ROMANIA-USSR: HOW MUCH RAPPROCHEMENT AND WHY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100330004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 18, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release
18 October 1976
SUBJECT: Romania-USSR: How Much Rapprochement and Wh
INTRODUCTION
The Chronology
In an exceptionally sharp attack on April 26, Ceausescu blasted
Moscow for twisting Marxist-Leninist doctrine in an effort to
promote Soviet hegemony in the world communist movement. The
Yugoslavs described his remarks--couched in heavily ideological
terms--as the official opening of a polemic against the advocates of
"limited sovereignty." This speech climaxed several months of 25X1
public and behind-the-scenes sparring with Moscow over preparations
for the European Communist Party Conference (ECPC), an escalatin
historical polemic over Bessarabia, F7 I
State Dept. review completed
For over four months, Ceausescu has maintained a conciliatory
stance toward Moscow that contrasts markedly with his often fiery
defense of Romania's sovereignty in the face of Soviet pressure.
Always adept at gauging precisely how far he can push the Soviets,
Ceausescu in the past often adopted a low profile to forestall
serious retaliat.ioi from Moscow. Once a respite has been gained,
however, he normally rebounds to challenge Moscow once again..
This time around there is no ready explanation for Ceausescu's
continued amity. Bucharest seems to have incurred increased Soviet
displeasure in late April and May, and--presumably in response--muted
its independent outbursts. Since then, however, Bucharest has
made its peace with Moscow on at least some long standing issues.
Romanian officials have, in fact, told US diplomats that tensions
with the Soviets have eased.
CI M 76 10167C
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100330004-6
 "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" and implicitly the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Three days after this speech, Vadim Zaqladin--CPSU specialist
in relations with foreign communist parties--arrived in Bucharest.
His purpose was to press the Romanians to accept the draft of the
eventual ECPC final document. The Soviet ambassador in Bucharest
also called on Ceausescu that same day.
At this point, Ceausescu apparently decided to adopt a lower
profile and to mute contentious issues. During a speech on May 3
celebratint4 the Romanian party's 55th anniversary, he disappointed
an enormous crowd attracted by hints that he would "say something
important." He instead delivered a ritualistic recitation of
Romania's national communist course, avoided mentioning the Soviets
except for one stock reference, and somewhat defensively described
Romania's "internationalist" credentials. A Romanian mobilization
and alert exercise at mid-nonth, however, mafred this surface calm.
The drill sparked rumors of an imminent Soviet invasion, and set
off some consumer. Panic buying. Party activists, it appeared,
had earlier done too good a job of spreading the word that the Soviets
and other East Europeans had territorial designs on historically
disputed Romanian lands. Ceausescu may have used the exercise as
a relatively unprovocative means to demonstrate Bucharest's resolve 25X1
in the face of Moscow's demands.
That some very modest accommodation had been reached was
signalled in Ceausescu's speech to the Congress f Political
Education and Socialist Culture on June 2. Hinn,appeared anxious to
write an end to Bucharest's historical polemics over Bessarabia,
Transylvania, and the Dobrudja. Surprisingly, he declared.
Approved For R4
 Approved For Rele
that Romania had no territorial or other problems with the USSR
or other neighboring states. He said that the ECPC could be held
"at any moment," reiterated previous pledges to fulfill Romania'
obligations under the Warsaw Treaty and to continue collaborating
with Pact states even after military blocs dissolve, and affirmed
Romania's commitment to the CEMA comprehensive program. The bulk
of his speech, however, was a firm carefully constructed defense
of Bucharest',; national communist course, and Ceausescu again
attacked the Soviets for their pretensions to hegemony within the
movement.
In mid-June, both Ceausescu and party secretary Andrei made
a point of assuring US diplomats that there were no unusual
tensions1in Soviet-Romanian relations. The Romanians, in fact,
seemed to come away from the European communist conference later
in the month feeling that they had struck a good bargain. Just
after the conference closed, Andrei lauded Moscow's "definitely
more realistic approach." He claimed that the conference represented
a "major advance" in inter-party relations because Moscow was
forced to give in +'o numerous demands of th'e independents and
endorse a number of standard Romanian positions.
Andrei nevertheless appeared to hedge on whether the Soviets
had permanently altered their behavior. He noted that a number
of Moscow's loyalist allies had gone on record in favor of "old-style"
proletarian internationalism, a new world communist conference,
and condemnation of China. His tone suggested that Bucharest would
not naively rush into open Soviet arms and thereby risk jeopardizing
its hard-won measure of independence.
The Romanians, nevertheless, continued their good behavior
at a CEMA ministerial meeting in early July. Premier Manescu's
speech--though it contained the standard defenses of Romania's
sovereignty in economic matters and made the usual pitch for
equalizing development levels among CEMA states--was tailored for
Soviet ears. At about this same time, rumors began to circulate
that Ceausescu and Brezhnev would soon exchange visits. Ceausescu
had not made an official bilateral visit to the USSR since 1970,
and Brezhnev has never made a formal bilateral visit to Romania
since becoming the Soviet party leader.
Following an unusual extraordinary session of the Soviet-
Romanian joint economic commission in mid-July, US diplomats in
Moscow began to pick up reports that Romania was angling for Soviet
economic benefits. Western diplomats heard that there were sharp
disagreements over Romania's request for greater supplies of raw
materials, particularly for iron ore, coking coal, and crude oil.
Romanian diplomats later said that the Soviets did not meet their
Approved For Rel$ase 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100430004-6
 25X1
Approved For Releas
requests, and that more negotiations would be necessary before
the commission', next regularly scheduled session--row apparently
set for mid-November. The Romanians added that they were dissatisfied
with their share of trade in the new Soviet 1976-1980 five-year
plan--which they labelled the most meager grant to any East
European country. This suggested that Bucharest was making an
attempt to nail down a greater share of Moscow's economic largesse
before the Soviet five-year plan was finally adopted.
Ceausescu's 11-day vacation in the USSR in early August--
which included a dramatic stop in Soviet Moldavia before he met
with Brezhnev i.n the Crimea--picked up the momentum again. Both
men expressed satisfaction about their "ever closer unity of views,"
and affirmed their determination to consolidate the cohesion of
the communist community of the basis of "proletarian internationalism."
The use of this favorite Soviet codeword for Moscow's leadership
within the movement was presumably a deliberate Romanian sop to
the Soviets, although Bucharest understands the term to embody the
principle of party, independence.
During Ceausescu's visit, there were still signs of Soviet-
Romanian friction. Speaking on August 3 in Kishinev, the capital
of Soviet Moldavia, Ceausescu reiterated his intent to work for
a new international economic order, to continue identifying with
the nonaligned and developing world, and to maintain Romania's
relations with all anti-imperialist forces--implicitly including
China. He also emphasized that the ECPC had confirmed the principle
of equality among parties.
While Ceausescu was still in the USSR, the Romanian media
churned out at least four articles that appeared to violate the
reported bilateral understanding that limited historical polemics.
The items praised Michael the Brave, the national hero who in
1600 briefly unified Romania's three historic principalities.
Equating Michael's fight for national independence with Ceausescu's
diplomatic struggles with Moscow, the items emphasized that
Ceausescu would not sacrifice Romania's independence for any gains.
This analogy was presumably intended as much for the domestic
audience as for Moscow's benefit, however, because Ceausescu's
visit to the USSR apparently caused some unease in the hierarchy
over the Romanian leader's intentions. At the same time, the
party's theoretical journal also revived the role of the nation-
state in world affairs for the first time since late April.
We do not, of course, know the details of the Ceausescu-
Brezhnev talks, but economics probably loomed large. A Romanian
diplomat in Moscow commented that his embassy had had to prepare
voluminous economic briefing materials for Ceausescu': trip.
We also suspect that Bucharest's overtures toward the nonaligned
were on the agenda--and that the Romanians assuredly caught some
Soviet flak. Ceausescu may also have offered to host a meeting
Approved For Re
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R00010q
of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee
Romanian diplomats, however, have generally sought to play
down the significance of the visit. They claim that it was similar
to those of other East European leaders this summer, and maintain
that Ceausescu proposed the trip.
Although the Romanians reiterated that
the Soviets had offered nothing concrete during the trip, a
senior Soviet economist said that Moscow was trying to be helpful
and had agreed to sell Bucharest some oil.
Ceausescu's attempts to curry favor with the Soviets did
not prevent him from journeying to Yugoslavia in early September
for talks with Tito. The two Balkan mavericks made an effusive
show of their determination to pursue independent courses in
foreign affairs.
Back home, in a speech on October 1 to an army-arty gathering,
Ceausescu aaain combined some reassuring words for Moscow with
independent rhetoric. Ceausescu again declared that Bucharest
would "adequately" fulfill its obligations under the Warsaw Treaty
and bilateral friendship pacts. He added that Bucharest would
continue to collaborate with the Pact states even after the
dissolution of military blocs. As in the past, however, he
stressed that the Romanian army's only mission is the defense
of the homeland; that Bucharest will fight any aggressive moves--
presumably also from Moscow; and that Romania will continue to
develop military cooperation with friendly states in the West
and the third world.
Possible Motivations
Most of 'she available evidence indicates that Romania's
economic problems have motivated Ceausescu to seek a limited
accommodation with Moscow. Bucharest remains committed to break-
neck heavy industrial development at the expense of the consumer,
and is struggling to maintain the highest growth rate of any East
European country. The economy appears to be slowing down from
the 9 percent growth rate of recent years--although it is not
yet in serious trouble--and top Romanian officials are reportedly
worried about widespread failures to meet goals of the 1976 plan.
There have lately been hints of some high-level political pulling
and tugging behind the scenes, suggesting that some within the
leadership do not support Ceausescu's hard-driving economic policies.
Ceausescu has nevertheless refused to lower his economic sights,
Approved For Rel
 Approved For Releo
and domestic critics could become more vocal if the economy falls
far short of Ceausescu's high objectives.
Ceausescu may be looking eastward in hopes of receiving
assistance in attaining his overly ambitious economic goals, and
may calculate that his less intractable stance will make Moscow
more responsive to Bucharest's economic requests. Despite its
relative independence from the Soviets in foreign policy, Bucharest's
economic strings are still closely tied to Moscow. For example,
Romania depends heavily on the Soviets for certain vital raw
materials--coal, coke, and iron ore--and has been unsuccessful in its
attempts to diversify its sources of supply
Romania's hard currency indebtedness to the West has been
mounting alarmingly, and Bucharest has sought to slow this
growth by severely curtailing imports. The'Romanians have
been unable to market domestically produced low-quality goods
in the West in return for hard currency to repay their obligations.
Payments for imports of Middle Eastern oil--at free market prices
and in hard currency--apparently represent a particular drain.
The price of Soviet crude is still about one-third that of the
West, and Romania need not pay in convertibile currency.
Despite its problems, the Romanian economy is apparently not
in enough trouble to force Ceausescu to consider significant
concessions. If the economy fails to meet plan goals, Ceausescu--
as in the past--will probably seek a convenient scapegoat, or
order falsifications of economic data if shortfalls are major.
There may also be political as well as economic motives for
seeking a better tactical relationship with Moscow. Bucharest's
successful bid last February for membership in the Group of 77
and its wooing of the nonaligned before the Colombo summit in
August, ma have caused the Soviets more heartburn
thought.
Ceausescu may also sense a climate of greater Soviet willing-
ness to tolerate diversity, and may now be testing Soviet waters.
Some Romanian officials have described the ECPC as a watershed in
inter-party relations, when Moscow realized that it must adopt
new tactics for dealing with the maverick parties.
Approved For Rellease 2007/02/08 - CIA-RfP85T00353R00010(I330004-6
 r V t
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100330004-6
The Soviet View
Over the past 10 years, the Soviets have had ample oppor-
tunity to observe Ceausescu's tactics, ranging from professions
of friendship and loyalty to the USSR to strident defenses of
Romanian independence. Moscow thus is probably inclined to
view Ceausescu's recent gestures as simply the latestmove in a
complicated Romani.-n balancing act. The Soviets may believe
that Ceausescu is seeking an accommodation in hopes of winning
Soviet assistance for the faltering Romanian economy.
The Soviets will make every effort to exploit Ceausescu's
stance to their advantage. They will probably adopt their
usual hard-bargaining attitude toward Romanian requests for
additional raw materials and other assistance, but would prob-
ably grudgingly come across with some help--although not to the
extent the Romanians would want. They will probably hold out
the prospect of more aid if Ceausescu continues to behave.
The Soviets may also seize upon Ceausescu's recent state-
ments that Romania will fulfill its Warsaw Pact obligations
to suggest that Bucharest consider participating in a Warsaw
Pact exercise outside Romania.
The Soviets will thus look for adjustments to Ceausescu's
policies over time, hoping to accomplish piecemeal their goal
of greater political, military, and economic integration in
Eastern Europe. They may suggest that Ceausescu alter his
independent course in ways more fundamental than simply temper-
ing Romanian rhetoric, but are unlikely to press too hard for
basic concessions that might make Ceausescu recoil.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100330004-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R0001003
CONCLUSIONS
Over the past five months, there has been an absence of
particularly nasty Romanian rhetoric directed at the Soviets,
but Ceausescu has nonetheless continued firmly to espouse
Bucharest's national communist line. We thus do not believe that
Ceausescu--whatever his motives--will make fundamental political
concessions to the Soviets at this time. Neither economic nor
political realities seem to dictate such major adjustments.
Romania's defense of its independence has been long and torturous,
and Ceausescu has won too much to abandon this basic course.
,*We do not, however, rule out the possibility that Ceausescu
will continue to minimize differences with Moscow. This effort
could lead to a revised set of tactics involving fewer polemics,
greater economic cooperation, and an effort to accentuate the
positive whenever possible.
Approved For Relea4e 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R0001003Pi0004-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100330004-6
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100330004-6