FRANCE: PROSPECTS FOR THE OPPOSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R002400140003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Secret
Intelligence
Council
France: Prospects
for the Opposition (v)
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Secret
NIC M 81-10016
December 1981
Copy 1 .0 0 6
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Foreign -Secret
Assessment
Center
France: Prospects
for the Opposition (u)
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Information available as of 3 December 1981
was used in the preparation of this report.
This Memorandum was coordinated within the
National Intelligence Council (NIC), the National
Foreign Assessment Center, and the Directorate of
Operations. Comments are welcome and should be
addressed to its authorl f the NIC
Analytic Grou
Secret
NIC M 81-10016
December 1981
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Secret
France: Prospects
for the Opposition (u)
Summary In the presidential and legislative elections last spring, the French voters
gave President Francois Mitterrand and the parties of the left the power to
bring about a profound transformation of the structures of French society
and the economy. The voters did not, however, give the Socialist-led
government anywhere near the popular mandate for change it claims. The
demographic base for the left is solid, but the elections were closer than
they appeared and the nature and extent of the change desired by the
voters was ambiguous.
Hardening opposition within the business community and the center-right
political parties to the government's plans thus has potentially broader
support within the country than the narrow parliamentary base of the
opposition would suggest. True, the absolute majority of the Socialists in
parliament means that they can override opposition to their plans to
nationalize major industries and banks; but obtaining cooperation from
business in combating unemployment-now at 2 million-and in creating
new private investment is proving difficult. Polls indicate that 83 percent of
business executives have not changed their hiring policies, and more than
half of French medium and small businesses have no plans to invest.
Private enterprise has been mollified by the presence in the government of
such ministers as the moderate and respected Jacques Delors at Finance,
but disconcerted by taxation measures that will increase labor costs and by
proposals for worker participation in management that will erode manage-
rial authority.
The center-right represents up to 48 percent of the electorate and its main
argument-that the French voters do not want radical change '-has
merit. The Socialist victory last spring had many unique aspects that were
circumstantial and unrelated to the appeal of a new model of socialism.
Among them were: the spoiler role played by Gaullist leader Jacques
Chirac and the two other Gaullist presidential candidates, Michel Debre
and Marie-France Garaud; the disavowal of Communist leader Georges
Marchais by a million Communist voters; the personal rejection of ex-
President Giscard by many Gaullists and centrists.
The center-right actually outpolled the left in the first round of the
presidential election: the four candidates of the right won just under 49
The conservative Le Figaro likens the average Socialist voter to an individual who thinks
he is attending Mass but finds out he is expected to enroll in the Trappist Order.
iii Secret
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percent of the vote to the left's 47 percent. And the Socialist sweep in the
subsequent legislative election-frequently described as a landslide-came
not from an increase in the left's strength-the left polled about what it did
in 1978-but from a severe dip in the right's score, largely caused by
abstentions.
The Socialists nonetheless appear determined to change the way economic
power is used in order to reduce inequalities and stimulate the economy.
Both Mitterrand and Prime Minister Mauroy have even warned that
socialism will become "more radical" if the opposition continues to resist;
that is, that they will no longer restrain Socialist Party elements pressing
for more rapid implementation of campaign promises. For the time being,
the government and the Socialist Party are playing a game of carrot and
stick: Mauroy and Mitterrand preach moderation and consensus, while the
Socialist Party talks of class struggle-its main targets are the banks,
certain upper levels of the administration, and the Patronat (the leading
French employers organization), which has been traditionally close to the
Gaullist party.
It is a delicate game, difficult to sustain in the current atmosphere of
acrimonious confrontation between left and right. Twenty-three years in
opposition have created an adversarial mentality in the Socialists that the
attaining of government power has not dislodged, and the right's mistrust
of Socialist intentions is profound. In addition, the French Socialists'
inexperience and fear of failure-some call it the Allende complex-are
such that they are overly defensive and the opposition may eventually
shape itself up enough to be able to take advantage of it.
At present, the center-right is in the process of organizing itself and
choosing its targets, conscious that-barring economic debacle-it will be
out of power at least until the legislative election of 1986. But in the
meantime its cooperation and good will is needed if the socialist experiment
is to have a chance to succeed.
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Secret
France: Prospects
for the Opposition (u)
Mitterrand's Mandate
It is difficult to sort out what was circumstantial in
the center-right's defeat last spring and what had
deeper causes. It will never be known now whether a
better organized campaign by ex-President Giscard
could have overcome his handicaps: the wear and tear
of power and the prospect of seven more years of the
same; Giscard's haughty personal style and gradual
loss of contact with political realities; the handicaps of
inflation and unemployment; the divisions and even
"treachery" within the center-right; a pervasive
"throw the rascals out" attitude, plus a strong desire
for change. Giscard had to make a strong effort to
reverse elements unfavorable to himself; Mitterrand
had only to be himself and talk to young voters of
their roots, of history, socialism, justice, and freedom,
while stressing Giscard's economic shortcomings.
What is clear is that Giscard needed both the cooper-
ation of the Gaullists and the indirect support of the
Communists to win. He received neither. The Com-
munist Party leadership, who wanted Mitterrand's
defeat but could not provoke it in too visible a fashion,
helped bring about his victory. One-fourth of Commu-
nist voters-a million-gave their votes to Mitterrand
in the first round of the presidential elections, and
Communist leader Marchais' paltry score of 15 per-
cent removed the fear of moderate voters that a
Socialist government would be held hostage by the
Communists. Faced with Mitterrand's good showing
in the first round, the Communist leadership capitu-
lated and urged their voters to vote for Mitterrand in
the second.
As for the Gaullists, even had Gaullist leader Chirac
been less equivocal in public
about his support for iscar , it is question-
able that the voters would have followed his instruc-
tions given the barrage of Gaullist criticism of the
Giscard government, which dates from Chirac's resig-
nation in 1976, and a Gaullist antipathy toward
Giscard so strong that 800,000 voters who had first
cast their ballots for Chirac did not vote for Giscard
in the final round. Giscard shares part of the responsi-
bility for this antipathy, for he never seriously tried to
heal the divisions in the ex-majority. His goal-as
expressed in his book French Democracy-was to
incarnate the spirit of a new middle class majority
located somewhere between the disadvantaged and
the most advantaged, whose political goals are poised
between revolution and conservatism. But by cutting
himself off from the Gaullists, he risked opening the
way to the Socialist accession to power.
Some aspects of the defeat could have been mitigated;
for example, the personal rejection of a President who
had progressively lost his "human dimension" and
had been touched by personal scandal; and the loss of
confidence in ex-Prime Minister Raymond Barre,
who probably should have been replaced. But it was
above all a badly run election campaign marked by
strategic errors by Giscard and his staff that made the
center-right more vulnerable. After the "divine sur-
prise" of the left's defeat in the legislative election of
1978, the former majority was too confident that the
left had been historically and definitively beaten,
overlooking the left's success in local elections in
1977. It was on this base that the left would build for
its victory in 1981. In addition, the 1981 presidential
and legislative elections themselves set up their own
dynamic, with the Socialist Party later profiting from
the euphoria and bandwagon effect of Mitterrand's
presidential victory.
It can be argued, however, that the Socialist victory
came not from a great leftist elan but from a drop in
rightist support. The left's score in the second round
at the legislative election in 1981 was about what it
was in 1978, but the right lost 10 points compared
with 1978. Many voters who habitually voted for the
right-particularly wage earners and people of mod-
est origin-felt they could not in conscience vote for
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the left but chose to abstain, apparently hoping there
might be something to be gained from a Socialist
victory. Other formerly rightist voters evidently be-
lieved that the proper functioning of French institu-
tions required that both parliament and the Elysee
have the same political orientation, which led them
also to abstain.
And, ironically, the two-round electoral system set up
to help the Gaullists, and which the Socialists had
repeatedly attacked, gave the Socialists a bonus of
seats. It is questionable whether the Socialists' 285
seats in the 491-seat parliament, which consigns
France's three other major parties to the political
sidelines, represents their true popular strength. The
Communists have repeatedly pointed out that if the
elections had been held under proportional represen-
tation, which the Socialists have long advocated, the
Communists' 44 seats would have been doubled.
But there were other causes of the defeat that the
center-right knows it must redress if it is to regain
power. Wage earners make up more than 80 percent
of the French work force, but the Giscardians had
gradually lost touch with them, and with the young.
After a reformist start (for which some of his elector-
ate never forgave him), Giscard's policies became
more conservative. He became more a manager than
an innovator and ceased trying to be a "centrist"
president to what was largely a rightist electorate. He
was also at a disadvantage since his party was only a
junior partner in a coalition in which many of the
senior Gaullists viewed him as a usurper.
In addition, the electoral base for the moderate left
has been growing over the last 20 years at the expense
of the conservative and Communist parties. The influ-
ence of the Catholic Church in traditionally conserva-
tive areas has lessened as the country has become de-
Christianized and has become transformed; Catholics
concerned by social justice have become more likely to
vote Socialist. The peasant class, bastion of the right,
has virtually disappeared. In fact, of the three pillars
of the traditional right-the Patronat, local notables,
and the clergy-only the Patronat remains strong. It
can be asked then why France did not vote left before
1981. Part of the reason lies in the existence until
recently of a strong Communist party. Another reason
is that socioeconomic status does not necessarily
dictate a political choice: cultural, family, and region-
al factors intrude.
The diffusion of middle class ideas, new categories of
workers and voters, and the entry of more women in
the labor force all helped the French Socialists, who
have a strong appeal for the middle class; at almost
every level of the salaried hierarchy, Mitterrand
attracted more voters than Giscard. These included
sectors where the Giscardians thought they had an
advantage-middle- and upper-level managers, the
liberal professions, and the retired. Also helping the
leftist victory were the perceived economic failures of
the outgoing administration; two-digit inflation, and a
regular increase in unemployment.
The left in power is a sociological paradox-a phe-
nomenon of modernity in that it represents the inte-
gration of rural areas, formerly conservative and
Catholic, at least temporarily into the leftist tradition.
One of the most ironic aspects of the spring elections
is that the emergence of a new cultural-sociological
majority that Giscard had foreseen and encouraged
ultimately profited Mitterrand.
Does this mean that electoral demography condemns
the center-right to impotence? To the extent that its
defeat was self-inflicted, no. To the extent that a key
swing vote-perhaps as much as 10 percent-no
longer considers itself bound by party labels and is
willing to shift between left and right, no. The
increasing difficulties of daily life and the failure of
the Socialists to cope adequately may also eventually
push the middle classes back into the arms of the
center-right. Obviously, the political opposition's pros-
pects rise as the ruling party falters.
But barring economic upheaval caused by Socialist
policies, the center-right is probably condemned to a
cure in opposition of at least five years. The next
legislative election is in 1986, the presidential in 1988.
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There are, however, cantonal elections in 1982 and
municipal elections in 1983; both the government and
opposition will be watching these elections for signs of
a shift in voter sympathy.
Confusion in the Opposition: After the Election
Giscard and the UDF. Within the amorphous UDF
(Union for French Democracy), the umbrella organi-
zation of Republicans, centrists, and Radicals that
backed Giscard in 1978, the conditions that contribut-
ed to the center-right's defeat still exist and have
become more acute with the loss of the assets of
incumbency. Giscard, who once provided the cement
of power to a group that was never cohesive, now
divides the UDF. The centrists believe that "Christian
Democracy" or even "Social Democracy" has more of
a future than Giscardism, dream of a centrist presi-
dential candidate, and want to mark their autonomy.
The Radicals, who now have only two deputies in
parliament, are even more restive. All realize, howev-
er, that any splintering of the UDF will make it easier
for Chirac to become leader of the opposition and
severely damage their chances in future elections.
The UDF is likely to stay together, at least as a
parliamentary group perhaps under some other name,
and work out some method of dialogue and coopera-
tion with the RPR on parliamentary and electoral
matters. Both the UDF and RPR are united in
opposition to most Socialist/Communist projects.
They differ somewhat on tactics, with the RPR
advocating systematic, unequivocal opposition and the
UDF pushing for a more selective approach.
Although before the spring elections there was talk of
defections from the UDF if the Socialists won, it is
unlikely that any of its elements will seek or be
offered accommodation with the Socialists. The So-
cialists' large majority, the presence of Communists in
the government, and the Socialists' mistrustful, sec-
tarian approach toward the ex-majority (the ex-major-
ity returns the favor) have produced a polarization
that has kept almost all opposition elements firmly in
opposition. In that sense, Mitterrand has given the
opposition a unity that it could not achieve when it
was the governing coalition.
Giscard is eager to reenter the political fray and is
known to be contemplating pruning those elements
from the UDF who oppose him to form a new liberal
party that he hopes will occupy the space between the
Socialists on the left and the Gaullists on the right.
But troops are scarce now that the Socialists have co-
opted so many centrist voters. And it is difficult to
exercise leadership when most of Giscard's advisers
are urging him to hold back until the aura of defeat
dissipates, his credibility is reestablished, and Social-
ist popularity starts to decline.
Giscard is holding himself in tactical reserve. He has
a political staff in Paris, his loyalists are forming new
study groups to develop themes and programs, and he
has a key spokesman in Jean-Francois Deniau, Gis-
cardian ex-minister and political strategist. Giscard's
popularity increased six points in an October poll-to
44 percent-perhaps indicating that his advisers were
right; Chirac polled 36 percent, Barre 34 percent.
Chirac takes the lead, however, when it becomes a
question of who should lead the opposition.
There is a young group within Giscard's own Republi-
can Party (PR), however, that is not totally committed
to Giscard. They believe that although Giscard may
have a political future, some other leader and poten-
tial presidential candidate may emerge. This group, in
which Francois Leotard, a deputy from southern
France, appears to be a rising star, has its own
political ambitions and would like to wrest the party
leadership away from unconditional Giscard loyalists.
They favor elections at all levels of the UDF and a
more collegial leadership.
Giscard's Republican Party, the largest component in
the UDF, has come a long way from the elitist groups
that first rallied around Giscard. But, though numer-
ous, it is still not a real political party. In the past no
true Giscardian party apparat existed, since both
strategy and tactics were dictated principally from the
Elysee. Loyalty to Giscard and his "advanced liberal
society" is still the major guiding principle for most in
the PR, and genuine, ideological debate has been
scant. The party lacks the tried and tested political
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personalities that have made their way up through the
ranks of the Socialist Party. Giscardians have been
notably absent from union activity and other social/
interest groups. A younger generation of Giscardians
is trying to remedy this by targeting the young civil
servants, salaried workers, and technicians who voted
for Giscard in 1978 but switched to Mitterrand in
1981. It is hard, however, for the new opposition to
unlearn its bad habits quickly.
The absence of a real Republican Party, which was
certainly due in large part to Giscard's authoritarian
and loner style of leadership, ultimately worked
against the ex-President, for it deprived him of a
useful barometer of influence and information and of
a mechanism by which a younger generation of
leaders could be developed. Giscard clearly counted
on a second seven-year presidential term to prepare
for his succession. He is now almost certainly aiming
at a second run for the presidency in 1988, at which
time he will be 62, younger than Mitterrand was when
he assumed the presidency.
But Giscard is no longer calling all the shots and some
of his attempts to impose his will on the UDF from
behind the scenes have failed. Giscard's future prob-
ably hinges to a great extent not only on the incum-
bent regime's failures but on his ability to project an
image of a "new Giscard"-less authoritarian and
more attuned to change; less precious and more
compassionate. Giscard's assets are: his age, 55,
which gives him time to create a new political image;
a political base (he received 48 percent of the vote in
the recent presidential election and there are over 200
political clubs loyal to him); and the prestige-a bit
tarnished-of having been chief of state.
Chirac and the Gaullists. Chirac's strategy is simple:
a) be prepared to harvest the fruits of discontent and
disorder once Socialist policies fail; and b) reestablish
order and reinstitute the old rules of French capital-
ism, eschewing the "advanced liberal democracy" of
which Giscard was so enamored. Chirac's tactics aim
first at capturing new local offices for the RPR (Rally
for the Republic in the municipal elections in 1983, in
which his own seat as major of Paris will be at stake.
Chirac hopes for a smashing personal victory in Paris
and is likely to get it, for more than 60 percent of
Parisians are happy with his energetic stewardship of
the city.
The RPR is strong in militants but weak in elected
officials: at least 50 of France's 95 departments have
no RPR deputies in the National Assembly. In addi-
tion, because it was the old hands in the RPR who
survived the Socialist election victory-77 percent of
RPR deputies are more than 50 years old (as com-
pared with 29 percent of Socialist deputies). Chirac
hopes to rejuvenate the RPR and enlarge its political
base by bringing under its wing individuals who
supported his presidential candidacy (he received 18
percent of the vote) but had no previous ties to the
RPR. He hopes to do this in part through a new
political club (Club 89) whose goal is to define a
contemporary definition of Gaullism. Chirac obvious-
ly hopes to "recenter" a movement both his allies and
adversaries place on the right of the political
spectrum.
Although there certainly must be some grumbling
within the RPR over Chirac's partial responsibility
for giving France seven years of Socialist rule, he
appears to be master of his party, whether or not he
reassumes the RPR presidency, which he gave up to
run for president last spring. Gaullist barons, such as
Oliver Guichard, who supported Giscard in the Gis-
card-Chirac feud, have returned to the fold, illustrat-
ing again de Gaulle's description of the Gaullists: "the
Gaullists are like wolves-they devour each other, but
hunt together."
As for Giscard, many Gaullists think-perhaps wish-
fully-that for the ex-President "the page has
turned." Chirac has multiplied conciliatory gestures
toward the UDF, estimating-perhaps correctly-
that the number of Giscardians with an undying
loyalty toward Giscard who are motivated by revenge
against Chirac are few.
Chirac's analysis of the center-right's electoral defeat
focuses on the wear and tear of the many years in
power and on Giscard's "inability to adapt to the
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evolution of French society." He believes, as he said
frequently during his presidential campaign, that
Barre should have concentrated on unemployment
rather than inflation and believes that the center-right
can regain the some 3 million votes it lost between
March 1978 and June 1981. Wherein lies the opposi-
tion's major problem: to regain power for whose
benefit?
Chirac would be a logical choice if his scenario of
Socialist failure/cum disorder actually takes place.
Whether or not he can win over sufficient Giscardian
and centrist voters to be a credible presidential candi-
date in 1988 is another matter. That he is determined
to do so and has a comparatively united party behind
him are among Chirac's assets, not the least of which
is his ability to tack into whatever wind seems to be
blowing in his direction. Chirac is at a disadvantage,
however, in that the Socialists have managed to co-opt
a considerable portion of Gaullist voters as well as at
least a part of the Gaullist heritage: a strong role for
France in the world, national independence founded
on the force defrappe, presidential power. Chirac also
has a credibility gap because of his long association
with the Giscardian government.
New Faces. The fall parlimentary season has made
stars of a number of young RPR and UDF deputies.
Among them are: Jacques Toubon, an RPR deputy
from Paris and a close associate of Chirac; Francois
d'Aubert (UDF), Charles Millon (UDF), and Jacques
Godfrain (RPR). Whether they are acting as stalking
horses for their respective chiefs or have a political
future is not yet clear. Particularly in the UDF, young
stars tend to appear and then disappear with
frequency.
Another old "new face" in the opposition is ex-Prime
Minister Raymond Barre, who was brilliantly reelect-
ed deputy in the midst of an overall electoral debacle
in which the center-right lost half of its seats. His
acerbic wit and didactic manner, coupled with his
lack of a political party base, makes him an unlikely
prospect for opposition leader, but he should probably
not be counted out. At the least, he will be an effective
and eloquent spokesman for the opposition in
parliament.
Another ex-Prime Minister, Jacques Chaban-Del-
mas, who tried to sell former President Pompidou a
Gallic version of the Johnsonian "great society,"
appears to be developing his own personal style of
opposition. He does not believe in an early comeback
for Giscard nor does he think Chirac is the man of the
hour. He hopes for a new liberal center-left, as does
Olivier Stirn, a former minister under Giscard. Stirn
announced this month the organization of a new
"social liberal" movement, which will try to reconcile
Social Democracy and economic liberalism. He
claims that his movement, which will hold its first
convention in February, will bring together deputies,
union members, and personalities like Edgar Faure
and Simone Veil. Stirn reproaches the ex-center-right
majority for its "dogmatism."
However laudable such attempts may be to give the
opposition a more center-left orientation, they run up
against the present two-round voting system, which
condemns Giscardians and Gaullists to cooperation, at
least on the second round. Proportional representa-
tion, which the Socialists are on record as favoring,
could make a big difference in party alignments.
However, it is most unlikely that the Socialists would
introduce a form of proportional representation that
risked undermining their local and regional control.
Current Socialist plans are apparently to see how the
1983 municipals go and then reconsider PR.
The Socialists still hold most of the cards. They have
the time and the will to create a new model of
socialism and if they master the economy, Mitterrand
will be considered a great and innovative president.
The question is whether the Socialists will be suffi-
ciently flexible if their experiment starts to falter.
This is as true of the moderates as it is of the party's
dogmatic, sectarian wing.
Status of the Center-Right. None of the issues that
agitate the center-right opposition arouse great popu-
lar interest. Neither nationalizations, which a major-
ity of the French support in the belief that they mean
job security; the wealth tax; nor the 1982 budget,
which has a large deficit, are controversial on a broad
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scale. Such issues have, however, given the formal
political opposition a target against which it can
tentatively unite for the first time since its electoral
defeat last spring.
The center-right has been durably changed and deep-
ly shaken by its defeat. Its magnitude has strength-
ened elements within it who want to create more
democratic party structures and rejuvenate them,
build up grass-roots support and-in the Giscardian
Union for French Democracy (UDF) look for new
leadership. How this will square with the authoritar-
ian tendencies of Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac, ex-
President Giscard and ex-Prime Minister Barre re-
mains to be seen.
So far the Giscardian UDF and the Gaullist Rally for
the Republic (RPR) parliamentary groups have been
working well together. In large part this represents
the willingness of a younger generation to forget the
personal quarrels of their leaders. The staffs of the
two parties, minus Chirac and UDF head Jean Leca-
nuet but with their blessing, met in late October for
the first time since the spring election to set up a
permanent coordinating commission. Coordination
will be limited to those issues on which the two parties
agree, primarily electoral and parliamentary matters.
But the three superstars of the opposition-Chirac,
Giscard, and Barre-are neither of an age nor tem-
perament to renounce their political ambitions
Former Economics
Minister Rene Monory, who has been organizing
business and stockholder opposition to government
policies, is also seen by some as a darkhorse for
leadership of the opposition.
The Socialists are solidly implanted now on both the
local and national level. Most in the opposition expect
to be out of power for at least five years-the next
legislative election is in 1986-and are concerned
about hanging on to voters and militants. Others think
that it is only a matter of time before the Socialists
demonstrate their inability to govern France
competently.
Yet even should the Socialists' reflationary dash for
growth fail, and their management of affairs (however
different) prove no more successful than that of the
predecessor government-a likely prospect-the ex-
majority's failure to come up with an attractive
alternative and the loss of credibility it suffered
during its 23 years in power will mean that the
Socialists should be able to hold on to their clientele
for a considerable period.
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