STRENGTH OF VIET CONG MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000700020008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 17, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI No. 0938,A/65
17 March 1965
JOINT CIA-DIA-STATE MEMORANDUM
Strength of Viet Cong
Military Forces in South Vietnam
Summary
1. While the Viet Cong have far fewer bat-
talions and less manpower than the ARVN, their
tactics and manner of deployment give them greater
flexibility. Although the ARVN has greater mobil-
ity (e.g., air transport), the Viet Cong are able
to exploit their freedom from the defense of fixed
sites and their ability to infiltrate an area se-
cretly in order to pose successive threats in widely
separated areas of the country. Thus they whipsaw
the ARVN general reserves, and achieve a kind of
strategic superiority in combat areas of their own
choosing.
2. US estimates of the confirmed strength of
Viet Cong military forces in South Vietnam are
based on a procedure requiring specific identifi-
cation by at least two "hard" sources before ac-
cepting the existence of a Viet Cong unit. Be-
cause availability of source data lags behind the
appearance of units in the field, actual Viet
Cong military strength is likely to be somewhat
above the confirmed figures. MACV also maintains
figures on probable and suspected Viet Cong units,
and on the Viet Cong militia. At times of a rapid
build-up of forces, which the Viet Cong seem
clearly to have been engaged in for the past
the real picture may present a substantiall year,
combat threat than confirmed strength su y greater
ggests.
ARMY and DIA review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
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Relative Strengths and Expansion
3, Government force strength on 15 February
totaled 567,000 including 245,000 regulars. MACV's
latest Viet Cong Order of Battle holdings, issued
on 6 March, show a, confirmed strength of 37,200
in regular, identified units. MACV has evidence
that there are probably as many as 45,000 Viet Cong
regulars, and reason to suspect an additional seven
to eight battalions, which would put Viet Cong
regular strength at between 50,000 and 60,000. In
addition, the Viet Cong are estimated to have in
the range of 100,000 irregular, or militia, forces.
4. Government force strength has been ex-
panded substantially since late 1961, when US as-
sistance was dramatically increased. After show-
ing signs of serious attrition in early 1964, gov-
ernment strength has been rising for about the past
nine months. Training and performance have also im-
proved, although in many a,rea,s serious deficiencies
remain. Desertions by popular, regional, and even
regular forces remain a, problem. Although many of
the deserters may ultimately return to the army, even
their temporary absence weakens their units.
5. Viet Cong regular force strength has also
shown a, steady growth during the same period. Con-
firmed strength has risen by more than a third since
a year ago, although this increase results in part
from MACV's confirmation during the year of units
already in place in late 1963. (There is a time
lag between the first reports of a new unit and its
acceptance in a confirmed category.) Some other of
the newly confirmed units were formed largely by
infiltrators who entered during the first eight months
of 1964.
6. MACV's confirmed OB holdings are based on
positive unit identification by at least two Viet
Cong prisoners or two captured documents, or a combi-
nation, Five regimental headquarters, 50 battalions
(an increase of eight since a. year ago), 145 separate
companies, and 35 separate platoons are presently
confirmed, Reports of still unconfirmed Viet Cong
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battalions, plus actual contact in combat, indi-:
cate that there may by now be some 20 Viet Cong
battalions in place in addition to the 50 listed
as confirmed. There is tentative evidence of at
least three Viet Cong regimental headquarters in
addition to the five already confirmed. These
include possibly two more in the northern prov-
inces and one south of Saigon, where no regiments
are yet confirmed but where some coordinated op-
erations of two or more battalions have been con-
ducted.
7. There are also indications of steady
recruitment within South Vietnam for Viet Cong
forces at all levels. This recruitment, to-
gether with infiltration, almost certainly off-
sets losses and augments force levels,
Viet Cong Capabilities
8, Since about mid-1963, there has been evi-
dence of a fleshing-out of Viet Cong units. A
Viet Cong battalion now averages 350 to 450 men
with a few in excess of 600. An ARVN battalion
runs about 350 men.
9. Aside from increased weapons captured
from government forces, there is evidence that
a growing number of Viet Cong regular main force
units are being equipped with the new 7.62-mm.
family of automatic and semiautomatic weapons,
which offer significantly increased firepower.
Use of this new bloc equipment suggests Viet Cong
confidence in an outside supply system, since
7.62-mm, ammunition is not available by capture
within South Vietnam. For nearly two years
Viet Cong battalions have been gaining firepower
in terms of mortars and recoilless rifles; mor-
tar fire against a variety of government tar-
gets, including hamlets, is now frequent.
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Effects of Viet Cong Growth
10. The growth in military capabilities of the
Viet Cong is reflected in their activities over the
past year. The number of Viet Cong - initiated in-
cidents in 1964 was about 60 percent higher than in
1963. Emphasis was on terrorist, harassing, and sab-
otage activity; the number of armed attacks dropped,
but there were more coordinated, multiple-battalion
attacks. Erosion of government control in the north-
ern provinces, particularly in the populated coastal
areas, is giving the Viet Cong increased access to
manpower. This Communist encroachment has been ac-
celerating in 1965.
11. Throughout the northern provinces, govern-
ment forces are now clearly on the defensive, and in
several provinces have virtually withdrawn into the
district and provincial capitals, thereby largely
abandoning the countryside to the Communists. A
similar situation has long generally prevailed in
the delta. Viet Cong interdiction of both the north-
south coastal railroad and the main highway, Route 1,
have been increasingly successful in i6olating the
north. Lateral roads in the north running toward
Laos and northern Cambodia have been interdicted or
subject to frequent harassment. Pacification efforts
in many of the northern provinces have been abandoned
in order to concentrate on defenses, and pacification
throughout most of the country is stalled. Even the
Hop Tac area around Saigon is being affected; one
battalion has already been diverted elsewhere and one
regiment is still undergoing command changes in the
aftermath of the latest coup attempt.
12. Viet Cong forces are believed capable of
mounting several widely scattered multiple-battalion
attacks almost simultaneously. It is Viet Cong
doctrine to attack at a time and place of their own
choosing and only with numerical superiority. ARVIN'
forces have the capability to meet most of these
attacks with a force of regimental size, either from
locally available troops or from the general reserve.
Due in part to the practical difficulties of this
type of warfare, ARVN forces often arrive -too late
or in too little force.
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ARVN Capabilities
13. The ARVN general reserve totals 11 marine
and airborne battalions, plus a possible five to
nine infantry battalions in the corps areas. How-
ever, these reserves are almost continually com-
mitted in one area or another. For example, almost
half of the general reserve is at the moment in
Binh Dinh Province, and the remainder in Phuac Tuy
Province. Their withdrawal from one commitment and
deployment to another can be described as "robbing
Peter to pay Paul."
14. Aside from the general reserve, most ARVN
battalions not engaged in pacification activities
are increasingly being committed to security operations
and thus are limited in their offensive commitment
against Viet Cong main force units. Neither the
government's Regional Forces nor Popular Forces
have the capability to relieve the ARVN for full-time
commitment against the Viet Cong regulars. Many of
these paramilitary units are used for static defense,
and others lack the morale or strength to move in and
maintain security in an area that has been cleared or
is being held by the ARVN.
15. The Viet Cong, whether engaged in large-
scale attacks or smaller scale harassment against
government outposts, hamlets, and communications,
generally have the initiative. The ARVN for the most
part is reacting defensively to Viet Cong moves.
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