THE CURRENT STATUS OF PAVN INFILTRATION TO SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010062-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: April 9, 1966
• Content Type: IM

Approved FoleaseR3SEFT79T0080005000`0
9 April 1966
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE CURRENT STATUS OF PAVN
INFILTRATION TO SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
:.ARMY review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current; Intelligence
9 April 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Current Status of PAVN Infiltration
to South Vietnam
The number of PAVN troops in South Vietnam con-
tinues to grow at a significant rate.
The presence o ten
PAVN units of regimental strength along with four
separate battalions, totalling some 18,500 men, has
now been confirmed in South Vietnam. In addition,
there are at least eight to ten other suspect PAVN
units in the South which, if confirmed, could raise
the total number of PAVN to over 30,000. Available
evidence indicates that large-scale infiltration is
continuing as the Communists prepare for their rainy
season offensive.
In addition to infiltrating regular units, Hanoi
has been forced to send in a considerable number of
replacements for Viet Cong and PAVN casualties. Many
of these replacement troops are being assigned to
what had once been purely Viet Cong units as well as
filling out depleted PAVN units. Hanoi is also con-
tinuing to send in cadre personnel destined for po-
litical, economic, and support units of the VC main
force. Estimates of infiltration in 1965 total al-
most 20,000 men, and preliminary estimates for the
first two and a half months of 1966 total more than
3,500.
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Recent Infiltration Developments
1. The year 1965 marked a significant turning
point in. Hanoi's pattern of infiltration.. Apparently
convinced early in 1965 that their goals in. the South
were within reach, the Communists began to commit a
number of regular army units to South Vietnam in. an.
effort to achieve decisive victory over the Saigon.
regime sometime in. 1965. The large US buildup in
South Vietnam has probably frustrated these ambitions.
It became necessary instead for Hanoi to continue to
pump in more units and more men to counter the US in-
volvement. It has not been. confirmed that some 20,000
men infiltrated South Vietnam during 1965--on. the
average of one regiment equivalent a month. This is
almost a 50 percent increase over the confirmed infil-
tration of an.y previous year.
3. It is estimated that some 6,000 troops may
have been. involved in the December 1965-January 1966
infiltration activity.
One o-
these--the 95th "B" Regiment--was confirmed in. South
Vietnam with a strength of 2,000 men. Captured
prisoners from this unit claim that it began its
filtration in late Decem er
an. ar-
rive in South Vietnam in. February 1966. The 95th
"B" regiment participated in. the early March attack
which overran. the A Shau Special Forces camp in Thua
Thieu Province.
4. A second 325th regimen.t, 18 "B", has also
been. reported in South Vietnam. A North Vietnamese
soldier captured
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I
I
is
uni a
so
e Nortft Vietnam
in
a e ecem er
and
arrived
in
Pleiku in March.
The
18 "B" regi-
ment
is not
yet
confirmed by MACV
but
probably will
be shortly as additional information. comes in.
7. In addition. to the units associated with the
325th, there are numerous indications from prisoners,
defectors and captured documents, of the presence of
at least eight other PAVN regiments in. South Vietnam.
These include the 141st, 6th, 19th, and 108th Regi-
ments plus a number of unidentified regiments. Two
such unidentified units have been. reported infiltrating
western. Quang Tri Province in I Corps in the past two
weeks.
8. Because of the scarcity of information. on.
these reported units they have not yet been. accepted
in. the order of battle. The weight of evidence and
past experience, however, suggests that the presence
of some of these units will eventually be confirmed.
The North Vietnamese Capability to Sustain or
Step-up Infiltration
9. Despite the infiltration. of substantial num-
bers of cadre and regular units from the North Viet-
namese Army in.to South Vietnam during the past few
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years, there is little doubt that the North Vietnamese
Army has been taking in new recruits at a rate that
adequately fills the gaps caused by infiltration as
well as those created by attrition and retirement.
DRV public statements together with reports 25X1
indicate that a large-scale mobiliza-
tion of manpower has been. underway in the DRV during
the past year. Most of the 4 million draft-age males
in. the DRV are now believed to be enrolled in the regu-
lar armed forces, some paramilitary organization., or
labor repair and maintenance battalions.
10. It is probable that Hanoi will con.tin.ue, at
least through 1966, to draw both on these mobilized
personnel, and on. regular North Vietnamese Army units
for the manpower to make up infiltration units. In.
addition, approximately 175,000 males reach draft age
each year in North Vietnam, and of these, slightly
over 100,000 will be physically fit for military duty.
From a manpower standpoint the North Vietnamese should
have no difficulty sustaining the 20,000-man pace of
covert infiltration into South Vietnam which was main-
tained during the past year, an.d at the same time pro-
vide an increase of as much as 200,000 in the strength
of PAVN forces remain.in.g in North Vietnam.
11. From a training standpoint Hanoi should also
have no difficulty in sustaining the infiltration rate
of 1965. The North Vietnamese have been. utilizing a
number of their organic regular army regiments (in
addition to the 325th Division.) to provide the train.-
in.g facilities and staff for in.filtrees during 1965.
Given the currently estimated strength of the North
Vietnamese Army, it is conceivable that the PAVN
could train. Up to 40 regiments for infiltration per
year. This would be on the order of 60,000 men.
Training Prior to Infiltration.
12. The amount and quality of training received
by prospective infiltrators in. North Vietnam prior
to departure for the South varies widely. For ex-
ample, a recent study of 125 North Vietnamese soldiers
captured in. 1965 indicates that the amount of train-
ing varied from none at all for two prisoners up to
two months for on.e battalion.. For the most part,
however, draftees generally receive a minimum amount
of train.in.g. Cadre personnel--who form the leader-
ship of infiltrated units--generally undergo a rigorous
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selection, and training procedure. Almost all of the
captured leadership-cadre in the study group (in.-
cluding a large number recalled into the army from
civilian life) were products of efficient training
schools in North Vietnam. Many battalion-level cadre
sent south are combat veterans of the French-In.do-
chinese conflict. The quality of cadre personnel
probably accounts, in large measure, for relatively
good military showing made by PAVN units in the South.
13. Nevertheless, many of the prisoners in. the
study group described their training as inadequate.
All but 13 of the soldiers were draftees. Over one
half had less than one year of military experience,
and a third had been in the army less than. six
months.
Utilization. Of PAVN Personnel in South Vietnam
14. In the last few months North and South Viet-
namese personnel are being increasingly integrated
into mixed units. One South Vietnamese captive
stated that he was one of 40 South Vietnamese re-
placements in the 500th Transportation. Battalion. Of
the Sao Yan-aa or 0th Division.. A North Vietnamese
prisoner
stated that at least two battalions o is
unit were 50 percent North Vietnamese and 50 per-
cent South Vietnamese. Other reports have sug-
gested that North Vietnamese replacements have been
assigned to Viet Cong units such as the 271st Regi-
ment and the 804th Battalion..
15. The assignment of replacements based solely
upon their availability an.d without regard for unit
integrity is probably a reflection of the increased
number of casualties inflicted on. Communist forces
in the last year. The replacement problem also
points up Viet Con.g difficulties in recruiting man-
power in South Vietnam and the necessity for North
Vietnam to fill the gap caused by moun.tin.g combat
losses.
16. There is no hard evidence available to indi-
cate that the mixing of North and South Vietnamese
personnel is causing any serious morale problems.
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VC/PAVN Military Organization, in South Vietnam
17. The Communist main force military strength
now totals almost 80,000 personnel in twenty-three
confirmed regiments (13 Viet Cong and 10 PAVN) and
a number of independent battalions. For many years,
the largest operatin. Communist force in South Viet-
nam was a regiment.
18. With the expansion. Of main force fighting
strength, the Communist command apparatus under-
went a further evolution into a number of division
level units as well as territorial commands.
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19. It has been estimated that the North Viet-
namese could maintain. an average infiltration, rate
to South Vietnam throughout 1966 of approximately
4,500 men (three 1500-man regiments) per. month.
During 1965, however, it appears that, on the
average, only one 1500-man. regiment infiltrated
per month.
20. It is now estimated that the Communists
can., if they so desire, infiltrate more than. 4,500
men. per month. Such a rate is also within the ca-
pacity of DRV manpower resources, at least in. the
foreseeable future. The evidence on recruitmen.t of
men. in.to the DRV armed forces suggests that Hanoi
has en.coun.tered little difficulty in. replacing those
personnel sent south. In. fact, it appears that there
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has been a substantial augmentation in, the over-all
strength of the DRV Army through stepped-up con-
scription..
21. The growing Communist military main force
with its improved command structure, coupled with
the increased infiltration. effort through Laos pro-
vides the basis for an. increase in. Communist mili-
tary action. in the future. The increasingly so-
phisticated organizational development of division
level un.its with as many as five regiments may also
presage a step up to more conventional warfare tac-
tics by the Communist forces.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
11 April 1966
The Current Status of PAVN Infiltration:
to South Vietnam
The penultimate sentence of paragraph 1, page 2,
of the above-cited memorandum which you hold should
read, "It has now been confirmed that some 20,000
men infiltrated South Vietnam during 1965--on the
average of one regiment equivalent a month."
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