SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT, 1982-92

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R000300070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Soviet Capabilities
for Strategic Nuclear
Conflict, 1982-92
National Intelligence Estimate
The Key Judgments
Secret
NIE 11-3/8-82
15 February 1983
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N I E 11-3/8-82
SOVIET CAPABILITIES
FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
CONFLICT, 1982-92
THE KEY JUDGMENTS
Information available as of 15 February 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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PREFACE
This year's NIE 11-3/8 is an updated version of last year's. We
have incorporated new intelligence information and refined or changed
some important judgments:
- Our judgments of certain Soviet offensive programs are more
comprehensive, largely as a result of new information. For
example, the Soviets now have flight-tested their new medium-
size solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile, the SS-X-
24, and a small solid-propellant ICBM. We are projecting that
solid-propellant ICBMs will be deployed as mobile systems, as
well as in silos, in the mid-to-late 1980s. We also have a more
extensive understanding of long-range (3,000 kilometers) land-
attack cruise missiles and their launch platforms, and have
identified new larger sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles.
- We have expanded our discussion of projected Soviet strategic
force deployments. We include quantitative measures of Soviet
forces configured to conform to the US and Soviet arms control
proposals, and we compare them with forces projected in the
absence of arms control constraints.
- For the first time, we estimate, on the basis of recent analysis,
the number of nondeployed strategic ballistic missiles that can
be stored at identified storage areas.
- We have updated antiballistic missile (ABM) judgments to
reflect those in NIE 11-13-82, "Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense,"
including issues dealing with deployment of widespread ABM
defenses and Soviet capabilities.
- We are more concerned about Soviet efforts to develop non-
acoustic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) detection methods.
- We now project that laser weapons for air defense will become
available later in this decade.
- We have revised our discussion of the initiation of theater
nuclear war, on the basis of how we believe the Soviets perceive
it and how they relate it to intercontinental nuclear war. We
judge that the Soviets see the use of long-range theater nuclear
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weapons as likely to be closely tied. to the use of intercontinental
nuclear weapons, and that they would see initial, localized use
of battlefield nuclear weapons as probably being the last
realistic opportunity to avoid large-scale nuclear war. As the
likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict increased, Soviet lead-
ers would face the difficult decision of whether to seize the
initiative and strike, as would be consistent with their general
military doctrine, or to be more cautious in the hope of averting
massive nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland. There are no
easy prescriptions for what the Soviets would actually do under
a particular set of circumstances, despite the apparent doctrinal
imperative to mount massive preemptive nuclear attacks.
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SCOPE NOTE
Like previous issuances in the series, this NIE 11-3/8 summarizes
the latest developments and projects future trends in Soviet weapons
and supporting systems for strategic nuclear conflict. Offensive attack
force levels are projected, along with our estimates of the effects of
factors influencing future Soviet policies and force developments,
including the presence or absence of arms control constraints. The
Estimate does not contain comparisons of present and future Soviet and
US forces or measures of the destructive potential of the forces
remaining to the two sides after a first strike. The war-fighting
capabilities of Soviet strategic forces cannot be conveyed by simplified
static and dynamic comparisons of Soviet and US offensive forces. A
joint assessment of Soviet and US capabilities for nuclear conflict is
being prepared under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence, for issuance shortly after this Estimate
is published.
In this NIE we are focusing on the USSR's strategy, plans,
operations, and capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict as we believe
Soviet leaders perceive them. We have emphasized Soviet views on the
origin and nature of a US-Soviet nuclear conflict and how the Soviets
would plan to operate and employ their forces during the various phases
of such a war. There are, of course, major uncertainties about how well
the USSR's present or future forces would be able to conduct a nuclear
conflict according to Soviet strategy.
In evaluating their capabilities to accomplish strategic missions, the
Soviets differ from us in terms of the operational factors they consider,
the analytic techniques they use, and their criteria for success. In this
Estimate we have assessed trends in Soviet capabilities in terms familiar
to US policymakers and analysts, although these assessments do not
necessarily correspond to those the Soviets would make. We do not
know how the Soviets specifically would evaluate their capabilities, and
we have limited information pertaining to how they measure their
ability to accomplish strategic missions.
This Estimate is in three volumes:
? Volume I contains key judgments about Soviet programs and
capabilities believed to be of greatest interest to policymakers and
defense planners.
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? Volume II contains:
- Key recent developments.
- Discussion of the Soviets' strategic doctrine and objectives, includ-
ing their views on the probable origin and nature of a US-Soviet
nuclear conflict.
- Descriptions of Soviet programs for the development and deploy-
ment of strategic offensive and defensive forces and supporting
systems.
- Projections of future Soviet strategic forces.
- Discussion of Soviet concepts and plans for the operations of
strategic forces during the several phases of a global conflict.
- Trends in the USSR's capabilities to carry out some missions of
strategic forces envisioned by Soviet concepts and plans for
nuclear conflict.
? Volume III contains annexes with detailed force projections and
weapon characteristics.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Soviet leaders view strategic arms policy in the context of a
persistent, long-term struggle between two world systems of socialism
and capitalism, in which socialism-with Moscow in charge-is des-
tined ultimately to triumph. From their viewpoint, progress in this
struggle is measured by favorable shifts in the overall "correlation of
forces"-political, ideological, economic, social, and military. The
Soviets seek through strategic and other military programs to continue
shifting the military component of the correlation of forces in favor of
the USSR and its allies. They recognize that military power is their
principal foreign policy asset and that continued high levels of defense
investments are necessary to sustain and expand Moscow's global role.
The Soviets believe that in the present US-Soviet strategic relation-
ship each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that could devas-
tate the other after absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders have stated that
nuclear war with the United States would be a catastrophe that must be
avoided if possible and that they do not regard such a conflict as
inevitable. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on force
improvements and deployments when it serves their interests. Never-
theless, they regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility and have
rejected mutual vulnerability as a desirable or permanent basis for the
US-Soviet strategic relationship. They seek superior capabilities to fight
and win a nuclear war with the United States, and have been working to
improve their chances of prevailing in such a conflict. A tenet in their
strategic thinking holds that the better prepared the USSR is to fight in
various contingencies, the more likely it is that potential enemies will be
deterred from initiating attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and
will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions.
The Soviets are intent on improving all aspects of their strategic
forces and supporting elements. We are currently aware of more than
30 new strategic systems that are in various stages of development. Over
the longer term, we believe the Soviets have an expanded number of
options in deciding on the size, mix, and characteristics of their strategic
nuclear forces and supporting systems.
The most significant new weapon systems projected for deploy-
ment in Soviet strategic offensive forces are:
- Solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for
both silo and mobile basing. The SS-X-24 medium-size solid-
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propellant ICBM, which they have just started to test, will
probably replace silo-based SS-17 and SS-11 ICBMs beginning in
about 1985. A small solid-propellant ICBM, which began flight-
testing in February 1983, will probably be deployed as a mobile
system beginning in 1986, as well as in silos. A solid-propellant
ICBM could possibly be deployed in a rail-mobile mode in the
late 1980s.
- Improvements in hard-target-capable SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs,
although they will become increasingly vulnerable to US mis-
siles in the late 1980s. We believe the Soviets will begin flight-
testing of these improved ICBMs in 1983.
- The Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) and its SS-NX-20 missile system to become operational
in 1983. The Soviets will probably begin flight-testing of a
follow-on to the SS-N-18 submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) in 1983.
- Other new ICBM and SLBM improvements already in develop-
ment, for deployment by the end of the decade. The Soviets
regularly field a major improvement to their key missile systems
about every five years.
- New long-range (3,000 kilometers) land-attack cruise missiles for
deployment on submarines (SLCMs) as early as 1983 and on
ground launchers (GLCMs) and aircraft (ALCMs) as early as
1984.
- Deployment of the new Blackjack A bomber as early as 1986, as
well as a new variant of the Bear bomber capable of carrying
ALCMs, which could be deployed as early as 1984. These new
bombers, together with their cruise missiles, will give the Soviets
a modern intercontinental bomber force that could vastly
complicate US air defenses.
If Soviet strategic force deployments proceeded without arms
control constraints, we project that the number of deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs would increase from the present number (more than 2,300
missiles) by 13 to 25 percent over the next 10 years-the increase
resulting primarily from mobile ICBM deployments. The number of
deployed ballistic missile warheads would increase by a much larger
number-85 to more than 190 percent-from the estimated 7,300 at
the end of 1982, resulting in 13,000 to 21,000 ballistic missile warheads
by the early 1990s. Soviet deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, if constrained
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by the US strategic arms reduction talks (START) proposal would
decrease by about 65 percent from current deployments, with a 30-
percent decrease in ballistic missile warheads. Soviet deployed ICBMs
and SLBMs if constrained by the Soviet START proposal would
decrease by about 30 percent from current deployments, but the
number of ballistic missile warheads would increase slightly. Although
the number of Soviet bombers increases only slightly, the number of
bomber weapons increases substantially in the next 10 years-primarily
because of the large payload of the Blackjack A bomber to be deployed
later in the decade. We expect the Soviets to deploy about 1,500 to
2,000 long-range land-attack cruise missiles over the next 10 years.
Many of these bomber weapons and cruise missiles-air-, sea-, and
ground-launched-would, however, be allocated for theater, and not
intercontinental, attack. Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces will continue to
be the primary elements of the intercontinental attack forces.
Despite these impressive offensive force developments, the Soviets'
potential future developments in strategic defenses could be of greater
significance to the perceptions, and perhaps the reality, of the strategic
balance. We are particularly concerned about their growing potential
for widespread deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles well
beyond the limits of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty using ABM systems
currently in development. The Soviets' air defenses are undergoing
significant changes, and they will have improving capabilities to
threaten current types of bombers at low altitude and, to a lesser extent,
cruise missiles. There is an alternative view that this Estimate substan-
tially understates the capability of the Soviet air defense system to
defend key target areas against low-altitude penetrators. This view is
presented in more detail in the Summary and in volume II.' According
to another alternative view, the Soviet Union will not have the
capability in this decade to deploy strategic defenses that would
significantly affect the US-Soviet nuclear relationship.,
Some key trends for strategic defense include:
- Extensive deployments of new low-altitude-capable fighters and
SA-10 surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), and initial deployment of
IL-76 Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
aircraft in late 1983 or early 1984.
The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.
The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
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- Deployment of the SA-X42 SAM. It is premature to judge the
capabilities of this new advanced SAM system. However, if
certain features that we have assumed for this system are
realized, its potential contribution to ballistic missile defenses
would be of growing concern as the system became widely
deployed in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the mid-to-late
1980s.
- The upgrading of ABM deployments at Moscow and active
engagement in ABM research and development programs. The
available evidence does not indicate with any certainty whether
the Soviets are making preparations for deployments beyond the
limits of the ABM Treaty-100 ABM launchers at Moscow-but
it does show they are steadily improving their ability to exercise
options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses
in the 1980s. If the Treaty were abrogated by either the United
States or the USSR, we believe the Soviets would undertake
rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen their defenses at
Moscow and cover key targets in the western USSR, and to
extend protection to key targets east of the Urals. Widespread
defenses could be in place by the late 1980s or early 1990s.
We have major uncertainties about how well a Soviet ABM system
would function and about the degree of protection future ABM
deployments would afford the USSR. We judge that, in evaluating the
technical performance of the ABM systems they could deploy, the
Soviets probably would not have high confidence in how well these
systems would perform against a large-scale, undegraded US missile
attack, especially in the late 1980s by improved US forces. However, the
Soviets would probably view their ballistic missile defenses as having
considerable value in reducing the impact of a degraded US retaliatory
attack if the USSR succeeded in carrying out a well-coordinated,
effective initial strike. Also, widespread Soviet defenses, even if US
evaluations indicated they could be overcome by an attacking force,
would complicate US attack planning and create major uncertainties
about the potential effectiveness of a US strike.
Soviet efforts in two technology areas-nonacoustic sensors for
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and directed-energy weapons-could, if
the Soviets succeed in major breakthroughs, have profound conse-
quences, particularly in areas of strategic defensive capabilities. The
Soviets are intensively investigating these technologies and would place
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a high priority on deploying any capabilities that might result from
their research efforts:
- Over the past several years we have learned that the Soviet
research program to detect submarines from space is much
more extensive than we had previously believed. We have only
limited knowledge of the precise nature of the program and
cannot state with confidence that the Soviets have not had some
success in their research.
We
cannot judge whether the Soviets will achieve a technological
breakthrough in remote sensing of submarine-generated effects
during the next 10 years. Even if such a breakthrough were to
occur, we do not believe, in view of the operational consider-
ations and the length of time needed for full system deploy-
ment, that a system which could simultaneously track a substan-
tial fraction of the US SSBN force is a realistic possibility during
the period of this Estimate. We are more uncertain, and hence
more concerned, about the capabilities that could potentially be
realized and deployed in the mid-to-late 1990s. An alternative
view is that
the Soviets have not had significant success in these
techniques and are unlikely to achieve a technological break-
through in remote sensing of submarine-generated effects dur-
ing the next 10 years.'
Directed-energy weapons potentially could be developed for
antisatellite (ASAT) applications, air defense, and, in the longer
term, ballistic missile defense (BMD). There is strong evidence
that the Soviets are pursuing development of high-energy laser
weapons. We project that lasers for air defense are the only laser
weapons for such applications likely to become available for
operational use during the period of this Estimate. We believe
that within the next 10 years, however, they will test prototype
space-based lasers for potential applications to ASAT or BMD
weapons. We also expect that during the 1980s the Soviets will
test the feasibility of ground-based lasers for BMD applications.
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Training of Soviet forces for a global nuclear conflict is increasingly
broad in scope and complex in the operational factors taken into
account. The Soviets recognize that numerous complications and degra-
dations would affect planned operations, particularly in the unprece-
dentedly difficult nuclear environment. The inherent uncertainties of
warfare cannot be eliminated by training for fighting under various
conditions, but the Soviets believe that their ability to continue to
operate effectively in adverse conflict situations would be enhanced as a
The Soviets apparently believe that a major nuclear conflict, if it
occurred, would be likely to arise out of a NATO-Warsaw Pact
conventional conflict preceded by a political crisis period that could last
several weeks or longer. We believe they would anticipate a convention-
al phase as lasting from a few days to as long as several weeks. The Sovi-
ets see little likelihood that the United States would initiate a surprise at-
tack from a normal peacetime posture; we believe it is unlikely that the
Soviets would mount such an attack themselves. Key objectives of the
Soviets in the conventional phase would be to weaken the enemy's
theater-based and sea-based nuclear capability, while protecting their
own nuclear force.
result of the experience gained
The Soviets, in our judgment, are unlikely to initiate nuclear
conflict on a limited scale, with small-scale use confined to the
immediate combat zone, because they would probably see it as being to
their advantage instead to keep the conflict at the conventional force
level. However, they appear to be developing a means for dealing with
the possibility of NATO's initiation of such limited nuclear use, without
the USSR's necessarily having to go to large-scale nuclear war. We
believe they would see an initial localized use of nuclear weapons as
probably being the last realistic opportunity to avoid large-scale nuclear
war. Once large-scale use of nuclear weapons in the theater occurred,
the Soviets plan for the likely and imminent escalation to intercontinen-
tal nuclear war.
As the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict increased, Soviet
leaders would face the difficult decision of whether to seize the
initiative and strike, as would be consistent with their general military
doctrine, or to be more cautious in the hope of averting massive nuclear
strikes on the Soviet homeland. There are no easy prescriptions for what
the Soviets would actually do under a particular set of circumstances,
despite the apparent doctrinal imperative to mount massive preemptive
nuclear attacks:
- We are unable to judge what information would be sufficiently
convincing to cause Soviet leaders to order a massive preemp-
tive attack.
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- They would be more likely to seize the initiative by launching
intercontinental nuclear strikes if the war had already reached
the level of theater nuclear conflict, than if it was still at a
conventional level. We believe they would be likely to launch a
preemptive intercontinental strike if there had been large-scale
theater nuclear strikes against the western USSR.
- If they acquired convincing evidence that a US intercontinental
strike were imminent, they would try to preempt. We believe
that they would be more likely to act on the basis of ambiguous
indications and inconclusive evidence of US strike intentions if a
theater nuclear conflict were under way than during a crisis or a
conventional conflict.
- For reasons such as lack of convincing evidence from their
strategic warning systems or fear of unnecessarily or mistakenly
initiating intercontinental nuclear war, the Soviets might not
mount a preemptive strike.
- We believe the Soviets place considerable emphasis on assessing
their strategic offensive capabilities under conditions where
they retaliate after the United States launches a major strike.
These would include scenarios where they are able to launch
varying portions of their forces on tactical warning (LOTW), as
well as the most stressful scenario-retaliation only after absorb-
ing a well-coordinated US counterforce attack. For the Soviets,
these retaliation scenarios are the most critical in an evaluation
of their capabilities and probably the ones to which they devote
most of their training.
The Soviets' offensive objectives in carrying out large-scale nuclear
strikes would be to neutralize US and Allied military operations and
warmaking capabilities. Their large-scale intercontinental strikes would
be conducted primarily with ICBMs and SLBMs. We believe that the
Soviets would conduct repeated attacks in an attempt to destroy,
degrade, and disrupt the United States' capability to employ nuclear
forces, and the reconstitution capabilities of its nuclear forces and their
supporting infrastructure. They would also attempt to isolate the United
States from the theater campaign by attacking its power projection
capabilities. Depending on the circumstances, they might also attempt
to reduce US military power in the long term by attacking US military-
industrial capacity. Limiting the initial strikes only to command,
control, and communications targets, or only to a portion of US strategic
forces such as ICBM silos, is not consistent with the available evidence.
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The Soviets probably have plans to reconstitute some surviving
general purpose and strategic forces and to occupy substantial areas of
Western Europe, while neutralizing the ability of US and Allied nuclear
forces to interfere with these objectives. They prepare for combat
operations that could extend weeks beyond the intercontinental nuclear
phase. Some Soviet SSBNs in protected areas near the Soviet homeland
would be withheld for potentially protracted nuclear operations, others
for longer term reserve. The Soviets would clearly prefer to accomplish
their objectives quickly, but recognize that the later phases could be
protracted, given the difficulty and complexity of conducting opera-
tions following massive nuclear strikes.
We do not know how the Soviets would assess their prospects for
prevailing in a global nuclear conflict. Sizable forces on both sides
would survive massive nuclear strikes:
- The Soviets have enough hard-target-capable ICI3M reentry
vehicles (RVs) today to attack all US missile silos and launch
control centers in a first strike. We project that, over the next 10
years, the USSR will have substantially larger numbers of hard-
target-capable RVs and that the effectiveness of individual
Soviet ICBMs against hardened targets will increase. In a well-
executed strike, Soviet ICBMs would have the potential-using
two RVs against a Minuteman silo-to achieve a damage
expectancy of about 75 to 80 percent today, and about 90
percent by the mid-1980s, although there are significant uncer-
tainties in these percentages because of our uncertainties about
Soviet ICBM characteristics. Although the Soviets' hard-target
capabilities will increase substantially, we believe that they will
still be concerned that at least a portion of the US ICBM force
would be launched while under attack.
- Soviet offensive forces will not be able to reliably target and
destroy patrolling US SSBNs, alert aircraft, aircraft in flight, or
land-mobile missiles, particularly those beyond the range of
tactical reconnaissance systems.
- Soviet mobile missiles and SSBNs patrolling in waters near the
USSR are highly survivable as are most silo-based ICBMs and
perhaps dispersed aircraft. We believe the Soviets can launch
ICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warning and control
systems are undegraded. However, with the increasing vulnera-
bility of Soviet ICBM silos during the period of this Estimate, as
the accuracy of US weapons improves, the Soviets will be faced
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with more difficult problems in assuring adequate retaliatory
capabilities in their critical planning scenario in which they are
struck first. We believe the Soviets' efforts to expand the
capabilities of their command and control network and SLBM
force, and to develop mobile ICBMs, reflect their concerns
about maintaining the capability to fulfill the missions of their
strategic nuclear forces.
Moreover, the Soviets are well aware of their inability to prevent
massive damage to the USSR with their strategic defenses even with the
improvements taking place in these forces. They also recognize that US
strategic defenses cannot prevent massive damage.
We believe that the Soviets' confidence in their capabilities for
global conflict probably will be critically dependent on command and
control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and destroying
the ability of the United States and its Allies to command and to operate
their forces. Although US attacks could destroy many known fixed
command, control, and communications facilities, elements of the
political leadership and military commands probably would survive,
and redundancy in Soviet strategic communications would prevent loss
of any one channel from disabling the overall system. We believe the
Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and Allied strategic
command, control, and communications to prevent or impair the
coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet
strategic defenses, and impairing US and Allied abilities to marshal
military and civilian resources to reconstitute forces.
The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are attempting to
prepare their military forces for the possibility of having to fight a
nuclear war and are training to be able to maintain control over
increasingly complex conflict situations. They have seriously addressed
many of the problems of conducting military operations in a nuclear
war, thereby improving their ability to deal with the many contingen-
cies of such a conflict, and raising the probability of outcomes favorable
to the USSR. There is an alternative view that wishes to emphasize that
the Soviets have not resolved many of the critical problems bearing on
the conduct of nuclear war, such as the nature of initiation of conflict,
escalation within the theater, and protracted nuclear operations. Ac-
cording to this view, the Soviets recognize that nuclear war is so
destructive, and its course so uncertain, that they could not expect an
outcome that was "favorable" in any meaningful sense.'
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The evidence that we have on how the Soviets would plan to
conduct a successful military campaign provides insight into how they
would seek to end a nuclear war on their terms-by neutralizing the
ability of US intercontinental and theater nuclear forces to interfere
with Soviet capabilities to prevail in a conflict in Eurasia.
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