SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R00890A000900010024-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 30, 1999
Sequence Number:
24
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 30, 1957
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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![]() | 106.3 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2001 0010024-1
NSC BRIEFING 30 September 1957
SOVIET-YUGOSL&V RELATIONS
I. Since the June changes in the Soviet presidium, Yugoslavia has
been lining up more and more with the USSR on foreign policy
matters. This has been especially apparent since the Tito-
Khrushchev meeting in Rumania (1-2 August), when Khrushchev seems
to have done a real selling job.
25X1 C
= visiting Belgrade in
early September, was disappointed by the pro-Soviet attitude
of the Yugoslav leaders.
B. During Tito's meeting with Gomulka in mid-September, the
Yugoslavs officially endorsed the Oder-Neisse line.
C. Belgrade has accepted the Soviet-inspired Rumanian proposal for
a. Balkan conference, and probably had a hand in its preparation.
Opening of trade negotiations with East Germany on governmental
level is another step toward recognition of that country.
Finally, Marshal Zhukov is scheduled to arrive in Belgrade next
week (8 October).
1. After last year's military intervention in Hungary, Soviets
may feel Zhukov'is,.best man to reassure Tito that the USSR
is planning to go ahead gradually with a more liberal
policy in Eastern Europe.
2. It could also be that Khrushchev hopes that Zhukov can
lure Tito a. little closer wit pofi_q;Ef.er__o f -military
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II. With the removal of the leading Stalinists from the Soviet
leadership, Tito appears to be convinced that the present Soviet
leadership under Khrushchev stands for peace, liberalization and
a gradual decrease of Soviet interference in Satellite internal
affairs.
A. In his recent article for Foreign Affairs Tito asserts that
since death of Stalin things have reaILy changed for the
better in the USSR.
Yugoslavs claim that they support Khrushchev in order to
strengthen his position against Stalinist elements still
remaining in the Soviet party.
III. It is still not clear how far the Yugoslav leaders will move
toward Moscow, for some of them are apparently not too pleased
with Tito's present course.
25X1 C
0 who has recently visited Belgrade
says he knows that Kardelj and the Slovene party, as well as
parts of the Croat party, were opposed to the increasing
rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow a year ago, before
the Hungarian revolution. He believes that they feel the
same way today.
B. Such differences could explain the announcement last month
that the Yugoslav party congress--scheduled for November--has
been postponed until next April.
C. In any event all Yugoslav leaders are still determined to
maintain their national independence.,,
1. Although the Tito-Gomulka communique endorsed the Soviet
line on foreign policy issues, it reemphasized the right
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