SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON CYPRUS SITUATION:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON CYPRU$ SITUATION:
Three new developments of major importance in the
past month. The visits of Inonu and Papandreou to
Washington have resulted in agreement to begin negotiations
with the UN mediator and Dean Acheson in Geneva this
week. General Grivas' return to Cyprus is a threat to
Makarios' leadership and could lead to eventual all-out
attacks by Greek Cypriots onthe Turkish Cypriots. There
has been a build-up of Greek Army forces on Cyprus (7,000
troops predicted in the near future) which will lead to
pressure on Inonu for intervention. A breakdown in
negotiations may trigger such intervention.
State Dept. review completed
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7 July 19614
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Cyprus Situation
1. in the month that has passed since US action was successful
in preventing threatened Turkish intervention on Cyprus, there have
been three noteworthy developments: Prime Ministers Inonu and
Papandreou have visited Washington and Paris (Inonu also con-
sulted with British officials in London), former Greek Cypriot
underground leader Grivas has returned to Cyprus, and the military
build-up on the island has been drastically increased--particularly
on the Greek side.
2. President Johnson's primary objective in meeting with
Inonu and Papandreou was to persuade the two to designate negotia-
tors to sit down secretly in the presence of an impartial American
at a neutral spot. :[nonu indicated a willingness to undertake
talks with the Greeks but Papandreou strongly resisted the pro-
posals. Papandreou was opposed on the basis that negotiations
were doomed to failure since the positions of the two governments
were so far apart. A breakdown in negotiations at this critical
stage, he argued, could lead to hostilities.
3. Papandreou displayed little interest in any real
negotiations at first, apparently feeling that time was working
to Greece's advantage. (The Greeks have announced plans to take
the Cyprus issue to the UN General Assembly this fall where they
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? hope to secure a resolution supporting "self-determination" for
Cyprus.) US officials, however, emphasized that internal pressures
in Turkey may soon force the government to take another decision
to intervene. Papandreou was warned not to count on the US to
interpose the Sixth Fleet to prevent'an actual military move.
Eventually, Papandreou accepted a proposal to appoint a negotiator
to meet with the UN mediator, Sakkari Tuomioja of Finland, and
with a US representative appointed by the President. Inonu also
agreed to appoint a similar representative to meet with UN or US
representatives. Greek and Turkish negotiators will not meet--
at least at the beginning. Dean Acheson, appointed by President
Johnson as the US representative, flew to Geneva on 5 July to be
available for consultations when the negotiations begin this week.
4. Inonu's position, repeated in Washington, London, and
Paris, was that discussions for a settlement must be based on
Greek acceptance of the validity of the London-Zurich Agreements
of 1959 which established the Cypriot Republic, gave the Turkish
Cypriots veto rights over important government decisions, and
assured Turkey of the right to intervene on Cyprus. Inonu was
pessimistic in discussions with British officials over the
probable outcome of the Geneva talks, contending that Turkey
could never accept the ultimate aim of the Greeks- enosis (union
of Cyprus with Greece). He says that if the Greeks demand enosis,
he will insist on "double enosis", i.e., partition, and he
believes that his treaty right to intervene was reaffirmed in
his talks in Washington and London.
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5. Papandreou, who was disappointed at being unable to
uncover what Washington would consider an acceptable final
solution for Cyprus, also complained privately that US "pressure"
was exerted on him 'both during his visit and in a letter from
President Johnson on 1 July, in which negotiations for a
permanent settlement were again urged. Papandreou's "solution"
has remained consistent--enosis and a NATO base on Cyprus
combined with international guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots.
6. The return of Grivas to Cyprus on 12 June apparently
was at his own initiative, but with the encouragement of right
wing groups on the island. His return was probably opposed
by the Greek Government and almost certainly by Makarios, whose
authority has been weakened by Grivas' presence. His popularity
is.such at present that even the powerful Cypriot Communist
Party is now paying lip service to enosis despite its long time
opposition to uniting Cyprus with NATO-member..-Greece. Makarios,
meanwhile, is biding his time--probably waiting for the
politically naive G:rivas to make a blunder.
..............................
7. Grivas' public statements have coupled a demand for
enosis with a call for peaceful coexistence with the Turkish
Cypriots. Leaders of the Turkish community predictably have
rejected Grivas' pledge of friendship, which they equate with
the relationship between master and slave.
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S. Leading supporters of Grivas, in contacts with US
officials, have repeatedly stated that the former EOKA leader
will establish firm control over the Greek Cypriot irregular
bands which have not responded to Makarios' leadership. They
have also stated that no unprovoked attacks will be launched
by the Greek Cypriot forces against Turkish Cypriot strongpoints
in the near future. Over the longer period, however, Grivas'
fanatic devotion to !enosis, combined with the urging of his
followers for some sweeping military success, probably will
lead to major attacks on Turkish Cypriot positions.
9. The rapid build-up of military forces and supplies on
Cyprus probably is the most singificant--and dangerous--develop-
ment of the past month. According to the 1960 Treaty of
Alliance among Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the Greek Army may
maintain a garrison of 950 troops on the island; the Turkish
Army is limited to 650.
10. Over a period of several weeks, the Turks have been
smuggling arms and men into northwest Cyprus. The UN head-
quarters in Nicosia estimates the Turks have a capability of
landing from small boats 100 to 150 men plus considerable
quantities of arms and ammunition per week. Many of these
arrivals may have been Turkish Cypriots returning from Turkey
While the Greeks claim the Turks now have up to 7,000
Turkish Army personnel illegally on Cyprus, our estimate would
be closer to 1,000.
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11. The Greeks probably have been sending Army officers in
civilian clothes to Cyprus for several months. (The two Greek
Army officers killed in Famagusta in May were not members of
the Greek contingent on Cyprus.)
Greek and
Greek Cypriot officials admit that personnel have been landed,
alleging that they are returning Greek Cypriot students. The
.Turks claim most are Greek Army personnel and Premier Inonu
states that up to a division of Greek troops (about 9,500
men) are illegally on the island. Our latest information,
from usually reliable sources, indicates that around 4,000
Greek troops--beyond the 950 men in the contingent--are on
Cyprus and that as many as 7,000 may soon be there.
12. The Greek buildup appears to be based on an assumption
in Athens that Turkish intervention is inevitable. There
probably is a direct connection between Greek awareness of how
close the Turks came to intervening on Cyprus in early June
and the decision to commit large numbers of troops to the
island. Knowing that Turkey probably can maintain air and
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naval superiority near Cyprus, the Greeks apparently intend to
concentrate on building up a major land force,
J We believe that the Turks would be able to land the
39th Division on the island in 3 or 4 days after a decision
to intervene were-taken.
13. The Turks are aware of the movement of Greek troops
to Cyprus, and it seems likely that pressure will mount rapidly
within military circles in Ankara to take some form of drastic
counter action. Failure to do so could allow Greek strength on
the island to reach the point where the success of Turkish
intervention would be highly problematical.
14. Attention is now focused on the negotiations about
to begin in Geneva. Passions are dangerously high in both
Greece and Turkey, however, and there is little optimism
even at the highest levels of government in either country
that negotiations will succeed. Both sides continue to look
to the US for some substantive solution in addition to our
procedural involvement. Should the Geneva talks collapse,
Turkey may well decide that military intervention can no
longer be delayed--even should the US again advise against it.
Greek officials have stated repeatedly that Turkish inter-
vention means war.
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