ANDROPOV: HIS POWER AND PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B01072R000200110011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 17, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/%&4ETCIA-RDP84B01072R0002 46V@01 AJC
DDI Registry
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Andropov: His Power and Program
1. The conventional wisdom is that the USSR will now enter a
period of collegial rule in which continuity will be stressed and
the new leaders will hold back from significant policy changes for
the near to medium term. The immediate post-Khrushchev period is
cited as precedent for what will happen.
2. That analysis is based on a misreading of the events of
recent days, Andropov's character and history. In 1953, a number
of new initiatives followed the death of Stalin (and preceded
Khrushchev's consolidation of power) -- a purge of the KGB, an
end to the intra-party terror, the Virgin Lands program, a decision
to end the Korean War, and a mending of relations with the Yugoslavs.
In 1964, the new leaders swept aside a number of major changes
Khrushchev had made in the party organization, sharply raised
investment in agriculture, began the heavy military buildup on the
Sino-Soviet border, and actively began to support North Vietnam's
effort to take over the South.
3. The nature of this succession and the character of Andropov
himself argue strongly that he will move quickly to tackle many of
Russia's problems. For the first time in Soviet history, there has
been a smooth succession where the new leader has assumed power in
an orderly way and probably with greater leeway to make decisions
than enjoyed by his predecessor. There is a widely perceived need
for renewal in the USSR -- to get the economy moving again, to get
rid of corruption, to restore discipline, to reassert the idealism
of the Revolution and relatedly reaffirm Russia's missionary/evangelical
role at home and abroad. Perversely, this often takes the shape of
nostalgia for Stalin. It is his forcefulness, toughness, decisiveness
and ability to move the country that the Party seeks in Andropov --
believing they can have all that without the old dictator's less
welcome attributes (such as a tendency to shoot his colleagues).
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4. Last spring, the Soviet leadership appears to have decided
that Andropov was the man to lead the USSR out of its political and
economic daldrums. He was moved from the KGB back to the Central
Committee Secretariat, a more appropriate and acceptable launching
point. I believe he has steadily been able to consolidate his power
and begin, with his colleagues, to develop new initiatives and take
action even before assuming power on certain of them. As the Soviets
say, "it is not by accident" that in the last several months we have
seen both a new internal crackdown in the Soviet Union and also a
major new initiative in foreign policy -- the effort to improve
relations between the Soviet Union and China. There also are
indications that the military has been asking for additional resources.
In my judgment, Andropov has been behind the first two of these initiatives
and supported the third.
5. In brief, I believe the precedent of an extended period for
the new leader to consolidate power -- as with Brezhnev after the
overthrow of Khrushchev -- does not apply this time around. Instead
we have a leader who has come to power with the support of the rest
of the Politburo -- and probably of Brezhnev as well, has a mandate
to act, and will do so broadly and sooner rather than later.
6. Andropov has been chosen as a man who can make decisions.
He is on close terms with the powerful conservative elements in the
Soviet hierarchy and is a man who can act with both intelligence and
imagination on a long list of pressing foreign and domestic issues.
What we are likely to see with Andropov is preservation of the forms
of "collegiality" but the absence of its paralyzing effect on decision-
making. All of the senior policymakers who might block Andropov are
dead or out of power; those who remain, such as Ustinov and Gromyko,
are closely allied with him. Indeed, if Andropov himself is not made
President of the Soviet Union, the next most likely candidate will be
someone with close ties to him such as Gromyko. By the same token,
the new head of the KGB obviously is an important ally of Andropov.
7. Given Andropov's prompt and apparently unchallenged accession
to power, his personality and past history, and the problems that face
him, what might Andropov's agenda resemble for the coming period? On
the basis of both 1953 and 1964, historical experience would suggest
that a number of changes or initiatives can be expected although they
may take time for, us to recognize:
Internal Affairs
-- A continuation of the "vigilance" campaign and internal
crackdown to restore discipline, to give the impression
of a strong hand at the top again, to forestall any
impression of internal relaxation as a result of the
succession, to keep the country well under control s-o
that other initiatives or reforms do not lead to unrealistic
expectations or spontaneous popular action, and to secure
the home front for perhaps severe measures to revive the
economy.
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-- A-major anti-corruption campaign by a man who is said to
have a reputation for being relatively "clean" among Soviet
leaders. It is plain that many of the present political
problems in Poland and Romania grow out of popular awareness
and resentment of the corruption of senior party officials.
While Andropov would have to proceed carefully with this,
the KGB's role in exposing the corruption of Brezhnev's
family early in the year is indicative of his willingness
to use this issue both politically and for larger ends.
With his KGB background, he would know against whom to
strike. There might even be a return of an occasional show
trial specifically for corruption, although Andropov would
choose the targets with care to insulate his strongest supporters.
It seems logical and likely that Andropov would press for
additional resources for both the military and the KGB.
These are important constituencies for him and for his
principal supporters in the leadership. While there might
be some reallocation of priorities within the military,
overall greater resources to respond to the perceived
increased threat from the US are in the cards, in my view.
On the economy, while specific policies are difficult to
forecast at this point, we should expect "reform" and perhaps
some limited experimentation. The focus on internal discipline,
anti-corruption and vigilance -- in essence, the maintenance
of strict internal controls -- must go hand in hand with any
effort to undertake economic reform or experiments, witness
the Polish experience. While a more detailed analysis of
economic options available to the new leadership will take
more time, the essential message is that we should anticipate
change in this area and it seems likely to involve (1) greater
trade with the West, (.2) more problems for us in the area of
technology transfer, and (3) more difficulty with our Western
and Japanese allies over the issue of trade with the East.
The idea of Andropov's willingness to consider reform in the
Soviet economy is suggested by stories that he has been the
protector of Hungarian economic reform and is willing to
consider such new approaches -- although Hungary is obviously
a much smaller country and the costs of failure are not as
high (always a disincentive to agricultural reform in Russia).
-- In the Party itself, I expect to see Andropov move to improve
the competence of senior officials generally while ensuring
that the new men are sympathetic to his objectives and
politically supportive. He will work to place his own people
in openings on the Politburo, Secretariat, and elsewhere in
the hierarchy. In doing so, Andropov and his colleagues have
an opportunity substantially to select the next generation of
Soviet leaders.
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The Soviets have seen a steady deterioration in US-Soviet
relations for seven years under three US administrations.
I believe they have concluded that the moment for establishing
a more benign relationship on their terms has passed. Arms
control negotiations and other forms of cooperation with the
US government are likely considered to hold out little prospect
of success for years to come. Thus, Andropov probably will
focus Soviet policy on isolating the US and trying, through
all instruments available to him, to build opposition to US
military modernization and to US government policies toward
the USSR generally, both at home and abroad.
-- East-West Trade: Andropov likely will continue efforts to
tie East and West Europe to the USSR through economic
"cooperation" and trade. The Soviets already are aware of
the leverage they hold because of the value of East-West trade
to the West and the jobs said to depend upon it. Trade thus
has both economic and political benefit for them. Andropoy
presumably will strive to maximize these benefits and seek a
corollary benefit in the strains such. increased dealings will
bring between the US and its allies. After removal by the US-
of sanctions imposed after Afghanistan and after Poland, this
instrument of US policy will have little credibility in the
future in Soviet eyes. Indeed, Andropov will see the US as
little more than an annoyance in the area of trade and technology
transfer, unable to impose discipline inside the US,-much-less.
in Europe and Japan.
Foreign Policy
-- US: Andropov seems likely to pursue a policy directed
at achieving simultaneously some visible reduction in
tensions with the United States, curbing new US arms
programs, preventing the deployment of INF, and dividing
the US from its European allies. A conciliatory approach.
to the United States at this point and effective use of
propaganda and active measures, not to mention reinforcing
the notions already current in the West of the need for
forthcoming gestures to the new Soviet leader and the need
to take advantage of this "new beginning," will be expected
to help achieve the above goals. While the European decision
on INF remains uncertain it would seem most unlikely for the
Soviets to abandon the Geneva talks. Rather, Andropov's
policy -- probably like that of his predecessor -- will be
to stonewall at the talks. Should INF deployment actually
begin, the Soviets could walk out and blame failure on the
US. They then would also strive to prevent full deployment
by playing on European fears and purported US intransigence.
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Eastern Europe: Andropov reportedly has evinced
considerable hostility to the Yugoslavs, Romanians
and Czechs in the past -- implying little tolerance
for deviation from loyalty to Moscow and political
orthodoxy. On the other hand, he is said to be close
to Kadar of Hungary and a protector of Hungarian
economic reforms. This and other information suggests
some flexibility toward East European efforts to cope
with economic problems but only within the context of
close ties to the USSR and firm party control. As in
the USSR, Andropov could well urge his East European
colleagues to impose stricter discipline at home --
accompanied by a campaign to root out obvious and
damaging corruption in high places, perhaps by making
examples of some officials.
Afghanistan:. Afghanistan seems to be a candidate for a
new Soviet initiative to try to diminish in some measure
both the insurgency there and their military role. It
continues to be an embarrassment'for'them in Islamic
countries as well as in the West, it does impose a certain
military cost in both materiel and casualties, and it is
an obstacle to any significant reconciliation with the
Chinese. Some new initiative combining a new government
with some greater legitimacy in Afghanistan (although still
under Soviet control) coupled with strong pressure on
Pakistan to abandon its supporting role for the insurgents
could conceivably meet with some success if orchestrated
well by the Soviets. It could involve a government in
Kabul with a figleaf image of neutrality and a diminution
of support for the insurgents that would allow the Soviets
to withdraw at least some of their forces.
-- Middle East: The short term options are not bright, but
the Soviets are prepared to be patient. Egypt and Iran are
the big prizes and Andropov will pursue overt and covert
policies designed to take advantage of any instability in
either country.
-- Kampuchea: Kampuchea is another area where the Soviets
could make some concessions to the Chinese for larger ends.
Never before have the Soviets shown any particular sensitivity
to Hanoi's concerns. Because the Russians are Vietnam's only
ally and only source of important economic and military assistance,
while the Vietnamese would be aggravated and unhappy with Moscow
if it, wanted to settle Kampuchea, Hanoi would have little choice
but to go along. Again, some sort of face saving settlement in
Kampuchea that would not involve a real defeat for the Vietnamese
but would get the bulk of their troops out of the country might
be sufficient.
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-- Third World: In the Third World, I believe we can expect
not only a continuation of the direct and indirect destabilization
activities the Soviets have had underway in recent years but
perhaps an increase in that activity. In many ways Soviet
policy in the Third World is likely to be indicative of a
more assertive Soviet role abroad generally, although as
our papers on Andropov have made clear, he prefers to win
by strategem and maneuver rather than resort to force --
although he will use force if maneuvering fails and the risks
are deemed acceptable.
8. In sum, the US faces a new and, in many ways, far more intelligent
and skillful adversary than we confronted in Khrushchev or Brezhnev -- and a
man who is a "doer". He is familiar with the world and a realist. My money
says we will face a much greater challenge from the USSR under his leadership.
While the specifics of his program are difficult to construct, we should be
prepared for new Soviet initiatives in both internal and foreign policy. A
leadership has come to power during the last week in the Soviet Union with
greater power and more unity at the. highest level than after either the
succession in 1953 or 1964. It has come to power with considerable work to
do and Andropov is not a man who will delay in setting in motion initiatives
to address a number of issues and problems. The effort to repair relations
with China -- long thought out of the question by most analysts in the West --
I believe is indicative of the kind of flexibility, pragmatism and boldness
we can expect from this new leader.
o er M. Gates
[All Portions of this Memo
are Classified SECRET]
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-- Eastern Europe: Andropov reportedly has evinced
considerable hostility to the Yugoslavs, Romanians
and Czechs in the past - implying little tolerance
for deviation from loyalty to Moscow and political
orthodoxy. On the other hand, he is said to be close
to Kadar of Hungary and a protector of Hungarian
economic reforms. This and other information suggests
some flexibility toward East European efforts to cope
with economic problems but only within the context of
close ties to the USSR and firm party control. As in
the USSR, Andropov could well urge his East European
colleagues to impose stricter discipline at home --
accompanied by a campaign to root out obvious and
damaging corruption in high places, perhaps by making
examples of some officials.
Afghanistan: Afghanistan seems to be a-candidate for a
new Soviet initiative to try to diminish in some measure
both the insurgency there and their military role. It
continues to be an embarrassment for them in Islamic
countries as well as in the West, it does impose a certain
military cost in both materiel and casualties, and it is
an obstacle to any significant reconciliation with the
Chinese. Some new initiative combining'a new government
with some greater legitimacy in Afghanistan (although still
under Soviet control) coupled with strong pressure on
Pakistan to abandon its supporting role for the insurgents
could conceivably meet with some success if orchestrated
well by the Soviets. It could involve a government in
Kabul with a figleaf image of neutrality and a diminution
of support for the insurgents-that would allow the Soviets
to withdraw at least some of their forces.
-- Middle East: The short term options are not bright, but
the Soviets are prepared to be patient. Egypt and Iran are
the big prizes and Andropov will pursue overt and covert
policies designed to take advantage of any instability in
either country.
-- Kampuchea: Kampuchea is another area where the Soviets
could make some concessions to the Chinese for larger ends.
Never before have the Soviets shown any particular sensitivity
to Hanoi's concerns. While Vietnam might not abandon its
campaign in Kampuchea under Soviet pressure, the Soviets
still-could claim to the Chinese that they were no longer
supporting Vietnam's effort and were amenable to new political
arrangements that could be worked out. This might involve
some sort of face saving settlements that would not represent
a defeat for Vietnam but would get most of their troops out
of the country.
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-- Third World: In the Third World, I believe we can expect
not only a continuation of the direct and indirect destabilization
activities the Soviets have had underway in recent years but
perhaps an increase in that activity. In many ways Soviet
policy in the Third World is likely to be indicative of a
more assertive Soviet role abroad generally, although as
our papers on Andropov have made clear, he prefers to.win
by strategem and maneuver rather than resort to force --
although he will use force if maneuvering fails and the risks
are deemed acceptable.
-- China: As I have suggested in several places above, I believe
Andropov is playing a key role in the new initiative to try and
patch things up with China. At some point, this will involve
tough decisions for the Soviets because any real reconciliation
with China will require acceding to Chinese preconditions
relating to Afghanistan, Kampuchea or Soviet deployments along
the Chinese border. The latter is probably the least difficult
area for the Soviets to be responsive. Andropov's pointed
conversation with Foreign Minister Huang Hua after Brezhnev's
funeral, the meeting between Huang Hua and Gromyko the next day
and Chinese willingness to send Huang Hua is indicative of both
powers intent to pursue an, improved relationship at minimum
and to improve their mutual positions with respect to the US.
8. In sum, the US faces a new and, in many ways, far more intelligent
and skillful adversary than we confronted in Khrushchev or Brezhnev -- and a
man who is a "doer". He is familiar with the world and a realist. My money
says we will face a much greater challenge from the USSR under his leadership.
While the specifics of his program are difficult to construct, we should be
prepared for new Soviet initiatives in both internal and foreign policy. A
leadership has come to power during the last. week in the Soviet Union with
greater power and more unity-at the highest level than after either the
succession in 1953 or 1964. It has come to power with considerable work to
do and Andropov is not a man who will delay in setting in motion initiatives
to address a number of issues and problems. The effort to repair relations
with China -- long thought out of the question by most analysts in the West --
I believe is indicative of the kind of flexibility, pragmatism and boldness
we can expect from this new leader.
[All Portions of this Memo
are Classified SECRET]
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