WEEKLY SUMMARY THE WARSAW PACT: AN ALLIANCE OF UNEQUALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010800080003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 17, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
The Warsaw Pact: An Alliance of Unequals
Secret
N2 58
May 17, 1974
No. 0020/74A
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THE
WARSAW
PACT
An Alliance Of Unequals
The Warsaw Pact is a political and military alliance of the USSR and its East European
neighbors. Created 19 years ago when West Germany entered NATO, the armed forces of
the pact members have evolved into a large, well-equipped combat force. It is dominated by
the USSR, both in terms of its first-line units and its command structure. It has, however,
developed councils, staffs, and commands on which all members are represented in an
organizational structure superficially similar to NATO's.
From Moscow's viewpoint, the pact's value as a mechanism of control over its allies is
probably as important as its value as a military counterweight to NATO. Although formal
pact political consultations have not submerged all differences among the members, they
have, by and large, ended by endorsing Soviet policies. Joint exercises, common equipment,
and integrated command have reinforced the sense of interdependence.
On June 4, the membership of all parties to the Warsaw Treaty will be automatically
extended until 1985, unless they formally announce their intent to leave the pact before the
June date. In addition, the text of the treaty provides for its own abolition should a "system
of collective European security" come into being. Given the pact's continuing political and
military usefulness as a multilateral institution, it is a foregone conclusion that it will be
neither dissolved nor renounced by any of its members.
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As a political alliance, the Warsaw Pact*
provides a facade of institutional respectability to
Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and is used
to give the appearance of a unity of purpose that
does not always exist. Moscow has found it to be
valuable as a coordinating and consultative me-
chanism.
Soviet foreign policy views have received
formal, multilateral endorsement from the pact's
political consultative organs. Aside from the prop-
aganda value, these documented endorsements
provide the necessary periodic reassurances of
East European loyalty and also help Moscow spot
any budding differences. They also are a record of
commitment that Moscow can later use to pull
recalcitrants into line. Additionally, the Soviets
can use the group pressure of a joint meeting to
gain tactical and strategic advantages in hammer-
ing out agreed positions. Nonetheless, such multi-
lateral political consultations apparently have not
always been the boon that Moscow may have
originally thought.
Despite the top-level Political Consultative
Committee's decision in 1956 to convene semi-
annually, it has met only 14 times in the 19 years
of its existence; only in 1970 did it meet twice.
Similarly, meetings of the pact's foreign ministers
have been convened only seven times since 1966.
The formal nature of the sessions and the ap-
parent requirement of unanimity have probably
contributed to this infrequency. As a sort of
supplement, the Soviets have convened informal
meetings of the pact leaders in the Crimea each
summer since 1971.
The Warsaw Pact is not and never will be an
alliance of equals or near equals, nor is it the
rubberstamp organization that it was in its early
years. There is now a little more give and take,
MEETINGS OF THE
POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
Prague
Moscow
Moscow
Moscow
Moscow
Moscow
Warsaw
Bucharest
Sofia
Budapest
Moscow
East Berlin
Prague
Warsaw
Warsaw
January 27-28, 1956
May 24, 1958
February 4, 1960
March 28-29, 1961
June 7, 1962
July 26, 1963
January 19-20, 1965
July 4-6, 1966
March 6-7, 1968
March 17, 1969
August 20, 1970
December 2, 1970
January 25-26, 1972
April 17-18, 1974
* May 1975
*Scheduled jubilee session to mark the 20th
anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty.
which poses some liabilities for Moscow, and con-
sequent advantages for the East Europeans. The
Romanians, in particular, and probably others at
different junctures, have successfully exploited
the multilateral forum to bring about some mod-
ifications in Soviet policy.
Peacetime Military Cooperation
The Warsaw Pact has been the paramount
institutional forum for the extensive peacetime
military coordination that Moscow has cultivated
since 1961. Indeed, the Warsaw Treaty appears to
be the only legal basis for such coordination.
Article 5 established the pact's Joint Command
*The members of the Warsaw Pact are the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria. Albania originally was a member of the alliance, but ceased active participation in
1961 in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split. It formally renounced membership in September 1968, to protest
the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Warsaw Treaty was signed on May 14, 1955, but did not
enter into force until June 4, 1955, when Albania deposited its instruments of ratification.
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I Muf
In the Crimea: Zhivkov, Ceausescu, Gierek, Kadar, Husak, Brezhnev, Honecker, Tsedenbal, and Gromyko
and further permits the adoption of other agreed
defensive measures against "possible aggression."
None of the bilateral friendship and mutual assist-
ance treaties between Moscow and its allies pro-
vides explicitly for such peacetime military co-
operation, despite the commitment to mutual
defense in case of an armed attack. All such
accords, except the one with Romania, do bind
the parties to cooperation in "all spheres." This
wording presumably could be taken to include
military cooperation.
Characteristically, only Romania is appar-
ently not obligated to peacetime military cooper-
ation should the pact be dissolved. The Roma-
nian-Soviet friendship treaty avoids the general
language of the other treaties and, instead, deline-
ates cooperation in the "political, economic,
scientific, technical, and cultural spheres." Mili-
tary cooperation is conspicuously absent. Such
legalisms are neither irrelevant nor happenstance.
They are a key to Romanian obstructionism
within the pact. 25X1
Extensive peacetime military collaboration
been trusted since 1968, Prague's production of
military hardware has been of great value.
Moreover, much of the political value of
peacetime military coordination lies in the means
it provides for monitoring and controlling nation-
alism in Eastern Europe. Through coordination
Moscow can keep close tabs on the individual
East European military establishments. The mere
act of planning and practicing for wartime con-
tingencies has introduced standardizations of
doctrine, organization, equipment, and language
along Soviet lines.
Such coordination has been useful to Mos-
cow in its dealings with the recalcitrant Roma-
nians. The process has been used in an effort to
keep Bucharest on the political defensive, to
nibble away at its concept of national sover-
eignty, and to provide a potential channel for
subversion.
benefits Moscow by enhancing the usefulness of In the give and take of Soviet - East Euro-
East European military forces, and by spreading pean relations, "defense preparedness" is evi-
out some of the economic burdens of the pact, dently a potent issue that the Soviets can use to
whether directly or indirectly. For instance, even good effect in extracting concessions from their
if much of the Czechoslovak military has not allies. Persistent Soviet demands for greater East
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Peacetime Strengths of Warsaw
Pact Divisions in Eastern Europe
A
IV
CC
I IV
A
.wa4
FEDERAL
REPUBLIC:
OF GERMANY
m
Tank Division Motorized Rifle
Division
?i Combat strength i
4bb Reduced strength
i Cadre strength
i Reserve
0 Non-Soviet forces
Combat strength At or near full manpower and equipment
strength.
Reduced strength 50% to 75% manned, missing some
equipment.
Cadre strength 10% to 30% manned, missing substantial
numbers of equipment.
Reserve No assigned personnel in peacetime, missing
substantial numbers of equipment.
o so ~
moss
GGcgGA 574 (JA
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European investment in Soviet economic schemes
are more difficult to ignore if Moscow links them
to the demands of joint "defense preparedness."
The Soviets did not initially consider the
Warsaw Pact useful for peacetime military col-
laboration, even though a separate annex to the
1955 treaty called for an extensive joint military
command. In fact, the Soviet Defense Ministry
did not implement the provisions of this annex
until the early 1960s, when economic exigencies
and the break with China made Moscow inter-
ested in increasing East Europe's military capabil-
ities. The pact leaders, meeting in Moscow in
March 1961, agreed on new measures for "further
strengthening their defensive capabilities." The
results of this decision became apparent in Octo-
ber 1961, when the first joint Warsaw Pact ex-
ercise was staged in East Germany. A year later,
Romania hosted joint maneuvers on its soil, the
first and only time it has done so. At the same
time, Moscow undertook an effort to modernize
East European forces.
The pact's command structure, however, ap-
parently continued to be little more than a sec-
tion of the Soviet Defense Ministry. Complaints
by Romania in the mid-1960s that the alliance
lacked the "international" features amply prom-
ised in the Warsaw treaty prompted an effort to
broaden participation. Moscow in effect agreed to
a greater East European voice in pact military
organs, in order to remove the Romanian excuse
for its failure to cooperate fully.
The Budapest meeting of the Political Con-
sultative Committee in 1969 approved "new
regulations" and "documents" to "further per-
fect" the pact's military organs. From this came
several new organs-the Committee of Defense
Ministers, Military Council-and the first assign-
ment of East Europeans to the pact's military
staff. Whether the East Europeans have a stronger
voice is still not certain, however, inasmuch as the
Soviets have not conceded any key positions.
Military Posture
During the 19 years that the Warsaw Pact
has been in existence, the pact countries' military
Special Report
forces have improved overall. Despite some pre-
sumed political differences and different degrees
of reliability, these national armed forces have in
recent years become interdependent components
of a combat entity.
The East Europeans are bound by a general
commonality of equipment, doctrine, and prac-
tice that conform to the Soviet model. With the
exception of a few items of equipment that are
indigenously designed and produced, virtually all
East European ground and air armaments are pro-
vided by Moscow or produced locally under
Soviet license. This is still generally true for
Romania, despite efforts by Bucharest in recent
years to diversify its equipment.
In any conflict with NATO, the East Euro-
pean forces would almost certainly act in concert
with the Soviet Union. They could scarcely do
otherwise. Nuclear weapons are a case in point.
All the East European forces have tactical missiles
with nuclear capabilities, and most have aircraft
suitable for delivering tactical nuclear weapons.
None, however, control the nuclear warheads, and
none could employ them except at Soviet dis-
cretion.
During peacetime, the pact countries main-
tain the structure and major elements of the en-
tire ground forces intended for war. Those forces
kept at full strength-mainly the Soviet units
stationed in Eastern Europe-provide the capabil-
ity to counter a NATO attack or possibly to
initiate combat operations while understrength
forces are being mobilized.
Most pact units, however, are manned and
equipped at less than full combat strength, largely
to avoid the economic strains of a large standing
army. This skeletal force ensures a ready frame-
work for the rapid expansion of ground forces,
and is used to train the large number of men
called up under universal conscription and then
assigned to the reserves. While the standing
strength of pact ground forces varies, almost all
are believed to have at least a cadre of personnel
and their complement of combat equipment,
except for armored personnel carriers.
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W
POLITICAL ORGANS
? Political Consultative Committee (PCC), designating the formal top-level meetings of
the political leaders of the pact member states. Its jurisdiction covers the broad range of
political, military, economic, and cultural affairs. Judging by differences in attendanc at
the PC-C sessions, national representation on the PCC may vary from state to state. Hungary
consistently sends the smallest delegation-usually the party leader, government head, 'and
foreign minister. Defense ministers apparently have not attended PCC sessions since 1969.
a Foreign Ministers. Meetings of foreign ministers have no formal title analogous too:... the
PCC. They have met irregularly since 1959, often, but not always, in apparent advance
preparation for the-PCC meetings.
? Deputy Foreign Ministers, who have met infrequently.
? Secretary General of the Political Consultative Committee, presently Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Firyubin, appears to perform administrative tasks for the PCC.
THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION
? Committee of Defense Ministers, formed in 1969 in line with decisions taken at the
Budapest summit. It has convened annually, usually to discuss the activities of the pact's
military organs and the- military posture of the member states. The committee's 1971
session-apparently focused on modernization efforts for the next five years.
? Joint Command, has always been headed by a Soviet, currently Soviet Deputy
Defense Minister Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, who has the title Commander in Chief of the
Joint Armed Forces. The command functions through a staff, maintains Soviet representa-
tives in each capital, and has jurisdiction over the Joint Armed Forces. There are at !least
seven deputy commanders, who command their country's units "assigned" to the Joint
Armed Forces.
? Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, consisting of permanently assigned representatives
from each country's General Staff and located in Moscow. Reports suggest that another pact
staff facility is being built at Lvov. Soviet General Sergei Shtemenko is Chief of Staff, and
every pact member is thought to have assigned someone to the staff. A convention on the
privileges and immunities of the staff wascompleted in 1973.
? Joint Armed Forces, are composed of specifically "assigned" units from the "allied
armies" of the member states. All East German armed forces were so assigned in January
1956, and presumably retain that status. It is not known what other units-specifically' from
the East European countries-have been designated part of the joint forces, or what the
conditions and modalities of assignment are. The joint command may exercise control
prerogatives only during wartime.
? Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces, formed in 1969, consists of a deputy
defense member from each member state. They hold the rank of Warsaw Pact deputy
commanders in chief and as such, "command" their own national units assigned to the'Joint
Armed Forces. The council is chaired by the commander of the Joint Armed Forces-and
meets semi-annually to plan training schedules for the joint forces and examine topical
military subjects. Council sessions appear to focus largely on the activities of the !Joint
Armed- Forces; concurrent gatherings of "leading cadres" discuss the apparently broader
subject of the "allied armies."
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Further Grooming
Moscow seems intent on further grooming
the Warsaw Pact for greater political and military
coordination..
Special Report
Over the long run, the Soviets may be inter-
ested in creating within the pact a standing, in-
tegrated military force, subject to pact (read,
Soviet) command that might be used for main-
taining internal security within Eastern Europe.
Clearly, the Warsaw Pact per se has not been the
asset during bloc crises-whether in Hungary in
1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968-that the Soviets
want it to be. Nonetheless, such military coordi-
nation measures, practiced since 1961, were prob-
ably useful during the Czechoslovak operation. In
September, 1965, Brezhnev alluded to the need
for establishing within the Warsaw Pact "a per-
manent and operative mechanism for considering
urgent problems." There were rumors in 1970
that Moscow had actively proposed the creation
of a multilateral "police force," but nothing ap-
pears to have come of it. In fact, the Soviets will
probably make little headway on this issue, given
the certain opposition (probably not only from
the Romanians) to pact (Soviet) control of na-
tional forces without the concurrence of the na-
tional political leadership.
Possible Treaty Revisions
Although organizational changes could be
made without any revisions of the original War-
saw Treaty, there is some reason to think the
Soviets might want to revise it. The treaty's
preamble contains historical references that-in
light of current European detente develop-
ments-provide an anachronistic rationale for the
treaty's existence. The Soviets undoubtedly
would prefer a simpler introductory statement of
principles and objectives, similar to those of the
North Atlantic Treaty. They might well hope to
include the mutual obligation to preserve social-
ism that has been called the "Brezhnev doctrine."
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Moscow might also want to remove the ref-
erences in the treaty that restrict its applicability
to Europe. In so doing, the Kremlin would seek
to commit the East Europeans to the Soviet side
in any clash with China. The Soviets have some
useful precedents; they successfully widened the
geographical perspective of bilateral friendship
treaties they renewed with four of the East Euro-
pean countries (including Romania) in the late
1960s. (The treaty with Bucharest contains some
qualifying language obviously intended by the
Romanians to dilute the anti-Chinese implica-
tions.) Aside from the Warsaw Pact itself, only
the Soviet bilateral friendship treaties with Poland
and East Germany are still restricted to a Euro-
pean context.
Whilethe East Europeans might conceivably,
albeit reluctantly, concede the geographical issue
(with appropriate qualifying language), the issue
of the Brezhnev doctrine would arouse strong
resistance, at least from the Romanians. Bucha-
rest evidently is prepared to offer counter-
revisions-undoubtedly changes in Article 5, on
peacetime military cooperation-should Moscow
raise the issue.
There is a possibility, though highly remote,
that the pact will be dissolved or that individual
members will withdraw. Article 11 of the Warsaw
Treaty provides for the pact's dissolution "should
a system of collective security be established in
Europe." The Soviets have never spelled out what
this would entail, but they clearly have in mind
more than a successful conclusion of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE).
From the time of its first European security
proposal at the Geneva summit in 1956, Moscow
has held that one prerequisite would be the simul-
taneous dissolution of NATO. Soviet Premier
Bulganin then hedged even this position by listing
such additional conditions as an agreement on
armaments reduction and the withdrawal of for-
eign troops from Europe. The pact summit last
month described a successful CSCE as the starting
point for a European security system and implied
that the dissolution of NATO and the implement-
ation of effective disarmament measures were still
prerequisites.
If the pact were dissolved, a separate net-
work of bilateral friendship and mutual assistance
accords between Moscow and each of its East
European allies exists to bind the parties to polit-
ical, economic, and other areas of cooperation. A
military cooperation clause comes into effect in
the event of an armed attack on either party. In
addition, dissolution of the pact would not affect
the bilateral status-of-forces agreements, which
legitimize the presence of Soviet troops in East
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
The Four Power Potsdam Agreement, signed at
the end of World War II, additionally authorizes
the presence of Soviet forces in Poland to protect
the lines of communication to Soviet troops in
East Germany.
Renunciation of the pact by any of its pres-
ent members is quite unlikely, although any of
them may legally do so until June 4 when the
pact will be automatically renewed until 1985.
Even the recalcitrant Romanians will not want to
challenge Moscow that directly.
Whatever its flaws, the Warsaw Pact is effec-
tive as an instrument of Soviet political/military
control over Eastern Europe. It is, therefore,
almost certain to remain a feature of the Euro-
pean scene for some time. It may even become
more important to Moscow in an era of detente,
when it will be necessary to prop up any flagging
East European commitments and military pre-
paredness, including defense spending. This will
be true for such countries as Hungary, Romania,
and Bulgaria that have a secondary role in Soviet
military strategy, as well as Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia, which have key roles.
Modernization of Warsaw Pact units will, of
course, continue and, at least in terms of the
equipment they have available, they will become
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a more effective fighting force. The political
mission of the pact, however, will remain crucial.
As West Germany makes its peace with the East,
and European security and force reduction talks
progress, the specter of a revanchist West Ger-
many will no longer seem as ominous. Instead,
the Soviets must deal with client states that are
most concerned with increased demands from
consumers, strong inflationary pressures, and
sluggish progress toward industrial modernization.
The Polish riots of December 1970 may have
more relevancy for the future of the Warsaw Pact
than the threat from NATO.
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