U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00080R001600090005-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 20, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Releas 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP81 B00080R0O p0090005-1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20506
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS January 20, 1977
CIA cy #1
National Security Decision Memorandum 348
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: U. S. Defense Policy and Military Posture
I have completed my review of the NSSM 246 report on U. S. Defense
Policy and Military Posture and have reached the following
conclusions with respect to the policies and strategies which are
necessary to preserve our security.
To ensure the credibility and strength of our military deterrent across
the full spectrum of potential conflict, our overriding aims must be to
maintain:
- ? A strategic balance with the Soviet Union that guarantees the
United States will never be in an inferior position.
-- An adequate American contribution to the defense of the
NATO area.
-- A global capability designed to meet those challenges outside
the NATO/Warsaw Pact area that threaten vital U. S. interests.
1. Strajga.c Forces
To he credible to the Soviets, the U. S. strategic deterrent must be
adequate both for a massive retaliatory strike against any Soviet
attack as well as capable of launching varied effective responses to
less -than -.al.l-out Soviet first strike. A. range of credible. options is
thus critical to maintaining deterrence, as well as to escalation
control, satisfactory war termination, and postwar recovery.
Therefore, the nuclear employment policy directed by NSDM 242
is reaffirmed, as amplified below.
TOP SECRET/SENSIT.LVI~.,'/XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
On file NSC releaseproy d For Reele~aye 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP81 B00080R001600090005-1
 Approved For R*se 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP81 B00080R W 600090005-1
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS Z
U. S. strategic nuclear force planning should be guided by the following
general principles:
-- The United. States must continue to maintain a Triad composed
of land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. Specific programs to
modernize each of the Triad elements are indispensable in light of the
projected military balance in the next decade. A modernized Triad
will constitute our principal strategic deterrent for the foreseeable
future. It will continue to provide the force diversity necessary to
assure that U. S. strategic forces can perform as.required across the
full spectrum of possible conflict, complicate any Soviet plan for
disarming attack, and hedge against unexpected technological break-
throughs or catastrophic failures.
-- Our strategic nuclear forces should be capable of meeting
targeting requirements against political, economic, and military
targets related to postwar recovery; permit flexible response options;
and provide a strategic reserve.
-- Our strategic nuclear forces should also be capable of denying
Soviet military advantages by providing an unqualified assurance of a
second strike against Soviet strategic and peripheral nuclear attack
forces and other military targets, after a Soviet first strike against
U. S. strategic forces. In particular, the United States should move
toward an effective counter-silo capability against residual Soviet
ICBMs .
-- Our strategic nuclear forces should not, however, in fact or
appearance be such as to persuade the Soviets that we have, or are
seeking, a disarming first strike capability, if we perceive that this
is not an objective of Soviet policy.
Because stability in times of crisis is critical to deterrence,
measures must be developed to assure the future survivability of the
U. S. ICBM force.
-- Strengthening of our strategic nuclear force posture to
accomplish these objectives can be compatible with the Vladivostok
SALT limitations on strategic forces, and should provide a strong
incentive to permit negotiated reductions in total numbers of
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP81 B00080R001600090005-1
 Approved For ,fWll se 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP81 B00080ROO1600090005-1
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE, /XGDS
2. General Purpose Forces
The security of Western Europe and the integrity of the NATO
alliance must remain a foundation stone of U. S. policy for the
foreseeable future. The modernization and growth in capabilities
of Soviet general purpose forces which NATO would confront in conflict
can be met with appropriate modernization and posture adjustments
by the U. S. and its NATO allies without need to fundamentally alter
the agreed NATO strategy, The following principles should guide
U. S. planning:
-- The responsiveness of U. S. and allied conventional forces to
potential attack should be designed to cope with both a short warning
time as well as attacks with larger and better prepared forces after
lengthier periods of warning. To meet these objectives, increases
in U. S. prepositioned equipment and supplies in Europe should be made
as warranted.
-- The current program to provide U. S. sustaining capability for
90 days of conflict should be continued. In addition, U. S. allies should
be encouraged to increase their own sustaining capabilities to 90 days.
Achievement of the complex and long standing NATO objectives of
standardization and interoperability of equipment, and capacity for
mutual support, may well be the critical ingredients in improving
European ability to sustain a conflict. This effort should be
encouraged.
-- Pending further assessment as to how the United States might
best participate in the collective defense of the flanks, current
planning for U. S. capabilities on NATO's flanks should be continued..
-- Planning for European defense should continue to include the
aim of achieving a better overall balance through negotiated reductions
in the MBFR context.
The United. States should. continue to maintain a strong theater nuclear
capability. Our theater nuclear forces serve as a hedge for theater
defense should conventional defense fail; deter Soviet theater nuclear
attacks; and provide a linkage to strategic forces, a particularly
important element in our NATO posture.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP81 B00080R001600090005-1
 Approved For R se 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP81 B00080R 600090005-1
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE /XGDS 4
There will be a considerable, and perhaps growing, potential for crises
outside of Europe. The United States must have as one of its objectives
to strengthen its worldwide capabilities. This calls for careful
attention to the planning of U. S. general purpose forces for non-NATO
contingencies, focusing on the potential force requirements for a, wide
variety of possible conflicts, the strategic mobility requirements to move
force elements to crisis areas, and the overseas base structure and
access rights necessary to support such force commitments.
3. Arms Control
The foregoing guidelines arc dictated by national security. It is
equally important to our security that we make a genuine effort in
arms control negotiations on both the strategic and regional levels,
seeking a more stable balance through a series of agreements.
Such agreements on an equitable and verifiable basis could provide
a reduction in the demand on defense resources, with no diminution
in national security, while enhancing overall stability and advancing
world peace.
C. S. 61)-%
cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, Energy Research and Development
Administration
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP81 B00080R001600090005-1