REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000800130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 15, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
FORT MCNAIR, WASHINGTON, D.C.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER HALL
15 DECEMBER 1982
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ABOUT 100 YEARS AFTER THIS COUNTRY OF OURS DECLARED ITS
INDEPENDENCE, THE BODY OF GENERAL GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER WAS
FOUND IN JULY 1876, BY A THEN LITTLE KNOWN STREAM CALLED LITTLE
BIGHORN. CUSTER WAS QUITE DEAD--THE RESULT OF POOR
INTELLIGFNCE, POOR JUDGMENT AND HIS OWN ARROGANCE. A HUNDRED
ODD YEARS LATER, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO PROVIDE POOR INTELLIGENCE
OR POOR JUDGMENT TO THE PRESIDENT, AND WE CERTAINLY HAVE NO
BASIS FOR ARROGANCE. THERE IS A WIDE ARRAY OF THINGS WE
NEED TO KEEP CLOSE TABS ON THAT REQUIRES HIGH VIGILANCE
AND INCREASED RESOURCES.
THE SOVIET UNION IS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S
NUMBER ONE PRIORITY; AND HIGH ON EVERYONE'S INTFPEST LIST IS
THE RECENT LEADERSHIP CHANGES. THE ABSENCE OF AN ORGANIZED
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PROCEDURE FOR SUCCESSION MAKES EVALUATION OF POWER SHIFTS AN
THIS IS ONLY THE FOURTH TIME IN 65 YEARS OF HISTORY
THAT SUPREME POWER HAS PASSED FROM ONE LEADER TO ANOTHER.
THE SPEED WITH WHICH YURI ANDROPOV ASSUMED POWER SUGGESTS HE
HAS A POWERFUL COALITION BEHIND HIM. HIS RISE WAS BACKED BY
TWO OF THE MOST REPRESSIVE STATE BUREAUCRACIES--THE SECRET
POLICE AND THE MILITARY. NO LEADER IS CURRENTLY IN A POSITION
TO MOUNT A CHALLENGE TO HIM AS PARTY LEADER AND HE HAS MOVED
RAPIDLY TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF AS CHIEF SPOKESMAN ON FOREIGN
SEIR _.T
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AFFAIRS. PARTY SECRETARY KIRILENKO'S REMOVAL ELIMINATES A
MAJOR RIVAL. ANOTHER RIVAL WAS MOVED ASIDE WITH CHERNENKO'S
SELECTION AS CHAIRMAN OF ONE OF THE TWO FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMISSIONS. Two OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL FIGURES ON THE
POLITBURO, DEFENSE MINISTER HSTINOV AND FOREIGN MINISTER
GROMYKO ARE CLOSE ASSOCIATES.
WE DON'T KNOW WITH MUCH CONFIDENCE WHAT TO EXPECT FROM
ANDROPOV. HE GAVE SOME HINTS STRESSING ARMS CONTROL,
U.S. CONCESSIONS ON START AND INF, ANTI-CORRUPTION, AND
HOLDING THE CURRENT ECONOMIC PLAN.
WHAT ANDROPOV CAN DO TO CHANGE THINGS IS ANOTHER
QUESTION; AND IT DEPENDS ON HIS ABILITY TO KEEP INTACT THE
COALITION THAT PUT HIM IN POWER. HE OWES POLITICAL DEBTS TO
ALLIES SUCH AS GROMYKO AND USTINOV. THESE ARE LEADERS OF
INDEPENDENT STATURE WHO WILL DEMAND A SHARE OF POWER. THE
POLITBURO AS A WHOLE CAN AND PROBABLY WILL REQUIRE THAT NO
MAJOR DECISION.BE MADE WITHOUT ITS APPROVAL.
GUNS VERSUS BUTTER ISSUE IS AN INCREASINGLY CONTENTIOUS
ISSUE WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE ECONOMIC TASKS ARE
FORMIDABLE. SOVIET AGRICULTURE HAS SUFFERED FOUR SUCCESSIVE
CROP FAILURES AND THERE IS A GROWING SENSE OF MALAISE OVER
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THE QUALITY OF LIFE. SOVIET SOCIETY SUFFERS FROM DECLINING
HEALTH. IT IS THE ONLY INDUSTRIALIZED NATION WHERE THE LIFE
EXPECTANCY FOR MEN IS ACTUALLY DECLINING. ALCOHOL ADDICTION
AND CORRUPTION ARE RAMPANT. AT BEST, THE SOVIET ECONOMY WILL
ONLY GROW FROM 1 TO 1.5 PERCENT PER YEAR FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL
YEARS.
TO RELIGHT THE ECONOMY, SOME ARGUE FOR MORE ATTENTION
TO THE CONSUMER SECTOR; OTHERS FOR THE INCREASED INVESTMENT
IN HEAVY INDUSTRY. ANDROPOV'S CLOSEST TIES HAVE BEEN TO
ADVOCATES OF THE LATTER COURSE.
WHILE THERE IS A PROPENSITY FOR A NEW SOVIET LEADER
TO ADDRESS CONSUMER PRODUCT SHORTAGES WHEN HE FIRST TAKES
COMMAND, OVER THE LONG RUN, ANDROPOV WILL PROBABLY FIND IT
POLITICALLY NECESSARY TO PLACE A HIGH PRIORITY ON SATISFYING
THE MILITARY. SOVIET CENTRALIZED PLANNING VIRTUALLY
GUARANTEES A STEADY FLOW OF RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY AND IT
WILL BE HARD TO INTERRUPT. CHIEFS OF CIVILIAN MINISTRIES FIND
IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT POLITICALLY DANGEROUS TO
CHALLENGE THE MILITARY'S PRIORITY. FEW OFFICIALS ARE PRIVY TO
THE DETAILS OF DEFENSE PLANS AND BUDGETS, THEREBY PREVENTING
A THOROUGH SCRUTINY OF PROGRAMS OR OPEN DEBATE ON PRIORITIES.
KEY MILITARY DECISIONMAKERS HAVE LONG TENURES. MINISTER OF
DEFENSE USTINOV BECAME A DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL MANAGER IN THE
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1930'S AND IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF ANDROPOV. USTINOV IS
PROBABLY THE MOST POWERFUL FIGURE IN THE NEW LEADERSHIP
BEHIND ANDROPOV.
THE UNRELENTING BUILDUP OF SOVIET FORCES SINCE THE
EARLY 1960S HAS BEEN FED AND SUSTAINED BY A GROWING DEFENSE
INDUSTRY. THE SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL BASE NOW INCLUDES
SOME 200 MAJOR WEAPON R&D FACILITIES AND 100 FINAL ASSEMBLY
PLANTS AS WELL AS THOUSANDS OF DEFENSE-RELATED R&D AND
COMPONENT OR SUPPORT FACILITIES.
NOR HAVE WE SEEN ANY EVIDENCE OF A REDUCTION IN SOVIET
DEFENSE SPENDING DESPITE DECLINING ECONOMIC GROWTH. ON
THE BASIS OF OBSERVED MILITARY ACTIVITY WE EXPECT DEFENSE
SPENDING TO GROW THROUGH 1985 BUT THE RATE OF GROWTH IS
UNCERTAIN GIVEN THE PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.
WE HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME 130 NEW OR SUBSTANTIALLY
MODIFIED WEAPON SYSTEMS UNDER DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD BE
DEPLOYED IN THE 19805 AND 1990s. THESE INCLUDE STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SUCH AS:
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0 A SMALL MOBILE ICBM AND AN MX-SIZED SOLID PROPELLANT ICBM
0 IMPROVED SLRMS
0 A NEW LONG-RANGE BOMBER AND LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES
DEPLOYABLE ON SUBMARINES, GROUND-BASED MOBILE
LAUNCHERS, OR POSSIBLY AIRCRAFT
0 NEW LOW-ALTITUDE FIGHTERS
0 MORE SA-10 SAMS
0 AND AN AWACS AIRCRAFT
THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO INTENSELY INTERESTED IN DIRECTED-
ENERGY WEAPONS AND IMPROVED SPACE SYSTEMS SUCH AS A REUSABLE
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM SIMILAR TO THE U.S. SHUTTLE AND
REUSABLE SPACE PLANES FOR A VARIETY OF MILITARY MISSIONS.
WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS WILL LAUNCH A SATELLITE WITH IMPRCVED
LAUNCH DETECTION
AND AT LEAST 5 NEW COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES. BY THE END OF
THE DECADE, THEY WILL HAVE ESTABLISHED A PERMANENT, MANNED
PRESENCE IN SPACE WITH FULLY OPERATIONAL, LARGE SPACE STATIONS
DESIGNED FOR A BROAD RANGE OF MILITARY AND SCIENTIFIC MISSIONS.
IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WE FORESEE THE WARSAW PACT
CONCENTRATING MORE ON OUALITATIVE THAN QUANTITATIVE
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IMPROVEMENTS IN THE 1980s. ADVANCES WILL BE MADE THROUGH
MORE HARD-HITTING WEAPONS AND IMPROVED COMMAND AND CONTROL.
BECAUSE SOVIET DOCTRINE EMPHASIZES THE OFFENSIVE, THE TANK
REMAINS THEIR CENTERPIECE WEAPON. A NEW TANK--A FOLLOW ON
TO THE T-80--IS EXPECTED, INCORPORATING NEW CONCEPTS IN
ARMOR PROTECTION. ALSO DUE TO BE INTRODUCED IN THE 1980S
ARE TWO NEW AIR-TO-AIR FIGHTERS, A FIGHTER BOMBER, SEVERAL
ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILES--SOME WITH LASER GUIDANCE SYSTEMS--
FROM MOSCOW'S VIEWPOINT NOWHERE ARE THE STAKES HIGHER
THAN IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER; BUT THEY DO FACE SERIOUS
PROBLEMS, A DECLINING BIRTH RATE AND A GROWING PROPORTION OF
POLITICALLY UNRELIABLE NON-SLAVIC CONSCRIPTS. RECENT EVENTS
IN POLAND RAISE THE UNCOMFORTABLE QUESTION OF THE RELIABILITY
OF FAST EUROPEAN COHORTS.
THE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION IS, HOWEVER, MUCH
BROADER THAN THE DIRECT MILITARY THREAT. THE SOVIETS
VIEW THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AS A TOTAL, ENCOMPASSING
STRUGGLE INVOLVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS
WHICH THEY CALL "THE CORRELATION OF FORCES." IN THE LAST
SEVEN YEARS, THE SOVIETS HAVE USED A MIX OF TACTICS--
POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, SUBVERSION, TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY--
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TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE AND DESTABLIZE GOVERNMENTS, IT
IS A NO-LOSE PROPOSITION BECAUSE THEY CAN STAY HALF-HIDDEN
IN THE BACKGROUND. EXPLOITING THIRD WORLD SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC DISCONTENTS GIVES THE SOVIETS A WEDGE INTO A
COUNTRY, A BASE TO FEED THE MALAISE THAT FOSTERS INSURGENCIES.
THE SOVIETS WORK IN CONCERT WITH CUBA, AND TO SOME EXTENT
FAST GERMANY, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, ANGOLA, SOUTH YEMEN, ETHIOPIA
AND NICARAGUA.
WHILE CUBA MIGHT NOT CONSIDER ITSELF A SOVIET SURROGATE,
MOSCOW MOST ASSUREDLY DOES. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID ALONE
TO CUBA EXCEEDS $3 BILLION A YEAR IN ADDITION TO SUBSTANTIAL
MILITARY AID. ALL TOLD WE ESTIMATE THE SOVIETS PROVIDE
CUBA IN EXCESS OF $1 PER DAY FOR EVERY MAN, WOMAN, AND
CHILD, OR SOME $10 MILLION PER DAY. THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS
AID PROGRAM VIRTUALLY ENSURES CASTRO'S SUPPORT TO MOSCOW-
BACKED INSURGENCIES.
IN GENERAL, SOVIET ARM DELIVERIES.TO THE THIRD WORLD
HAVE STEADILY INCREASED WITH AN 80 PERCENT RISE IN RUBLE
PRICES AND HAVE BECOME AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF HARD CURRENCY
FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY.
EACH OF THE 11 NATIONS FACED WITH INSURGENCIES IN THE
WORLD TODAY HAPPENS TO BE CLOSE TO THE NATURAL RESOURCES OR
TO THE SEA LANES ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
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MUST DEPEND TO SUSTAIN THEIR ECONOMIC LIFE. CENTRAL AMERICA
HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY FERTILE GROUND. THE SANDINISTAS'
SUCCESS IN NICARAGUA--WITH HELP FROM CUBA--PROVIDED THE
SOVIETS A FOOTHOLD TO EXPAND THEIR LINKS WITH LEFTISTS IN
FL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS.
THE SOVIETS' BASIC AIM IS TO UNDERMINE U.S. INFLUENCE.
MOSCOW ANTICIPATES THAT REVOLUTIONARY FERMENT IN AMERICA'S
OWN BACKYARD WILL DIVERT OUR. ATTENTION AND RESOURCES FROM
MORE DISTANT PROBLEMS, SOW DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
ITS ALLIES, AND UNDERCUT WASHINGTON'S CREDIBILITY IN THE
THIRD WORLD.
ANOTHER THREAT IS THE ABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION, LARGELY
THROUGH ITS INTELLIGENCE ARM, THE KGR, TO INSIDIOUSLY INSERT
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ITS POLICY VIEWS INTO THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN THE UNITES STATES
AND OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THE KGR IS ADEPT AT DOING THIS
IN A WAY THAT HIDES THE SOVIET HAND AS THE INSTIGATOR. WE
SEE SOVIET AUTHORED OR INSPIRED ARTICLES SURREPTITIOUSLY
PLACED IN THE PRESS AROUND THE WORLD, FORGED DOCUMENTS
DISTRIBUTED, MANIPULATION OF INDIGENOUS FOREIGN COMMUNIST
PARTIES, INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL COMMUNIST-FRONT ORGANIZATIONS,
AND CLANDESTINE RADIO OPERATIONS, ALL EMPLOYED AGGRESSIVELY
TO ERODE TRUST IN THE UNITED STATES AS THE LEADER OF THE FREE
WORLD.
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THESE SOVIET GOALS CAN RE THWARTED; RUT IT TAKES CONCERTED,
SUSTAINED U.S. ACTION. FL SALVADOR OFFERS THE BEST EXAMPLE.
THE TURNABOUT IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS WAS IN LARGE MEASURE
DUE TO OUR QUICK ACTION TO ASSIST THE FL SALVADORANS
ITHE RESULT WAS THAT THE
WORLD'S TELEVISION AUDIENCE SAW FOR THE FIRST TIME THE VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR OF THE GUERRILLAS CONTRASTED BY THE LONG LINES OF
FL SALVADORAN CITIZENS WAITING PATIENTLY FOR LONG HOURS IN
THE HOT SUN FOR THEIR CHANCE TO VOTE.
To COMBAT FALSE PROPGANDA, OUR INTELLIGENCE CAN IDENTIFY
THE FORGERIES AND DISTORTIONS. PUT TO EXPOSE AND REBUT THEM,
THE PRIVATE SECTOR OF THE FREE WORLD WILL HAVE TO TACKLE MUCH
OF THE LOAD. THIS IS A CHALLENGE FOR EVERYONE WHO BELIEVES
IN THE VALUE OF A FREE, OPEN SOCIETY.
I WOULD LIKE TO TURN NOW TO THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE U.S.'S INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING CAPABILITY WAS DRAWN DOWN IN THE L970S WITH A
40 PERCENT CIIT IN FUNDS AND A 50 PERCENT SLASH IN PERSONNEL.
OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS WE HAVE BEEN REBUILDING OUR
RESOURCES. WE HAVE STARTED ON A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN
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THE NUMBER OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTORS AND HAVE
HIRED MORE ANALYSTS TO ADDRESS AREAS OF NEW INTEREST--THE
THIRD WORLD, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
AND GLOBAL RESOURCES. WE HAVE CREATED NEW ANALYTICAL
CENTERS DEALING WITH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INSURGENCY AND
POLITICAL INSTABILITY, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THESE
CENTERS FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,
AND MILITARY ANALYSIS ON RAPIDLY EVOLVING ISSUES. THE MONSTER
KNOWN AS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS BECOME A GROWTH INDUSTRY.
TERRORISTS, MOREOVER, HAVE MADE AMERICAN FACILITIES THEIR
MOST FAVORED TARGETS. WE WERE THE TARGETS OF ROUGHLY
ONE-THIRD OF ALL INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS DURING
THE PAST 10 YEARS. ALMOST 200 AMERICANS HAVE BEEN KILLED
BY SUCH ATTACKS SINCE 1968. WHILE ONE-HALF OF THESE WERE
VICTIMS OF INDISCRIMINATE ACTS, THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS
SINGLED OUT FOR ASSASSINATION INCREASED STEADILY DURING
THE 1970s.
To COUNTER THE TERRORISTS, WE WORK WITH THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES OF FRIENDLY NATIONS. TOGETHER WE ARE DEVELOPING A
NETWORK TO TRACK TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES AND
TRAIN LOCAL OUICK REACTION FORCES TO CARRY THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD.
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OUR CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INSURGENCY AND INSTABILITY
SEEKS TO PROVIDE ADVANCE WARNING OF INSTABILITY AND POTENTIAL
FOR DESTABILIZATION IN ORDER TO PROTECT US FROM BEING CAUGHT
BY SURPRISE AS WE WERE IN IRAN. THE SMALL AND WEAK COUNTRIES
IN WHICH INSURGENCIES CAN BE FOSTERED AND DEVELOPED DO NOT NEED
AND CANNOT HANDLE EXPENSIVE AND SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS FOR WHICH
VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEM CLAMOR. WHAT THEY NEED IS LIGHT ARMS TO
DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST EXTERNALLY TRAINED AND SUPPORTED
GUERRILLAS, GOOD INTELLIGENCE, GOOD POLICE METHODS, GOOD
COMMUNICATIONS, AND MOBILITY TO KEEP UP WITH THE HIT-AND-RUN
TACTICS OF GUERRILLA FORCES.
I GOVERNMENTS FACING CIVIL WAR CANNOT ACHIEVE ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL PROGRESS UNTIL THEY ARE ABLE TO CONTROL INTERNAL
DISRUPTION.
LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REMAIN AN IMPORTANT
CONCERN OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. LEAKS HAVE REACHED EPIDEMIC
PROPORTIONS--MORE THAN 250 WERE REPORTED AND INVESTIGATED
IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN 1981. THE COMMUNITY
SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD TO BACK DOWN FROM THIS PROBLEM. IT
AFFECTS OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT CERTAIN ASSETS OVERSEAS;
LOWERS MORALE OF OUR PERSONNEL. LEAKS CAUSE US A LOSS IN
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS; HARMS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.
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THE DIFFICULTIES IN CONTAINING LEAKS ARE APPARENT.
DESPITE THIS ADMINISTRATION'S STRONG EFFORTS ON CONTAINMENT,
CONFUSION STILL PERSISTS IN EQUATING THE WHISTLEBLOWER WITH
THE LEAKER. WHILE THE WHISTLEBLOWER CAN SERVE JUSTICE, THE
LEAKER SERVES ONLY HIMSELF AND HIS PERSONAL INTERESTS.
MOREOVER, EXISTING ESPIONAGE LAWS DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES
TO LEGAL SANCTIONS. LEGAL ACTION IS OFTENTIMES PERCEIVED
AS OVERKILL; PROSECUTION CAN OFTEN INVOLVE THE POTENTIAL FOR
DISCLOSURE OF FURTHER CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
WE ARE LOOKING INTO NEW LEGISLATION FOCUSED EXPLICITLY ON
CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION AS WELL AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT-WIDE
POLICY AND REGULATIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT APPLICATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST LEAKERS, INCLUDING TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT IF WARRANTED. PASSAGE THIS YEAR OF THE
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT IS EVIDENCE OF THIS
ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO STOPPING DAMAGING DISCLOSURES
AND EVIDENCE THAT CONGRESS UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR
EFFORTS.
WE ARE ALSO LOOKING INTO SECURITY INDOCTRINATION OF
ALL EMPLOYEES INCLUDING APPOINTED OFFICIALS AND ARE IN THE
PROCESS OF GAINING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND JOINT ACTION
ON PURSUING LEAK INVESTIGATIONS WITH GREATER VIGOR AND
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PREPUBLICATION REVIEW PROCESS FOR ALL CURRENT AND FORMER
EMPLOYEES. SENIOR OFFICIALS ACROSS ALL AGENCY DIRECTORATES
THOROUGHLY SCRUTINIZE MANUSCRIPTS, FICTION AND NON-FICTION,
TO ENSURE NO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS DISCLOSED. AS MEMBERS
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY, YOU ARE ONLY TOO AWARE OF
HOW THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF UNRELATED LEAKS CAN GIVE OUR
ADVERSARIES AN EDGE IN MILITARY STRATEGY, EVEN ENDANGER THE
LIVES OF OUR DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY OFFICIALS STATIONED
ABROAD. I WANT TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE I PLACE ON SECURITY
FOR THE CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS AA WHOLE AND
ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE GOING TO ALLOCATE WHATEVER RESOURCES
WE NEED TO BRING IT UNDER CONTROL.
STILL ANOTHER CONTINUING, HIGHLY DAMAGING THREAT CAN
ONLY BE CALLED A HEMORRHAGE. ONLY RECENTLY HAVE WE
ESTABLISHED THE DEGREE TO WHICH ACCURACY, THE PRECISION,
AND THE POWER OF SOVIET WEAPONS, WHICH WE ARE REQUIRED NOW
TO COUNTER WITH BUDGET-BUSTING APPROPRIATIONS, ARE BASED
ON WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO A FAR GREATER EXTENT THAN WE EVER
DREAMED.
SOVIET DEFENSE PLANTS ROUTINELY USE WESTERN R&D
APPROACHES, AND OUR BLUEPRINTS--OBTAINED LEGALLY AND
ILLEGALLY--TO SHORTEN WEAPON LEADTIMES. FOR PROJECTS IN
THE EARLIEST STAGES OF R&D, OUR STOLEN OR PURCHASED TECHNOLOGY
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CAN SHORTEN LEADTIMES OF MORE THAN A DECADE NEEDED TO FIELD A
NEW WEAPON BY TWO TO FIVE YEARS. SOVIET LEGAL AND CLANDESTINE
EFFORTS TO OBTAIN OUR TECHNOLOGY HAVE BECOME LARGER, MORE
SOPHISTICATED, AND BETTER MANAGED. SOVIET POLITICAL AND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS, THE KGB AND THE GRU,
HAVE FOR YEARS BEEN TRAINING YOUNG SCIENTISTS TO TARGET AND
ROAM THE WORLD TO ACQUIRE TECHNOLOGY FOR THEIR MILITARY
ARSENAL. THE ACQUISITION EFFORT IS LIKELY TO INCREASE DURING
THE 19POS AND TO FOCUS HEAVILY ON MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES.
FUTURE SOVIET MILITARY NEEDS ALSO DICTATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR
ADVANCE COMPONENT AND SUBSYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES.
THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN MICROELECTRONICS IS ONE OF
THE MOST STRIKING EXAMPLES OF HOW THE SOVIETS HAVE RESORTED
TO ESPIONAGE, BRIBERY, COVERT OR OPEN PURCHASES TO FUEL THEIR
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL BASE. OVER THE PAST DECADE, THE ABILITY
TO MAKE HIGH-QUALITY MICROELECTRONIC COMPONENTS HAS BECOME
INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT FOR MISSILES AND PRECISION-GUIDED
MUNITIONS, AS WELL AS MODERN AIRBORNE RADAR, FIRE-CONTROL,
AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, HAVE
LAGGED IN THE REQUIRED MANUFACTURING AND FABRICATION
TECHNOLOGIES. THEIR SOLIJTION--TO ACQUIRE WESTERN MICRO-
ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY VALUED AT HUNDREDS OF
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS. MUCH OF THIS WAS CLANDESTINELY OBTAINED.
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THE DAMAGE TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY BECOMES ALL TOO
OBVIOUS AS WE FACT THE NEED TO SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
TO DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST NEW SOVIET WEAPONS. OBVIOUSLY,
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS GOING TO HAVE TO DEVOTE THE
NECESSARY RESOURCES TO TRACK THESE SOVIET EFFORTS, AND WE
HAVE ALREADY BEGUN. THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS PROBLEM IS SUCH
THAT ALL CONCERNED AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT--THE FBI,
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, AND STATE WILL HAVE TO REDOUBLE THEIR
EFFORTS AND CLOSELY COORDINATE ACTIVITIES. To COMBAT THE LOSS
OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY TO OUR ADVERSARIES, WE'VE ESTABLISHED
AT THE CIA A TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CENTER TO PROVIDE AMMUNITION
TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND TO SENSITIZE OUR SCIENTISTS,
ENGINEERS, AND BUSINESSMEN TO THE TECHNOLOGY PICKPOCKETS,
THE DUMMY CUSTOMERS AND THE FORGED PAPERS USED TO FUNNEL
SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT BEHIND THE IRON
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CURTAIN.
THE 50 PERCENT DRAWDOWN IN FUNDING AND 40 PERCENT DRAWDOWN
IN PERSONNEL DURING THE SEVENTIES SHOWED UP MOST VIVIDLY IN THE
NATIONAL ESTIMATES WHICH DWINDLED FROM AN ANNUAL AVERAGE OF
51 IN THE LATE 60'S, DOWN TO 33 IN THE EARLY 70'S AND ALL THE
WAY DOWN TO AN ANNUAL AVERAGE OF 12 IN THE 6 YEARS FROM 1975
THROUGH 1980. DURING 1981 WE DID 38 NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND WE
WILL DO 60 OR MORE DURING 1982.
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THE REAL VALUE. OF THIS SHARPLY INCREASED NUMBER OF
ESTIMATES TURNS ON THEIR TIMELINESS, RELEVANCE AND QUALITY.
MOST OF YOU KNOW THAT WE HAVE INSTITUTED A NEW FAST
TRACK SYSTEM THAT CAN PRODUCE NATIONAL ESTIMATES ON ISSUES
COMING UP FOR POLICY DECISION VERY QUICKLY. PERHAPS MORE
IMPORTANT, WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO ASSURE STANDARDS OF
INTEGRITY AND OBJECTIVITY, ACCURACY AND INDEPENDENCE, AS
WELL AS RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS TO THE NATIONAL ESTIMATE
PROCESS. THE CHIEFS OF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--fIA, NSA, STATE INR, ARMY, NAVY,
AIR FORCE, MARINE CORPS, TREASURY, FBI, ENERGY--SIT ON THE
NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND FUNCTION AS A BOARD
OF ESTIMATES. EACH CHIEF AT THE TABLE IS CHARGED WITH SEEING
THAT THE INFORMATION AND THE JUDGMENTS COMING OUT OF HIS
ORGANI7ATION ARE REFLECTED IN THE ESTIMATE. I'M RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ESTIMATE BUT I CHARGE MYSELF TO SEE THAT ALL
SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIATED JUDGMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY
ARE REFLECTED SO THAT IN POLICY FORMULATION AND DECISION-
MAKING THE FULL RANGE OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS IN THE
COMMUNITY IS ON THE TABLE. I BELIEVE THIS PROCESS HAS DONE
A GREAT DEAL TO DEVELOP A NEW SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE
COLLABORATION AMONG THE COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
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THE STRENGTHENING AND EXTENSION OF OUR CAPABILITIES
IS BEING ENCOURAGED AND STRONGLY SUPPORTED. WE HAVE A
COMPLETED'COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES
WE SEE FOR THE REST OF THE DECADE, THE ADEQUACY OF OUR
CURRENT COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES TO MEET THEM
AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO OVERCOME THE INADEQUACIES. WE HAVE
RECENTLY COMPLETED A SIMILAR REVIEW OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
THREATS, OUR PRESENT ABILITY TO COUNTER THEM AND THE
ADDITIONAL COUNTERMEASURE CAPABILITIES NEEDED. WE HAVE
STARTED ON A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF HUMAN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTORS OVERSEAS AND THE EXPANSION OF THEIR
ACTIVITIES INTO NEW AREAS. WE'VE.MADE A GOOD START ON
SIZEABLE INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS
ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS WITH PARTICULAR
EMPHASIS ON THOSE AREAS OF SHARPLY INCREASING DEMAND--THIRD
WORLD, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND
GLOBAL RESOURCES. WE WILL BE BRINGING ON NEW TECHNICAL
CAPABILITIES TO CLOSE GAPS IN OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC, SIGNALS AND
ELECTRONIC COLLECTION. WE WILL BE STARTING THIS IN 1983 AND
COMPLETE IT IN 1986.
ONE OF MY PRIME OBJECTIVES HAS BEEN TO GET BETTER MUTUAL
SUPPORT AMONG THE COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
AND BETWEEN THE DIRECTORATES AND THE OFFICES OF THE CIA. THE
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND INR AT STATE ARE CARRYING AS
MUCH AS ONE-THIRD OF THE DRAFTING OF THE EXPANDED ESTIMATES
PROGRAM. MONTHLY WARNING MEETINGS DID NOT YIELD A CLOSE
ENOUGH WATCH AND THEY ARE NOW SUPPLEMENTED BY A WATCH MEETING
EVERY THURSDAY IN WHICH THE CHIEF OF OUR INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTORATE MEETS WITH THE CHIEFS OF DIA, STATE/INR, AND NSA
TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH A WEEKLY WATCH REPORT ON FRIDAY
MORNING. ONE OF MY SPECIAL INTERESTS OF LATE HAS BEEN TO
PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH A WEEKLY WATCH REPORT ON FRIDAY
MORNING. ONE OF MY SPECIAL INTERESTS OF LATE HAS BEEN TO
ENERGIZE ANALYSTS TO ACTIVELY AND REGULARLY SPECIFY
INFORMATION GAPS THEIR ANALYTICAL WORK POINTS UP. WE NEED
THIS TO ASSURE THAT OUR EXTENSIVE TECHNICAL AND HUMAN
COLLECTION ABILITIES ARE DRIVEN PRIMARILY BY THE INTELLIGENCE
NEEDS OF ANALYSTS AND DECISIONMAKERS RATHER THAN BY OUR
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FINALLY, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
ARE GOING TO HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE INCOMPATIBILITY
BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.
THE PRESS HAS, AT TIMES, MISUNDERSTOOD MY POSITION. WE
ARE NOT CALLING FOR THE TOTAL REPEAL OF THE ACT, NOR ARE
WE ASKING FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE PRIVACY ACT, WHICH GIVES
ALL AMERICANS THE RIGHT TO SEEK INFORMATION ABOUT THEMSELVES.
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BUT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED BY LAW
TO SEARCH THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS FOR MATERIALS WHICH IT KNOWS
IN ADVANCE ARE NOT RELEASABLE.
LET ME GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF THE ABSURD SITUATIONS WE FACE.
THE IRANIAN REGIME--THE SAME GOVERNMENT THAT HELD OUR PEOPLE
HOSTAGE--HAS RECENTLY FILED AN FOIA REQUEST FOR ALL INFORMATION
IN CIA ON THE LATE SHAH. THIS IS A PERFECTLY LEGAL REQUEST.
WE ARE THE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD WHICH GIVES FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OR OTHERS HOSTILE TO OUR INTERESTS LEGAL
LICENSE TO POKE INTO OUR FILES. As JUSTICE GOLDBERG ONCE
SAID, "WHILE THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS AGAINST INVASION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, IT IS NOT A SUICIDE PACT."
THANK YOU LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, FOR INVITING ME TODAY.
WE ARE NOW WORKING TO REBUILD INTELLIGENCE. IT WILL NOT
COME EASY OR FAST, BUT OUR COMMITMENT IS FIRM. THANK YOU.
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