JOINT ARMY AND NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES (JANIS), COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THEREON.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01147A000100010016-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 19, 1945
• Content Type: MEMO

C l.~ F'I i Lon T
Approved Folelease 2005/08/10: CIA-RDP79-0114 A , 0' Uc~
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From: LieUtene:nt, Colonel T.L. ITIDGE;, ACofS G- 2,,3d
,G_-iri.ne Division,
To: Chief of NBevel OperF t:ions (Office of Naval
Intelli"ence).
Via': (1) The Comma.ndinb Gener. E -L, 3d :h rive Division.
(F') The Commanding General, Fifth I.mpL:ibi.ous Corps.
(3) The Commanding General; Fleet Brine IF'orce, Pacific.
(4) Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Subject: Joint Army and. Na=vy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) ,
comments and recomr;iendh.tir,ns thereon.
1. ....Va.rious strong points a.nd deficiencies v era noted. r,hile.
using JAMS in 'the development of intelligence regarding either the
target area or the enemy strategic Erea supporting the t,, rget c rea or
both for ..5evera7... operational plans.
JANIS public, tions have provided basic intelligence
rer;uirements, especially in the planning stages. This point i-c s
noted. particularly in the prepe.ra tion for the BLj'.CKLIST ohera.tiorh,
and the following comments are thought to be of interest:
b. In preparing for the BLACKLIST opera: tion, the available
intelligence material, the majority of which was obtained from
CINCPA.C ForwE rd Echelon and from the Twenty-First Bomber Comw nd,
consisted of "J:J,,!I,S No.E841"; "Stra?tegic ;:ngineer? Study No. L2'511;
ONI Port Studies on NAGASAKI,. SASFBO, thOKfh pl , end
b:IOTI-
ir>Ldeo,:ate photo coverage; and some U. S. i,rmy Air Corps Tz rget I'c>;Lder. s.
Of these sources JAi\IS No. 84 provided the bahsir intelligence and the
other>as a
strong desire that J!'IS ;784 should have contained
sever-.l hundred annotated,.ground photographs of the
cities under considu.ration.' It is therefore recommended
that additional subject pictures eith.,r be included in
the body of the ch ptirs or be included. in a special
booklet enclosed in the supplement and their coverage should
be annotated on and cross indexed in th?.: body of JLNIS
and on the cr,arts, mans anti city plans. ren pos: i )le
each pictu o shoulu have attached thereto such C to as
tho.focal length of the lens, the hour and date taken,
the.direction of shot, subject photographed, etc., for
such data'-sill onablo photograohic interpreters to
develop many details of value %hen required. Such photo-
graphs should be methodically collected during time of
oeace for they are no longer available once hostilities
commence except from neutral travelers departing from the
country in question or the procurement of the old photo-
graphs accumulated by the many American tourists and
Lion
~Jb
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only of vhut is available and not of ghat is desired.
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5. JiNIS has now become an essential type of publication
that should be maintained in times of peace and constantly
improved as to quality, accuracy, completeness of coverage,
scope, usability, and timeliness of the information contained
therein for the following reasons:
a. Our experience in this war hz.s effectively proved
that if the United States is to h.,-:.v6 the necess-,ry, basic
intelligence available for early planning of possible
operations, it is essential that such inelligence must
be collected., collated, published, and distributed, i. (11.,
ready to use, prior to the bcginning.of hostilities. The
technological develop .cnts of the ~rorld vitally )-Ifect
military agencies in; first, the reduction of the time
and space factor in enemy or unfriendly nations' canabilitius
of attacking our military and semi-military installations,
and, second, the over increasing quantity of ntr military i
technological developments, including the technique of
their use. Due to these essential factors, intelligence
must receive an ever increasing emphasis, especially ae to
timeliness, because military plans can only be as sound
as the intelligence upon which. they are based.
b. Our present evolutionary state of foreign policy
whereby the United States v,-ill pos .ibly assume international
calico cowers indicates the probability that the United
States will assume an unprecedented amount of treaty
obligations that will remain effective directly in proportion
to the ability of our armed forces to enforce such obligations.
In view of this probable international employment, adequate
intelligence must be readily available to units ~wwhich wrill
be required to fulfill such assigned missions. J1f:N1S is the
only present publication that could be the basic source for
such intelligence information. ....
Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CIA-RDP79-01147A000100010016-0