NIGERIA: HOW THE CIVIL WAR MAY END

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 3, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
Nigeria: How the Civil War May End
Secret
No. 2-69
3 February 1969
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 2-69
SUBJECT: Nigeria: How the Civil War May End*
SUMMARY
Biafra's prospects, which reached a low point last
autumn, have improved. If the airlift of arms and food
from abroad continues near the present level, then Biafra's
chances of obtaining independence or a wide measure of
autonomy will increase. The military stalemate is generating
war-weariness and new frictions in the Federal area of
Nigeria. Another coup attempt, led either by hawkish
northern officers or by war-weary Yorubas, may be in the
offing. Such an attempt, whether or not immediately
successful, would probably lead to the break-up of the
remaining Nigerian Federation and so hamper the war effort
as to give Biafra victory by default.
3 February 1969
*This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic
Research.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading anc
declassification
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1. The 19-month old Nigerian civil war has thus far
enabled the Federal Military Government (FMG) to paper over the
underlying frictions in federal Nigeria and to postpone some
difficult problems. Still unresolved are the fundamental
issues of state versus federal authority and the distribution
of power among the contending tribes. But as the conflict
drags on with no end in sight, war-weariness and tribal
frictions are beginning to surface. Moreover, the economic
impact of the civil war is just beginning to be felt by urban
and other tax-paying Nigerians and by the deficit-ridden state
governments which depend on large subsidies from Lagos.
2. General Gowon's government seems threatened from two
sides. The hawks -- mostly northern army officers -- feel he
has deferred too much to world opinion and pressures from the
governments of Western nations on behalf of the suffering
civilians in Biafra and thereby enabled reeling Biafrans to
regain their balance. These hawks urge a more ruthless policy
to win the war quickly. The doves -- Yoruba politicians and
probably some officers from western Nigeria -- resent bearing
what they feel is a disproportionate share of the war costs
and have never been keen on forcing Biafra to submit. Many,
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perhaps most, Yorubas now see the war as unwinnable. Moreover,
the Yorubas have always resented northern domination of the
Federal government, are uneasy about their subordinate status,
and probably find the notion of an independent Yoruba state
increasingly attractive.
Riots in the Western State
3. Discontent is most evident in the Western State where
the situation is highly reminiscent of the months immediately
preceding the January 1966 coup that led eventually to the
civil war. The Yoruba-run regime in the Western State is
notoriously corrupt, inefficient, and daily becoming more
unpopular. Taxes have gone up and the federal subsidy to the
state government has declined. Now as in the earlier crisis,
many Yoruba feel they are not receiving their fair share of
benefits, especially since the Western State's cocoa provides
a large share of Federal revenue while the cocoa farmer gets
relatively little. Anti-tax riots and political assassinations,
often incited by the political outs and their hired thugs, have
occurred with increasing frequency since last November. The
toll of deaths -- well over 100 -- and property damages is
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mounting, and army units have been called in to aid the local
police in quelling disorders. Neither the state nor the
federal military government has shown any inclination to get
at the roots of the trouble nor have they devised effective
measures for stopping the disorders.
4. The situation in the west is almost certain to get
worse if the war drags on. Yoruba impatience is likely to
grow, and with it, riots and killings. Some western leaders
are already openly accusing the FMG, particularly the military
commanders (most of whom are non-Yoruba) of prolonging the war
in order to increase their personal profits. There is ample
evidence that many officers, including field commanders, are
enriching themselves. More obvious to the bulk of the Yorubas
are the various extortions practiced by the army in the Western
State. Soldiers stationed in the west, deserters and men posing
as army officers are increasingly preying on the merchants,
holding up travellers at road blocks, and fleecing the population
in general.
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Discontent Elsewhere
5. Although the other new states are currently more
peaceful than the Western State, they are experiencing much
tribal dissension as they attempt to set up and run their new
administrations. In some, non-natives are being pushed out of
office, even where natives with the required skills are lacking.
Where indigenous tribal groups are contesting for office, the
losers are angrily calling for new states of their own.
Energies are largely absorbed by these contests and few are
in a position either to sponsor a coup or to help in crushing
one.
6. The former ruling northern aristocracy is by no means
reconciled to the breakup of the old feudal regime that until
recently ran the north and, in effect, the whole country. They
can be expected to resist further diminution of their influence.
The minority tribes, particularly those from the north, are the
core of the Federal army and strong supporters of the new state
system as a bulwark against an aristocratic resurgence.
Although these new states are desperately short of funds and
feel neglected by the FMG, we doubt that they will trouble
Gowon, at least so long as the war goes on.
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Biafra Struggles On
7. Biafrans are the only group in black Africa to have
fought for their independence and the process appears to have
forged a kind of national cohesion unique in that area. Morale
remains high despite shortages and sizeable human and material
losses. Between July 1967 and September 1968, Biafra was
reduced to less than one-fourth its original size. It now
covers about 7,000 square miles and contains 6-7 million
people, nearly half of whom are refugees. They have shown
extraordinary inventiveness in the face of blockade, war, and
territorial losses. They remain well organized and capable of
producing a wide variety of essential goods despite the loss
of their main refinery, power plants, and manufacturing centers.
The ordinary Ibo, both civilian and military, is convinced he
is fighting for his life and Colonel Ojukwu has come to
symbolize the Ibo spirit of resistance. While there may be
some disagreements among influential Biafrans, Colonel Ojukwu's
important leadership role does not appear seriously threatened.
Should he die in office, Biafra would probably fight on.
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8. Militarily, Biafra is almost entirely dependent on
a clandestine night airlift mainly from Libreville and Abidjan
for arms and ammunition. A few guerilla bands operating beyond
the lines capture some weapons. Funds for imported arms now
appear to come mainly from friendly governments
and from charitable
organizations engaged in supplying food, medicines and money for
the needy. A few foreign business firms may have been willing
to speculate on a Biafran victory but we doubt that funds from
this source have been very large.
9. The well-publicized plight of the refugees and other
helpless civilians has garnered much sympathy abroad and
considerable assistance. The food situation has improved since
last autumn as the main crops were harvested and the airlift
of relief supplies increased. The most critical current
shortage is of protein, particularly for the hundreds of
thousands in refugee camps or without access to the land.
The International Red Cross airlift alone had been feeding
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more than 800,000 until it was stopped by the government of
Equatorial Guinea in early January. Although other airlifts
from the Portuguese island of Sao Tome and from Libreville in
Gabon continue, the plight of those dependent on the Red Cross
is likely to worsen rapidly in the next few weeks unless the
Red Cross finds ways to resume its efforts. Moreover, locally
grown staples will become even scarcer soon because, even in
normal times, this area had to import food in the spring
months and it now must support a greatly enlarged population.
Biafra, however, probably would accept a higher rate of death
from starvation before surrendering.
10. Under present conditions, it appears unlikely that
Biafra will be defeated militarily. It would require the with-
drawal of French support, or more direct foreign intervention
on behalf of the Federal forces, or a drastic deterioration
in Biafra's food supplies -- none of which seem probable.
If French support should be increased, as is possible, then
Biafra would stand a fair chance of successfully counter-
attacking.
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11. The FMG employs a number of foreign pilots and is
getting all the arms it needs from the UK, USSR, and elsewhere.
It lacks the will, the logistical skills, and the effective
discipline and leadership necessary to win. While the Biafran
soldier is convinced he is fighting for his life, the Federal
soldier is told to fight for the unity of a country he can
barely conceive of. He probably joined the army not for love
of country or even because he hated the Ibo, but because the
pay is not bad and he can show off among the civilians. His
division commanders run their own campaigns pretty much as they
see fit. Each lobbies with the central government for materiel
and personnel. Troop discipline, especially in the two northern-
led divisions, seems to depend largely on tribal ties and on
conditions at the front. Mutinies and inter-tribal clashes
among the troops have already broken out on a few occasions
and successful Biafran counter-attacks could lead to even more
serious disarray in the federal army.
12. The war has been stalemated since last September when
Biafra's arms supplies increased significantly. Even if the
next Federal offensive, scheduled for some time between February
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and March, should capture Biafra's one working airfield less
than 12 miles inside the lines, another airstrip is in readiness.
Federal planes have tried but failed to bomb the airfield out of
commission or otherwise interdict the 10 to 20 planes that now
land in Biafra on the average night. Moreover, the FMG is
unable or unwilling to attack the relief aircraft that fly at
the same times and over much the same routes as the arms planes.
Nevertheless, the airlift remains highly vulnerable to more
aggressive tactics and. improved ordnance.
The Outlook
13. While we cannot predict with confidence which of
several courses events in Nigeria will take, the signs point
to a further disintegration of Nigerian unity. The war is
likely to drag on for months without much change. So long as
it does, unrest in the Western State is likely to deepen,
leading the Yorubas to press for some settlement which would
allow Biafra a large measure of autonomy at least. They would
then probably demand the same status for themselves. If the
Yorubas despair of achieving such an end, they will be
increasingly tempted to try to change the government or to
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opt out of the federation. In either event, the FMG would
probably resist such an attempt with force and would find
it difficult to sustain the war with Biafra.
14+. As time goes on, the hawkish elements are likely to
be more tempted to oust the present leaders and try more
ruthless methods to end the war. They now blame outside
interference for the failure to defeat Biafra. Public sentiment,
especially in the north, is turning strongly anti-Western.
France, the US, the Red Cross and other charitable institutions,
even the UK at times, are seen as the enemies of Nigerian unity.
Calls for expulsion of missionaries and Peace Corps personnel,
for breaking diplomatic relations with France, even for
expropriating foreign-owned firms are mounting. So long as
Biafra gets food and arms from outside and the stalemate
continues, this anger and frustration is likely to grow and
could easily turn against General Gowon for being too soft.
15. A northern coup seems somewhat more likely than a
Yoruba coup, because it would probably be organized by military
leaders who stand in no awe of their colleague, General Gowon.
Should such a coup succeed, the new rulers would probably be
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determined to push for a military victory and would be much
less concerned about international public opinion. They would
probably expel the Red Cross from the territory under Federal
control, and have far less hesitation about trying to shoot
down relief planes. Successful attacks on these planes would
in turn probably arouse still greater sympathy for the starving
civilians and induce many Western governments to make still
stronger representations on behalf of relief efforts. The
Nigerian government would almost certainly interpret this as
gross interference in Nigeria's internal affairs and might
allow its anger to be taken out on Westerners and Western
interests in the country.
16. Moreover, a new government run by predominantly
northern hawks would be even less acceptable to the Yorubas
than the present relatively moderate and ineffectual regime.
Yorubaland might finally despair of ever getting a fair share
and attempt to secede. At that point, tribal frictions in
the army could well erupt into mutinies or widespread fighting.
The me,n and arms necessary to subdue even a badly organized
Yoruba uprising would have to come largely from the best
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northern troops on the Biafran front. In the resulting
confusion, it would be very difficult for the FPM to maintain
a semblance of national unity. Biafra would probably win by
default and other states, particularly in the far north,would
probably go their own way.
17. If General Gowon's government manages to remain in
power, rising discontent at the cost of the war is likely to
make a negotiated settlement more attractive as the stalemate
continues. We doubt that Gowon could begin real negotiations
without the approval of the hawks. If he made concessions at
a peace conference, he would be likely to be in real trouble
with them. Biafra's strategy, on the other hand, is to hang
on in hopes that internal pressures will eventually force the
FMG to give up and allow it either a wide measure of autonomy
or complete independence. And the odds seem to be changing
in Biafra's favor.
18. Whether the fighting is ended by negotiations, by
a coup or an uprising, or degenerates into guerilla warfare,
the result will probably lead to either a loose confederation
of semi-independent states or the formation of three or more
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completely independent countries. In either event, the USSR
as the most active supporter of the present FMG policy would
lose some influence. The West could probably live with most
if not all of the resulting states who would seek a considerable
amount of post-war assistance. An independent Biafra, Western
State, and even several northern states would be at least as
viable as most West African countries.
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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