VARIETIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE CASE OF THE TUPAMAROS IN URUGUAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500020009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 3, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

Y /f
Approved For Lease 2007/03$kCAW-F~DP79R00967A 150020Q0"
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 January 1972
SUBJECT: Varieties of Political Violence in Latin America:
The Case of the Tupamaros in Uruguay
This is written as a companion piece to the memo on
violence in Ceylon. The materials on Uruguay and the Tupamaros
are voluminous by any definition and lend themselves to a major
research effort which would explore a variety of plausible and
useful explanations of the onset of major violence in a for-
merly peaceful society. Admittedly, I have read only a frac-
tion of the materials readily available and my particular
emphasis on the importance of individual and group dynamics
is only part of the story.
Approved For Release 2007/03
~~P79ROO967AO01500020
HIR
 Approved For M ease 2007/03/yElep- ZgF79R00967Mb1500020009-5
1. One simple definition of political violence is the use of
force and coercion by organized domestic groups to achieve their
national political objectives. As so defined, political violence
is virtually endemic in most Latin American countries. Not only
do would-be revolutionaries on the periphery of the political spec-
trum resort to insurgency campaigns to destroy the established
order, but elite groups close to the center of power also turn to
coups and other coercive acts to preserve that order, protect their
special interests, and cope with national problems.
2. Perhaps the most dramatic case of political violence in
Latin America so far during the 1970s is the urban insurgency of
the Tupamaros in Uruguay. The Tupamaros have repeatedly disrupted
the traditional tranquility of the country through such actions as
the kidnapping of foreign and local dignitaries, the robbing of
banks, the bombing of foreign business enterprises, the theft of
documents that reveal the corruption of domestic entrepreneurs,
the murder of policemen, and the seizure of radio stations for the
delivery of revolutionary lectures. Their challenge to the author-
ity of the state was perhaps best seen during 1970-1971 by their
ability to hold their victims in "people's prisons" for as long as
they chose, and yet to arrange for massive jailbreaks of captured
insurgents from government prisons. In despair of coping with the
Approved For Release 2007/03/06~-61'A`A;P79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For Wease 2007/03" PETP79R00967} A'01500020009-5
challenge solely through ordinary police action, the government
has sponsored a campaign of "counterterrorism" to eliminate known
insurgents and intimidate suspected supporters.
3. The Tupamaros have been in the field since 1963. Yet
as recently as 1968, few observers (certainly not the present
writer) took them to be a particularly potent guerrilla group,
or thought Uruguay to be particularly susceptible to a major in-
surgency campaign in any case. True, Uruguay had suffered for
years from a deteriorating economy and a rather feckless political
leadership; but it still seemed blessed (by Latin American stan-
dards) with a remarkably open political system, a high standard
of living, a basically homogenous and relatively complacent popu-
lation, and a dearth of obvious social injustices. As in the past,
there was always some prospect of a military coup to ease the way
out of a governmental crisis, but terror and counterterror as a way
of life seemed a world away.
4. Let's look again: Who are the Tupamaros? What is behind
their campaign of political violence? And why in Uruguay? To put
it simply, the Tupamaros are attempting to duplicate through urban
terrorism that which Fidel Castro accomplished through guerrilla
warfare in the mountainous countryside of Cuba in the late 1950s
-- the forceful overthrow of the established political system.
Approved For Release 2007/03/&.Q6 &P79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For please 2007/03/SE P79R00967AfO1500020009-5
The formal name of the Uruguayan revolutionaries is the Movement
for National Liberation. The founders, most prominently Raul
Sendic, were originally connected with Uruguay's Socialist Party
and other legally-constituted political groups on the far left.
For a time in the early 1960s, they engaged in organizational
work in the countryside to radicalize the sugar workers, one of
the few downtrodden groups in the country. Then in 1963 -- dis-
couraged by the poor returns for their electoral and union
activities and influenced by Castro's insistence that Latin Ameri-
can revolutionaries make revolutions -- Sr. Sendic and company
turned to a campaign of political violence. Their first inning
as guerrillas came in July, with a successful raid on a provin-
cial rifle club where they commandeered a dozen weapons. At the
time, there were probably no more than a dozen or so active in-
surgents.
5. The leaders of the Tupamaros are mainly members of the
intelligentsia and young professionals. The great majority of
recruits over the years probably have come from the ranks of uni-
versity students, but the movement has also attracted some members
from all walks of life, including businessmen and bureaucrats, as
well as sugar workers and other laborers, and perhaps some con-
genital outlaws and adventure-seekers. To some extent it appears
Approved For Release 2007/03/59CC& EP79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For Lease 2007/03/ (K;]kfW79R00967 'O1500020009-5
to be a case of sons and daughters rebelling against their fathers,
as many of the terrorists come from relatively advantaged and at
times from prominent families. There is little reliable data on
total membership, but from the style and frequency of Tupamaro
raids, one could envisage (in December 1971) perhaps 500 or so
terrorists, and at least an equal number of would-be adherents
(mainly high school students) and part-time helpers. The Uruguayan
population is approaching three million, so that the same rates of
participation applied to the US population would produce a mini-
mum of 75,000 terrorists and ardent supporters.
6. From the point of view of the leadership the name Move-
ment for National Liberation is self-explanatory. They insist that
Uruguay is controlled by a repressive oligarchy that rules in its
own interests and in those of foreign businessmen and governments,
especially the United States. The ruling groups ignore the true
interests of nation and people, who therefore have to be liberated.
The name Tupamaro, on the other hand, springs from history and per-
haps also legend. Tupac Amaru was the last surviving member of the
Inca royal family and was executed by the Spanish conquerers in
Peru in 1571. Some 200 years later a Peruvian mestizo adopted the
name Tupac Amaru II, to lead a nativist uprising against Spanish
rule; he too was executed, and in an unbelievably barbaric way.
Approved For Release 2007/03/(?f"q R' 79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/RkLP79R009601500020009-5
In the early nineteenth century, rebellious elements in the dis-
tant region of Uruguay were dubbed "tupamaros" -- derisively by
those in authority, with pride by those challenging it. The term
was subsequently applied to a succession of outlaw and rebellious
groups.
7. As perhaps with all revolutionary movements, it is
difficult to separate the operative motives and objectives of
the Tupamaros from the mountain of rhetoric by and about them.
Most, perhaps nearly all, of them seem motivated by an intense
nationalism and an idealistic belief in the efficacy of a revo-
lutionary society. The main problem for these restless and
idealistic youths is not one of jobs and security, but of real
influence and significant accomplishment in a dull and static
society. In any case, they profess that Uruguay as presently
constituted offers little future to them as patriots or to the
great bulk of the population. For the most part they are action
rather than program oriented. In the glare of the publicity
their tactical success has evoked, they have, over the past
year or so, talked somewhat more freely of their post-
revolutionary objectives. They would envisage a society
much like Castro's Cuba, where the influence of the privileged
and of selfish foreign interests is eliminated, and where the
Approved For Release 2007/03/C 16R+ 79R00967A001500020009-5
 Approved For ease 2007/03nfP79R00967.001500020009-5
government is demonstrably on the side of the mass of the popu-
lation and in support of the victims of imperialism the world
over. While they admire Castro, it is worth noting that, ex-
cept perhaps at the very beginning, they have neither sought
nor much needed Cuban encouragement or assistance.
8. As we have indicated, one problem the present-day
Tupamaros have faced as would-be liberators is that there are
few unassimilated cultural groups in Uruguay and little of the
grinding poverty that afflicts the swollen slums and benighted
countryside of most other countries in South America. Indeed,
nearly 90 percent of the population is of European descent;
most are middle class in fact or in aspiration and rather con-
servative and complacent in outlook. By the standards of most
countries, the quality of life is rather decent (e.g., per
capita GNP, though smaller than a decade ago, is still over
$900; the rate of literacy is over 90 percent; the social-
welfare system is quite extensive). Thus, while there defini-
tely is a small, rather prosperous and influential ruling circle,
it is difficult for most Uruguayans to look upon it as either an
alien or exploitative class.
9. This does not mean that the Tupamaros are the only
disgruntled people in Uruguay. Far from it. The country has
Approved For Release 2007/03/OV.gFR- DP79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For FWease 2007/0:~pCkitfFP79R009677o[1101500020009-5
suffered for more than a decade from acute and relentless eco-
nomic problems that have led more than one observer to call it
a "bankrupt welfare state." The sources of malaise are many:
a sharp decline in prices for agricultural exports starting in
the mid-1950s; inadequate investment in agriculture; low labor
productivity and entrepreneurial competitiveness in the indus-
trial sector; and the high, fixed costs of a swollen bureaucracy
and of the extensive social-welfare programs. The symptoms are
numerous and painful: stagnation or decline in investment, ex-
ports, production, and eventually in per capita consumption;
acute inflation; and a growing shabbiness in everything from
the appearance of public buildings to the style of life of the
middle class.
10. From the point of view of the Tupamaros, this grow-
ing malaise and the resultant discontent, while a hopeful sign,
were not likely to produce revolutionary changes in society,
either through the ballot box or through labor strikes and mass
demonstrations. Their rationale, copying Castro's example and
Che Guevara's propaganda, was to create a revolutionary situa-
tion through a relentless campaign of violent action. Their
goal was to polarize society and to sensitize the population
to the point where revolution would become possible, if not
Approved For Release 2007/03 (~~fia - DP79R00967A001500020009-5
 Approved For Rase 2007/03/ ;+ (C1IkfP79R00967i 1500020009-5
inevitable. Drift and complacency, along with the prevailing
bourgeois mentality, were literally to be shot out from under
the populace. In time, military action would preclude any
other form of political contention, and the well-organized
and -led revolutionary forces would win. The Tupamaros were
vague both as to timing and format for the final victory.
They professed belief that the course of armed action would
create not only a mass revolutionary movement but also a
truly revolutionary moment; the strategy for taking power
would become apparent only when the moment drew close.
11. The Tupamaros' choice of urban terrorism as a tac-
tic was determined first and foremost by geography. There
is little in the way of mountainous or otherwise inaccessible
countryside in Uruguay, but the metropolitan area of Montevideo,
which contains roughly one-half of the country's 2.9 million
inhabitants, provides a myriad of streets and buildings which
supply a bounty of vulnerable targets and invulnerable hide-
outs. If the Tupamaros had any doubts on the matter when
they started in 1963, the course of revolutionary warfare in
Latin America over the next several years would have served
to confirm their choice of battleground. Campaigns of guer-
rilla warfare in the countryside either failed or floundered
Approved For Release 2007/031 -Ff~bP79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For FWease 2007/0~(PCRtF1DP79R00967M61500020009-5
-- most ignominiously with Guevara's personal effort in Bolivia,
but also with attempts in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala,
Peru, and Venezuela. In time, urban terrorism became more
prevalent, no doubt in part because of the frustration of rural
campaigns, but perhaps in part as well in emulation of the suc-
cesses of the Tupamaros. Among the noteworthy examples of
following suit were Brazil and Argentina, the colossi to the
north and south of tiny Uruguay.
12. In any case the Tupamaros spent several years after
1963 honing their techniques through sporadic attacks; these
may have been mainly training exercises for new recruits, but
they also served to capture funds, arms, and the headlines.
Terrorist attacks became both bolder and more frequent start-
ing in 1968. The Tupamaros over the next year or so acquired
something of a Robin Hood reputation because of the light-
heartedness of some of their capers, and because many of their
exercises were intended to discredit the powerful and benefit
the poor (e.g., the exposure of corruption; the distribution
to working class districts of stolen foods).
13. The public tolerance of the Tupamaros -- probably a
mixture of admiration and indifference -- was underscored by
Approved For Release 2007/03,J~DP79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For R Lease 2007/03" 1P79R00967*id01500020009-5
the growing unpopularity of the government of President Jorge
Pacheco Areco. Pacheco, who was elevated from the vice-
presidency following the death of the incumbent in December
1967, was determined to make a frontal assault against Uruguay's
deep-seated economic problems. He adopted a stringent belt-
tightening campaign to force the population to work harder
while consuming less. While his program had considerable
success in reducing inflation and reviving production, es-
pecially during 1969-1970, the end of Uruguay's economic
ills and the demands for popular sacrifice came nowhere in
sight. During this period, clashes with organized labor
and their parliamentary champions led Pacheco to adopt a
tougher and more authoritarian executive hand than the coun-
try had recently experienced. Pacheco's combativeness also
produced a constant turnover of cabinet ministers, which
gave the government an aura of disorder and drift.
14. At first the government and security forces tended
to underestimate the importance and staying power of the
Tupamaros. The very democratic and libertarian traditions
of Uruguayan society served to the advantage of the insur-
gents. The security forces were poorly equipped and not
Approved For Release 2007/03kY,CZEP79R00967A001500020009-5
 Approved For l (ease 2007/03/gt..(fi*- P79R009677 1500020009-5
much used to combat; they were far from the best or :he
boldest when it came to chance encounters with the ter-
rorists or to the systematic work of intelligence and pur-
suit. The terrorists, in addition to being more highly
motivated, had the advantage of choice of time and target.
Their intelligence -- including penetratiors in the govern-
mental bureaus and commercial establishments that were
their targets -- seemed excellent. In short, the picture
for the general public for the most part was one of a
rather feckless government versus a resolute and resource-
ful guerrilla force. These images -- with the initiative
seemingly always with the Tupamaros -- probably contributed
heavily to the rapid expansion in their ranks, especially
during 1968-1969.
15. President Pacheco in time came to take the threat
from the terrorists more seriously and decided upon a tough
and unyielding line. This more or less coincided with the
Tupamaros' decision to turn a much more ruthless face to
the public. Late in 1969 the terrorists started gunning
down policemen to intimidate the security forces and
launched daring attacks meant to demoralize and destroy
Approved For Release 2007/03/E P79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For F ase 2007/03"Mi~1TP79R00967AM1500020009-5
the effectiveness of the government generally. In July-
August 1970 they kidnapped a total of five members of the
diplomatic community: one escaped; three were in time
released; but one victim, a police advisor from the United
States, was assassinated. The last act was justified by
the Tupamaros on the grounds that Pacheco refused to nego-
tiate for the release of rebels held prisoner (and also
that the victim was a US agent sent to teach the police
methods of brutally repressing their organization).
Pacheco's line was that the Tupamaros were outlaws to be
erradicated and not an important political force to be
accommodated. He used the popular revulsion at the assas-
sination and a growing public testiness about the terrorist
campaign in general to demand several periods of emergency
powers during which numbers of terrorists were captured.
Also during 1970, officially-sponsored terrorist groups
started operating against suspected Tupamaros and their
sympathizers to even the odds somewhat. At one time some
250 suspected terrorists were in jail. But the slow and
lenient course of Uruguayan justice and several jailbreaks
-- including the escape of 111 prisoners in one caper in
Approved For Release 2007/0 `: RDP79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For Tease 2007/03M1J4Tt4MP79R0096701500020009-5
September 1971 -- undercut these government successes and
again showed the Tupamaros to be a more or less indominable
force in termss, of their chosen tactics.
16. The recently concluded national elections (November
1971) served as a testing point for the strategy of the
revolutionaries. To what. extent had their demonstrably
effective terrorist tactics produced the political polari-
zation that was essential to their revolutionary game plan?
To what ex,h.! rt had the political system as well as the
Pacheco administration become discredited in the eyes of
the population?
Approved For Release 2007/03/WCG [ P79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03Jc i P79R00967MO1500020009-5
17. The leaders of the Tupamaros apparently split on the
issue of how to react to the election. Some probably preferred
to disrupt the electoral process and force Pacheco or the mili-
tary to establish a dictatorship that would serve to discredit
thoroughly the old political system. But others, whose views
prevailed, decided to back conditionally the challenge of the
Frente AmpZio to the two traditional parties (known familiarly
as the CoZorados and the BZancos). The Frente -- a combination
that included Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats, and
dissidents from the traditional parties -- adopted a political
platform that called for far-reaching changes in society. While
the Tupamaros endorsed and supported the Frente campaign, they
stressed that violent revolution was the only course open to
Uruguay. The Frente, they argued, could serve to mobilize addi-
tional popular support for the revolutionary forces in the coun-
try, but the oligarchy -- no matter what the election tallies --
would never hand power over to the people peacefully. The Tupamaros
in any case, did largely suspend their terrorist attacks during the
pre-election period.
Approved For Release 2007/03/
E?L - 79R00967A001500020009-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03I 9 pP79ROO967 1500020009-5
18. As I write, some aspects of the election are still
in doubt, including the winner of the presidential contest.
Others are pretty clear: nearly 90 percent of the eligible
voters participated, and more than 80 percent of those who
went to the polls supported one or another representative of
the traditional parties. Despite the dire straits of the
economy, the growing shabbiness of life, the fecklessness of
the security forces and the foibles of the political leader-
ship, only 18 percent of the voters opted for the Frente and
its calls for a dramatic political departure. Indeed, it seems
most likely that after every ballot is counted and recounted
a protege of President Pacheco (Sr. Juan Maria Bordaberry) will
take office as chief executive.*
19. Late in December 1971 the Tupamaros demonstrated that
they retain their remarkable capacity for disruptive terror by
pulling a series of successful raids (theft of two-way police
* Uruguay is now going through the process of counting
absentee and challenged ballots. With well over 100,000
votes yet to be counted, the conservative Bordaberry has
about a 10,000 vote edge over a more enlightened and
liberal runner-up.
Approved For Release 2007/03/ft. &`RDP79RO0967A001500020009-5
 Approved For FV(ease 2007/03/@E(C;FkJP79R00967'01500020009-5
radios and of the master plans for the Montevideo sewer system;
destruction of a leading country club). Some members may become
discouraged because the populace has rejected and discredited
terrorism; some may defect to support the parliamentary activi-
ties of the Frente (which won a respectable number of seats in
the legislature). Almost certainly, however, the campaign of
terrorism will continue to be used by the revolutionaries to
demonstrate their strength and at the same time the weakness
of the government. The terrorists aside, the new administra-
tion will perhaps enjoy something of a honeymoon period -- both
the professional politicians and the ordinary population are proud
of the achievement of having held a democratic election. But
the government will still have to contend with titanic economic
problems and minuscule capacity for rolling them back dramatically.
Almost certainly the use of counterterror, somewhat greater public
cooperation, and improved performance by the security forces generally
will prevent the Tupamaros from shooting their way to power. But
only a loss of heart or a change of mind on the part of the revolu-
tionaries would provide a return of domestic peace to Uruguay any-
time soon.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06' U79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For Mease 2007/03&ffP79R00967M61500020009-5
20. We still are faced with the issue of Why Uruguay?
Perhaps it would be useful to divide this into three separate,
if overlapping, questions.
A. Why a revolutionary insurgency? I would
start by saying -- because the place is Latin America
and the time is post-Castro. Nearly every Latin Ameri-
can country over the past decade has seen political
radicals turn to insurgency campaigns either in the be-
lief that they could change the course of their country's
history by somehow duplicating Castro's success against
Batista, or because they thought the effort itself
would provide gratification and rewards in the context
of the usually fratricidal politics among would-be revolu-
tionaries. I would concede the Tupamaros high marks
for idealism as these insurgency groups go. They found
Uruguay to be a run-down, humdrum welfare state, where
most of the people were either too complacent and
materialistic to realize society's limitations or too
timid to try for something better. As thoughtful and
ambitious youths, such a society was a bloody bore and
an intolerable offense to the revolutionaries. They
Approved For Release 2007/03/3cdI-h79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For ease
2007/03/(aCf 79R00967"U1500020009-5
were convinced that mankind should aspire to something more
noble (the details did not matter), and that only a campaign
of violence could shake the population out of its rut.
B. Why have the Tupamaros demonstrated staying power
whereas most other Latin American insurgencies have folded
or faded into the background? Here one can point to the
special characteristics and problems of Uruguayan society:
First those that served to discredit the administration
and the status quo -- especially the economic malaise, the
aimlessness of the political system, and the lack of oppor-
tunity for ambitious youths. Second, those which in other
circumstances were the pride of the populace -- the rather
permissive political system, an extremely libertarian judi-
cial system, and an inexperienced and rather timid security
force. In the general context of idealistic youth, the
ranks of the terrorists grew in good part because the
escapades of the terrorists were generally successful, and
even failure meant no more than a tour in prisons run by
the Ministry of Education and Culture.
C. But why have the Tupamaros proved so remarkably
effective in sowing disruption? I would say a very important
- 19 -
Approved For Release 2007/03/0}& D 79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For ft ease 2007/03/ Z(C-.E{fP79R00967Af01500020009-5
reason is the personal and group dynamics of the forces
on both sides. The leaders of the Tupamaros apparently
are exceptionally capable -- by general Latin American
standards -- in maintaining unity and in projecting both
a dynamic and largely positive image. They have avoided
the personalistic and ideologic factionalism that has enervated
movements elsewhere. They have also avoided the foreign ties
which have tainted other insurgencies. And they have avoided -- with
>ome exception offending the sensibilities of the popula-
tion at large. Most people -- from admiration and tolerance
as well as fear -- have accepted them as part of the Uruguayan
political scene. President Pacheco and his key advisors, for
their part, proved too rigid to steal the terrorists'
thunder or otherwise isolate them politically, and too clumsy
to beat them at their own game of force.
21. All other factors considered, does it take clever guerrillas
and inept government? A Colombian guerrilla once lamented to a
sympathetic reporter -- we needed a Batista but had a Lleras (referring
to former President Lleras Restrepo). The Brazilian terrorists were
by and large an effective group. But the military regime met
Approved For Release 2007/03/(FEUR"79R00967AO01500020009-5
 Approved For Release 2007/03/OOEc]ftf79ROO967AJ150002OOO9-5
violence with violence on the one hand, and won a measure of
popular acceptance through its economic achievements and ad-
ministrative integrity on the other. The government of Vene-
zuela, within the context of a relatively democratic political
system, isolated the very effective FALN through political and
combat skills. In Bolivia, in contrast, the government and its
security forces were far from effective, but the guerrillas
under Guevara proved even less so for a variety of reasons.
22. I realize I say only what is obvious when I conclude
that Uruguay has a first-class insurgency problem because it
has first-class terrorists and second-rate government. But I
believe this to be an essential element in the overall story.
Approved For Release 2007/03/O?E& 79ROO967AO01500020009-5