POSITIONS OF THE POWERS ON BERLIN AND GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A000400080002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 30, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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POSITIONS OF THE
STATU OF THE CITY OF BERLIN
3461;79T01762A000400080002-5
/
ON
30 march 1959
AND GERMANY
Soviet Position: Essence: The Western powers ShQU1C withdraw from Berltn.
The Soviet Union proposes that West Berlin be made a free, demili-
tarized city, independent of both German. states. The UN can participate
in observing the free city status, which would be respected by the
four powers plus the two Germanies. AB 4 free aity, West Berlin would
not permit on its territory hostile and subversive activities directed
against the GDR or any other state.
While the Soviets at first demanded )that all foreign troops be
evacuated from the proposed free city and declared that the West
had lost its right to be in Berlin, Khruahchev on 9 March said
that a minimum number of troops of the Western powers, plus the
USSR, or neutral troupe, could be stationed in a free West Berlin.
On 20 March, he acknowledged the legal right of the Western powers
to be in West Berlin due to the capitulation of Germany; however,
he also Stated that a peace treaty between the GDR and the Soviet
Union would automatically cancel this right.
It is unlikely that the Soviets will agree to the inclusion
of East Berlin in a free city scheme.
Working Group Report. Essence: The Western powers Should not withdraw.
Any settlement Should permit the Western occupation troops to
remain in West Berlin. The present basis of our right to be in Berlin,
i.e., the right of conquest, Should be maintained. The Working Group
took note of some possible new arrangements for Berlin, while at the
Mime time criticizing these suggestions and making the point that the
cki
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present etatus is satisfactory. Per example, the West might agree to
terminate the occupation status of Berlin in return for a formal
quadripartite agreement giving the West the right to be there and
maintain access. The West might suggest reunifying Berlin on the
basis of free elections. Or the West might propose that West Berlin
become 4 tend of the Federal Republic. The Working Group felt that
the problem should be settled on a Four Power basis rather than a UN
basis, although, as a last resort the UN might participate.
Proneki,Vte
The French .eem to give
possibility of any different itatus o or Berlin, seeain determined
to preserve the prement arrangements.
t le consideration to the
1,0 GSY)004 Vik,/
Bonn probabi will be hard to convince that there is any other
acceptable status for Berlin than the one we have now. Certainly
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it is not pushing Any new plan, although individual CDU mem (like
Heck and Guttenberg) feel that a UN solution might work.
US View
The US is probably not seriously cons1deririg any change in thr
ettu of the city.
ACC88 TO WEST BOLIN
Soviet Poeition. Eseence: Travellere to and from Berlin will have
to deal with the Beet Germans
Btrtctiy- .peaklng, Soviet statements on Western access conflict
with the demand that the West evacuate Berlin. However, Shortly after
the ilitarization demand made in November, various Soviet statements
made tt clear that the USSR reoognized thin might not be &thieved, and
accordingly proposals on future &00041 were made. The Western powers
wouId have to come to arrangements with the GDR (though there was no
formal demand tor de jure recognition of the GDR). From Pankow, various
authoritative statements were made that no difficulties were to be
expeoted.
Original (Nov 274 turnover of controls would occur after six
montha. Subsequently, Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev, have
made this turnover contingent upon a peace treaty; if necessary, a
Soviet-GDR treaty. The six-month "deadline" is now disavowed.
Both the Soviete and East Germans have declared that, once a
turnover of functions occurs, if the West tries to force its way to
Berlin, the East will retaliate with force.
Working group Eepprt Essence; Not dealing with the East Germans in
best, but we might deal with them.
that the preeent arrangements are satisfactory, the
Working Group suggested alternatives. The two which it oharacterizid
am the moat acoeptab1e" were these: The Went would accept a formal
;
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nt of Sov1.et obligations to the GDR provided
gni
the GDR, and the USSR and ODR both guarantee that
the obligations will continue to be carried out for a stated period of
time, e.g., till Berlin is the capital of a united Germany.
The second possibility is 4 formal declaration by the ODR that It
will gUerantee us access until. Berlin becomes the capital of it
united Germany, notice of this declaration being conveyed to us by
the USSR.
Gbvious3y, in both of these courses. the West would de
East Germans once the guarantees were given.
The Group also noted that the UN might exercise reiponaibiUties
on the access routes,
th the
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?
Allies on the me.
e statements
to].. as Allied,
tinue on through
n particular', have been the most adamant
of maintaining SWOONS. re Gaulle has made
Ito the effect that we Should identify
ede nothing further to the Rest Normans
erlin, In his only public statement,
Donn otfioisls blieve that the West must ma
but they prefer to leave methods
the crisis arose, officials frequently couneelled
the Zest Normans, but th.y did not endorse an a
ut permission, ortaking to the air.
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o Berlin,
When
dealing with
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this &our
would prefer totest
without Slat Osman permission
edients. If our Allies will not
MeMil that the US might be willing
with the gait Gemmel!. the ODR is willing to guarantee our
440*WW.
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on is power bus .
eecuri y te a topic independent
urity measures should
The U3SR hae repetediy stated that Oennan reunif1oatton is not
a subject forfour-power negotiation, but rsther for the two Germanise
alone.The USSR, however, recommends reunification via confederation*
and endorses Pankow'; proposals in this regard. The most authoritative
statement is that of Ulbricht on 17 January* in which he proposed:
1. Formation of a 100-member all-Oerman Council on a parity
basis* the members to be named by the two parliaments from
among parliamentary deputies.
2. The Council is to elect its preiidi, whose tnitt*1 dutiee will
be to sign it peace treati on behalf of the confederation and
enter into oontact with other signatories re the implementation
of the peace treaty. Subsequently, the presidium could
negotiate with foreign states on sudh issues as foreign trade
Shipping, and scopes to world markets and international
organisations.
3. The Council is to deaj with suo! OlIt-CDR relation as abolishing
eonsoription in t Pederal flepubUc, putting a ceiling on armed
tomes* and economio matter intra-German trade, financial,
settlements* transport* social insuranoe, etc.). Commissions
are to be formed for these purposes.
The Council will have the right only to mcommend to the two
governments, which will retain their 'sovereignty,
5. The Council is to have only temporary existence. It will
prepare all-Osrman elections and draw up a constitution for a
united German state. Confederation will lapee when the peace
treaty provision* have been carried out, reunification has
(gummed* and all-aerman elections have been held,
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t
In respect to
barrage of proposals
eecurit the USSR has over the years rn
of whioh remain outstanding, concerning
troop withdrawals, arms limitations, general (inter-Bloc) security
pasts, and base evacuations. The latest official statement, in the
2 Peroh note, is another greb-bag oontaining the following;
I. reciprocal pullbaok of troops and establishment of a nuclear
weaponleas zone and a zone of disengagement between the NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces
2. reduction of forces of the four
of other states;
3. prohibition of atomic and ydrogen we nis1 and test t o
4. *and so on."
on the territory
Orouk Report. Essence;
UzdLet1on is four-power business, and
should go hand-in-hand with security
measures.
Though the ?Our Powers are responsible for German unifleatio
n changes can be mode in the poet Western formula in order to
take into acoount the Soviet contention that the Germans themselves
organize their elections, and the Soviet oritioism that under
rn plan the Vomit Germans would impose their will on the Bast
rmans wiping out the latterie "social achievements'. An all-derman
*commission oould run elections, and the .at German Lavender could have
the right to retain *social achievements*.
The Working Group developed a four-stage plan for Unification and
Aeourity as follows:
&TAGS I
Powers would t up a comm on to deal with reoiprooal
oerning Berlin and Germany.
The Four Powers would make a declaration that they will settle
peaceful means, that they will not transfer nuclear
waste into the custody of oountries in a Special Security Area
(all of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly ftngary) and
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that they are in pro e a of adjusting their armed forcei to these levels:
Franoe afld UK 7504000 each; US and USSR 2,500,000 each. (Prance has not
agreed) The Pour Powers would aleo say that they are not stationing
IRONs in the Special Seourity Areas (US has not agreed.)
each
MOE II
I fthiihed, the German
d be the step.;
n plan could
Committee would be formed of 2 rpresentat1veE
fl st Norman Leander and each of the five East German
Leander, pl one representative from West and Bast Bmrlin. The Committee
would have no executive &uthor1ty, but would 000rdinate technical
oontacts end would formulate prin iplea for free and direct election
of an all-Oerman Council.
One yeer after the convening of the Coumtttee, populaD elections
woia3.d take place in the Laender for an all-Oerman Council. Prior to the
election there would be free movement of people, ideas, and publications.
'Mach Land would have 3, 4, or 5 representatives, according to population.
The Council would make decisions by a two-thirds majority. It would
arry on the 000rdination of technical contacta and would formulate
draft law for elections to an all-Oerman assembly, as well as a law
to establigh the authority of a provisional government to be met up.
The Council would also develop principles for a popular referendum on
the two laws.
One year after the formation of the Council,
on the two laws would take place. If approved, t
Pour ?Oilers for their approval.
During this Stage, certain security
rendum
to the
&sures would be taken with
respect to surprise attack prot?cton. French have not agreed. An
exchange of information on military forces in the Special Security Area
would be undertaken. After agreement on an inspection system, the
countriea in the Speoial Security Area would pledge not to produce
ABC weapons.
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ii
months after the referendum on the two laws, and about 30
after the-unification process started, elections for an all-German
Assembly would behId-
The Assembly would start drafting a-conatitOieei
nths
a,provis onal
German government would be net Up, replacing the Bonn and
rnments. This provisional government would enjoy freedom of
anoe, and would enter into negotiations with the Pour Powers on
pee?. treaty.
At the time
government wAs formed, ceilings would
effect on the armed forces of all countries in the Special Se
Area, and the Big ?bur would agree to limit their own forces in this
Are*, Moreover, upon the inetallation of an inspection system, the
Your Powers would reduce their armed forces to the following levels:
Pram, and UK 700,000 each; US and USSR 2,100,000 each. When compliance
has been verified, the Big Pour would further reduce their forces
to these levels; Frame and the UK 650,000 each; US and USSR 1,700,000
each. (Prance has not agreed.) The levels for other essentiel
states would also be negotiated.
If Germany chose to join an alliance, the disposition of its military
f roes might be regulated. If Germany decided to join a collective
security pact, the lbw Powers would be ready to join other parties in
a treaty of assurance, and agree also not to advance their foram, beyond
the former interzonal border.
The
all the states
The OS hail a
de for unification
WAGE
11 be signed by the all-Germsn governmen
t war with Germany.
rsion of the above plan, The US plan would
achieved within three years. A Wee
would be formed of two delegates from each land in Bast and West Germany,
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vote.
social
The ef tasks of the Conrntuion would be to draft an
would m of elections) and a
The Gomm sion would make decisions by a two-thirds
onstituti?would establish a German Federal Union, leaving
oonomic matters to the Leander legislatures. The constitution
would be, approved by the Pour Powers, and then by the people. Wring
the three-year period pending the implementation of the constitution,
the Commission would coordinate technical matters of common OER-OPR
concern,
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ted in effect
on the bikes of free elections and freedom of al i .
want to leave Germany divided, nor does it went to
Germany on a bails of none-alliance.
The US1 screover, has never been in favor of security measures
which do not had to more general disarmament or to political
benefits.
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PEACE TREATY
Soviet Position. Essence: A peace treaty without unification.
In its note of 10 January, the USSR called for a peace treaty
between all opponents of Nazi Germany (including Communist China)
and the two Getman states plaa (not 92) any confederation which had
in 'the meantime come into being. Moscow said that a treaty should
be worked out et a conference to be convened within two months (this
deadline passed without note on 10 March)*
MI4or Provisions of the Treaty:-
1. Withdrawal of both Oermanies from their military pacts and
the prohibition of any military alliances of which all Pour Powers
are not members;
2. eeognit1ou of the existing German frontiere;
3. Guarantee of personal freedoms;
4. Unhampered activity of political parties except for
a. Nazi and revanchist parties;
b. Al]. organizations, including emigrant bodies, which
conduct hostile activity against treaty signatories. (It
Is also forbidden to grant political asylum to persons affil-
iated with such organizations);
5. Promise to foreswear force in seeking reunification;
6. Pending reunification, West Berlin is to be a demilitarized
free city;
7. German land, air, and naval forces are needed for national
defense, with the: following prohibitions:
a-. Mb production, acquisition, or experimentation with ABC
weapons;
b. No rockets, guided missiles, or launching/guiding i 1-
Iations;
c. No bomber aircraft or submarines;
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8. ra of foreign tro pa within one year or within agreed
time limits; in the latter case, a one-third reduction to be accom-
plished within six months;
9. Cloaing of foreign bases upon withdrawal of troops and sub-
sequent prohiition against foreign troops or bases.
The Soviet Union and East Germany have repeatedly threatened to
sign a "separate" peace treaty, in the event that a peace treaty
acceptable to both German states cannot be found. However, there
wax no mention of a Soviet-GDR peace treaty in the Soviet-East German
communiqud which resulted from Khrushehevls March visit to the GDR.
Working Group Report. Essences A peace treaty only after unification.
While adhering to the standard Western position that a peace treaty
n be signed only with an all-German government, the Working Group
felt that negotiations might be conducted before German unification,
subject to the overriding proviso that the position of an all-Oerman
government is reserved.
The Working Group, however, was not able to reach any decision
as to Whether the West should put forth a draft peace treaty or even
a statement of principles to govern a treaty. It felt that "in the
present circumstances," it is difficult for the Western Powers to make
proposals on frontiers or the political or military status of a united
Germany.
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CONFERENCES
Soviet Position.
On 19 March, Khruahchev accepted a foreign ministers' conference
for 11 Nay. The USSR bas indicated that it wants representatives of
both German states, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as the foreign
minieters of the Big Powers, to participate in the proposed conference.
The agenda, in the Soviet view, would be Berlin and a German peace
treaty.
Although the Soviet kion has agreed to a foreign min10e meet-
ing, it evidently is intent on a four-power summit conference. There,
the Soviets would probably agree to discuss a wider range of problems.
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Westrn Position.
The Western Powers have proposed a foreign ministers' conference
for U. ifty in Geneva. East and West Germans would be present as con-
sultants, and Polish and Czech representatives would be there in the
"later stages" in which European security rather than Germany would
be discussed.
With differences on emphasis, the individual Western Powers have
indicated that they would be willing to enter a four-power surmit
meeting in the summer. They intend to express their thoughts on Ger-
man unification, regardless of the Soviet attitude.
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