HOW 'PERMANENT' IS THE SOVIET CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400030042-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: February 11, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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11 February 1969
DI
t" is the Soviet Central Group of
choolovakia?
1. The Central Group of Soviet Forces, Czechoslovakia (car)
is disposed politically rather than militarily and shows signs
of impermanence. This situation is contrary to estimates made
immediately after the invasion which forecast the permanent
stationing of strong Soviet forces disposed in a militarily
logical posture; i.e., two Soviet field armies (about 8 divisions
protecting the Czech-West German border.
2. The validity of early estimates was quickly thrown into
doubt when the best candidate for a permanently forward-deployed
army in Czechoslovakia, the 11th Guards Army from the Baltic,
returned to the USSR. The forces that remained in Czechoslovakia
were disposed well away from the Czech-West German border, primarily
in Slovakia, strung out in an east-west line near the Polish border.
Of some 550 combat aircraft deployed for the intervention, all but
five or six squadrons of interceptors (1D-odd aircraft) returned
to home bases. The commander of CGF turned out to be the
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two-star general who also comzandsthe 38th Guards Army of the
Carpathian Military District -- a low-ranker for a Group of
Forces commander.
3. The current strength and disposition of Soviet troops
in Czechoslovakia is a matter of some dispute among order of
battle analysts, but the anomalies in themselves are revealing.
Apparently headquarters elements from the 38th Guards Army
constitute the headquarters of the Central Group of Forces (CGF).
Order of battle evidence is murky, but it indicates that some
divisions of the 38th Guards Army are located in Cz choslovalcia
while at least one division remains in the USSR. Unless some
undetected reshufflink has taken place, we are faced with the
unprecedented deployment of a Soviet army over 350 miles of
territory both inside and outside the USSR.
4. The three divisions of the 38th Guards Army are the
only divisions claimed to be firmly identified as remaining
inside Czechoslovakia. These are strung out on an east-west
line in Moravia and Slovakia. They appear to be further spread
out in regimental and battalion-sized groups in broad areas of
divisional respon8J.bility -- i.e., In. litical rather than
military dispositions.
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5. The intelligence community has accepted the probable
existence of two more divisions in the extreme northern area
of Bohemia. These "divisions" are not identified as to designation
or even origin. There are some iidicatioaa that these elements
are not real divisions, but ad hoc grotngs of troops, tailored
for population control.
they may be
Iv of staregimentsy detached from
various Soviet divisions from East Gerrnaxy, Poland, or the USSR.
At any rate the evidence supporting designation of these additional
units as divisions (which we allowed for in BIE 11-14) is not very
convincing and become less so as time goes by without a clue as
to identification.
6.
the di
nerally
f the ground troops of the Central
Groiip of Forces (CGP) is political and their organisation make-
shift. They further agree that the lack of Proper tactical air
army is a mystery if CGF is in fact a permanent Soviet deployment.
They note that the South* Group of Forces, Hungary, which also
has more political than military significance, nevertheless was
quickly provided with a gEfacto tactical air army. The 80-odd
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aircraft of the Ca hien MD tactical air army
now in Czechoslovakia do not constitute an air army or even an
air division; they are apparently operating as separate regiments
and squadrons.
7. All these anomalies in the cor2osition and disposition
of CC' point to an essentially non-military and non permanent
posture; they suggest, though they do not prove, a Soviet intent
event.*lly to withdraw troops from Czechoslovakia. At a minimum
they indicate that thore has been no Soviet decision to repair
the weakened Warsaw Pact southern flank in Central Europe by
redeploying Soviet troops.
8. if the Soviots
Czecthoslovkia, the ramifi-
cations for estimates of the Soviet strategic stance vis-a-vis
MATO would be far-reaching. The case for the Warsaw Pact attack
against MATO (never very strong, but nonetheless the backbone of
MATO lanning) would be greatly weakened. The "increased threat"
notion which has been used as a stiffener within NATO would go
up in smoke. Further? withdrawal from Czechoslovakia would
probably be tantamount to the junking of standing Soviet military
plans to meet contingencies in Central Europe. In view of the
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events of the past year, it teems incredible that the ovie
would believe on the basis of renewed confidence in the
reliability of Czech forces that they had reestablished the
politico-military
9. Of course, the case can be nde that the pxvblems
reliability are not really resolved by retaining Soviet forces
In zethoeiovakJ.a. In fact, the political reaction to the
continued presence of Soviet troops probably adds to the
reliability problem. If the Soviets see it this way, they
have a military-strateeic incentive to withdraw. Their basic
military options were (as we originally estimated) to establish
Soviet front to replace the Czechs, or to junk 4 large part of
their strategic plane. The only basis for concluding otherwise
is an assumption that Czech reliability and the Soviet view of
it has remained unchanged despite the events of the past year.
10. In sum, from a military point of view Soviet forces in
Czechoslovakia do not look permanent. Deployments are patently
political making little military sense, and constituting no
increased throat to NATO; the Soviet occupation may actually be
reducing Warsaw Pact capabilities against NATO because of adverse
political impact within Czech forces.
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