AFRICAN COUP POSSIBILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 3, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 1152/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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F I
OCI No. 1152/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
3 March 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
African Coup Possibilities
1. Only a few African governments appear at
present immune to coups. South Africa, Tunisia,
Egypt, Zambia, and the Somali Republic are con-
sidered stable enough to be in no danger now.
Virtually all the others are so fragile that change
could come at almost any time. Among these, how-
ever, the following appear to be the best candi-
dates for quick and perhaps violent change: Burundi/
Rwanda, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, and the
Sudan.
2. All these countries possess most of the
usual shortcomings that make for instability. Their
governmental institutions lack competent administra-
tors, their economies have not fulfilled the post-
independence expectations of the people, and their
tribal and ethnic divisions have prevented the growth
of real national unity. There is usually a broad
gulf between the educated elite and the masses, and
many younger military and civilian officials covet
the positions held by the older generation. Political
power is generally centralized in the capital, and a
ridiculously small military or civilian group can
quickly seize the government machinery. Each state
also has its own particular-set of unsettling circum-
stances, as detailed below.
3. Burundi/Rwanda: Sharing a common history and
tribal makeup un i 0, and almost constantly at
odds since then, the two states are involved in plots
and international agitation against each other. Ex-
tremists seem likely to increase their power in
Burundi--possibly overthrowing the indolent King
Mwambutsa--which would lead to greater friction with
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democratic Rwanda. The extremists would encourage
the numerous exiled Rwanda tribesmen to invade their
former homeland.
4. Dahomey: General Soglo ousted the civilian
governmenT-37 Premier Ahomadegbe late last year. The
situation has not yet stabilized, and chances are
good that one or more coups will follow within the
year.
5. Ethiopia: The 73-yeax'-old Haile Selassie
is still the single dominant force through strength
of personality, political acumen, and resolve. How-
ever, as he ages, the number of his critics is in-
creasing, and they are becoming more vocal. Active
insurgency in five border provinces is such that the
military and police forces are fully occupied, and
any major outburst could overtax their ability to
control the country. A growing civilian and military
class of young educated elite is anxious for power
and for more rapid modernization. The Emperor has
been able to keep opposing forces in check by intimida-
tion, blandishment, and security control. His removal
from the scene, however, would immediately open the
floodgates to change.
6. Nigeria: The regime of General Ironsi still
faces possible action by junior officers who are no
longer constrained by their experienced seniors, many
.of whom were victims of the January coup. A number
of these junior officers have their own strong con-
cepts of the "New Nigeria," and they may not be in
accord with those of the Ironsi group. Ironsi will
be hard pressed to come up with satisfactory solutions
to Nigeria's staggering problems. His failure may
lead to a recrudescence of the regional and tribal
bitterness that was at the base of his own coup. The
result could be the fragmentation of Nigeria, and/or
more coups.
7. Uganda: The recent coup by Prime Minister
Obote agains he moderate forces in Uganda is prob-
ably unfinished. Obote has clearly won the first
round, but there are at least two potential moderate
factors-which have not been decisively dealt with as
yet. Moderate elements of the army, representing the
southern Bantu kingdoms, have not taken a clear-cut
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stand and may yet rally against Obote and his imposi-
tion of General Amin as military commander. Similarly,
political factions may unite around some moderate
leader, perhaps the King of Buganda, Uganda's largest
region. Buganda may even try to secede from Uganda.
In any of these events, Uganda could be plunged into
civil war.
8. The Sudan: The moderate coalition government
installed-Tam une is fumbling along, beset by a
limping economy and a serious rebellion in the south,
where separatist Negroes are fighting the northern
Arab army. The army has become disgusted with civilian
rule in Khartoum since stepping aside in 1964. It
may now feel that a return to authoritarian rule would
enable the country to achieve stability. Any move by
the military, however, would probably be carried out
in league with one of the civilian parties, most
likely a faction of the conservative Umma, which domi-
nates the present regime.
9. Less likely candidates as the scene of up-
-heaval, but still distinct possibilities, are Algeria,
some of the French-speaking states of West Africa,
and Congo (Leopoldville).
a. Algeria: Colonel Boumedienne has failed to
solve the nat on's pressing economic problems.!
b. West Africa: Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania,
and Togo are all in erently fragile, with administra-
tive shells that can be easily broken by dissatisfied
military, labor, student, or tribal elements. Congo
(Brazzaville) has been the subject of sporadic and
fragmentary reporting about dissension and possible
coup efforts, in part reflecting cross currents of
Sino-Soviet rivalry in the country.
c. Congo (Leopoldville): General Mobutu's
military regime is making very little progress in
solving his country's almost impossible problems.
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There is reportedly growing opposition to his rule,
and a coup effort would not be a surprise, although
none of the potential leaders appears to have suf-
ficient backing at present. Meanwhile, former
premier Tshomb6 is lurking in Europe, waiting to
make a comeback should Mobutu's fortunes decline
sufficiently.
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