SOVIET ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: July 26, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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TS # 185876
26 July 1965
SUBJECT: Soviet Antisatellite Capabilities
1. The most recent National Intelligence Estimates
concerning Soviet air and missile defense deal also with
Soviet capabilities and intentions to develop and deploy
antisatellite weapon systems. We have reviewed this part
of the estimates and consider it still generally valid.
In the latest paper* we reached the following major
conclusions:
The Soviets have an incentive to develop such
a system, and are almost certainly investigating
its feasibility.
-- They could probably develop a limited capability
within a few months, using existing ballistic
missiles, radars, and nuclear weapons, but there
is no evidence that they have decided to do so.
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-- The Soviets are now constructing a series of large,
radars, most of which will
probably be completed in 1966; some or all of
these will probably be linked together as a
space surveillance system.
-- Considering the power, placement, and capabilities
of these radars, we think the chances are better
than even that the Soviets intend to provide
themselves with an antisatellite capability as
well.
-- The decision to use an antisatellite system in
peacetime, however, would present serious problems --
both political and practical.
2. This estimate was accepted by all members of the
USIB with the exception of the State Department, which felt
that the judgment that the Soviets were developing such a
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system was premature, and gave insufficient weight to
the political consequences of its peacetime use.
3. The estimate was reaffirmed (again with a State
dissent) last month, when we issued a revised and updated
version of Intelligence Assumptions for Planning,
4. In connection with your recent inquiry, we
requested the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence
Committee (GMAIC); to review the latest National Estimate
concerning a Soviet antisatellite capability. GMAIC
reported on 22 July that it found the estimate still
valid.
5.
The entire question of Soviet capabilities and
intentions in this field will be re-examined in connection
with the preparation of the forthcoming NIE 11-3-65, now
scheduled for USIB consideration in November.
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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26 July 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Reactions to the Soviets' Orbiting
Nuclear Weapons in Space
1. We have reviewed recent Estimates concerning Soviet
capabilities and intentions to develop and deploy orbital
bombardment satellites, and consider that they remain generally
valid. In our latest estimate on this subject,* we reached the
following major conclusions:
The USSR almost certainly is investigating
the feasibility of space systems for use
as offensive weapons, but we have no
evidence that the Soviet leadership
seriously contemplates a program to
establish an orbital bombardment capability.
For the foreseeable future, we think that
orbital weapons will not compare favorably
with ICBMs in terms of effectiveness, re-
action time, targeting flexibility,
vulnerability, average life, and positive
control.
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