COMPLETED PRB REVIEW - STANSFIELD TURNER, HOORAY FOR LEAK CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300070019-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: MEMO

A~pp~'ove~-For-Release 2007/0-5/0
CIA=RDP80M009?~ROOfl3QQ0~t~@'~9-Oj"--~-- "
15 January 1982
PRB Legal Advisor
THROUGH: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Lavon B. Strong
Chairman, Publications Review Board
SUBJECT: Completed PRB Review - Stansfield Turner,~Hooray for Leak
Control (548-82)
1. The PRB has completed without security objection its review
of the above manuscript.
2. Upon DDCI concurrence, please notify Admiral Turner of the
Board's decision. He has requested a response today.
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
~avon B. Strong
. ~a~ ~~~~
STAT
STAT
 ip`roved-~or~eTease ~~~~`T~6~It~$" ~f?~=R-6P~S~Nf~3'QJ~I`4~003'OUQ7D~0'"~`~=~,"~~'
M1=.M~ from Stansfield Turner
 "Approved For Release 2007/05108: CIA=RDF83M00914R000300070019-6
Hooray for Leak Control
The President has established new controls to
curtail teaks of classified governmHnt information.
The various media are not providing the public a
blaanced response to this commendable effort. They
are telling us; that inhibitions on public servants
will result irr a less well informed media and hence
a less well informed public; that no~such system of
controls has ever worked anyway; and that the govern-
ment will continue to leak when it wants to for its
'own advantages. What is missing is a discussion
of the damage that is done through unauthorized leaks.
First there is the endangering of our sources
of intellignece information. She may spend billions
d8 dollars on a new technical system for collect-
ing data and then give away the secret for counter-
ing it. Sde may endanger the life afa foreign agent
i
who is taking risks at our request `and on our behalf.
Perhaps. even more importantly, by lessening confi-
dente in our ability to protect our agents, we re-
duce the probability that we will be able to re-
cruit the. agents today whom we#11 need five to ten
years from now.
Second, we do direct damage to our foreign
policy and our military readiness by tipping our hand
 Approved For Release 2007105108: CIA-RDP83M00914R000300070019-6
or describing our capabilities. Perhaps the most
significant element here is that we are often denied
opportunities just because the risk of a Leak is so
high. In my opinion, one of the key reasons that the
hostage rescue raid into Iran did not succeed was the
perceived necessity for extreme measures to prevent
leaks during the planning process. And even at that,
the fact that an action of some sort was underway .
with respect to the hostages was beginning to be
perceived by newsmen by the. time the raid too place.
Leaks of securit3Y informations are, in my
view, the sinble most serious handicap to our ~or-
eign policy internal to our government, Gertailln++ly,
leaks are the greatest problem our intelligence ag-
ericies face. N:ost presidents have had to ,face this
issue. -Some m~de valiant attempts toy control leaks,
n ,-
r? He deserves a trial period to demonstrate
that his new controls will not be abused by over class-
ification or by selective leaks.
certainly neither doomed to failure nor is it~' ~
__----
One reason that it is worth giving the
President`s plan a try is that the dangers of controls
are being grossly exaggerated. ?dhat do leaks accom-
plish for our country? They often simply advance the
time at f?hich the public will be informed and in so
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-3-
doing pre-empt or destroy a foreign policy, initiative.
Or they releaJSe~ some detail of classified data that
is well beyond the interest or comprehension of the.
general public. For instance,. when our hostages were
.being held in Iran there were particular threats ag-
ainst those whom the Iranians identified as having
been with the GIA. Two ma3ore newspapears published
detailed descriptions about how to identify a GI9
person from other embassy employees based on records
.which the Iranian captors held. I wrote to the ed-
itors and complained ghat the American public may.
-hardly ,neede.d the specifics in this instance and
that ~~ lives might be at stake. ~'^ 1- - ?~~r
~g~~"~' Both editors responded that it was their
duty to publish such information despite its irrel-
evance to informing our public.
The principal argument for not discouraging
the illegal practice of .leaking is that someone will.'
uncover another Watergate by this means. That is a
risk, but would a set of contrgls such as the President
has established dissuade either a ;r'oodward and Bern-
stein team or a Deep Throat from doing what they each ~
did?
.Woodward and Bernstein provided a valuable
public service, Hut the popularity of investigative
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reporting and of whistle blowing has risen too far.
There is little :,~~.. question that the public
interest today lies on the side of curbing the ea-
cesses of un~uthgrized leaks to which we have sub-
jected ourselves. Let's give the Presideant's plan-a
fair trial and ~r wish hieti luck.
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