THE RUSSIAN OUSTER- - CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 22, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved Folease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R0096`"14000500020007-1
Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
The Russian Ouster--Causes and Consequences
Secret
22 August 1972
Copy No.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For Release 2O J EdiA-RDP79R00967*00500020007-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
22 August 1972
MEMORANDUM*
SUBJECT: The Russian Ouster -- Causes and Consequences
Egypt's dramatic ouster of Soviet military personnel
is an event of considerable ongoing consequence. There
remain a number of uncertainties as to the circumstances
surrounding it. This memorandum explores the topic pri-
marily from the Egyptian-angle. A subsequent memorandum,
now in preparation, will examine it from Moscow's point
of view.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
National Estimates and discussed with other
components of the CIA, who are in general agree-
ment with its judgments.
Approved For Release 200 SEM A-RDP79I 00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For Base 2008E O VA-RDP79R00967Ad00500020007-1
I. THE BOMBSHELL
1. On 17 July, Sadat announced the following decisions:
"1. To terminate the mission of the Soviet military
experts and advisers, who came at our request, as
of 17 July, and to replace them with our sons in the
Egyptian Armed Forces in all the tasks they used to
carry out.
"2. All the military equipment and installations set
up within Egyptian territory during the period foZ-
lowing the aggression of June 1967 will be the sole
property of the Arab Republic of Egypt and under the
administration of its armed forces.
"3. To call, within the framework of the treaty of
cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union,
for an Egyptian-Soviet meeting on a Level to be
agreed upon for consultations regarding the coming
stage."
Although Cairo had notified Moscow a few days previously,
and the latter went along as gracefully as it could, the
decision was unquestionably an Egyptian, not a joint one.
This paper examines the reasons for the dramatic move, its
meaning for Egyptian policy, and some implications for the
US. Its time frame is the next six months to a year.
Principal judgments are summed up in paragraph 23.
II, THE REASONS
2. The causes of the Egyptian move are complex and
interacting; some go back for years, others are more recent.
Approved For Release 200`CfiA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For F ase 2005,EEA-RDP79R00967MbO500020007-1
The record shows substantial evidence of friction between
Egyptian and Soviet military on both personal and pro-
fessional levels. This friction, which seems to have grown
markedly in the last year or two, was certainly a contributing
cause, perhaps the precipitating one, but more fundamental
matters were certainly involved.
3. The growth of Soviet forces stationed in Egypt,
especially those operating for Soviet purposes, had become a
grave affront to Egyptian national pride. Through much of
the first half of this century, Egypt sought to rid itself
of foreign military forces; British troops evacuated the
Suez canal bases in 1956. After Egypt's crushing defeat in
1967, the USSR poured new arms into Egypt; it also intro-
duced Soviet naval and air units into Egypt. By 1971 these
forces, operating for Soviet purposes, had grown to 30 air-
craft with ASW and reconnaissance missions, together with
ships and shore-based naval personnel in three Egyptian
ports. In addition, Soviet advisors were attached to
Egyptian units down to battalion level. And, in response
to Israeli air raids deep into Egyptian territory in 1970,
Cairo had asked for and obtained Soviet air defense units.
Approved For Release 200 70$`kTA-RDP79ROO967A000500020007-1
 Approved For FJase 200- ' (OITA-RDP79R009670500020007-1
The total of Soviet military personnel peaked at more than
15,000. It must have been galling to Egyptian generals to
have to lean so much on the Russians for help, and in all
likelihood a substantial number of Russians patronized their
Egyptian counterparts in ways that reminded the latter of
British behavior of old.
4. Egypt for Egyptians -- not for other Arabs and
certainly not for foreigners -- has been a theme of Sadat's
presidency. In retrospect, it seems clear that Egyptians
at large had grown weary of Nasser's pretensions to area
leadership and of the burdens that Arab causes have imposed
on their country. Sadat seems to sense this and has de-
parted from Nasser's policies and style in many ways,
domestic and international. He has catered to his people's
desire to turn their attention inward; most would be happy
to enjoy a spell of tending to their own affairs, if only
something could be done about getting back Sinai.
5. Here, of course, Sadat has a problem. He and his
generals know that Egypt cannot expect to regain any sig-
nificant part of Sinai by military means. The Russians have
refused to grant Egypt's requests for more and newer
Approved For Release 20A1A': A-RDP79ROO967A000500020007-1
 Approved For Ra ase 2007/S i PDP79R00967 40500020007-1
"offensive" weapons (just what the Egyptians wanted is un-
clear, but in all likelihood they were pressing for items
which could take, or at least threaten to take, some toll of
Israeli lives and property if new fighting broke out
equally important for Cairo has been the fact that the
Russians had shown no capacity to put pressure on the US to
make Tel Aviv more -forthcoming diplomatically and that the
recent Moscow summit clearly showed the Russians' pre-
occupation with wider interests. Both the US and Israel were
on public record as believing that the Russian presence in
Egypt was an obstacle to resolution of the Arab-Israeli
problem. And Moscow was permitting an annual flow of 30,000
Jewish migrants to Israel.
6. Cairo's policy of relying on Moscow for effective
help in its confrontation with Israel was manifestly not
working. Evidence that the Egyptians were aware of the
situation has accumulated over a period of months. But there
was no easy alternative for Cairo; in effect, it selected
what it saw as the least bad course of action. The Egyptian
Approved For Release 2007/&Y c ATRDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For Rase
200$ A-RDP79R0096T 0500020007-1
leaders could have no assurance that the results would be
commensurate with the gamble. The move Sadat chose, however,
has the merit of removing the mass of Soviets from Egypt,
of reducing domestic political pressure, and of offering a
potential break in the no-war-no-peace situation existing
between Cairo and Tel Aviv.
Why Mid-July?
7. Four months before an American presidential
election is not the most auspicious time to get Washington
to encourage Israel to be more forthcoming in the modalities
or the substance of a settlement. The Egyptians know this.
If the ouster was based on Egyptian judgment that the
"military option" against Israel was foreclosed and that
Cairo should concentrate on the diplomatic one, mid-July
seems singularly poor as the date to inaugurate such a
policy. There are reports that Sadat's move was occasioned
primarily by a final Soviet refusal to provide "offensive"
arms or to permit Egypt to attack Israeli forces in Sinai.
In view of the Egyptian leaders' realistic assessments of
their forces' capabilities, we strongly doubt that this was
Approved For Release 200 T(f I-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For R ease 200 * lOR-l'ii -RDP79R00967UA0500020007-1
the real reason or indeed that the Egyptians really wanted
such weapons. For Sadat has used Soviet unwillingness to
provide certain types of assistance as justification for
Egypt's not initiating hostilities, which he wanted to avoid
anyhow. Cairo's rationale of lack of "offensive" weapons
is another case of Moscow being the scapegoat.
8. The compelling reason for the timing must be sought
elsewhere. We lack sufficient data on Egyptian political
dynamics in this post-Nasser era to judge whether Sadat had
over-riding specific fears -- of a military move, of public
outbursts, or of other domestic difficulties. It is very
likely however, that Sadat felt under heavy pressure from
several components of his constituency in Egypt. In the first
place, he needed to repair the damage he had done to his
status by inept explanations as to why Egypt hadn't gone to
war in 1971. The attitude of the Egyptian military leaders
may have been the decisive factor; we know that a number of
them had become angry at Soviet attitudes and conduct and
the good will and support of the military is a basic prop
of the Cairo government. It is also noteworthy that a
number of formerly prominent civilian politicians had circu-
lated a letter criticizing his methods and Egypt's dependence
Approved For Release 200 flc08E A-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For lipjease 200fl..-R-RDP79R009670500020007-1
on the USSR and that there had been widespread discussion
of Egyptian-Soviet relations in Egypt. The twentieth
anniversary of the revolution of course provided a most
appropriate time for dramatic affirmation of Egyptian
national sovereignty and dignity.
9. Forceful action against the Soviets would also
appeal in a special way to the segment of the population
which Sadat represents and leans on -- the Egyptian middle
and upper middle classes. It is to these groups, which pro-
vide Egypt's administrators, army officers (who rapidly
assume bourgeois attitudes whatever their origins), business
and professional people, that many of Sadat's social and
economic measures have been directed. They have benefited
from desequestrations of property, increased availability of
luxuries, and a general easing of austerity. All things
considered, it is clear that, with mounting frustration in
the country, Sadat and his associates were pushed toward
their big decision.
10. Sadat's move has undoubtedly relieved domestic
pressures on him. He has taken the step his most important
critics had demanded. He has shown his countrymen that he
Approved For Release 200 ~J`Ck-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For.lease 200- ' IDTA-RDP79R0096'00500020007-1
is as solicitous a defender of their dignity and independence
as was Nasser. He will no doubt have to show in other ways,
as time passes, that efforts to deal with Israel are at least
in train. He is taking precautions by asking the national
assembly to pass a law, restricting certain forms of poli-
tical activity, which could be used in the future to cope
with discontent. Over time, domestic dissatisfaction is
likely to grow again to serious proportions, but the momentum
provided by the ouster should carry him for several months
at least.
11. The deed is done. The Russian military are leaving.
We do not know precisely how far the exodus will go; indi-
cations are that relatively few will remain and that those
who do will serve as trainers and instructors as Russians
did before the exigencies of the post-167 period required
and permitted vast increases and as they presently do in,
say, Syria and Algeria. What does this development mean
for Egypt's foreign policy?
Approved For Release 200?03705 k -RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved Forwease 200'BHOIT4-RDP79R0096700500020007-1
The USSR's Position
12. The nature and extent of Soviet influence in Egypt
will have to be worked out over time. Soviet counsels will
have less effect than in the past. (Even then Moscow's
words did not prevent Sadat from jailing Ali Sabri, supporting
Numairi against the communists in the Sudan, or expelling
the Russian military in a humiliating fashion.) Egypt has
shown that it intends to manage its destiny. The Soviets
are likely to insist on fairly strict compliance with the
terms for debt repayments. As the source of all Egypt's
armament, the USSR retains both political and economic
leverage. The USSR has already reminded Egypt that it stands
alone facing a powerful enemy by mentioning Israel's nuclear
potential in the Moscow press. A total break with Moscow
by Cairo would be very risky in terms of military unpre-
paredness, and Egypt almost certainly will not go this far.
For while Cairo presently sees the likelihood of hostilities
as slight, it knows that circumstances can change and it
fears Israel's might. It appears that the Egyptians will
let Soviet naval units continue to use some port facilities
at Alexandria, Mersa Matruh, and Port Said, but these will
Approved For Release 2007%'7 1;G"CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For ease 200R-1-RDP79R0096700500020007-1
be restored to Egyptian control. Thus, anything smacking
of extraterritorial privileges is probably lost to the
Russians completely.
The Confrontation with Israel
13. The departure of Soviet missile crews, five
squadrons of fighter aircraft and other air defense per-
sonnel sharply reduce Egypt's capability to defend itself
against Israeli air attack. The Egyptians may have deluded
themselves into believing that they can somehow get along
without Soviet help in this area.
Cairo knows
full well that the Israelis are capable of inflicting
substantial damage should they deem it necessary. The
Egyptians have no capability to put forces across the canal
and hold territory for more than a day or so in the face of
Israeli opposition.
The chances of
Egypt's initiating any major military action have become
even smaller than they were before Sadat's 17 July
Approved For Release 2007 diW. ti -RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For f, ease 2007.BW-RDP79R00967j}00500020007-1
announcement. Thus it is unlikely that there will be a
cross-canal assault or a "war of attrition"; there will,
perhaps be an occasional small probe or other incidents.
14. This leaves the Egyptians with the "diplomatic
option" as the way to start on the road to getting back at
least part of Sinai. Cairo has long believed that the US
could get Israel to withdraw partially anyhow -- if it
wanted to. Sadat doubtless believes that his ouster of the
Russians should be viewed favorably by Washington; Egyptian
officials have already said as much. Despite the cautiously
uncontentious statements emanating from Tel Aviv, he will
not expect action from there unless Washington interests
itself. And he probably doesn't expect much along this
line until the election is over.
15. Israel has reacted with caution to Sadat's move,
but has hinted that it sees some element of promise in it.
Premier Golda Meir spoke directly to Sadat in a speech on
26 July before the Knesset, saying that if the hour has really
come, "Let us meet as equals and make a joint supreme effort
to arrive at an agreed solution...", a safe statement, in
view of Cairo's known opposition to direct talks. She did
Approved For Release 200MW"ETA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For RJase 2007/0CIDP79R00967Ip0500020007-1
say that "interim steps such as the proposal of February 1971
regarding a special arrangement for the canal ...can (be) ...
a temporary solution and a step toward peace...". This could
be interpreted as a concession to the Egyptian view that any
such special arrangement must be labelled as partial and
not foreclose a final settlement restoring all of Sinai.
Defense Minister Dayan has more recently spoken of dividing
Sinai on either a temporary or permanent basis.
16. There are certainly some influential Israelis
who will wish to make a serious effort to determine whether
progress toward an agreement has become more feasible now.
The general mood, in the government and among the public,
however, appears pretty inflexible. Most Israelis see their
country as strong and secure to a degree never before
experienced as the consequence of resisting temptations to
take risks in order to get a settlement after the 1967 war.
They are firmly behind the policy of "creating facts" in
the occupied areas and of insisting on direct negotiations
without preconditions as the approach to a settlement. The
Israeli economy is strong and growing. The country has
received assurances of a continuing flow of essential weapons
from the US. The pressures created by the Rogers initiative
have ceased. There is less trouble on the borders than for
Approved For Release 2007 X / IA- RDP79ROO967A000500020007-1
 Approved For ,lease 200UR:IFS1-RDP79R009600500020007-1
years. The Arab states are disunited and weak. And, not
the least in importance, the Soviet presence in Egypt has
been greatly diminished and Soviet operational units with-
drawn. It will be asked in Israel: What more could the
country want? Is not our policy of firmness beginning to
show results? Why upset so favorable a situation?
17, Prospects for advance in this sector are not
good. Not long after the US elections are over, the
Israelis will begin campaigning to choose a new Knesset
-- not a time for a government seeking votes to be flexible
on territory. There has been no abatement of the distrust
which prevails between Egypt and Israel. The Israelis
will wish to avoid any UN or four-power involvement to the
extent possible. Israel will continue to try to reduce
Egypt's options to the single one of direct negotiation.
1$. The Egyptians have already hinted that Sadat's
initiative in cutting down the Russian presence should be
viewed favorably by the US. And the action is consistent
with others taken over the past year or so -- Cairo's
stated willingness to sign a peace agreement with Israel
Approved For Release 2007T(Y'S/ I -RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For;, .lease 200* Og A-RDP79R0096W M000500020007-1
in response to Jarring, its favorable response to the
Rogers initiative, and its tacit acknowledgement by so
responding that the US, not the USSR, held the keys to a
Middle East settlement. There are suggestions here that
post-Nasser Egypt, in addition to paying less attention
to pan-Arab matters and to liberalizing the domestic
economy, is moving away from the over-close association with
Russia, which developed after the June 1967 war, toward
a more genuine non-aligned posture. Cairo will want the
US to recognize this move and is likely to be very unhappy
if the US does not use it as an opportunity to move the
Israelis.
19. The Egyptians don't expect miracles from the US.
Their attitude is one of realistic cynicism; they have been
disappointed at US failure to live up to their expectations
before. They hope the US will do something about Israel,
believing that only the US can. They will be disappointed
if they see no results. (Despite Sadat's threats of a "hot
autumn" for the US if the latter doesn't swing into action,
he probably expects no more than an earnest of US intentions
in the next few months.) With Russian presence and influence
so diminished in Egypt, the latter will at some point feel
Approved For Release 2007/06"`b-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved Forlease 2007/9f'EiTRDP79R0096W00500020007-1
.the need for an additional -- or substitute -- scapegoat,
and the US is likely to fill this role. If, after what they
regard as a suitable time, nothing happens, Cairo will
consider actions against US interests in the area.
20. None of the courses open to Egypt seems promising.
Sadat could try to get the oil producing Arab states to
curtail shipments of oil produced by American companies.
He is not likely to get a favorable response from any
except Qadhafi in the near term. Saudi Arabia is already
involved in discussions on behalf of several states with
oil companies on the issue of participation and Feisal has
stated he will not use a threat to cut off oil supplies
as a political weapon. Getting Saudi Arabia and other pro-
ducers, such as Kuwait and Iraq, to sacrifice for the common
cause appears highly unlikely. A renewal of hostilities
would raise the chances of such cooperation, but Egypt
clearly neither wants nor expects major fighting. The price
of warfare would be very high and the desire for it is
clearly not widespread in Egypt. Despite all the rhetoric
about reconquering Sinai, at any given moment over the next
Approved For Release S A
 Approved ForQOease 2007/6ELC6 UDP79R009675Y 00500020007-1
year at least the arguments in Cairo favoring postponement
are likely to outweigh those favoring initiating military
action.
21. Nor is Egypt likely to feel strong pressure from
other Arab states. Sadat's move has been welcomed by most
of them. Syria's Asad is quietly approving; he has consis-
tently resisted pressure to sign a treaty with Moscow, and
no Soviet military forces have been based in Syria. King
Feisal, staunchly anti-communist, approves; so does Qadhafi,
who will probably pay a lot of Egypt's bills to the USSR
in return for the just-agreed "total unification" of his
country with Egypt. Tunisia and Morocco also approve while
Iraq and South Yemen are doubtless annoyed, but their
several views count for little in Cairo.
For Europe
22. Egypt is not merely waiting for the US, however.
It is continuing and broadening the process of better rela-
tions with Western Europe begun some years ago. European
firms are going to finance the $200 million oil pipeline
which is to be built from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediter-
ranean. Cairo sees France and, to a lesser extent, the UK
Approved For Release 2007/ M RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved Forlease 2007/fiWTRDP79R0096v000500020007-1
"on its side" in the four-power talks on the Arab-Israeli
issue. Cairo has already begun diplomatic moves designed
to get European support for some new peace initiative.
Egypt has sounded out the UK about purchasing arms. It
has just resumed relations with West Germany. Sadat is
going to visit West Europe within the next year. We expect
that this improvement in relations will continue, that
Cairo will hope to use the better ties as a way of getting
European countries to persuade the US in turn to persuade
the Israelis to be more forthcoming in matters relating
to a settlement.
Summing Up
23. The principal conclusions which can be drawn at
this time from Cairo's ouster of the Russians are:
(a) Resentment of Soviet forces in Egypt,
recognition that the USSR was unwilling to support
political efforts to regain Sinai, and a variety of
domestic pressures occasioned Sadat's step.
(b) A suggestion that post-Nasser Egypt is
moving away from the over-close association with
Russia, which developed after the June 1967 war,
toward a more genuine non-aligned posture, including
better relations with Western Europe.
Approved For Release 2007/0?kc*17Z DP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For=ease 200706R.E1-RDP79R00967#00500020007-1
(c) Egypt intends to concentrate on the "diplo-
matic?" option and not to use military force against
the Israelis in Sinai and has no expectation of an
immediate Israeli attack.
(d) Egypt hopes that the US will respond
favorably and persuade Israel to be more forth-
coming on the issue of a settlement. It has no
great expectations, but sees no other force able to
move the Israelis. It will seek to compel the US
to so act, but has little capability to do so.
It will, however, blame the US if progress is not
achieved.
Approved For Release 2007ftW- A -RDP79ROO967A000500020007-1
 Approved Frelease 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79RO09VA000500020007-1
S-E-C-R-E-T
22 August 1972
Memorandum for:
John uizenga
Subject Additional Distribution for Memorandum:
The Russian Ouster -- Causes. and Consequences
Subject to your approval, we would like the following to
receive this Memorandum:
White House
Mr. Harold Saunders (2 copies)
National Security Council
Room 372A
Executive Office Building
State Department
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant.. Secretary, NEA
Room 6242
Mr. Ray S. Cline-
INR/OD
Room 6531
Mr. Phillip Stoddard
INR/'RNA/NE
Room 7533
Mr. Alfred Atherton
Deputy Assistant Secretary/NE
Room 6242
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved ,49r Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79ROV67A000500020007-1
S-E-C-R-E-T
Mr. Irwin Tobin
INR/RSE
Room 7427
penta on
[FDA -SC-
Room 2C231
Mr. James H. Noyes NESA
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Room 4E840
OSD/ISA
Mr. James Rigas
OPNAV 5C636
Chief, Near ast Staff
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
COPY
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ray S. Cline
Copies of the attached Memorandum have been
.forwarded to Assistant Secretary Sisco and Deputy
Assistant Secretary Atherton.
JOHN HUIZENGA
Director
National Estimates
22 August 1972
(DATE)
10,101
MAY FORM
FORMN 10 1 WHICH REPLACES
BE
I AUG 54 USED.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
 pied %rrRelease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79ROOWAO
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
These are the two papers I suggested for
Admiral Zumwalt and which I have sent him. We
think the expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt
is a major development and have tried in these
pieces to spell out some of the more far-ranging
implications.
John Huizenga
MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
Mr. Helms asked me, after your conversation
with him yesterday, to supply you with the attached
papers. In them, the Board of National Estimates
has tried, to set down some views on the broader and
nts
longer-term implications of recent developme
in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
FORM NO. i01 RELACES MAY FORM
USED 101
V, AUG 54
30 August 1972 .
(DATE)
Director`
National Estimates
30 August 1972
(DATE)
Approved For Release 2007/03/06
65O&'OO7f
,;2a-
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020007-1