MODELS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY RESEARCH PROJECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100030023-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2007
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 6, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY. CALIFORNIA 93940
MEMORANDUM
IN REPLY REFER TO:
NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
From: David Yost, Assistant Professor, NSA, Naval Postgraduate School
To: Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, and
Colonel Frederick Giessler, Assistant Director
Subj: Models of European Security research project
Before we discuss the best approach to this research, I would request that
you read this memo. This memo has six parts:
(1) a re-statement of the project's purposes, including some caveats
about my prejudices and methods;
(2) 5 lists of questions that will guide my research, including interviews
with European observers;
(3) a list of published sources that I intend to draw on;
(4) lists of people to see in the U.S. and Western Europe;
(5) a schedule for completing the research; and
STATEMENT OF PURPOSES AND PREJUDICES.
In Colonel Giessler's words, this research "is intended to be the first step
in clarifying and understanding the changing Western perceptions of alternative
structural systems of European security. The work will also advance the under-
standing of the objective realities that promote these changing perceptions, e.g.,
demographic and sociological changes--the generational shift in leadership
elites--changing economic, political and energy prospects and divergent
assessments of the Soviet military threat to the extent possible. The early
part of this research will also review European security policy alternatives
that may face the US in the next 20 years."
To this concise statement, I would add a caveat--an acknowledgement of some
of my prejudices about the subject and methods of research.
First, this research is based on the perception that the most basic
assumptions of NATO's long-standing security structure--the presence of U.S.
forces and nuclear weapons in Europe as a guarantee to deter Soviet aggression
and neutralize Soviet influence in peace-time--are beginning to be openly
questioned by vocal minorities on both sides of the Atlantic, with increasing
(though still peripheral) prospects of bringing about fundamental change.
Prospects for success in bringing about change depend not only on. voluntaristic
factors but also on underlying factors--demographic, economic, and social
changes--that are rarely amenable to conscious manipulation. If we can identify
changing attitudes and perceptions with greater precision, however, we may be
able to understand more successfully what might be called the moral and psycho-
logical dimensions of Western security, dimensions that are vital for alliance
cohesion. .
'~a.A\ Y re i -o,r corr pI tNoj
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Mr. Andrew Marshall -2- NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
Second, in considering such. moral and psychological attitudes and
perceptions (as has always been the case in NATO), the core of European-American
disagreements regarding the nature of the European security problem has been
threat assessment. How should the USSR's capabilities, objectives, behavior,
and decision-making processes be assessed? While I intend to focus on West
European perceptions of the USSR--especially as concerns the pertinence of
alternative security structures--I would also like to discuss (a) the
perceptions the USSR is trying to cultivate in Western Europe; and (b) relevant
U.S. perceptions of the Soviet threat to Western Europe. I see the possibility
(albeit remote) of a dangerous convergence of the following factors:
(a) the Soviet-purveyed model of Western Europe's future--i.e., a
zone of lasting peace through military detente and all-European cooperation
with Soviet socialism;
(b) the U.S. advocates of withdrawing from Western Europe;
(c) The West European advocates of a U.S. departure, especially
those who believe a neutralized Germany (or Western Europe) viable.
Third, as in the original proposal, I still believe that France and
West Germany deserve the bulk of attention, and that other countries should
receive only what time remains, if any. Because of the importance of the U.K.
it would receive priority attention after France and West Germany.
West Germany obviously has to be one focus of the research because
German-American relations are central to the survival and effectiveness of the
.al'liance. In recent months, a number of Americans--disgusted with the West
German attempt to preserve a "separate detente" decoupled from U.S. policies--
have wondered if the U.S. should not decouple from Europe. What Uwe Nerlich
has described as an "horror scenario" in German-American relations seems possible:
U.S. over-reaction to events and attitudes mostly confined to (or determined by)
the SPD left, which plays into the hands of the SPD left's contention that the
U.S. is an occupying power forcing "militaristic" and "aggressive" policies.on
the Federal Republic. This sequence of events must.be avoided, because security
in Europe ultimately concerns a Soviet-American struggle regarding the political
orentation of Germany.
France merits attention as the other main focus of research because the
Fr,'anco-German relationship will determine the future of effective West European
political and defense cooperation, and because of France's special military and
political status. France's independent and impressive defense effort and its
location would alone justify special attention, but special political factors in
France make the French simultaneously the nation most interested in such
alternative models of European security and the most difficult partners in
cooperative European enterprises. Gaullists such as Pierre Messmer and
Olivier Guichard are--however paradoxically, at first glance--leaders in the
Mouvement pour 1'inde endance de 1'Euro e. Hence the title Uwe Nerlich gave
to an article seven years ago: "West European Defense Identity: The French
Paradox." (The World Today, vol. 30, May 1974, pp. 187-193).
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Mr. Andrew Marshall -3- NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
As concerns the research methods to be employed in this research, I
hope that the following understandings will be acceptable to you:
(a) Given the magnitude of this project, I will have to be
selective and exercise judgment in order to avoid spending too much time on
secondary differences between models for radical change that are likely to
have only peripheral policy impact--e.g., differences between neutralism
advocates in the "peace" movement. At the same time, I intend to give such
models adequate attention, especially as concerns the future of Germany.
(b) Perhaps the same point, I would stress my intention to focus
on the most important and likely factors of change. Again, judgments will be
unavoidable; yet I will strive not to go beyond the evidence without distinguishing
personal judgments from facts.
(c) The vast and speculative nature of the topic rule out use of
highly quantitave social science models. How can anyone detect confidently the
difference between an episode and a watershed until the history of a period is
over? Nonetheless the effort to understand the recent past is worth making.
(d) I will continue to do related research while this project is
underway, all of it concerned with France, :Jest Germany, and European security
generally. For your possible interest, attached are three of my recent essays:
-- "France Under the Socialists," which will be published in
Strategic Survey 1901-1982 by the International Institute
for Strategic Studies;
-- "West German Party Politics and Theater Nuclear Force
Modernization Since 1977," which will be published in
Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1982; and
-- "INF and the U.S. Guarantee to NATO Europe," whic:i has just
been completed.
I mention this other research to assure you that I am trying to give
due attention to mundane day-to-day realities while focusing on broad structural
factors and possibilities of change. The book or monograph that will ultimately
result from this research on models of European security should thus provide
a useful contribution to the public debate.
QUESTIONS THAT WILL GUIDE RESEARCH
I have grouped the questions that will guide my research, including inter-
views, into five areas of assessment:
a) Soviet military power and intentions;
(b) radical models for.change in the European security system;
(c) U.S. reliability and alternatives (as perceived in :-lestern Europe);
(d) non-military threats to Euroepan security; and
(e) recommendations for change in military and arms control policy.
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Mr. Andrew Marshall -4- NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
a.''assessment of Soviet military power and intentions
-- How solidly based is Soviet military power? That is,
are the economic and political foundations of Soviet power
solid? Has the Soviet military effort peaked, or will the high
levels of defense spending of the 1970s persist in the 1980s?
Should one assess Soviet behavior in the political field--
especially its public information policy, as expressed in
the media and through spokesmen like i,:ilstein, Arbatov, and
Zamyatin--as highly successful or nearly irrelevant? In
what sectors of the public do the Soviets have most success
in building influence? Wily? Is this.public information
policy truly a key part of the U.S.-Soviet "battle for the
soul of Europe,"-to use the expression of Arthur Burns,
U.S. ambassador to West Germany?
Which factors will be most critical to the fulfillment or
frustration of apparent Soviet objectives?
To what extent can one continue to hope for positive social
change through detente in the USSR and Eastern Europe? Is
a process of benign evolutionary- change in the Soviet sphere
of influence likely? To what extent can confidence in long-
term social change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
substitute for Western defense capabilities?
-- What long-term relationship with the USSR should the West
develop on the European continent?
Should Soviet policy toward Western Europe be seen as
coherent and expansionary, oriented toward bringing about
a type of influence that could be called "Finlandization"?
-- What would Soviet war aims be in a European conflict?
-- Is NATO's "flexible response" strategy based on an accurate
threat assessment?
-- What instruments of leverage could be applied by the West
to try to influence Soviet policy?
-- What are the obstacles to using the West's economic
leverage--in, for example, the natural gas pipeline deal?
-- -Can the West do anything to affect the leadership succession
process in the USSR?
- How can the West promote greater stability in East-West
relations?
-- How can the West induce the USSR to moderate its objectives
and become cooperative? That is, is there any hope left for
the model of detente articulated by Kissinger in the early
1970s?
-- Are Soviet objectives limited to gaining a position of
political dominance over Western Europe, or will the Soviets
seek direct administrative control?
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Mr. Andrew Marshall -5- NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
b. assessment of radical models for change in the European security
system
In recent years numerous radical models of change in the
European security system have been described, predicted
or advocated. Perhaps the two most common radical models
are (a) European defense union (advocated most often in
France) and (b) neutralism via superpower disengagement
(discussed most frequently in West Germany, and not only
in the peace movement).
-- To what extent are these proposals taken seriously in
politically influential circles?
-- Which proposals, if any, have the more plausible prospects
for success? Why?
-- Do you take any new "model" of a different security arrange-
ment seriously, and if so, which one? That is, what would
you prefer to see happen,.as opposed to what--objectively--
you deem likely to happen?
-- Has there been a qualitative increase in the degree of
seriousness with which alternative security structures are
considered in Western Europe?
-- Is the apparent increase in interest in alternative models
an optical illusion? Is the bulk of security thinking in
Western Europe devoted, rather, to current issues like INF
and burden-sharing in defense spending?
-- If there has been an increase in interest in alternative
models, to what factors should it be attributed? Fear of
war? Generational change? Economic insecurity?
c. assessment of U.S. reliability and alternatives
U.S. Senator Ted Stevens in March 1982 said that he may introduce
a resolution this year to withdraw American troops from Europe. Senate
Majority leader Howard Baker has observed that such a resolution might pass.
Other signs of new trends--isolationist or, more frequently, nationalist--in-
the U.S. have appeared in the spate of articles, books, and analyses recom-
mending a reassessment of the U.S. commitment to NATO. These proposals
generally deplore unfair burden-sharing in the alliance, and suggest that a
severe reduction in U.S. troops in Europe would save money, free U.S. forces
for use elsewhere, and encourage West Europeans to devise their own in-theater
deterrence and defense capabilities. (Proponents include Jeffrey Record,
Laurence Beilenson, Ronald Nairn, William Safire, Leonard Sullivan, Jr., etc.)
-- What prospects of success do such proposals for changes
in the U.S. commitment have? What factors might lead the
U.S. to make such a dramatic shift in policy?
-- What reactions would take place in Western Europe if the
proposals gained greater popularity and authority? If the
U.S. was going to withdraw, is there an intelligent way for
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Mr. Andrew Marshall -6- NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
the U.S. to do so? Can one envisage transition strategies
for the U.S. in a period of withdrawal from Western Europe?
Would a prospective U.S. withdrawal from Western Europe put
all the radical models for change in the European security
system in a new light?
-- What can the U.S. do to bring about greater solidarity
within the alliance?
Eight years ago Pierre Hassner said: "the worst solution would be
for the United States to withdraw [its deterrent capability from Western
Europe] after having prevented the emergence of a possible substitute."
("How Troubled a Partnership?" International Journal, vol. 29, Spring 1974,
P.183).
-- Is the U.S. somehow preventing the emergence of a possible
substitute? What could the U.S. do to encourage or prevent
the potential development of a different security system?
-- Are current U.S. defense programs appropriate responses to
the Soviet threat? Does the U.S. lack of conscription or
universal military training send the wrong signal to Western
Europe and/or the USSR?
d. assessment of non-military threats to European security,
-- Are economic and energy problems more likely to threaten
the fabric of the Atlantic Alliance than Soviet military
power?
-- Has pessimism about the economic situation increased so
dramatically that unilateralism and protectionism could
lead to divisions in the alliance?
-- To what extent does generational shift--the advent of a
generation indifferent to (or ignorant of) the experiences
of the 1940s and 1950s--portend change in West European
security policies and orientations?
What underlying social or economic trends are likely to be
most significant to West European security orientations
during the 1980s and 1990s?
e. recommendations for change in military and arms control policy
-- What changes are necessary in NATO deterrence policy--force
posture and strategy--in light of recent and foreseeable
changes in the USSR.?
-- What changes are necessary in NATO negotiations policy--
concerning both arms control and economics--in light of
recent and foreseeable changes in the USSR?
What changes are necessary in NATO's public information
policy to obtain greater public support and allied cohesion
behind the alliance's deterrence and arms control policies?
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Mr. Andrew Marshall -7- NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
RECENT BOOKS AND STUDIES THAT SHOULD BE USEFUL
William E. Griffith, The Superpowers and Regional Tensions: The USSR, the
United States, and Europe. Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1982.
James 0. Goldsborough, Rebel Europe, New York: Macmillan, 1981.
S. Szabo, ed. The Successor Generations: International Perspectives of
Postwar Europeans London: Butterworth, 1982.
K. Baker, R.J.Dalton, and K. Hildebrandt, Germany: Transformed Political
Culture and the New Politics Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1981.
George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy Toward
Western Europe New York: Praeger, 1978.
Hannes Adomait, The Soviet Union and Western Europe: Perceptions, Policies,
Problems, Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations,
Queen's University, 1979.
Pierre ~assner, "Western European Perceptions of the USSR." Daedalus,' vol.
108 (Winter 1979).
Gregory Flynn, ed., The Internal Fabric of Western Security (London: Croom
Helm, 1981).
Pierre Lellouche, La Securite de 1'Europe dans les annees 80. Paris: Editions
Economica, 1980.
Michael Harrison., The Reluctant-Ally: France and Atlantic Security.
.Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981..,
Simon Serfaty, Fading Partnership: America and Europe after 30 Years.
New York: Praeger, 1979.
Kenneth Myers, ed., NATO: The Next Thirty Years. Boulder, Colo: Westview
Press, 1980.
Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Defense Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany."
in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defence Policies of
Nations. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982
Walter Laqueur, A Continent Astray: Europe, 1970-1978. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979.
.Peter Bender, Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters: Die Europ-~isierung
Europas. Severin and Siedler, 1981
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Mr. Andrew Marshall
NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
John van Oudenaren, The "Leninist Peace Policy" and Western Europe. Cambridge,
Mass: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1980.
PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN U.S. REGARDING "MODELS"
recommended by Colonel Fred Giessler:
Edward Luttwak--undertaking similar project for ONA
Colin Gray
Christopher Mains
Carl Bernard
Catherine Kelleher
Robert Pfaltzgraff
Robert Komer
Douglas Zakheim--in Perle's office
recommended by Uwe Nerlich
William Griffith - MIT
Seweryn Bialer - Columbia
recommended by Pat Parker
Bill Van Cleave
Albert Wohlstetter
Jim Thomson
Richard Perle
Harry Rowen
Paul Nitze
Charles Burton Marshall
Russ Murray
Harold Brown
James Schlesinger
PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN FRG RE "MODELS"
Richard Lowenthal - Free University of Berlin
Ernst-Otto Cziempiel - University of Frankfurt
Theo Sommer - Die Zeit, Hamburg
Ulrich Albrecht - Free University of Berlin
Uwe Nerlich - Stiftung Wissenchaft and Politik
Hans Peter Schwarz - University of Cologne
Peter Stratmann - Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik
Konrad Seitz - Foreign Ministry
Jorg Mentzel - Defense Ministry
Klaus Citron - Foreign Ministry
Dieter Braun - Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik
Kai-Uwe von Hassel - former Defense Minister, Euro-MP
Karl Kaiser - DGAP
Josef Joffe - Die Zeit, Hamburg
Hans Ruhle - Ko rr- ad-Aaenauer-Foundation, Bonn
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Mr. Andrew Marshall -9-
NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN FRANCE RE "MODELS"
Thierry de Montbrial
Dominique Moisi
Walter Schutze IFRI
Pierre Lellouche
Jean Klein
'Pierre Hassner - CERI
Denis Delbourg - Cabinet of Claude Cheysson
Pierre Morel - Elysee Palace
Jean-Louis Gergorin
Michel Duclos Foreign Ministry planning department
Jean-Marie Guehenno
Etienne de Bellescize - Defense Ministry planning department
Raymond Aron - College de France
Fran5ois de Rose - former Ambassador to NATO
?Patrick Wajsman - Institut d'Etudes Politiques
Michel Tatu - Le Monde
PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN LONDON RE "MODELS"
Michael Howard - Oxford
Hedley Bull - Oxford
Philip Windsor - LSE
John Van Oudenaren - at IISS until September 1982
Robert Jackson - Euro-MP
Michael Quinlan - MoD
Lawrence Freedman - King's College
Laurence Martin - Newcastle
David Watt - Chatham House
Jonathan Alford - IISS
PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN BRUSSELS RE "MODELS"
S.I.P. van Campen
Joseph Luns
Lawrence Legere
ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE
.Johan Holst - Norway
Robert Strausz-Hupe - U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
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Mr. Andrew Marshall -10- NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982
SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETING PHASE I OF RESEARCH
1. Examine published-data as thoroughly and systematically as possible
during April, May, and early June 1982.
2. During June, July, and August 1982, continue pursuing issues through
standard questions to pose to key European observers. I will not follow a
questionnaire rigidly, according to the preferred canons of rigorous social
science research, but I will pursue the line of questioning in a reasonably
systematic fashion. I keep meticulous notes of all interviews (and indeed
have files of notes of interviews with West Europears extending back to 1974).
3. Submit trip report summarizing interviews in September 1982; tentative
conclusions regarding Phase I of the study, and a request for Phase II support,
would be attached. This trip report would, I hope, be regarded as not for
circulation or attribution beyond OSD because I might name names. I will
organize the interview findings concisely and with a sensible organizing
framework.
4. Submit Phase I final report with fuller analysis and reflections.
QUESTIONS FOR YOU.
(1) Are my assumptions as to what you are interested in correct?
(2) In the five areas of questions, do any areas-=e.g., threat
perceptions--seem more important than others? Or should I strive
to give balanced attention to all five areas?
(3) Can you recommend other published sources or other written materials
(contractor or government-produced) that I should consult?
(4) Who else would you recommend that I speak with, in the U.S. or in
Western Europe? Are there any experts in other U.S. government
agencies you would especially recommend? Would it be appropriate
for me to participate in the Atlantic Institute discussions you
mentioned?
(5) Is the schedule for research completion acceptable to you? Can you
show me some of the best research reports you would envisage mine
resembling--i.e., length, format, etc.?
David Yost
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