HANOI'S MAJOR ALLIES - - A POST-SUMMIT ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500030006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 9, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
9 June 1972
SUBJECT: Hanoi's Major Allies -- A Post-Summit Assessment
I. THE SOVIET POSTURE
1. After a hold on coverage immediately before and during the
Summit, the Soviet press resumed its treatment of DRV military
"successes" in the South soon after the President left Moscow. There
have been the usual reminders that all "progressive" humanity remains
on the side of the Vietnamese "patriots", explicit praise for Hanoi's
determination, and generalized assurances of Soviet sympathy and
support. But along with this there has also been an unusually strong
element of implied criticism concerning North Vietnam's sole reliance
on military means to achieve its goals.
2. This sort of criticism was most apparent in an authoritative
article in New Times written by Vadim Zagladin, a deputy chief of the
CPSU Central Committee's International Department. The article, which
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was published on 26 May and summarized in broadcasts to foreign
audiences (including Vietnam) from 26-29 May, defends the USSR's
mild response to US actions in May and specifically rebuts those
-- presumably including the North Vietnamese -- who asked the
Soviets to do more:
"People are encountered who, while seemingly pronounc-
ing themselves in favor of the implementation of the
coexistence principle, are in fact casting doubt on it
in one way or another. For example, it is sometimes
said that in response to a particular tough action by
imperialism, the socialist countries -- and above all
the Soviet Union -- have no alternative but to react
in the same way, to toughen their position too."
The author stresses that any international situation that arises,
"even more so an acute situation", requires that the socialist states
react in a flexible manner.
3. A Soviet military commentator on 31 May ended his vivid
account of alleged South Vietnamese losses in the field with the
following peculiar cautionary note:
"The liberation forces hold the initiative throughout
Indochina and achieve fresh successes, thus confirm-
ing that attempts to resolve the problems of Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia by force of arms are doomed."
4. Subsequently, on 4 June a Pravda article acknowledged for
the first time in the Soviet press that there are "extreme left-wing"
opponents of the Summit, who allegedly argue that any agreements
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are inadmissible while military conflicts exist and imperialist
aggression continues. The article does not identify these oppo-
nents further, but it could easily be read as a rebuttal to Hanoi's
expressions since 1 June of implicit displeasure with the Summit
and with the Soviet role in it.
5. Finally, on 6 June the Soviets accompanied their public
greetings to leaders of the PRGRSV with their first major commen-
tary on Vietnam since the Summit, an article in Pravda. The piece
was unusually low-keyed, and was notable chiefly for its insistence
that the Vietnamese Communists have only limited, reasonable aims,
e.g:
"The patriots of Vietnam... are far from the thought of
humiliating the national honor of the United States in
any way or demanding its capitulation ... Lthey~ have no
intention now of imposing a Communist regime on South
Vietnam."
6. In private comments since the Summit, the Soviets have been
explicitly critical of both the North Vietnamese and the Chinese and
fairly accommodating toward the US.
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7. On 2 June, a Soviet academic specialist on US-Soviet relations
sought out a US diplomat in Moscow for a discussion on Vietnam. He
predicted the DRV offensive would soon end, and (contrary to Moscow's
public line) said he expected that Hanoi would accept the convening
of a new Geneva conference if the US agreed to accept a coalition
government.
8. Other Soviets have privately been spreading the word that
the Chinese are refusing Soviet requests to forward USSR deliveries
to the DRV.
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10. There have been no significant Soviet military activities
which can be related to Vietnam since the Summit. The one possible
exception concerns a Soviet Alligator-class landing ship which recently
left Singapore on a course toward the Soviet naval group stationed
off the Paracel Islands. The air evacuation of Soviet and East
European specialists and their dependents from North Vietnam has
continued. This was initiated during the current phase of US bomb-
ing of the DRV.
II. THE SOVIET APPRAISAL -- CURRENT AND FUTURE
11. The Soviet leaders response to US actions in early May,
together with their decision to proceed with the Summit, underscores
the USSR's reluctance to risk a direct military encounter with the US
and its unwillingness to jeopardize broader Soviet interests in order
to assist Hanoi in the accomplishment of its war aims. And having
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acted in this way to prevent the intensification of the war from
interfering with the normalization of US-Soviet relations and other
important ongoing foreign policy undertakings, Moscow presumably has
all the more reason to want to see those undertakings go forward to
fuller success.
12. It remains our belief that the Soviet leaders' decision to
respond to US interdiction efforts as they did was not an easy one,
that it may indeed have caused fairly severe stress within the leader-
ship. But we also believe it likely that Brezhnev and those colleagues
who supported him have been strengthened by the success of the Summit
-- and by ratification of the Soviet-FRG treaty -- and that neither
the Vietnam decision nor Soviet detente policy in general is likely
to face serious internal challenge in coming months, The Brezhnev
leadership will, in fact, win some credit at home and abroad for
having risen above the US provocation for the sake of the higher
interests of the Soviet state and the easing of international tensions.
13. It is difficult to foresee developments in the war which
might cause Moscow to alter its policy on Vietnam radically in the
near future (excluding such extreme contingencies as a US nuclear
attack on North Vietnam or an invasion of the north involving US
ground forces). This is not to say that lesser shocks -- US bombing
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of the North Vietnamese dikes, signs that the North Vietnamese were
on the verge of a military setback in the South serious enough to
weaken their negotiating position substantially, or indications that
the North Vietnamese economy was in grave difficulty -- might not
put the Kremlin consensus under strain or introduce renewed tension
into US-Soviet relations. But Moscow has probably believed for
some time that the North Vietnamese were within reach of a favor-
able political settlement of the war -- one which would give them
a good chance of realizing the greatest part of their war aims in
the reasonably near term. We think it likely that the course of
events in Vietnam in recent months has left the Soviet assessment
unchanged. If this is so, it must by Moscow's intention to do what
it can to prevent the war from heating up further and to encourage
the US and North Vietnam to resume the Paris talks.
14. Moscow's capacity to induce the two parties to move in
this direction is, of course, limited. Yet, it may be greater now
than in the past. Where the US is concerned, the Soviets are prob-
ably not unmindful that the Administration is committed to continued
withdrawal of USforces and the winding-down of the war generally and
that failure to secure these objectives might be especially embar-
rassing in the forthcoming electoral period. Moscow can also, in
its efforts to persuade the US to relax its military pressures,
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invoke the "spirit of Moscow" and in particular the pledges of mutual
restraint exchanged at the Summit.
15. The Soviet moral position in Hanoi has almost certainly
been weakened. This need not mean, however,! that its actual influ-
ence there -- discreetly exercised -- has been commensurately
diminished. For one thing, Moscow may be able plausibly to disclaim
responsibility for North Vietnam's southern campaign, if, as seems
possible, the Soviets had earlier indicated to Hanoi that it regarded
this venture as untimely and fraught with risk. But whatever its
feelings about Soviet staunchness, Hanoi cannot fail to recognize
that it has nowhere to turn except Moscow and Peking for essential
political and military support. And at this juncture, the North
Vietnamese are not likely to feel any greater warmth for Peking
than for Moscow. Indeed, the scales of influence might tip
definitely in Moscow's favor if Peking fails to cooperate fully
in facilitating the movement of Soviet military materiel to Vietnam
across its territory.
16. In sum, Moscow's aim in the next phase will be to recon-
struct the scenario that was developing before Hanoi began its
southern offensive. This will entail continued advocacy of a polit-
ical settlement. It will also involve in the interim a continued
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supply of military and economic assistance to an extent that is
practically possible, though we would expect Moscow to exercise
greater care to limit the flow of equipment chiefly useful in
offensive operations. It would be Moscow's hope that by following
this course it could avid a deeper involvement in the war on its
own part and impairment of its relations with the US, while, at the
same time, winning credit for its efforts toward ending the war on
terms acceptable to Hanoi.
III. T1 CHINESE POSTURE
17. In the short time since the Moscow Summit, Peking has
made no discernible shift from the cautious policies that have
governed its relations with Hanoi over recent months. Since the
escalation of the US bombing of North Vietnam in early May, Peking
has maintained its perfunctory support of Hanoi without taking
extraordinary measures, either in propaganda or material aid, to
bolster the hard-pressed North Vietnamese.
18. In its most recent public statement, Peking used the
occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG) to repeat its pledges of support,
but only in standard, proforma terms. Even in this routine
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expression of support, the Chinese managed to convey little enthusiasm
for Hanoi's renewed reliance on conventional warfare. Peking's
editorial, for example, lauded the PRG for "persevering in a protracted
people's war" and referred only briefly to the large-scale battles
initiated by North Vietnamese main-force units.
19. As regards Peking's logistical support for Hanoi, there is
no evidence yet of any sharp deviation from past practices. We have
yet to see any unusual measures on Peking's part to counter the US
interdiction of sea shipments. Peking has permitted East European
ships to offload North Vietnmaese cargo in China but has apparently
thus far stalled Soviet requests for similar treatment. Indeed,
there are a variety of reports reflecting Peking's intent to block
Moscow from making any spectacular show of its support for Hanoi.
The Chinese continue to cite rail congestion at the Sino-North
Vietnamese border -- a plausible explanation -- to justify their
failure to make a massive effort to resupply the North Vietnamese.
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20. Nor have the Chinese made any apparent move to use the
many small vessels in their coastal fleet to bypass the North
Vietnamese ports that have been mined. The four Chinese freighters
that were offloading into lighters in the Vinh and Hon La areas last
week seem mainly symbols of Chinese support -- in contrast to the
reluctant Soviets -- and not harbingers of a new crash effort. This
is suggested by the way in which the Chinese have played up the
activities of these ships. In early May the Chinese were extolling
the crew of one of their ships for fighting "shoulder-to-shoulder
with the Vietnamese comrades-in-arms on Vietnamese territory." This
message was given even greater prominence on 9 May when China's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged US ships and aircraft with
repeatedly attacking two Chinese freighters in Vietnamese waters.
Here again the intent seems to be to advertise Chinese support to
Hanoi -- even in the face of US interdiction attempts -- and thus
to accentuate the cautious Soviet response.
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