ISRAELI POLICIES IN THE WEST BANK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001202830034-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: October 28, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NIC 8713-82
28 October 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
A/NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Israeli Policies in the West Bank
1. Israeli historian (and former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem) Meron
Benvenisti presented the conclusions of his major West Bank Data Project to
US government officials, Middle East experts, Capitol Hill staffers and
journalists at the American Enterprise Institute. His not-yet published
study analyzes Israeli government policy in the West Bank, including legal
aspects, land policy, demographics and the economic angle of the
"occupation."
2. Benvenisti's research and observations lead him to conclude that
Israeli policy vis-a-vis the West Bank is now poised at "5 minutes to
midnight" -- that is, the "creeping annexation" can still be stopped short
of de ure annexation but only, he opines, if the status of the West Bank
has eesolved before 36 months have elapsed. At the end of that 36-
month time- frame, a "critical mass" - defined by government insiders as
100,000 - of Israeli Jews will have settled permanently in the West Bank,
making politically unacceptable any Israeli government consideration of
pressing for. their expulsion.
3. Benvenisti based his conclusion that events were not yet
irreversible on the fact that President Reagan's 1 September initiative has
given.those Israelis who favor territorial compromise - namely the Labor
Alignment - support for their position. While many "ifs" will have to
become realities before a policy shift can even become a possibility,
Israeli supporters of territorial compromise had absolutely no chance of
shifting directions without such an initiative, and without an Arab partner
eventually joining the game.
4. In fact, the Israelis are in the process of creating a new reality
on. the West Bank - one to which the USG currently is paying little heed.
While the President's initiative called for a freeze on settlements, it did
not address the thickening of those already existing ones or the trend
This Memo is classified
CONFIDENTIAL in its entirety.
CONFIDENTIAL
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toward settlements organically tied to major population centers. It is
those urban settlements in close proximity to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem that
are changing the face of the West Bank. In time, those settlements will
house hundreds of thousands of Israelis with no ideological commitment to
"resettle Judea and Samaria," but who are populating the West Bank because
of the conveniences and economic benefits it affords them. A vivid example
of the economic benefits: A 3-story, 1800-meter sized house on the West
Bank sells for approximately $90,000. Some $75,000 of that will be
underwritten by a government mortgage, of which half may be forgiven should
the owner remain for 5 years. A comparable house within Israel proper
might cost $220, 000 or more, without such generous government terms.
Benvenisti argued that the US should revert to its earlier policX of
continuously impressing upon t 5e Israelis the seriousness with which the US
government takes all settlements expansion.
5. Some additional key points of Benvenisti's research on Israeli
policies vis-a-vis the West Bank include:
-- The disproportion between Arab and Jewish residents on
the West bank is not becoming more. exaggerated toward Arab
preponderance, despite their considerably higher birth rate.
The major reason for this is the out-migration of Arabs who
seek employment abroad. Thus, the commonly held Israeli view
of a "demographic threat" is not supported by the data.
-- Almost 50% of the active West Bank labor force is employed in
Israel proper. One third of those for more than 10 years, the
other two-thirds for more than 4 years -- indicative of great
employment stability. Their hourly wages are about 50-60% of
those received by Israeli Jews, the difference due largely to
lower fringe benefits and pension payments.
-- More than one-third of the West Bank's GNP is derived from
economic ties to Israel - largely transfer payments. Despite
very high rates of economic growth over the past several years
- about 12 percent annually - the West Bank economy is stagnant
and non-viable. Industry is underdeveloped with almost no new
investment, no capital market, (and therefore no availability
of credit for investment), and no protection of West Bank
industries against competition from imported Israeli goods.
Israeli policy has intentionally encouraged West Bank
dependency on Israel rather than the creation of independent
economic viability.
-- On the sensitive subject of.land: Although only about 26-27%
of West Bank land has been officially acquired by Israel, the
more important statistic is that 65-70% has either been taken
or is legally susceptible to being taken by the Israeli
government. Application of the Turkish land code and an
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Israeli Supreme Court decision will enable 65-70% of total West
Bank acreage to come under Israeli control by whatever time the
government decides to acquire it. It is not rushing forward to
complete the process.
-- On the legal status of the West Bank: Benvenisti argues that
Israel is acting not as an occupier but as a power moving
toward establishing permanent sovereignt. Israeli military
orders dealing with treatment of West Bankers are being raised
to the level of substantive judicial law. There is, moreover,
a clear move underway toward dual legislative/judicial systems
for the West Bank - one for Jews, the other for Arabs.
6. In conclusion, Benvenisti noted that while the majority of the
Israeli polity would oppose territorial compromise at the current time, the
experience of obtaining support for the Camp David Accords at a time when
there was no broad support for return of the Sinai, should teach us a
lesson. If the balance between benefits and costs of pursuing or refusing
to pursue compromise become clear to the Israeli populace, there may well
be hope for a change in the Israeli position.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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NIC 8713-82
28 October 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Israeli Policies in the West Bank
NIC/A/NIO/NESA:
28 Oct. 82
25X1
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Exec. Dir.
SA/IA
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DD0
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - DDI Registry
2 - NIO/NESA
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