of China's persistently anti-Soviet line. The
article repeats earlier themes that the new leadership in China has perpetuated
Maoism and is inspired by militarism. In foreign affairs, the article charged that
China continues to oppose detente and unites with imperialism in order to slander
and undermine Soviet policy initiatives.
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Individual Assessments of Sino-Soviet Tensions
Level of Tension
100
70 is defined as
the level of tension 70
in August 1969
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10 is defined as
the level of tension 10
through 1958
0
MAY
JUL
The points on this chart were chosen by each participant on an intuitive basis.
using the rough guidelines shown on the chart.
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