INDO-PAKISTANI TENSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 28, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Indo-Pakistani Tensions
Secret
28 May 1971
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
28 May 1971
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Indo-Pakistani Tensions*
SNIE 32-71, "Prospects for Pakistan", published on
12 April 1971, is still valid. However, in view of the rapid
march of events in the subcontinent, it seems useful to update
this assessment. The present paper assesses the apparently
irrational quality of West Pakistani leadership, and the factors
working for and against major Indo-Pakistani conflict.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and coordinated within CIA.
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THE SIT'JATION IN EAST BENGAL
1. The immensity of the human tragedy in East Bengal has
become apparent. The West Pakistani army controls the cities
and larger towns, or what is left of them. A good many residents
of the cpaital city of Dacca have apparently fled, and the same
seems to be true of the other urban centers. Most textile and
jute mills (the principal industries) are working at about one-
third of capacity, and some are not in operation. Rail and road
transport is sporadic, unreliable and frequently cut by insurgents;
the essential rail line between Dacca and Chittagong has been cut
in a number of places, most notably on a long steel bridge which
may take up to a year to repair.
2. Food, however, is the most critical problem, inasmuch as
the east wing requires large foodgrains imports even under normal
circumstances. In recent years such requirements have amounted
to 1-2 million tons annually. Shipments to the East were stopped
for a time during the hostilities and are now only slowly and
partially resuming. There is no place to store any large new
stocks of foodgrains, and in any case little can be moved inland
from the ports. Those areas devastated by the 1970 cyclone
already are experiencing food shortages, and unless distribution
problems are overcome within the next few months, the problem
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will spread to the traditional food-deficit urban areas.
Famine may occur in some areas.
3. Resistance continues. We do not know hcw much guerrilla
activity there ie; it is apparently less than the Indian sponsors
of the insurgents would like, but greater and more effective than
the Pakistani leaders expected. Enough guerrilla and counter-
guerrilla activity goes on to keep surface transport disrupted,
to provide Western reporters on the Indian border with visible and
continued evidence of armed combat, to make travel o=itside the
cities sometimes risky, to lead to angry Pakistani charges about
"Indian sappers and infiltrators", and to make province-wide civil
administration difficult, and in some places impossible. This
situation is likely to continue for the foreseeable future; the
army shows no signs either of acquiring full control or of with-
drawing.
4. Apart from conflict between the East Pakistanis and the
army, the fighting has taken on ugly ethnic and communal over-
tones, and many of the area's residents are becoming brutalized.
There are two aspects to this; on the one hand, native Bengalis
and the million or so "Biharis" (Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees
from India) have turned on each other in many places. How many
Biharis have been killed by Bengalis and vice versa will never be
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established, but the rumber runs into the thousands. Pakistani
authorities claim that the only atrocities in the area were those
perpetrated on the Biharis by the wicked Awami Leaguers and that
this was one of the principal reasons for military intervention.
This is doubtful, but numerous killings have been substantiated
since the fighting began, and the gap between the two communities
is now very wide, perhaps irreparable.*
5. More extensive, and -- for the peace of the area --
much more dangerous have been the extensive killings of members
of East Bengal's 10 million Hindu minority. There is considerable
and convincing evidence that some Pakistani army units have run
berserk, shooting up Hindu quarters in the cities and whole villages,
indiscriminately murdering men, women and children on a very large
Probably the most dramatic episode we know of was in Mymensingh,
a city of some 125,000 until March 1971. When the fighting
began, some 25 cr so Punjabi soldiers were killed by the local
constabulary; t?:? city then remained quiet for some time under
Bengali control. Tensions mounted as air raids began and the
army neared. Finally the Bengalis rounded up a number of
Biharis, and all males over ten (perhaps a thousand in all) were
i;ttchered. The army arrived soon after to find the city
deserted. When the news of Mymensingh reached Dacca, most
Bengalis fled that city too, at least temporarily, fearing
Bihari reprisals. Mymensingh remains abandoned except for
some Biharis.
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scale. Islamabad has angrily denied this has happened, and
has insisted that it offers full protection to Hindus and Muslims
alike. Whatever the real official policy, Pakistani soldiers
have almost certainly been encouraged in their extreme actions
by the steady stream of anti-Indian, anti-Hindu propaganda put
out by the Pakistani authorities, who claim that the trouble is
India's fault and that they are only fighting foreign inspired
subversive and secessionist plots.
THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
6. These atrocities and uncertainties have led not merely
to a heavy exodus from cities occupied by the army but also to
a mass flight from East Bengal itself. Beginning about the
middle of April, Bengalis began streaming into India. New Delhi
claims that some three and a half million have come in and that
they continue to cross over at a rate of from 50,000-100,000 a
day. No one knows how many may ultimately arrive; some Indians
believe that eventually the refugees may total as many as 6-10
million people.
7. No accurate check on these figures is possible, but
neutral observers on the scene think these Indian claims are
not far off. Many of the refugees, probably most, are Hindus
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but there are very many Muslims as well. The sheer numbers
are putting a very heavy burden on the Indian government,
which is doing its best to feed them and provide some rudiments
of accommodation. But India is hardly affluent or amply pro-
vided with food. The refugees are disrupting life in border
areas, depressing labor costs, raising food prices, exhausting
medical supplies, creating dangerous sanitation problems,
occupying all such available buildings as schools and hospitals.
Costs for providing them with a bare subsistence may run to
several hundred million dollars a year -- a task beyond India's
means. In any event, New Delhi wants the refugees to return
to East Bengal as soon as possible.
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8. Superficially, the situation appears fairly normal in the
west wing. But the economy there is in bad shape and getting .worse.
The east wing formerly served as the principal external market for
the west's industries and as an important earner of its hard
currency. Its performance in both roles has sharply declined;
foreign exchange reserves are greatly depleted; foreign debt
repayments are in de facto default (they are being made in non-
convertible rupees). World Bank representatives have pronounced
the situation bleak; special Pakistani envoys are visiting the
principal world capitals seeking emergency assistance. Except
in the case of China they have had little success.
9. The deteriorating economic conditions hold the seeds of
political trouble for the Martial Law Administration (MLA). Mili-
tary operations in the East reportedly are costing about $2 million
a day, z rate that would approximately double the nation's pre-
crisis defense expenditures. Islamabad reportedly is considering
some politically risky measures to bring revenues more nearly in
line with expenditures, including a pay cut for military and civilian
government personnel and higher taxes. Meanwhile, future economic
aid commitments from the Free World Consortium -- which accounted
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for over 80 percent of Pakistan's total foreign aid in recent
years -- is being withheld pending some resolution of the situation.
10. The MLA continues to rule sternly. Political activity is
strictly controlled anu the press remains sychophantic and muzzled.
There is considerable that is puzzling about the MLA, its principal
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figures, and particularly about its chief, President Yahya Khan.
The top figures in the MLA are apparently
tough, hard-line generals. Yahya himself may not be the absolute
boss, but he has so far been the regime's principal spokesman.
it appears that he and his colleagues
have, at least on some occasions, been grossly misinformed about
military, economic, and political developments throughout Pakistan.
Thus many of the assessments of the situation in East Bengal given
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the President, at lea,': in the early days of the rebellion, mirrored
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official propaganda rather than the facts. Further
Evidently prone to
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hearing what he wants to,
facing hard facts only when forced to do so, Yahya
in his public statements has shown him-
self erratic, isolated, and ill-informed.
11. Yahya seems to have no idea of the realities of the
situation in East Bengal or of the extent to which recent events
have widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan. He also
seems.to believe that the former situation can be restored by the
army. If he and the other members of the MLA are really oblivious
of the genuineness of the eastern desire for autonomy, or of the
hatred being engendered by army actions in East Bengal, the pros-
pects are dim that the MLA can do anything but aggravate the
situation and make the breakup of the country even more of an
eventual certainty than it now is.
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13. Whether Yahya will come anywhere near carrying out his
aim is another matter; we are doubtful. There appear to be at
least som^ hard-liners in the inner circle who might seek to
frustrate any move towards liberalization even if Yahya himself
should try it. Not many Bengali politicians are likely to volun-
teer to serve at essentially Punjabi behest, though a few might
go along. The situation is likely to remain messy, both in econom-
ic and political terms, and the military will probably continue to
be reluctant to get down from the tio:, it mounted.
In the December 1970 elections, the Amami League won 167 of
East Pakistan's 169 seats in the National Assembly. Only
four of those then chosen have declared their support of the
present military regime.
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THE SITUATION IN INDIA
14. The continuing Bengali uprising is causing considerable
trauma for the Indians. The cause of Bangla Desh has acquired
widespread popular support. The Indian press has given it wide
coverage, grossly exaggerating Bengali military successes describing
Punjabi atrocities and so on. Mrs. Gandhi's government has so far
exercised some restraint. It permits a government-in-exile to
stay in Calcutta, but has not so far recognized it. 25X1
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15. But Indian restraint may be wearing thin. Parliament
was in recess when the Bengali crisis began on 25 March. It has
just reconvened and is already exercising a familiar role: raising
the political temperature with intemperate speeches and resolutions,
exerting steady demands on the government to take drastic steps.
And the government may be more amenable to such suggestions. The
re-Fa^ee problem, even with substantial and forthcoming international
assistance, would be -FFormidable; to the Indians it may be becoming
intolerable.
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16. Whatever India's forthcoming decisions, they will be
principally made by Mrs. Gandhi, whose newly acquired parliamentary
majority has given her undisputed leadership in India. Her policies
to date have been cautious ones and she has been able to make them
stick. But if the crisis atmosphere continues for an extended
period, even she will find herself under stronger parliamentary
and popular pressures for some kind of forceful action.
PROSPECTS FOR INDO-PAKISTANI HOSTILITIES
17. India and Pakistan are closer to a major war with one
another than at any time since 1965. This is not to say that
heavy fighting is necessarily imminent or inevitable, but some
factors point to a further deterioration in relations: the high
pitch of official denunciations by the two governments; the con-
tinuing and seemingly increasing clashes between Indian border
guards and transgressing Pakistani army units (presumably chasing
Bengali guerrillas); growing awareness in India of the atrocities
inflicted on Hindus; the frustration and anger among Pakistani
officers at India's support of the Bengali cause .Ad its material
aid to the "freedom fighters"; and India's belief in its military
superiority and ability, if need be, to put an end to Punjabi rule
in East Bengal.
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18. There are still, of course, important factors working
against another major round. The leaders of the two nations are
aware of the great and unpredictable dangers that would result
from such a conflict. The Indian army is probably ill-prepared
logistically for major operations in the riverine areas of East
Bengal. International pressures -- especially from the US, the
UK, and the USSR, and the fear of loss of foreign aid -- are work-
ing to dampen the danger of a new war. The Pakistani leaders
probably know they would lose tnless they got major outside, i.e.,
Chinese help -- and there are no signs of that being forthcoming.
in India, however, fears of Chinese intervention are sufficiently
real to act as one of several constraints on any decision to
fight Pakistan.
19. While the situation carries great potential for a new
conflict, there have as yet been none of the slowly escalating
clashes between regular military units in Kashmir which preceded
the last major Indo-Pakistani conflict. Were these to start,
the situation would clearly become more dangerous. Were India
to undertake a policy of major reprisals against any real or
threatened Pakistani frontier incursions, then action and reaction
could lead to a major conflict even though neither side wanted it.
To date, both sides have shown great caution on the Kashmiri and
Punjabi frontiers.
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20. There remains the question of war breaking out by a
deliberate decision by ei'i'ler government. A Pakistani decision
to attack India is unlikely, given Pakistan's relative military
inferiority. But with the current climate of stress and misinfor-
mation which seems to prevail in the MLA, it cannot be ruled out
entirely.
21. In the case of India, there are some political and
popular pressures for a military move into East Bengal designed
to end Pakistani army rule, restore the Awami League to power,
and permit the return of the refugees in India. A decision to
do so would probably be based on a calculation (compounded of
rational assessments, hopes and guesses) that such an operation
would be accomplished quickly and would not lead to major fighting
in the Punjab. These propositions are open to question; the
West Pakistanis would almost certainly put up a fight in East
Bengal and probably in the West as well. And despite India's
overall superiority, in view of the logistic difficulties India
could probably not achieve a quick and easy victory.
THE USSR AND CHINA
22. In their separate ways, both the USSR and China continue
to show caution in this situation. Moscow has apparently not
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followed up its earlier reprimand to Yahya with anything strong^r.
We continue to estimate that the Soviets hope that major conflict
can be avoided and are probably exerting their influence in the
subcontinent to that end. This may account for their avoiding
sharp gestures toward Islamabad. The Chinese, while expressing
support for the Pakistani government, and voicing their disapproval
of Indian meddling, have also refrained from threatening actions
against India. If Indo-Pakistani hostilities should develop,
China might engage in more threatening gestures against India, but
we would also continue to estimate that China will not risk major
military involvement to help bail out West Pakistan.
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