CUBA-USSR: VULNERABILITIES IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 103
• Publication Date: February 12, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
Washington. D G 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 February 1982
MEMORANDUM
CUBA-USSR: Vulnerabilities in the Next Six Months
Key Judgments
Cuban vulnerability to some of the actions) will vary
considerably over the next six months. For example, the Castro regime has
almost completed its preparations for countering broadcasts by Radio Marti.
Economic vulnerability will be somewhat higher during February to early April
when manpower and transportation resources are most needed for the ongoing
sugar harvest. Cuba's military capability for defending the island or pro-
viding support to Nicaragua will steadily improve over the next six months as
the armed forces absorb the recent deliveries of new Soviet equipment.
In other areas, Cuban vulnerabilities will not change significantly in
the near term. Because the centralized nature of the Cuban leadership
restricts its ability to cope with several crises at the same time, the effect
of the measures would be heightened somewhat if they were
applied simultaneously rather than sequentially. Nevertheless, the Castro
regime is unlikely significantly to alter its behavior unless it, perceives the
economic, political, and military postures adopted by the US as being fully
sustainable and capable of sharnli increasing the costs of Cuba's objection-
This memorandum was prepared by the Cuba-Caribbean Branch, Middle
America/Caribbean Division of the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis and China-Third World Branch, Current Support Division of the Office
of Soviet Analysis. It was requested by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. This memorandum contains information available
through 10 February 1982. It was coordinated with the Office of Scientific
and Weapons Research and the Directorate of Operations. Questions and
comments are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Middle America/
Caribbean Division,
Copy #
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
The USSR is facing a series of major economic and political
problems, but they will not significantly change Soviet
vulnerability in the next six months. Most.of the US measures
now planned regarding Cuba do not directly impinge on these
problems, and have only limited relevance to Soviet policy toward
Cuba. On the other hand, as is the case with Cuba, the highly
centralized Soviet leadership could be stretched by an
orchestrated or fortuitous series of simultaneous challenges such
as a major upsurge in fighting in Afghanistan, serious outbreaks
of resistance in Poland, US measures against Cuba, a threat to
the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola and perhaps an Israeli attack
into South Lebanon. There is, however, significant potential
danger in such a scenario including a reflexive Soviet military
response to one crisis or another. . .or even at an unrelated
site. There is also the risk of a major Soviet political or
military miscalculation when faced with such a wide range of
problems.
Whatever time advantage existed for Radio Marti has
virtually dissipated. Cuba reacted immediately to the
announcement last year of the creation of Radio Marti because the
Cuban leadership, with the Mariel experience of 1980 still fresh,
was keenly aware of the wide gap that has appeared between
popular expectations and the regime's ability to satisfy them.
As a result, Havana gave high priority to a multifaceted
campaign to combat Radio Marti. The campaign included:
-- the hasty acquisition last year from Czechoslovakia of
four 1,000 watt transmitters, apparently to be used
across the island as jammers, with ten 5,000 watt trans-
mitters to follow this year;
-- the rapid construction of transmission facilities in the
Havana area for two possibly superpowered (500,000 watts
each) transmitters to be used for jammi
counterbroadcasts, or both;
ng, for
-- the formation of a propaganda team to organize counter-
'broadcasts to the US aimed at fomenting social unrest;
-- the reorganization of transmitter and frequency usage by
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
Cuban mediumwave broadcasting stations to demonstrate in
part the Castro regime's ability to interfere with
frequencies used by US commercial broadcasters.
What little information is available on the two potentially
superpowered transmitters suggests that technical preparations
for their inauguration are fairly complete. The lower powered
Czech transmitters are mobile and presumably can be put into
operation on short notice. It would appear, therefore, that the
inauguration of Radio Marti's transmissions will be met
immediately by strong jamming in western Cuba and by increasingly
effective jamming--as the additional Czech equipment arrives--in
central and eastern Cuba. This assumes that Radio Marti will
transmit on only one or two frequencies; should more than two be
used, Havana would be hard pressed over the short term to jam all
frequencies effectively. The Castro regime would then probably
adopt stop-gap measures to counter Radio Marti--such as large
scale, deliberate interference to US commercial broadcasters and
placing Cuban broadcasting stations on Radio Marti's frequencies-
-while awaiting more jamming equipment from East Europe.
The Economy
Cuba is now in the midst of its sugar harvest which places
the economy in a position of greater than normal vulnerability.
The harvest season runs from November to early May with the
period of greatest activity occurring between January and
April. Cargo vessels are loaded with sugar throughout the
harvest, but most of the shipments are made between February and
June. Recent figures are unavailable, but during 1980, some 64
percent of Cuba's sugar exports were shipped during this five-
month period. Thus, the heightened susceptibility of the economy
will remain in effect only until May.
If Havana perceived the US threat great enough to mobilize
its armed forces during the harvest, sugar production probably
would drop markedly, perhaps resulting in decreased hard currency
earnings. Such a mobilization, if maintained over a period of
several weeks, would most likely drain manpower from harvest
activities. Some 130,000 regular sugar workers are employed
fulltime, but an estimated 100,000-150,000 additional workers are
utilized during the peak months of the harvest. Because the
rainy season generally begins in May, even a temporary disruption
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
1 ~
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
before then would cause a reduction in sugar production. The
extent of the impact would depend upon the scale of the
mobilization, but for every one percent decline in sugar
production Havana stands to lose $21 million at current world
prices.*
If sugar workers were excluded from a mobilization, other
sectors such as non-sugar agriculture, industry, and construction
would be especially hard hit. A large-scale mobilization could
also cause a disruption in the transportation sector no matter
when it occurred. The movement of goods between factories and
ports would be obstructed as the vehicles used for this purpose
probably would be diverted to military use. If such a call-up
was implemented during the harvest, however, the effect would be
compounded, causing additional drops in production and export
Another potential vulnerability for the near term results
from Cuba's apparent lack of major economic preparations for a
possible US blockade. The Castro regime seems to have done
little to stockpile petroleum, consumer goods, or basic food
products as a contingency against such an action. There have
been no.indications such as increased shipments of petroleum or
grains and no new facilities for storage of these commodities
About 77 percent of Cuba's total energy needs come from
imported petroleum. The island has a maximum storage capacity of
only about two months supply. Detected deliveries of petroleum
for 1981 were slightly below last year's level, and deliveries
during October and November--when several military mobilizations
occurred--remained within normal bounds.
The Castro government reportedly formed a task force last
September to study Cuban food reserves, which
are sufficient to last about 15 days. The
*This figure is based on a harvest of about 8 million tons, and the value
of $21 million should be viewed as exemplary. Not all of Cuban sugar sales
are for hard currency, and Havana could divert some of its soft currency sales
or reduce domestic stocks to offset shortfalls in production.
L4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
lox]
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
4
?
group was charged with making recommendations on how to increase
these reserves. Because of Cuba's climate, it will be difficult
to do this over the short term. At least 40 percent of certain
key food staples--wheat, rice, beans, canned meat, powdered milk,
and cooking oil--are imported. Moreover, a cutoff of petroleum
deliveries would cause domestic agricultural production to
decrease significantly. Trade data for individual commodities
are not available yet for 1981, but overall deliveries of
foodstuffs to Cuba do not appear to have increased signifi-
cantly. Cuba currently is experiencing severe hard currency
shortages stemming from low world sugar prices, and thus is not
able to purchase substantial quantities of foodstuffs on the
Centralized Leadership
The highly centralized nature of the Cuban political system
gives Castro considerable flexibility in policy formulation since
rapid changes can be undertaken with a minimum of debate. On the
other hand, the system can be vulnerable in an environment of
multiple crises; because of limited time to focus on rapidly mov-
ing events, a small group cannot render effective decisions on
all matters for which it has responsibility. The decision-making
process of a small group in such an environment tends to lose
creativity and become increasingly rigid. New information or
action are either ignored or misinterpreted.
During the height of the Mariel refugee exodus in May 1980,
for example, the Cuban leadership was simultaneously trying to
manage a massive anti-US propaganda campaign, the flow of
hundreds of refugees per day to the US, diplomatic maneuvering
against the US and several Latin American governments, and mob
attacks against would-be emigrants. In this highly charged
atmosphere, the Cuban Air Force sank a Bahamian patrol boat,
mistakenly believing the craft was engaged in an exile attack on
Cuban fishing boats. The incident lasted over 24 hours and
included violations of Bahamian waters and airspace as well as a
brief landing by Cuban soldiers on a populated Bahamian island.
In the next several days, the Cuban military also provoked two
incidents with the US Coast Guard in international waters.
This vulnerability would be affected by the rapid implement-
ation of a broad range of actions, particularly if they emitted
mixed signals concerning US intentions toward Cuba. Initially,
these would disrupt Havana's policymaking process as Castro
25X14
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
attempted to assess and respond to each new action. As the mul-
tiple crises developed, Cuba would almost certainly become
increasingly aggressive which would undercut the regime's image
with other nations in the region. As a corollary, however, the
chances for a dangerous miscalculation by Havana would rapidly
multiply, increasing the risk of an armed confrontation with the
Declining Military Vulnerability
Cuba's military capabilities for defending itself or provid-
ing military support to an ally will continue to improve over the
next several months as the armed forces absorb recent Soviet arms
deliveries. It could take up to a year after delivery for Cuban
crews to become proficient in a combat situation on totally new
weapons systems *such*as the Koni frigate, the SA-6 surface-to-air
missile system, and the MI-24 Hind helicopters. All three
arrived in the last six months. Overall, we estimate that Cuban
personnel will be combat proficient with these new systems no
The Cubans probably already have enough personnel on active
duty and in the reserves to operate the ditional MIG-21 and
MIG-23 fighters nd possibly the
additional Osa-I missile attack boats. It could.take up to six
months, however, before newly trained active-duty crews would be
fully proficient in their operation. A similar period of time is
required for development of the support structure necessary for
Two major factors influence the length of time it will take
Cuba to assimilate the totally new weapons systems.
-- The amount and nature of training Cuban crews received
in the Soviet Union prior to the systems' introduction
to Cuba.
-- The amount of support provided by Soviet technical
- personnel once the systems arrive in Cuba.
Normal Soviet practice with the Koni frigate is to provide
familiarization training in the Soviet union on the vessel's
basic operational and performance characteristics prior to
delivery. The provision of similar training on systems such as
the SA-6 and MI-24 could reduce the length of time Cuban crews
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
?
would need to become proficient from close to a year to perhaps a
few months after the system is delivered to Cuba.
Cuban crews probably could learn the most basic operating
procedures for much of the new equipment within a matter of
weeks, but it would take several months of training--whether in
Cuba or in the Soviet Union--before they could master both the
operation of new armament and new tactics for employing the
systems most effectively. The MI-24 helicopter, for example, is
produced by the same manufacturer as Cuba's older MI-8 Hips and
the similarilities between the two would enable Cuban MI-8 pilots
to fly the MI-24 safely in a relatively short time. Much longer
would be needed, however, for the gunner on the MI-24 to become
sufficiently proficient with the helicopter's on-board fire
control system or to engage targets successfully in a rapidly
changing tactical environment, such as in Angola or Nicaragua.
In addition, these new systems are considerably more complex
and difficult to maintain than Cuba's older weapons. The initial
training of technical personnel responsible for maintaining these
new types of equipment normally takes several months to a year--
severely limitina any o erational use of the weapons system
involved.
Given the complexity of the
other new systems, some Soviet technical personnel probably are
advising the Cubans on the maintenance of those systems as
well.
The Cuban Interests Section
The closure of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington
D.C. almost certainly will cause a reciprocal action by the
Castro regime against the US Interests Section in Havana.
Although the Cuban Government would still have a presence--albeit
restricted--in this country by virtue of its UN mission,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
I
25X1 '
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3 1
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
Soviet Vulnerabilities and US Options Toward Cuba
Moscow's economic problems are likely to grow gradually over
the next six months. The Soviets face serious hard currency
payment problems as a result of a large agricultural import bill,
sluggish oil export prices and aid to Poland. Indeed the Soviet
cash position is especially tight now because receipts from
exports are sluggish during the winter months. For the year as a
whole we expect their payments position to worsen; the trade
deficit could exceed $8 billion compared to $6 billion in 1981.
This is not to say, however, that the USSR is on the brink
of disaster. Its capacity to service its debt remains good; it
has substantial amounts of hard currency assets. Its gold stocks
are worth $20-25 billion at current market prices, and its
deposits in Western banks total some $5 billion (as of September
1981). Nevertheless, the Soviets will not be able to continue to
import substantially more from the West unless they can borrow
massive amounts.
A unilateral US grain embargo against the USSR would have
little impact over the next six months. In any event, Moscow's
purchases of grain for Cuba are relatively small from the Soviet
perspective and come from Canada. The Soviets are likely to feel
immediate greater pressure from multilateral Western restrictions
on credit which could force them to:
-- deplete national assets, i.e., gold,
-- reduce further their assets in Western banks;
-- cut imports of Western.goods sharply.
Such actions would raise the cost of supporting Cuba at a time
when Moscow faces unprecedented demand for support from Eastern
Europe, expecially Poland.
Nevertheless, the Soviets almost certainly see the benefits
of their aid to Cuba is important to Soviet prestige and Castro
serves major Soviet foreign policy interests in the Third World,
particularly Africa and Central America. Soviet subsidies and
military aid to Cuba in 1980 totaled about $3.2 billion.
Although Moscow will continue to press Castro to use Soviet aid
more effectively
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
?
it is probably willing to increase
its assistance to ease any economic Droblems created by US
Moscow does face substantial military constraints on its
ability to respond to US military activity in the Caribbean.
Although Soviet military power and the capability to project it
is steadily growing, Moscow cannot hope to match the military
power the US has or can quickly move into the region. This
constraint is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, in response to US measures designed to project
a heightened US threat to Cuba, the USSR is likely to continue
and possibly intensify efforts underway since early last year to
I- 'I
t
o -')
er Cuban defenses. Additional shipments of armaments,
possibly including some new weapons systems, are well within
Soviet capabilities and would serve to demonstrate Soviet reso
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Moscow is likely to continue the pattern of
continuous deployment of naval reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba,
could further increase intelligence collection against US
military activity, and could again begin regular naval port calls
to Cuba (the last one was in April 1981).
Moscow is preoccupied with serious international problems.
These include continued uncertainty over the future course of
events in Poland and a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign in
Afghanistan. Furthermore, political maneuvering has already
increased in the Soviet leadership in the wake of Suslov's death
and could increase over the next six months if Brezhnev dies or
becomes seriously ill.
It is unlikely, however, that these problems will
dramatically change Soviet determination to preserve Communist
rule in Cuba or that they will make the USSR more vulnerable in
the next six months. Indeed, in the face of such external or
internal problems, Moscow could become more determined to show
firmness. The delivery of MIG-23 aircraft on the eve of the
Haig-Gromyko talks has already indicated a Soviet willingness to
supply military hardware to Cuba regardless of its impact on
relations with the US. Furthermore, these problems are not of
such magnitude that they preclude a Soviet military response to
US actions against Cuba in some other theater such as Berlin,
25X1
II
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3
0
a
Iran, or Korea. While the threat of such a move might be used to 25X1
deter major US military action against Cuba, Moscow would have to
weigh many factors before carrying such action out. Short of a 25X1
blockade, none of the measures
would trigger such a response. 25X1
Timing of US Actions
While Soviet vulnerabilities themselves have little bearing
on the implementation of specific US measures regarding Cuba, the
Soviets will probably consider their timing in assessing US
intentions. We believe, for example, that in 1978 the Soviets
interpreted the six month pause between initial introduction of
the MIG-23 and our demarche on the subject as a sign of US 25X1
l
re
uctance to challenge them on the issue. Moscow would probably
view-a warning that we would not tolerate the presence of fighter
aircraft in Nicaragua in a similar way if it came after the
actual introduction of the planes.
While a'change in US policy toward Angola -- repeal of the
Clark amendment and assistance to UNITA -- would not particularly
affect Soviet vulnerabilities, it could make preservation of the
Soviet-Cuban position there another difficult issue before the
Soviet leadership. Intensified efforts to repeal the Clark
amendment, however, could improve the Soviet-Cuban position in
Angola over the next six months. There have been a number of
signs that Moscow is concerned that the Dos Santos regime in
Luanda is too willing to undertake a dialogue with the US over
Namibia'and to compromise on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from
the country. Moscow is likely to-use increased US lobbying
regarding the Clark amendment to reinforce its message to Angola
that the US cannot be trusted and that Luanda should therefore
Approved For Release 2007/11/30: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940103-3