EAST AFRICA: OUTSIDE INFLUENCE AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A000500070002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 7, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
East Africa: ? Outside Influence and
Potential Conflict
Secret
DCI / N1 O 1076-75
7 May 1975
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EAST AFRICA: OUTSIDE INFLUENCE
AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT
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EAST AFRICA
GULF OF
ADEN
Approximate area inhabited
by Somali people
C A L.L A .Ethnic groups
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CONTENTS
NOTE Page
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 2
DISCUSSION ........................ .
4
I. SOMALI IRREDENTISM ...... ......... 4
The Ethiopian-Somali Arms Balance .. .... . ....................
The Kenyan-Somali Arms Balance 4
Siad Bides His Time ..................... 5
....... .
-And Pursues the Diplomatic Gambit ... .... 5
Somalia's Economic Problems ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 5
Prospects for Detente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... .
Outlook for Future Military Action .....
.
II. THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION .. ............................ .
Eritrea
The Gallas ....... , .
6
Implications for the FTAI .. . ................................
7
III. OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONFLICT .................. .
7
Ugandan Attack on Tanzania .....................................
Ugandan-Kenyan Tensions ..........
7
.
U
gandan Li
it
i
8
m
at
ons .............................................
Kenyan-Tanzanian Relations ......... .
8
8
I
V.
THE SOVIETS IN EAST AFRICA .................. .
8
. .
U
SSR and Somalia ....... .
The Soviet Contribution ................... .................
Th
id
9
9
...
e Qu
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I
The Soviet Presence and the War Issue ... .......
Page
...... 10
10
..............................
USSR and Ethiopia ....
10
USSR and Uganda
...................
11
USSR and Tanzania
-----
.............................
11
USSR and Kenya .................. .
V. THE CHINESE IN EAST AFRICA ............ ..... . ............ 11
..........................
Tanzania 11
Kenya and Uganda ............... 12
Somalia ....... ...................................... 12
Ethiopia ..... ..................................... 12
VI. THE ARAB STATES IN EAST AFRICA ........
Somalia .........................
Ethiopia . .............. 112
3
Other States ..... ......................
TABLE I ...... ..................... 14
... 15
........... ..............
TABLE II ....... . ......... . .... .
TABLE III ...... .. .................. 15
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EAST AFRICA: OUTSIDE INFLUENCE
AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT
NOTE
The continuing arms buildup in a number of East African countries
raises questions as to the stability of the region and the role of rival
outside powers. At the request of the Department of State's African
Bureau, we examine the prospects for conflict.
This Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for the Middle East at the request of the Depart-
ment of State. The initial draft was prepared by State/INR and CIA
with contributions from DIA. The final judgments were coordinated
with State/INR, CIA and DIA.
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RET
CONCLUSIONS
There is at present considerable potential for conflict in East Africa.'
The risk of warfare arises from the chronic differences between many
pairs of neighbors. Jeopardizing the peace are:
- Somali irredentism, which seeks to draw into the Somali fold those
parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and the French Territory of Afars and
Issas (FTAI) peopled by Somali-speaking nomads;
- Instability in Ethiopia, which could lead neighboring countries to
side with separatists or opposition elements, thereby provoking
retaliation and hostilities;
- Bad feeling among members of the faltering East African Com-
munity (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), which finds its most
dangerous expression in the Ugandan President's paranoid view
of Tanzania.
Mistrust of neighbors and a sense of vulnerability have characterized
most of the East African governments throughout most of the last dec-
ade, accounting for an ever-increasing arms buildup in the area. The
Soviet Union has become the largest supplier of arms to East Africa.
The West European input has diminished in the wake of decolonization.
In recent years, the US has become a substantial supplier of arms,
mainly to Ethiopia. Another supplier, especially to Tanzania, has been
China. Several Arab states are giving increasing support to the insur-
gents in Eritrea.
We believe that destabilizing influences will not diminish and that
the risks of armed conflict will increase, since:
- The Soviets and others will maintain an arms flow to East Africa;
- Growing Arab support for the Eritreans makes it doubtful that
the insurgents will modify their newly intransigent position on
independence;
- The Eritrean conflict will probably reinforce centrifugal tenden-
cies in other Ethiopian provinces;
I in this paper "East Africa" covers Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.
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- Further political stress could jeopardize Ethiopia's territorial in-
tegrity;
- A serious weakening of Ethiopia will increase the odds of Somali
intervention;
- The Ethiopian uncertainties will complicate life for the French in
the FTAI and may invite subversive moves by the Somalis and/
or Eritreans;
- Acquisition of additional arms by Kenya-which fears Somali
territorial ambitions-may further encourage the heavy defense
spending in Uganda and Tanzania;
- The Ugandan government's erratic and frequently bellicose be-
havior could touch off a brief conflict through miscalculation.
There will probably be an endemic risk of minor border clashes for
years to come. The more serious threat of Ethiopian-Somali fighting
would become increasingly plausible if the situation in Ethiopia were
to deteriorate, although economic adversity and other factors restrain
Somali adventurism.
We believe that the communist powers seek no direct involvement in
East African conflicts, although tensions in the area can serve their
purposes. The Soviets' access to Somali air and port facilities was formal-
ized in 1974, and they would not like to see use of these facilities jeop-
ardized by war. The Soviets may well provide a more restraining in-
fluence on the Somalis than do the Arabs. Growing Arab sympathy for
the Eritreans and hostility toward the new rulers in Addis increase the
chances of Somalia's securing Arab support if it clashes with Ethiopia.
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DISCUSSION
1. SOMALI IRREDENTISM
1. Somalia wants to acquire the Somali-inhabited
areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and the FTAI. The
Somalis probably hope to combine diplomatic and
military pressures when they judge that either
Ethiopia or Kenya is sufficiently weak internally.
Somalia is currently resorting to diplomatic means,
but it is also operationally integrating into its weap-
ons inventory the sophisticated Soviet military
equipment delivered since 1972.
2. Somalia at present could seize and hold a
portion of Ethiopia or Kenya. But it would eventu-
ally face a retaliatory action in which its neighbors'
larger populations and resource bases would weigh
heavily. Somalia would also face international dip-
lomatic pressures to return the seized territory.
The Somalis do not want a prolonged war:
- Their ailing economy could not support sus-
tained military action;
- The Ethiopians and Kenyans could exploit
political and economic strains within Somalia;
- Somalia could not count on sustained resupply
from the USSR.
The Ethiopian-Somali Arms Balance
3. Ethiopia, as long as its internal cohesion lasts,
has an overall advantage over Somalia. The Ethio-
pian armed forces are twice the size of Somalia's,
although the balance along the border is more
nearly equal. Ethiopian military personnel, especi-
ally pilots, are generally better trained, and the
Ethiopians have the edge in antitank capability.
However, the combat readiness of Ethiopian forces
has been severely impaired over the past year
because of the breakdown of discipline and the
disarray in the chain of command. Moreover, fight-
ing in Eritrea has severely strained military logistics
and strategic reserve capabilities.
4. The Somali armed forces are numerically su-
perior in artillery, radar, and armor. Although the
delivery to the Ethiopians of M-60 tanks is helping
redress somewhat the armor imbalance, their great-
est impact will be psychological. When all of
Somalia's MIG-21s become operational, its armed
forces will have the edge in air power (which
could be offset if the Ethiopians obtained air-to-air
missiles for their jet fighters). The Somalis have
SAM-2/Guideline defensive missiles in place around
Mogadiscio.
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5. Both countries have serious maintenance, logis-
tics, and communications deficiencies, which sug-
gests an early stalemate in any fighting.
The Kenyan-Somali Arms Balance
6. The Kenyan armed forces could deal effec-
tively with a renewed insurgency in Kenya's Somali-
inhabited North East Province, but not with a con-
ventional attack. Kenya's army is less than one-third
the size of Somalia's. It is inferior in almost every
category of equipment, especially armor and air-
craft. The Somali forces could take and hold some
Kenyan territory for a limited period of time. Long,
exposed Somali supply lines would be vulnerable
to a Kenyan counterattack, however, and any new
equipment could improve Kenya's counterattack
capability.
7. One constraint on the Somalis has been con-
cern about possible Ethiopian action in support
of Kenya. Kenya and Ethiopia have had a mutual
defense agreement since 1963. But the preoccu-
pation of the new Ethiopian government with Eri-
trea reduces the chances of such assistance.
Siad Bides His Time
8. Somali President Siad is basically cautious.
He believes that time is on his side, given Ethiopia's
internal troubles and the uncertain political suc-
cession in Kenya. He fears that a premature military
attack would unify the Ethiopians against the for-
eign threat. Instead he hopes that Ethiopian do-
mestic turmoil will reach the point of national disin-
tegration. Siad also believes that Kenya's political
and economic strengths will be dissipated when
President Kenyatta passes from the scene. He visited
Kenya last September in another futile attempt to
interest Kenyatta in a federation with Somalia (and
thus wean it away from its alliance with Ethiopia).
-And Pursues the Diplomatic Gambit
9. In the meantime Siad is trying to improve his
country's international image and thereby gain sup-
port for Somali irredentist claims.
10. The Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Siad is exploiting his role as the current OAU chair-
man to overcome lingering suspicions of Somalia's
African credentials. (Somalia's newly emphasized
Arab ties may have contributed to the defeat of
its candidate for OAU secretary general at the
June 1974 summit.) He has also been on the road in
the past year-to Burundi and Uganda to reinforce
existing bilateral ties, and to 14 West African
countries to gain exposure in a region where he is
little known. Siad sought to downplay Somalia's
close Soviet ties, to gain support for Somalia's claim
to the FTAI, and to argue for giving the OAU
more authority to deal with border disputes.
11. The Arab League. Siad is by no means ready
to disown Somalia's Arab links, however. He hopes
the Africans will accept Somalia as a bridge be-
tween the OAU and the Arab League, particularly
as a conveyor of African demands for relief from
the high cost of oil. He has suggested Mogadiscio
as the site of the next Arab summit.
12. The West. Siad has also made overtures to
the West, especially to Italy, the European Com-
munity as a group, and to the US. He hopes eventu-
ally to obtain US economic aid (and to that end
might revoke the charters of Somali ships trading
with North Vietnam and Cuba) and to enlist US
help in persuading Ethiopia to make concessions
on it Somali inhabited Ogaden region.
Somalia's Economic Problems
13. The poor state of Somalia's economy con-
tributes to Siad's reliance on diplomacy rather than
military action. Somalia's fundamental poverty has
been aggravated by socialist mismanagement,
higher oil costs, general inflation, and a serious
drought.
14. No economic remedies are in sight. Soviet
assistance has been limited and in some cases un-
productive. A major factor in Somalia's decision to
sign its Friendship Treaty with Moscow last July
was the Soviet offer of budgetary support, relief
on oil costs, and debt rescheduling. Somalia pre-
sumably hoped that its accession to the Arab League
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in February 1974 gave it a claim on Arab oil money.
But the most promising donors, Saudi Arabia, Ku-
wait, and Libya, dislike Siad's close Soviet tics
and doubt his commitment to Moslem values and
culture.
15. A government reorganization last December
seems, in part, to have been another effort by Siad
to improve the country's economic performance.
His replacement of military officers with techno-
crats better qualified to make economic decisions
has caused unhappiness in the defense forces. Mili-
tary malaise, economic discontent in urban areas
over high food prices and rationing, and religious
tensions (stemming from the execution of ten Mos-
lem sheikhs) have fostered opposition to Siad.
He could conceivably try to distract attention from
domestic problems with military adventures in
the Ogaden. But it is more likely that these prob-
lems will constrain a military move.
Prospects for Detente
16. Ethiopia's military rulers have stated that
they intend to grant more political autonomy to
all the country's provinces, although it is uncertain
how much real decentralization will be tolerated.
At some future time Addis Ababa might revive
plans for joint Ethiopian-Somali development of
the Wcbi-Shcbclli River region and exploration of
the potential oil and gas deposits in the Ogaden.
17. More autonomy might defuse the Ogaden
issue, but the Somalis would regard it as only a
temporary palliative, with no substantial impact
on their determination to bring the nomads under
the Somali flag. Nor is Somalia likely to agree to
proposals for economic cooperation that imply
Somali recognition of Ethiopia's jurisdiction over
the Ogaden.
Outlook for Future Military Action
18. Siad has so far resisted the pressures of those
Ogadeni Somalis undergoing guerrilla training in
Somalia to start insurgency against Ethiopia. But
he might change his mind if the internal Ethiopian
situation continues to deteriorate, or if additional
Ethiopian army units in the Ogaden are sent to
Eritrea.
19. If the Somalis should take advantage of a
breakdown of order in Ethiopia to move into the
Ogaden, they could count on the sympathy of most
Arab states. Protests would come from the black
member states of the OAU (especially Kenya and
its supporters), but the OAU's ability to act might
be impaired by divisions between its Arab and
black African members.
20. Kenya would probably offer Ethiopia limited
assistance in defense against Somali incursions. The
Kenyans fear that a Somali takeover of the Ogaden
might lead to a renewal of Somali insurgency in
northeastern Kenya.
II. THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION
21. The ruling Provisional Military Administra-
tive Council (PMAC) is an unstable coalition of
disparate military figures ranging from illiterate
privates to highly educated officers. As it tries
simultaneously to cope with the Eritrean insur-
gency, defend the Ogaden against the Somalis, and
implement far-reaching internal reform, serious
strains are developing. Also, the chain of command
has never been firmly reestablished since the first
mutinies in early 1974.
22. Anti-PM AC dissidence is steadily increasing.
Although the uncoordinated opposition groups do
not yet pose a threat, a serious crisis-provoked
by a military debacle in Eritrea or widespread re-
sistance to land reform-might present an oppor-
tunity to overthrow the PMAC leadership. Even
if the PMAC is ousted, indefinite military rule
(perhaps interspersed with periods of military-
guaranteed civilian government) is the most likely
pattern for the coming years.
23. It is too early to say, of course, whether the
regime which eventually emerges will be able to
maintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity. A weak-
ening of the central government has historically
encouraged centrifugal tendencies in the provinces.
A contracting Amhara center, surrounded by weak,
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autonomous or independent states, would invite out-
side intervention and destabilize the East African
region.
Eritrea
24. The currently high level of insurgency in
Eritrea stems as much from PMAC weaknesses as
from insurgent capabilities. An Ethiopian regime
which managed to overcome its internal divisions,
demonstrated an ability to govern, and possessed
some diplomatic skills might be able to prevent
Eritrean secession. Federation might eventually
prove to be an acceptable compromise. Although
some insurgent leaders may balk at a formula that
falls short of total independence, the Tigrinya-
speaking, Christian half of the population might
prefer to maintain some political ties with Ethiopia
to balance the influence of Arab states on the
Muslim half.
25. But continued political disarray in Addis
Ababa increases the likelihood of Eritrean inde-
pendence and possible further fragmentation. Eri-
trean Muslims are themselves divided along tribal
lines. The conservative Afars, for example, have
little in common with radical insurgents and might
insist on an autonomous state. An independent Eri-
trea would be even more unwieldy if it absorbed
other Tigrinya-speaking areas in northern Ethiopia,
especially the province of Tigre (whose ex-gov-
ernor is cooperating with the Eritrean insurgents)
and parts of Begemdir and Wollo provinces.
The Gallas
26. The Gallas, Ethiopia's largest single ethnic
group (40 percent of the population), pose another
potential threat. The Gallas are split internally-
by clan, wealth, dialect, religion, and the degree
to which they have assimilated Amhara culture-
and are scattered throughout the country's prov-
inces. Although Galla plotting against the PMAC
continues, the conspirators' goals seem to be the
easing of grievances rather than the creation of
a separate state. The Gallas would lack the easy
access to foreign support enjoyed by peoples con-
centrated on the peripheral areas bordering the
Red Sea and Somalia.
Implications for the FTAI
27. An independent Eritrea might combine forces
with Somalia to press France to relinquish the
FTAI. The French, however, want to play a sig-
nificant role in the Indian Ocean, and Djibouti's
strategic importance has increased with the immi-
nent reopening of the Suez Canal and the forced
French withdrawal from southern Indian Ocean
bases. Reinforced French garrisons in the FTAI,
while incapable of preventing limited incursions,
could halt and eventually repel any invasion. Con-
cerned now about the longevity of Ethiopia's
PMAC and its ability to resolve the Eritrean fight-
ing, the French are reportedly trying to improve
relations with the Eritrean insurgents and to gain
support from neighboring Muslim states for a con-
tinued French presence. If faced with a possible
Somali takeover, Red Sea littoral states would be
torn between their anti-imperialist sentiments and
their distaste for a Soviet-backed Somali presence
on one side of the Bab-el-Mandab.
28. In the long run, there is a question whether
France would have the political. will to stay on
in the face of a major challenge requiring another
colonial war. In the meantime, the French seem
disposed to stay indefinitely.
III. OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONFLICT
Ugandan Attack on Tanzania
29. The greatest potential for conflict among
Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya stems from the er-
ratic behavior of Ugandan President Amin, who
continuously encourages belief in threats where
none exist. He frequently uses the slightest pretext
for making bellicose accusations that Tanzania,
alone or in conjunction with Ugandan exiles, is
planning an imminent attack on Uganda. On these
occasions Amin puts his forces on increased alert
and sometimes sends reinforcements to the border.
His impulsiveness could result in further border
skirmishes, such as occurred in 1972 when Tan-
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zania's President Nycrere supported an unsuccess-
ful Ugandan exile attack. Since then, however,
Nyerere has not gone beyond providing the exiles
asylum in Tanzania.
34. In contrast, the Kenyan and Tanzanian armed
forces have better leadership and have had ample
time to prepare defenses along the most likely
Ugandan attack routes.
Ugandan-Kenyan Tensions
30. Uganda has close relations with Somalia, and
Kenya is concerned that Amin might undertake
some supportive military action if Mogadiscio in-
stigated a renewal of the insurgency in Kenya's
North East Province or ordered the Somali army
into action. If Somalia asked for support, Amin
might be willing to reinforce his troops on the
border to tie down some Kenyan forces.
31. Other factors contribute to tensions between
Uganda and Kenya. Amin shares many Ugandans'
resentment toward Kenya. Ugandans consider that
the countries' former close economic association
permitted Kenya to industrialize and prosper at
Uganda's expense. Kenya controls the major land
routes to the sea, and Kenyatta has not hesitated
to use this leverage. On a personal level, Amin
also resents Kenyatta's prestige in Africa.
32. The presence of Ugandan exiles in Kenya
could trigger incidents. Amin might respond to any
Kenya-based attempt to overthrow him with a show
of force on the border. A miscalculation by either
side or an accidental confrontation between op-
posing troops could lead to fighting.
Ugandan Limitations
33. The Ugandan army's confidence that it has
weaponry superior to its adversaries might make
it adventurous and give it an initial advantage, but
it appears unlikely that it could sustain cross-
border operations for long. Sustained offensive
action wiuld be limited by logistical deficiencies,
which result both from the depressed state of
the Ugandan economy and poor military manage-
ment. The Ugandan army also suffers from the
low quality of officers, lack of discipline, and fre-
quent reorganizations and personnel shifts, mostly
resulting from Amin's continuing purges.
Kenyan-Tanzanian Relations
35. Kenya's and Tanzania's economic interests
tend to be opposed, and their political orientations
differ. Many Tanzanians consider Kenya as a so-
ciety which retains many undersirable traits from
the days of British rule, while Kenyan leaders
believe that China and the USSR have all too much
influence in Tanzania. Nonetheless, Kenyatta and
Nyererc have a personal relationship which has
usually enabled them to smooth over differences,
and each government considers the other nation
a bastion of stability in contrast to Uganda. Even
if there were a military takeover in either country
the new rulers would probably be preoccupied
with maintaining themselves in power rather than
initiating military adventures.
IV. THE SOVIETS IN EAST AFRICA
30. Outside powers, drawn to East Africa for
a number of reasons, have materially altered the
balance of forces there, and by their involvement
have given international significance to local con-
frontations. No estimate of the prospects for war
between Somalia and its neighbors or other lesser
conflicts in the area can ignore the Soviet factor.
An assessment of likely Soviet behavior toward
Mogadiscio or Addis Ababa depends in turn on
wider considerations of Soviet policy.
37. Regional rivalries provide opportunities for
the Soviets to promote themselves as an arms sup-
plier and to gain access to military facilities. These
same rivalries also can limit Soviet freedom to
act, since close identification with one party in
a dispute generally restricts influence with another.
Furthermore, Soviet influence is nowhere so great
that Moscow can exercise unlimited control over
internal or regional developments. The prospect
of becoming embroiled in regional disputes that
it does not want and could not stop thus injects
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an element of caution into Soviet conduct in East
Africa.
38. The Soviet Union has found military aid to
be the most effective means of gaining influence
and cooperation. It has become the major arms sup-
plier to Somalia and Uganda, has signed significant
new arms agreements with Tanzania, and in the past
has made periodic overtures to Kenya and Ethiopia.
In the economic sphere, in contrast, the Soviets have
been less active except for fishing and port con-
struction. Moscow has extended economic credits
to all East African countries, but has done little to
encourage their use.
39. The Soviet Union's interests in East Africa are
political and strategic and in most respects are ex-
tensions of Soviet interests in the nearby Arabian
Peninsula and Indian Ocean. Moscow's East African
interests are:
underwrites Moscow's economic and military aid
commitments and possibly reduces frictions in the
day-to-day administration of aid agreements.
42. The Soviet Union is Somalia's major source
of arms. This supply is limited mainly by Somalia's
ability to absorb and effectively utilize relatively
sophisticated weaponry and by Moscow's desire to
maintain some balance in the region. During the
past year, nevertheless, Moscow has begun supply-
ing surface-to-air missiles and MIG-21s. In addition,
the Soviets have provided training to the Somali Air
Force and are building a large airfield for it near
Mogadiscio.
43. The Soviets have become important economic
aid donors, but the total value of their economic
credits (about $90 million extended, $47 million
drawn) is less than that offered by the Chinese
(around $132 million extended, $43 million drawn).
-reducing Western influence, power, and pres-
ence;
- gaining political influence on the southern
edge of the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea
littoral, and supporting and protecting its
flanks in the Middle East;
- securing access to support facilities for its
naval forces in the Indian Ocean;
- countering Chinese influence.
USSR and Somalia
40. The Soviet Union's focal point in East Africa
has been Somalia. By meeting Somalia's needs for
military aid where the West has been reluctant, the
Soviets have gained a significant political position
and convenient access to Somali military facilities.
The Soviet Contribution
41. Soviet influence in Somalia has gradually in-
creased since 1969 and appears to have reached a
peak with President Podgorny's visit and the signing
of a Friendship Treaty in July 1974. This treaty, like
those the Soviets signed with Egypt, Iraq, and India,
The Quid
44. In return for their assistance, the Soviets now
have apparently unrestricted access to the northern
port of Berbera, which is the port most frequently
used to support the USSR's Indian Ocean naval
force. The importance Moscow places on Berbera
was underscored by the recent visit of Soviet naval
commander Admiral Gorshkov to Somalia. Although
there are no ship repair facilities ashore, Soviet tend-
ers provide in-port maintenance and minor repairs.
In addition, the Soviets use the port for crew rest,
have a barracks ship, and have constructed a bar-
racks compound. There is also a Soviet naval com-
munications relay facility near Berbera.
45. There are indications that the Soviets are
building a facility at Berbera to handle cruise mis-
siles for their Indian Ocean naval force. The facility
is the first of its kind discovered outside the USSR
and when completed will improve the reload capa-
bility of Soviet ships and submarines equipped with
cruise missiles. Moreover, recent evidence shows
that within two miles of the Berbera facility the
Soviets are building a new airfield with a run-
way apparently long enough for the biggest Soviet
aircraft.
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48. The Soviets would undoubtedly like to stage
periodic naval reconnaissance flights from Somalia,
possibly following the pattern established in Guinea,
from which they periodically operate TU-95 Bcar-D
reconnaissance flights. Indeed, the Soviets already
have taken advantage of Somalia's strategic location
by stationing naval reconnaissance aircraft (the
IL 38s) in Somalia during their naval exercises
last month.
The Soviet Presence and the War Issue
47. Despite Moscow's military quid pro quo with
Mogadiscio, the Soviets have sought to dampen
Somali irredentist ambitions. The USSR prefers to
take advantage of regional tensions without en-
couraging actual hostilities that might endanger its
access to Somali facilities.
48. Should the Somalis decide to go to war, the
Soviets would counsel restraint but probably would
stand behind Somalia, at least in a limited engage-
ment. The Friendship Treaty commits the USSR and
Somalia to consult in the event of a threat of war.
This provision gives Moscow grounds for urging re-
straint but does not obligate it to come to Somalia's
aid.
49. For leverage, the Soviets will probably con-
tinue discreetly to limit resupply of ammunition,
spare parts, equipment, and petroleum in order to
restrict Somalia's ability to conduct a protracted
war. But to soften the repercussions of such action
Moscow would probably offer to back Somalia in
any subsequent negotiations and would replace
equipment lost during the fighting.
50. Moscow's refusal to endorse Somali's irreden-
tist claims probably has been a contributing factor
to Soviet unpopularity in some government circles.
However, Siad and those officials who feel the So-
viet presence is beneficial appear to have the upper
hand in the Somali government at this time. Never-
theless, Siad remains sensitive to criticism from his
Arab and African friends regarding his close ties
with the Soviets. The Soviets also are being blamed
increasingly by some Somalis for Siad's unpopular
domestic moves.
USSR and Ethiopia
51. The Soviets clearly have favored the recent
revolutionary changes in Ethiopia, but have so far
adopted a cautious approach to the PMAC. Al-
though the Soviets have reportedly discussed the
possibility of military aid with the Ethiopians, no
commitments have been made, primarily because
of Moscow's desire not to offend Somalia. But the
Soviets may believe they have some leeway to deal
with Addis Ababa without serious damage to their
Somali relationship.
52. Future Soviet initiatives most likely will be
tied to Ethiopian internal developments. Moscow
would favor and might even support a regime that
reduces its ties with the West. But unless the Ethio-
pians made a radical break with the US, including
the ouster of US military personnel, the Soviets
would probably refrain from becoming deeply in-
volved and would continue to view the Addis Ababa
regime as basically unstable.
53. Moscow's treatment of the Eritrean problem
has likewise reflected caution. The Soviet press
criticized the "secessionist rebels" and the Soviets
have reportedly pressed the South Yemenis to stop
supporting the Eritreans. It is unlikely, however,
that the Soviets will offer Addis Ababa arms to
fight the rebels.
USSR and Uganda
54. The Soviet Union renewed its military aid
program to Uganda last year following a reduction
in Western aid, and quickly became the country's
principal arms supplier. The Soviets are providing
modern equipment, including MIG-21s. As a result
of Moscow's generosity, Uganda's neighbors, especi-
ally Zaire and Kenya, have become suspicious of
Moscow's (as well as Amin's) intentions. It is
highly doubtful, however, that Moscow wants
Uganda to become a serious threat to its neighbors.
The Soviet risk in supplying the quixotic Amin with
this equipment is partly offset by the latter's grow-
ing dependence on Soviet good will.
55. Soviet motivation appears to be largely polit-
ical opportunism in the wake of declining Western
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influence in Uganda. The Soviets are striving to
encourage Amin's anti-Western posture and to pre-
empt any move by the Chinese to secure active
influence. Looking beyond Amin, Moscow undoubt-
edly hopes that continued Soviet military aid will
increase the dependence of the Ugandan armed
forces on the USSR.
USSR and Tanzania
56. The Soviet Union has shown interest during
the past year in expanding ties with Tanzania. The
Soviets signed new arms agreements with Dar es
Salaam-their first since the mid-1960s-which may
have put the total value of Soviet military aid
above that of China, Tanzania's major arms sup-
plier until now. The agreements reportedly provide
for $74 million worth of Soviet arms, including
MIG-21s and surface-to-air missiles.
57. Moscow's interest in Tanzania transcends its
desire to compete with the Chinese. Tanzania pos-
sesses potentially valuable ports, and the Soviets
probably hope that by being generous in their mili-
tary aid they can persuade Dar es Salaam to
reconsider its opposition to port calls by naval ships
from non-littoral countries.
58. The Soviets also value Tanzania's location
near southern Africa, where the accelerating pace
of change in the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia
is spurring Moscow's interest.
USSR and Kenya
59. Soviet-Kenyan relations continue to be cool.
The Kenyans blame the Soviets for increasing the
danger of war by providing arms to Somalia and
Uganda. The Soviets have tried to allay Nairobi's
fears by claiming that the arms are intended only
for defensive purposes and by suggesting that the
Kenyans could also receive some. So far, however,
the Kenyans have put their requests for arms to
the UK and the US.
60. In addition to offers of arms, the Soviets have
shown an interest in expanding ties between the
Soviet and Kenyan trade unions. The Soviets also
approached the Kenyans about allowing Soviet
technicians to visit Mombasa on a regular basis to
supervise the repair of Soviet fishing vessels.
V. THE CHINESE IN EAST AFRICA
61. The Chinese have long placed a premium
on improving relations with East African govern-
ments and since the mid-1960s have been cautious
to avoid entanglement with anti-regime groups. All
signs point to a continuation of this policy. The
Chinese are equally wary of involvement in disputes
between African states. Peking's military aid to
East African countries will probably continue at
current levels. Political factors as well as resource
limitations are likely to preclude any major new
programs in the military sector.
62. China's policy toward East Africa is moti-
vated by its desire:
-to counter, where possible, the growth of So-
viet influence (as in Somalia) ;
- to retain its lead over the Soviets where its
investments are substantial (Tanzania) ;
- to cultivate new African partners as part of
its campaign to play a major role in Third
World matters.
63. China can be expected to continue to keep
a careful watch over the growth of Soviet and
Western military power in the region. The Chinese
are particularly wary of the potential strategic
threat of a Soviet naval presence in the Indian
Ocean. There are clear indications that China
favors a US naval presence in the area although
the Chinese try to make political capital by verbally
attacking the intrusion of both superpowers into
the region. Thus China supports an Indian Ocean
"zone of peace."
Tanzania
64. Tanzania was the point of entry for China
in East Africa in 1964 when the political situation
provided an opening for Chinese assistance, first
to the island of Zanzibar and later to the mainland.
The country has remained the focus of China's
most extensive activity in Africa, primarily because
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of the magnitude of the TanZam railway project.-'
Even after the railway is completed, however, China
will remain Tanzania's major economic aid donor.
China has also been Tanzania's principal supplier
of military assistance. Peking hopes that close co-
operation with Tanzania will convince other de-
veloping countries of China's value as a friend and
partner.
wishes to obtain Chinese military aid. But Peking
is hesitant to become closely identified with a ruling
coalition whose lifespan is so uncertain. The Chi-
nese are also wary of engaging in a costly arms
competition with Moscow so far from their borders.
Greater involvement, whether political, economic,
or military, will be delayed until the Chinese be-
lieve that the situation has stabilized.
Kenya and Uganda
65. Neither Kenya nor Uganda figures promi-
nently in Chinese policy planning. Peking main-
tains studiously correct relations with Nairobi, but
it has not moved toward any major programs there.
Given Kenyatta's disposition to keep Chinese pres-
ence at a minimum, bilateral relations will prob-
ably continue to develop at a relatively slow pace.
66. Peking seems skeptical of close involvement
with Uganda's erratic Amin. Prospects for much
cooperation are poor; China could not compete
with the Soviet Union in providing Amin with
sophisticated military hardware even if it were
inclined to do so. Nor is China likely to suggest
increased economic ties with a regime whose com-
mitment to development is negligible.
Somalia
87. In Somalia the Chinese run a poor second
to the Soviets. Only in economic aid have the
Chinese surpassed the Soviets, as noted in para-
graph 42 above. Somalia can be expected to seek
continued Chinese activity as a balance to the
Soviets. On their side, the Chinese can be expected
to bide their time, hoping to profit from some future
misstep.
Ethiopia
68. Some of Ethiopia's new military rulers have
shown interest in Chinese development models
and may request increases in the economic credits
that Peking extended to Haile Selassie's govern-
ment. There have also been reports that the PMAC
2 The construction of the 1,200 mile railway is the largest
financial and technical assistance project that Peking has
ever undertaken.
VI. THE ARAB STATES IN EAST AFRICA
69. For the past decade and a half, East Africa
has been one of the arenas in which Israel and
the Arab states have maneuvered for support by
means of trade, aid, and political pressure. With
the steady erosion of the Israeli position and the
increasing power accruing to the oil-producing
states, the Arabs have been increasingly involved
with other East African issues.
70. The Arab states have not marched in lock
step, although on Arab-Israeli issues and on sup-
port for Muslim minorities they have maintained
something of a common front. But it is on the
issues of the Soviet presence and radicalism in
East Africa that the interests and policies of the
Arab states diverge.
Somalia
71. The Arabs are the Soviets' only significant
competitors in Somalia. Since its adherence to the
Arab League in February 1974, Somalia has been
the primary recipient of Arab aid in East Africa.
But the most generous Arab donors are conserva-
tive states which have made new aid-apart from
drought relief--conditional upon a reduction of
Soviet influence. Siad is willing to make some con-
cessions to the Arabs (for example, he recently
made Arabic an official language), but not to the
point of jeopardizing Soviet military assistance.
Nevertheless, in the event of a cooling in Soviet-
Somali relations, Siad might look to Arab countries
for spare parts and surplus Soviet weaponry.
Ethiopia
72. Until 1973, Ethiopia was the cornerstone of
Israel's East African policy. In return for a bal-
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anced diplomatic stance in the Arab-Israeli dispute,
the Israelis supported Ethiopia with economic aid,
military training and advisers. Ethiopia's diplo-
matic break with Israel in the midst of the 1973
war was forced by Arab pressure, but many Arabs
are skeptical of the permanence of the split. Israel
undoubtedly views the upsurge in Eritrean fight-
ing with misgivings, and fears an Eritrean success
would establish another hostile Arab power on
the shores of the Red Sea.
73. After the break with Israel and the ousting
of Haile Selassie, the Arabs began a flirtation with
Ethiopia. But the appeal of the new government
in Addis Ababa decreased following the political
executions in November 1974 and deteriorated
further when its hard line on Eritrea committed
the PMAC to a resumption of military operations
against the insurgents.
74. The Arabs are now maintaining some dis-
tance from Ethiopia's military government, and are
providing increasing assistance to the Eritrean in-
surgents. Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen
(Sana) have generally sought a negotiated settle-
ment in Eritrea and have tried to counter inroads
by militant Arab states (Iraq, Syria, Libya and
South Yemen) and communist countries. But Saudi
Arabia might step up its aid to the insurgents if
Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea becomes increas-
ingly repressive. A large influx of arms from
Saudi Arabia-or Libya or Iraq-might enable the
rebels to resume the offensive.
Other States
75. Shortly after Idi Amin seized power in
Uganda, he ended the previous close relationship
with Israel. Since then, Uganda has taken a vio-
lently anti-Israeli position, established a close re-
lationship with Libya, and has received some mili-
tary aid from Egypt. Tanzania has been sending
high-level delegations to the Arab world in an
attempt to acquire financial aid, and so far has
reportedly received a loan from the Arab League.
Kenya has attempted to maintain a continuing,
albeit unpublicized, relationship with Israel. Con-
tinuing Israeli military sales are a symbol of this
link. Nonetheless, Kenya is also trying to improve
its relations with the Arabs, even to the point of
establishing diplomatic ties with an Arab outsider
such as South Yemen.
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COMPARATIV S'T'RENGTH AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT OF EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES
ETHIOPIA
SOMALIA
KENYA
TANZANIA
UGANDA
FRENCH
FORCES
(FTAI)
STRENGTH-TOTAL
53,500
24,450
9,200
16,530
18,650
4,340
200
3
Army
40,000
22,000
6,500
13,850
17,000
,
680
Air Force
3,100
750
760
800
1,000
908
Navy
1,400
200
340
450
None
370
Paramilitary
9,000
1,500
1,600
1,430
560
OFFENSIVE EQUIPMENT
Jet Bombers
4
3
6
None
None
16
00D
F
tB-57)
(I L-28)
iBAC167)
)
-1
(
Tanks
82'
180
None
40
786
21
(T-34_P
(T-62)
(AMY-13)
Armored Vehicles
140
368
73
78
116
23
DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT
Jet Fighters/Trainers
352
454
3
20
53
(M-16//AML)
None9
8
ADA
11
225
None
375
81
(40-mm)
AT Weapons/Rocket Launchers
3,400
145
475
430
20
None 10
'
SA Ms
None
1 -2
None
None
Unk 7
None
OTHER EQUIPMENT
Naval Craft
15
fins (SA-2)5
12
4
10
None
10
k
U
Mortars
745
114
129
148
80
n
20
FA Guns (75-mm and above)
93
220
None
109
24
(105/155-mm)
Recoilless Rifles 504
96
20
130
36
Unk
17
Helicopters 6
12
None
None
9
' Includes 71 M-41s and II M-60s.
2 Includes 16 F-86s, 9 F-5s, and 10 T-33s.
3 40 additional T-54(55 tanks are probably in Somalia but their presence is not confirmed.
4 Three MIG-21s have been observed. Additional MIG-21/17s are in Somalia but the exact number of each type is unconfirmed.
5 The presence of SA-6 and SA-7 missiles has been reported but is unconfirmed.
8 Includes 51 T-34s, 12 USM-4s, and I5 T-54/55s.
7 Press reports on delivery of SA-3s are not confirmed.
Excludes ships' crews whose exact numbers are unknown.
The F-100D is an interceptor and fighter-bomber.
Some armored cars are equipped with SS-11 anti-tank missiles.
1t The French plan to install the Crotale surface-to-air missile system in Djibouti in the near future.
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ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FOREIGN MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN EAST AFRICA AND
AFRICAN MILITARY TRAINEES ABROAD
ETHIOPIA
- - - - - - - - - - --- - - -
SOMALIA KENYA TANZANIA
UGANDA
TIC
MTA
TIC
MTA TIC MTA
TIC
MTA
TIC
MTA
COMMUNIST
Bulgaria
3
Cuba
-
-
17
280
Czechoslovakia
-
East Germany
- -
4
-
N. Korea
-
50
4
22
-
PRC
745
207
-
Poland
--
4 -
-
-
USSR
-
1,000
230 - -
Unk
145
27
600
FREE WORLD
Canada
-
Egypt
-
France
3
22
-
West Germany
13
8
10
Ghana
-
--
10
Greece
-
10
India
4
6
12
-
2
Italy
-
15
6
86
8
-
Libya
--
-
-
-
0
25
240
Norway
-
1
--
Pakistan
-
-
-
Sweden
-
-
UK
-
14
--
Yugoslavia
8
-
-
-
Zambia
-
Legend: TIC-Technicians in Country
MTA-Military Trainees Abroad
VALUES OF COMMUNIST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EAST AFRICA
(MILLION 3 US)
ETHIOPIA
SOMALIA
KENYA
TANZANIA
UGANDA
DONOR
A
D
A
D
A
D
A
D
A
D
USSR
2.7
2.7
100.0
99.0
0.4
0.4
26.0
6.0
20.0
8
4
China
-
1.0
1.0
-
-
62.0
62.0
Negl.
.
Negl.
Czechoslovakia
Negl.
Negl.
---
-
Negl.
Negl.
7.0
7.0
East Germany
3.0
3.0
-
-
Bulgaria
2.8
2.8
Romania
2.0
2.0
-
North Korea
1.0
1.0
-
-
Cuba
Legend: A-Agreements
D-Deliveries
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