IRAN--DWINDLING OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000300310007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Iran--Dwindling Options
1. Iran is facing a critical period ahead as its options in the
Iran-Iraq War seem to be sharply diminishing, leaving it with few
palatable choices. As Iran seeks to redefine its goals, a strain on the
leadership is likely to result.
-- With Iran's open options, the regional situation has become
more fluid and harder to predict, with at least some possible
outcomes even less desirable for US interests.
2. Victory Recedes: Up through last winter Iran looked like it had
backed Iraq into a corner:
-- Iran was producing oil and able to pay for the war while Iraq
could not; Iraq was on the dole.
-- Iran seemingly could take massive casualties whereas Iraq could
not.
-- Iran seemed intransigent and unresponsive to Iraqi offers to
end the war, providing no light for Iraq at the end of the
tunnel.
-- Iraqi defensive strategy was passive and uninspired.
3. It was on this basis last fall that the US gave consideration to
"tilting" towards Iraq out of concern that otherwise Iran could
eventually prevail.
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4. Changing circumstances: A strategic shift in the war has
occurred over the past many months:
Iraq is producing and using mustard and nerve agents.
Iraq is nearing agreement on an Iraq-Jordanian pipeline.
Iraq is employing the Super Etendard and Exocet with increasing
effectiveness and now has a growing capability to deter oil
shipments from Kharg Island.
Iraqi static defenses and use of flooding have proven daunting
to Iran.
Iran seems engaged in more intense internal debate on the
tactics and costs of the war.
Saudi Arabia has demonstrated some capability to defend itself
in the air.
The Soviets have stepped up their commitment to Iraq and are
more willing to arm the Iraqis heavily against Iran,
heightening Iranian concern.
Saddam Hussein shows no signs of slipping.
5. The War Option: If Iran decides to continue the war, it faces
the following prospects:
-- Iraqi attacks against Iranian population centers may increase.
-- Iraq is increasingly likely to repel Iranian onslaughts through
Iraqi use of chemical warfare, flooding and static defenses;
-- Iraq will intensify attacks against Iranian shipping and may be
able to sharply curtail Iranian income;
-- Iraq may be more willing and capable of striking at Kharg
itself;
-- The US could be drawn directly into the conflict in an air or
sea war which would lead to severe Iranian losses.
-- Iranian casualties could greatly increase, possibly threatening
internal stability and the rule of the mullahs.
-- Syria is increasingly unenthusiastic about the broadening
prospects of the Gulf War.
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-- The cost of ending the war may be going up as Iraq grows more
confident of its ability to go the long haul, defend itself and
concede less at the bargaining table.
-- The USSR may provide further strategic weaponry to Iraq and
could even threaten Iranian security from within Soviet borders.
6. In short, victory seems increasingly unlikely and the costs to
Iran are going up. Yet the peace option is equally unattractive to
Tehran.
7. Iran's Strategic Goals: Iran cannot lightly decide to dispense
with the war. It is not simply a matter of redrawing tactical goals.
Iran has long been locked in a geopolitical struggle with Iraq which
predates both Saddam and Khomeini; it is basics y a historic contest
for primacy in the Gulf--a contest whose implications the Shah
recognized clearly.
-- If Iran abandons the war now it will essentially be
conceding the prospect of dominance in the Gulf for the
foreseeable future--whether Saddam goes or stays. This is
almost intolerable for Iran and doubly so given the new
religious ideology with w ich this struggle is
additionally invested.
7. The struggle for oil: Iran's war goals aim not only at humbling
of Iraq but at a s cho o ical victory over the other Gulf states as
well. If Iran is locked in a geopolitical struggle with Iraq, it a so
challenges Saudi Arabia as the bastion of US influence and the chief
prop for oil policies anathema to Iran. An Iranian victory over Iraq
would thus also have a clear-cut message for all the Gulf oil-producing
states:
-- Iran is the power to be reckoned with in the Gulf.
-- The US is basically unreliable as a refuge in time of long-term
political struggle in the region.
-- The question of oil production ceilings and oil prices are no
longer to be determined by Saudi Arabia, but by Iran. Iran
will be the chief proponent of higher prices and less
production. (This issue predates Khomeini.)
8. The struggle will continue: Whether or not the Gulf conflict
moves out of hot-war phase, the struggle will continue, both against
Iraq and the other Arab states. Iran cannot afford to abandon this
conflict in either geopolitical or religious terms; to do so would be
tantamount to admitting the failure of the Revolution and its
irrelevancy to the Muslim world.
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9. The key question for Iran therefore becomes: is war, or peace,
the more damaging to Tehran's vision of the future? What other ways
exist for Iran to pursue its historical and religious ambitions?
10. Iran most probably will decide to delay the battle but not
abandon the war. Signs are already afoot that Iran may be seeking ways
to broaden its base of support within the country in order to prepare
itself more effectively for some future grand battle whose time and
place have yet to be chosen. The regular military may be sought to play
a greater role, thereby lending greater effectiveness--and perhaps
greater realism--to Iran's military aspirations. Such a step might also
contribute to the greater rationality of Iranian politics in the future.
11. Iranian tactics in the war: Whatever strategic dilemma Iran
may face, it has several tactical options in the coming months:
-- pursue limited attacks against Iraq designed to maintain the
war of nerves and attrition but reduce casualties;
-- periodically attack Iraq up and down the length of the border
when the opportunities arise;
-- stimulate the Kurds in northern Iraq into breaking the current
Kuraish-Iraqi government truce and forcing Iraq to open a new
and costly front in this region;
-- continue to alternately threaten and entice the Arab Gulf
States to persuade Iraq to limit its air war in the Gulf.
(Iran knows the Gulf states fear a spread of the war and will
try to persuade them to remove Saddam Husayn as the "sole
obstacle to ending the war.")
-- seek improved aircraft and other strategic weapons in order to
achieve greater weapons parity with Iraq.
12. Iran can turn to longer range political subversion in the
region including healthy doses of terror. This is likely under almost
any circumstances, yet it is puzzling why Iran has not employed this
terror option since last December. Are its terrorist capabilities less
than we had imagined, or has Tehran decided to deemphasize this
instrument?
13. Khomeini's death: Were Khomeini to disappear from the scene we
might expect some shift in emphasis: the zeal of the crusade against
Saddam personally would probably diminish and Iran might review the
value of the hot war per se. It is unlikely that Iran's strategic
geopolitical goals in the Gulf will change, however, and the general
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outlines of an anti-Soviet, anti-Iraqi, anti-Saudi pattern will
persist. As long as the mullahs remain in power this geopolitical goal
of Iran will be strengthened by its particular brand of Shia radicalism
with its strong anti-US thrust.
14. The Soviet Option: The Soviets have probably decided that
sticks are more likely to get the attention of Iran's leaders at this
stage than are the ineffective Soviet carrots of the past few years.
Iran may already be concerned at this development and be taking steps to
relieve Moscow's pressure through regularization of relations.
-- Yet I doubt very much that Tehran has changed its view of the
historical fact of the Soviet/Russian threat to Iran.
Ideologically Iran is still most unlikely to turn to the
Soviets for support--much less an alliance. Improved
Soviet-Iranian relations can still serve to create a
Soviet-Iranian arms relationship which has highly negative
implications for the West.
15. Any such period of turmoil and fluidity offers Moscow new
opportunities for intervention in Iran, especially as the prospect of US
intervention in the Gulf grows. Moscow furthermore has formidable tools
at its disposal with:
-- a standing army on Iran's borders;
-- Soviet forces in Afghanistan (with legitimate casus belli
against Iran for its support to the Afghan insurgents);
-- Moscow's 1921 treaty with Iran permitting Soviet intervention
under certain circumstances.;
-- Tudeh and other leftist elements still exist in Iran (albeit
hunkered very low);
-- irreaentist movements for "northern and southern Azerbaidzhan
unity" are being touted in Baku.
Yet the present leadership in Moscow will probably conclude that the
implications of Soviet military involvement in Iran, with uncertain
results, is far too bold a policy at this time.
-- This prospect nevertheless remains the single most disturbing
one as Iran moves into a period of increasing pressures,
critical choices, possible internal turmoil and strategic
disappointments. The US can only view a struggle for power in
Tehran with some ambivalence because the options it opens can
more readily be exploited by Moscow than the US.
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-- Because of this prospect the US will find advantage in avoiding
military confrontation with Iran if possible and in in
encouraging others to develop a limited military supply
relationship with Iran as soon as possible after the shooting
war with Iraq looks like it is over. China, Israel, Brazil,
and Western Europe remain the best bets.
16. US prospects: The US is unlikely to be able to get close to
Iran anytime soon. We will remain committed to Saudi Arabia and the
Arab Gulf moderates, in support of Israel, and an advocate of price
control on oil. All of this conflicts with Iran's goals. The US is
also ideological symbol for the rich against the oppressed and the weak
no matter what we do. The anti-US bias could diminish over time,
however, and eventually probably will in the event of a growing Soviet
threat to Iran. We are, after all, a distant, and not a neighboring,
Satan.
17. Tehran's unpalatable choices can serve as only limited comfort
to us in the months ahead since the outcome is not fully predictable and
involve at least several possibilities potentially worse for our
interests. We must recognize that a long-term geopolitical struggle in
the Gulf will in any case be entering a new phase with different perils,
only slightly less dramatic than the closure of the Gulf to Western oil.
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NIC #04165-84
20 July 1984
SUBJECT: Iran--Dwindling Options
DCI/NIC/NIO/NESA:G.FulllUNC ED) July 84)
Dist:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DCI/SA/IA
1 - ER
DDI Registry
1 - VC/NIC
1 - C/NIC
2 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - D/NESA
1 - NIO/W
1 - NIO/ECON
1 - NI0/USSR
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