COMMENTS ON PHOTINT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800040012-1
.....III Ib'IL. I1 I Irl I..
low,
IAS-116/74
13 September 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy Chief, Product Review
Division, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT Comments on PHOTINT
1. Herewith my informal comments on the draft forwarded with
2. This draft is an improvement over the previous one, but
it still misses the mark. It retains misperceptions which can only
stem from a superficial investigation of the subject under study! and
the continued reference to the PHOTINT exploitation community
when referring only to NPIC is misleading the reader. I'm disappointed
that there still have been no formal interviews with lAS managers or
workers--contrary to what might be inferred from paragraph 7--which
might have dispelled some of the misperceptions. I am also struck
by the presentation of single solutions to the problems raised, with
no consideration of feasible alternatives.
memorandum of 30 August 1974.
3. Most of the problems cited in this paper are unique to NPIC
because of the nature of its role and mission, and they are not
necessarily shared by other PHOTINT components--certainly not by
IAS. These matters pose problems for NPIC, because that component
is charged with immediate exploitation of imagery in support of the
intelligence community. NPIC has many customers from various
agencies competing for its services, and in crisis situations it may
be swamped with conflicting or overlapping requirements. lAS
serves only one agency, and in crisis situations receives requirements
from only two or three different points within CIA. These requirements
and their relative priorities are closely monitored by lAS management,
and conflicts resolved through negotiation with requestors.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800040012-1
 t omP1t)1=R1T1?I
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800040012-1
,WWI, -14W
SUBJECT: Comments on PHOTINT
4. I concur fully, however, in the concept of having the NlO
play a greater role in coordinating and prioritizing requirements for
imagery exploitation by NPIC in support of community crisis task force
reporting needs. I believe the paper should, however, examine the
option of having the NIO do this, through some streamlined variant of the
existing USIB directed COMIREX/EXSUBCOM mechanism rather than
layering on an NPIC liaison officer. The NlO's. can influence requirements
levied on the "departmental" PHOTINT components--IAS and DI-8--
indirectly as they levy crisis-related tasks on the production components
of their parent agencies. As a minimum, paragraph 15 needs reworking
to eliminate the confusing misuse of the term "collectors" when
exploitation elements presumably are intended.
5. The second major thrust of the paper--integration of crisis-
related PHOTINT exploitation resources into a joint effort--can be justified
only if all crisis-related production components in the community are
similarly integrated. Central to the problem stated in paragraph 18
is that CIA and DIA have separate intelligence production actitivies,
and that, in CIA at least, not all production resources concerned with a
crisis area are placed in the current intelligence crisis task force. Most
production offices retain some resources to prepare estimative or in-depth
analytical studies which complement the work of the task force. The work
of these elements will usually be in the purview of the NIO, and is in
support of national requirements. Direct PHOTINT support of such
studies is the mission of IAS, and the detailed imagery analysis required
differs from the quick exploitation of standing requirements performed
by NPIC. These functions are best kept separate and distinct, to
ensure that each is effectively accomplished without detriment to the
other.
6. Another function served by IAS--in the process of
assimilating imagery into its files for later use in detailed analysis--
is that of providing a "second look" at the film. This "second look"
may be redundant, but so is the reading of collateral reports by more
than one person in the production offices. That "second look" has
often corrected serious errors in initial PHOTINT reports. The
arguments presented in paragraphs 19 and 20 imply that the intelligence
consumer needs his information "quick" rather than "right"--that
accuracy is less important than speed. I would suggest that in the
incident cited in paragraph 19--which is not accurately described--
the delay was less critical than the difference in numbers. In any event
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800040012-1
 ( f omPInWMTIAI
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800040012-1
tir
SUBJECT: Comments on PHOTINT
the cost of the "second look" can be justified on the basis of the
confidence it engenders in the accuracy of analysis ultimately presented
to the consumer.
7. Finally, the ambivalence of paragraphs 21 and 22 is not
helpful to the reader. The Director of NPIC already has a charter to
support the community by immediate exploitation of imagery. In a
crisis situation he uses only a fraction of his own resources in this
task. He has no responsibility for direct support of departmental needs,
and there is no sound justification for diluting his immediate read-out
responsibility by giving him that added task in a crisis, in the absence
of the total integration of all DIA and CIA crisis-related production
activities.
GEORGE W. ALLEN
Director
Imagery Analysis Service
Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800040012-1