THE SOVIET PROBLEM IN MANAGING THE EAST EUROPEANS IN AN EAST-WEST CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100050002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 15, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 July 82
The Soviet Problem in Managing the East Europeans
in an East-West Conflict
Assessments made by NATO planners and by US planners usually assume
that 1) a war with the Soviet Union would erupt suddenly with little
waring and almost always assume 2) that all of the members of the Warsaw
Pact (as well as NATO) participate in the conflict.
The grounds on which these assumptions rest are that they may be
correct and that they put maximum stress on NATO's ability to defend.
Therefore they are prudent planning assumptions. However, for several
reasons, it is doubtful that such assumptions are in fact prudent
ones. One is that the planners seem always to conclude that NATO loses
(or a nuclear war results which is also an unappealing prospect). This
conclusion arguably has had a progressively demoralizing effect on the
West and induces neutralism among the Europeans. Another is that it
causes us not to pay enough attention to opportunities that might,
indeed are likely, to present themselves. For instance, a European war
very likely would be preceded by a period of crisis. During such a
period both sides would be mobilizing and domestic and international
political and economic maneuvering would occur within and between West
and East. For the Soviets a principal aim would be to assure the
participation of the Eastern Europeans in a conflict. For the West, the
opposite would presumably be a crucial goal, that is to minimize the
likelihood of such participation.
F
These considerations suggest several questions; for instance, How
might the East European peoples and governments behave during a severe
East-West crisis? Under what circumstances might various East Europeans
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cooperate with the Soviets? How would the Soviets try to control the
East Europeans before and during a war and what cost? What confidence
do the Soviets have of their ability to manage in various
circumstances? and, What might we do to reduce their confidence? Such
questions have not received enough attention.
In addressing these questions one should keep in mind that a
paramount consideration is the Soviet perspective on them.
A place to start is by observing that a large majority of the East
Europeans want to be free of domination by the Soviet Union. (The
exceptions are that minority which benefits from Soviet control.) This
control has been challenged on several occasions since 1945 -- most
recently by the rise of Solidarity -- and has failed to be maintained in
two countries, Yugoslavia and (less decisively) Romania. But Soviet
dominance has been sustained in the key countries in the north and
center.
The ability of the Soviets to maintain control in the key countries
in the absence of an East-West conflict is a different matter from
assuring that the East Europeans will do the Soviets bidding in such a
conflict. Consider the following set of war outbreak possibilities:
a Warsaw Pact attack, or threat of attack, on
Europe stemming from a conflict elsewhere,
especially the Middle East
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a conflict begun by Soviet pressure on Berlin
or on a single NATO member such as Norway or
Turkey
a conflict triggered by an uprising in Eastern
Europe, especially the DDR.
In the last three of these contingencies an extended period of
crisis and mobilization might occur.
In such circumstances what would be the interest of most East
Europeans in cooperating with the Soviets? The contingencies listed
above do not seem likely to raise the spectre of German revanchism -- a
prospect which might unite the East -- with the possible exception of
the last one; e.g., an uprising in the DDR which results in an FRG
intervention and an attempted de facto unification of the two Germanies;
but this is an unlikely case. What is most plausible to assume in most
war outbreak circumstances is a sharp divergence of interests. To these
should be added the point that NATO could make it clear to Eastern
Europe that it would suffer great damage in an East-West war and that if
the Soviets prevailed over the West the East Europeans would probably
find such freedoms as they now have greatly curtailed.
In short, if the East Europeans were in a position to choose, a
large majority would probably opt for neutralism, some might see such a
conflict as providing an opportunity (for themselves personally or for
their country) to become free of Soviet control, and some would no doubt
support the Soviets out of conviction.
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Moscow's Management of the East Europeans. To Moscow it is of the
utmost importance that the East Europeans cooperate. Not only do they
supply about one-third of the ground forces and one-fourth of the air
forces that would be used against NATO, but they also sit athwart the
Soviet lines of communication. The Soviets probably need the active
participation of these forces in order to do well against NATO forces
and hostility on the part of significant portions of the East European
forces and populations could produce disaster for them.
It seems plausible to assume that they would use the following
techniques among others to try to assure such cooperation:
placing Soviet or "loyal" East European
personnel in key military and political
positions and removing unreliable ones
preempting control over communications and
intelligence organizations and channels
occuping key political and logistic nodes with
Soviet or reliable East European uni##s need
to be worked through in some detail. How many
people and/or units might be involved in such
Soviet operations? How long would they take
to carry out? Might there be open resistance
on the part of some East Europeans? How much
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of this activity would we be able to detect?
What constraints might these requirements
impose on Soviet operations against NATO,
etc.?
Soviet Perceptions. Aside from a more or less
objective assessment of the Soviet's management problem, we
need to consider the likely Soviet perception of this
problem. One might make the following guesses as to how the
Soviets might assess their prospects:
The behavior of the East European military and
the civilian populations during a crisis or
conflict with the West, especially a prolonged
one, is of grave concern to Moscow and it will
be conservative in assessing the likelihood of
resistance, passive and active
In order to minimize the incidence of East
European deviant behavior, the Soviets would
try to shape events so as to portray NATO --
and especially the Federal Republic of
Germany -- as the aggressor. (On the other
hand, the Soviets might hesitate in portraying
events in this way given the possibility --
even if remote -- that many East Europeans
would react positively to the news that NATO
forces were on the move)
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The Soviets see a compelling need for early
successes in order to establish an aura of
invincibility; conversely early Soviet
difficulties (or NATO successes) might
resonate, be amplified in the East, and cause
widespread defections and resistance
It is also important to convince the NATO
governments of the inevitability of Warsaw
Pact success; whatever the private doubts of
the Moscow regime, all means must be used to
project confidence in early as well as
ultimate success; exercises play a role in the
projection of such confidence
Although the West has strictly refrained from
encouraging the East Europeans to resist the
Soviets in past crises or to help them
materially, the Soviet leadership doesn't
count on such forebearance in all future
circumstances; it does not exclude Western
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political agitation and material support to
the East Europeans in an East-West conflict
From the US-West European perspective:
These considerations could constrain Soviet
options in a number of respects:
in the assignment of Pact forces; e.g.,
by not putting Polish units in contact
with US, UK, or French ones; by forcing
them to assign Soviet units to safeguard
rear areas, etc.
-- by taking actions which makes an attack
from a standing start difficult to
execute
NATO promises to spare those European
countries that stay out of the war might evoke
favorable responses; advance publicity on this
policy might be in order. (Discussions on
such Wstern actions have taken place at the
NATO MOD ministerial level.)
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Preparations in the West evidently directed at
collaboration with and support for East
Europeans will intensify Soviet concerns about
the behavior of the East Europeans and induce
caution
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