BUT WHICH CITIES WILL WE PROTECT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090034-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 8, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090034-9
But Which Cities
Will We Protect?
By Marquis Childs
United Feature syndicate
THE DEBATE behind the closed
doors of the House Armed Services
Committee last week was a weird mix-
ture of far-out science fiction and court-
house politics. The subject: Should an
immediate start be made in installing
an anti-ballistic missile system and
where?
Secretary of Defense Robert S. Mc-
Namara presented his case for holding
off to see if an aggreement can be
reached with the Soviet Union to stop
this threatening new round In the
nuclear arms race. Gen. Earle G.
Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, made his argument for going
ahead on the ground that an ABM
system will help to deter the Soviet
Union from starting a nuclear war.
Then the fireworks began. The Army
has two separate plans for deploying
an ABM system. Since no system could
protect the entire Nation, one plan
would protect 25 cities, the other and
more costly system 50 cities.
But which cities? Several committee
members complained bitterly that they
saw no reason why Washington should
determine who will have a chance to
live and who will be condemned to die
in the event of a nuclear attack. They
wanted to know how the cities were
chosen.
c+_9
THE WITNESS was Lt. Gen. Austin
W. Betts, chief of research and develop-
ment for the Army. He said the decision
was made by computer on the basis of
density of population. Then why, critical
committee members demanded, is
Charleston, S.C., on the list of 25?
There was a certain amount of wry
snickering around the table. It happens
that Charleston is the home town of
L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the com-
mittee and an unfailing champion of
military against civilian authority.
Nothing could show more dramatical-
ly the difficulty, if not the impossibility,
quite apart from the technical problems
of trying to protect part of the Nation
and conceding that aside from. the 25
or 50 cities the balance will face nuclear
attack undefended. There was even
apme grumbling, that Washington should
be on the list. Protect all those bureau-
This is, probably, why McNamara
Will win the debate. That depends, of
course, on how the talks with the
Soviets on limiting both offensive and
defensive weapons progress following
Premier Alexei N. Kosygin's go-ahead
in his letter to President Johnson.
The difference between McNamara
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is simple.
Wheeler's argument for going ahead
with the first $330 million of spending
to put an ABM system in place is based
on the contention that the Soviet Union
will not respond by stepping up its
offensive missile power. Therefore, the
United States would be in a much more
secure position with the ABM.
a,"
McNAMARA, on the other hand, sees
no reason at all to doubt that the
Soviets will respond by putting in
more missiles and more powerful
missiles. Both sides will, in short,
escalate at enormous cost and at the
end of a decade the nuclear standoff
will be virtually what it is today, with
casualties on each side in the order of
90 million to 120 million.
In his testimony McNamara dis-
missed the conflict within the intelli-
gence community over just what the
Soviets are doing in putting ABMs
around Moscow and in developing a
system called Tallinn which may or
may not be superior. It doesn't matter,
McNamara said in effect. We are in-
creasing our offensive capability--
already three to four times that of the
Soviets-to such a point that it will off-
set even the most-advanced defense
system.
On the cost of an ABM system the
Secretary of Defense was unequivocal.
He told the committee: "I'm willing to
bet you now and give you ten-to-one
odds that if I come back here at the
end of a decade and a ballistic missile
defense has been installed the bill will
not be less than $40 billion."
Actually, as with all Pentagon price
tags, the estimated initial cost is likely
to be no more than a down payment.
If you protect against missiles, so the
argument will go, then you must also
put in a defense system against manned
bombers. And with an ABM in place
you can hardly survive without an un?
derground shelter system. Up to $2 bil-
lion has already been spent on Nike-
Zeus and Nike X missile research. The
new budget provides an added $440 mil-
lion. This is, in short, a critical moment
inlthe Jopg seesaw of the nuclear arms
race.
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