PROSPECTS FOR SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001400070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 12, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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l~ationa On 1 ntlal
Intelligence
Council
Prospects for Sino-Soviet
Rapprochement (v)
National Intelligence Council
I ,::?:R ..I;'~F:: C::' F
?7339'
I
Confidential
NIC M 82-10007
May 1982
057
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National
Intelligence
Council
Prospects for Sino-Soviet
Rapprochement (v)
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
This paper was produced under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. It was
reviewed within the National Intelligence Council
and the Directorate of Intelligence. (u)
Confidential
NIC M 82-10007
May 1982
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Confidential
Prospects for Sino-Soviet
Rapprochement (u)
Key Judgments A significant Sino-Soviet rapprochement is unlikely in the near future
because:
? The historical and geopolitical rivalry is too long, too deep, and by now
too institutionalized.
? China is determined to become a superpower, and the Soviet Union, on
whose Asian borders China lies, will continue to try to prevent it from be-
coming one.
? China's growing nuclear potential will make a Sino-Soviet war and a
significant Sino-Soviet rapprochement even less likely, because the Soviet
Union will become more vulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons and
China will therefore have less need for better relations with the Soviet
Union.
This unlikelihood will remain even though the near future is likely to bring
some additional impulses-arising especially from the coming Soviet and
Chinese succession crises-toward a rapprochement, because:
? Moscow and Beijing are carrying on a double encirclement of each other.
? Sino-Soviet rivalry has now extended to important areas for both
(Indochina and Afghanistan); remains in North Korea; and is potentially
rising in India (toward which China's attitude is softening).
? Other powers, notably Vietnam, India, and the United States, can and
want to prevent a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
? Beijing, as well as Moscow, will in principle not want to be so susceptible
to manipulations by the United States to their disadvantage.
The United States has policy options that would contribute, albeit probably
not decisively, toward making any Sino-Soviet rapprochement less or more
likely:
? Vis-a-vis China, its policies toward the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and
Vietnam.
? Vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the extent to which the United States avoids,
or moves toward, both total break and major rapprochement.
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Confidential
Prospects for Sino-Soviet
Rapprochement (u)
Ever since the mid-19th century when the Russian
and Chinese empires came into active contact, Russo-
Chinese rivalry has been endemic. Stalin doubted that
Mao's victory in all of China woyld be, to Soviet
advantage, and before and after it he treated the
Chinese Communists as Soviet satellites, to their
lasting resentment. After a century of weakness, the
Korean War, and Stalin's death, China again became
strong, united, and expansionist. In contrast, Stalin's
successors fought each other, had problems in Eastern
Europe, pursued detente with Washington-to Mao's
fury-and expected China to continue unquestion-
ingly to follow their lead. Mao therefore broke with
Moscow, and global Sino-Soviet rivalry has continued
ever since.
Two major powers with common borders-like Russia
and China-are, as history shows, usually condemned
to mutual conflict. Because both have nuclear weap-
ons, and because China's nuclear potential is increas-
ing, an all-out war between them becomes less likely.
The political conflict, however, is more likely to
continue because China has less need to be concerned
about its own weakness.
The Sino-Soviet conflict led to competition for influ-
ence in other areas, beginning in the late 1950s. Until
the early 1970s the competition on the Sino-Soviet
border was primarily for North Korea and North
Vietnam, both of whom were strong enough to try to
remain neutral and profit therefrom. North Korea is
still neutral. But Vietnam, once it became engaged in
a major war with the United States, depended so
much on Soviet arms and was historically so fearful of
renewed Chinese domination that by the late 1960s
Hanoi was increasingly tilting toward Moscow. Viet-
nam broke with China in the mid-1970s and joined
the Soviet encirclement of China, primarily by allow-
ing the Soviet Union to use bases on its territory.
Double Encirclement
The Sino-Soviet conflict has now reached a new stage,
that of double encirclement. The Soviet Union, be-
cause it is far stronger, has been the prime mover in
this process. Russia historically has been addicted to
deployment of overwhelming military force (and to
lack of diplomatic finesse). In the 1960s Khrushchev
began, and Brezhnev has intensified, an enormous
Soviet troop deployment on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-
Mongolian frontiers. This, plus the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, drove Mao toward the United States,
the more so as Washington was beginning to disen-
gage from Vietnam. Moscow, which had both feared
and unwittingly encouraged this, stepped up its culti-
vation of Vietnam.
By the mid-1970s the Soviet Union had built the
airlift and sealift capabilities-and had used Cuban
troops-to exploit successfully opportunities of local
origin in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. This
drove China and the United States more rapidly
toward each other. Japan drifted toward them, and
away from the Soviet Union, because of Chinese
initiative, the Soviet refusal to hand back to Japan the
four southern Kurile Islands, and US encouragement
of Japan's drift.
Thus China has successfully begun the encirclement
of the Soviet Union. Moscow's "preemptive breakout"
from this encirclement, by encircling China (and the
United States in Asia) itself, has succeeded in Indo-
china, can probably succeed in Afghanistan (and
thereby menace the US position in the Middle East),
and can possibly profit from the turmoil in Iran.
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This double encirclement has introduced a new, corro-
sive factor in the Sino-Soviet conflict: manipulation of
both countries by allies and enemies. The principal
global manipulator was the United States. Moscow
had vainly hoped to maintain its preferred version of
detente with Washington: US priority for arms con-
trol agreements over countering Soviet advances in
the Third World.
As Soviet-American relations rapidly worsened in the
late 1970s and early 1980s because Washington re-
fused to accept Moscow's priorities for detente, the
Soviets tried to reach the same goal indirectly, via
Western Europe, and in the process to encourage
Chinese distrust of the United States. The West
European-especially the West German-attachment
to detente, even after the Afghan and Polish develop-
ments, has led to a rift in US-West European rela-
tions. Moscow is trying to exploit this by encouraging
West European pressure for Soviet-US arms control
negotiations and agreements. This would constrain
US global responses to Soviet moves, Moscow be-
lieves, and raise Chinese distrust of US reliability as a
firm ally against the Soviet Union.
The United States has remained a power in the
Pacific and is becoming one in the Indian Ocean. It is
committed to support ASEAN. China gives priority in
Southeast Asia to support of the Khmer Rouge
against the Vietnamese in Kampuchea. Singapore and
Thailand seem to support this but Malaysia and
Indonesia think China a greater long-range danger
than the Soviet Union. To the extent that its hostility
to Vietnam might decrease, ASEAN might try to get
the United States to persuade China to be less hostile
to Hanoi, for example, by tacitly accepting the status
quo in Kampuchea. China would probably regard
such an ASEAN and US attitude as "objectively"
pro-Soviet and would distrust the United States as a
result.
Finally, there is Taiwan. Beijing balances its need of
the United States to help contain the Soviet Union
with its determination to recover Taiwan, to which the
United States is the principal obstacle. Although
Moscow has so far had no success in its attempts to
cultivate Taiwan, China remains concerned about the
possibility. To the extent that China may feel that the
United States is not paying enough attention to its
interests vis-a-vis Taiwan, it may be inclined to
improve its relations with the Soviet Union, or at least
appear to be starting to do so, in order to put pressure
on the United States. Such a Chinese move could well
become a reality if the United States were significant-
ly, in China's view, to increase its support of Taiwan.
The Communist Ideological
and Organizational Factors
The fact that the Soviet Union and China are also
Communist powers and therefore rivals for ideological
and organizational hegemony in what is left of the
"international Communist and workers movement"
further complicates the picture. Both these factors,
which delayed the Sino-Soviet split from becoming
public, make compromise regarding the split more
difficult, because Sino-Soviet rivalry over ideological
and organizational factors normally becomes absolute
in public polemics. Since Marxism-Leninism explicit-
ly rejects ideological compromise and denies that state
interests rightly can overshadow "proletarian interna-
tionalism," Communist ideology has hindered prag-
matic compromise.
Even so, the "de-ideologization" of post-Mao Chinese
Communism, Beijing's abandonment of its previous
charge that Moscow had "restored capitalism," and
the cessation of Chinese attempts to split Communist
parties throughout the world and form a "Maoist
international" have downgraded the ideological aspect
of the Sino-Soviet split. However, Chinese party
relations with the Romanian, Yugoslav, Italian, and
Spanish Communist parties, all by now independent
from Moscow, have contributed to an international,
anti-Soviet "independentist" rather than an "anti-
revisionist"entente. Moscow will continue to consider
this, and Chinese participation in it, hostile to the
continuing Soviet claim to ideological and organiza-
tional hegemony in the international Communist
movement.
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Thus, although the ideological factor is likely to
remain downgraded in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the
Communist organizational factor has become a more
important barrier to rapprochement, because it is
based upon a pragmatic, partial partnership among
independent Communist parties that are united by
opposition to hegemony, and made easier by their
mutual tolerance of ideological differences.
The New Factors For and Against
a Sino-Soviet Rapprochement
Ever since the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, Brezhnev
has been trying to bring about a partial Sino-Soviet
rapprochement at the state level. He has consistently
failed because the Chinese-Mao, Zhou, Hua, and
Deng-have always rejected his repeated overtures.
The Internal Influences
Moscow. The 18-year-old Soviet policy of partial
rapprochement at the state level is not likely to
change in the near future, but it may be interrupted.
The principal impending Soviet development that
might, but probably will not, influence Soviet policy
in this connection is the Brezhnev succession struggle.
That it will lead, even temporarily, to a return to
Khrushchev's total political hostility to China seems
unlikely, for such a policy would only push China even
closer to the United States, something Moscow has
been trying for the last decade to prevent. It might
well, however, interrupt the present policy, for succes-
sion struggles have historically initially limited the
freedom of foreign and domestic policy maneuvers of
the main contestants. (Sometimes, however, contes-
tants have proposed major foreign policy initiatives, as
Beria reportedly did in 1953 on the German question.
That this probably contributed to his fall is not likely
to encourage further such initiatives.) The winner in
the Soviet succession struggle might well launch new,
more inviting initiatives toward a Sino-Soviet rap-
prochement, but even then his possibilities would be
limited. This would probably be especially true with
respect to any military initiatives. We know that the
Chinese conditions for a rapprochement set forth in
and after the 1979 Sino-Soviet negotiations included
Soviet military withdrawal from Vietnam, Afghani-
stan, and Mongolia, plus scaling down the deployment
of Soviet troops on the borders of China to their level
under Khrushchev. Given the influence of the Soviet
military, and the possibility that their support will be
important in the succession struggle, they might well
be able to persuade any new Soviet leaders that such
concessions should not be made.
Beijing. During the past few years some Chinese
intellectuals have on occasion advocated improvement
of relations with Moscow. However, they have been
consistently slapped down by Beijing. Nor has Beijing
used or exaggerated this opposition to try to put
pressure on the United States. On the contrary, its
anti-Soviet line has remained consistent for at least 23
years. Nevertheless, after Deng leaves the scene there
may be such an attempt among those struggling for
succession. It seems, however, unlikely to succeed.
First, the succession is already fairly well determined.
Second, just as with the Soviet Union, the issues
involved in any Sino-Soviet compromise have become
so much more serious and so less susceptible to
exclusive control by Moscow and Beijing, that the
possibility of a rapprochement is less than it was a
decade ago.
The External Influences
Moscow. There seems to be no serious prospect that
Soviet concessions will come close to the minimal
Chinese demands. On the contrary, the influence on
the Soviet Union of Vietnam, which can threaten to
bar the Soviets from bases in that country if Moscow
makes concessions of any kind to Beijing, will prob-
ably be significant in the opposite direction. More-
over, US conditions for a Soviet-US rapprochement
would probably also involve Soviet military evacua-
tion of Vietnam and Afghanistan. Moscow would be
even less likely to make similar concessions to Beijing,
because such concessions could hardly be counter-
balanced by anything less than a full Sino-Soviet
rapprochement. But this would mean de facto Chinese
hegemony in East and Southeast Asia. Nor would the
United States in the near future be likely to make
major concessions to the USSR in return for Soviet
evacuation of Vietnam and Afghanistan. Thus Mos-
cow's rivalry in these areas with Washington as well
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as Beijing makes compromise with either more diffi-
cult, because each of the latter two would find the
danger of arousing mistrust in the other an additional
barrier to successful negotiation with Moscow, which
in turn would, by trying to play each against the
other, probably arouse the mistrust of both.
Will the Soviet Union move toward China in order to
make up for the recent worsening of Soviet relations
with the United States? Realpolitik would require
that this occur, the more so because of the current US
global military buildup. The next five years or so will
probably see this factor become more important in
Soviet policy considerations. But the Soviet Union has
worked for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement since 1964,
and all the more as Sino-US relations have improved.
The primary reason why Moscow has not succeeded
has been that the Chinese have refused to play. But
there have been, and will probably continue to be,
other reasons as well: first, the continuing geopolitical
causes of hostility set forth above; second, the time-
tested maxim, which Moscow probably shares, that
concessions all too often only increase the appetite of
one's opponent for more; third, the high probability
that a partial rapprochement at the state level would
not end the Sino-Soviet struggle. On the contrary, a
partial rapprochement would allow China to become a
player as well and therefore gain an advantage vis-a-
vis the United States, which now enjoys the advanta-
geous position of being the only member of the
strategic triangle that can profit from maneuvering
with and against the two others. But China would
then also enjoy the same possibility, which by defini-
tion would limit the Soviet freedom of maneuver.
Given the Soviet tradition of caution in foreign af-
fairs, many in Moscow will probably find this another
reason for opposing even minimal concessions to
China. Fourth, and most important, the recent, in-
creased Chinese demand for concessions, set forth
above-including, most importantly, Vietnam and
Afghanistan-will discourage even smaller Soviet
concessions in the near future. Indeed, it is difficult to
imaging a scenario in which any Soviet leader, Brezh-
nev now or whatever successor later, would meet even
a major part of these Chinese demands.
Beijing. Some of the possible Chinese motives for a
partial rapprochement with the Soviet Union are the
converse of Soviet motives: to profit from equidistant
manipulation of Moscow and Washington; the decline
in the ideological aspects of the dispute; and the desire
for greater autonomy from the United States. Other
motives are different: the end of the violent ideologi-
cal hostility toward the USSR of Mao and the "Gang
of Four" in favor of far more pragmatic Chinese
policies; the desire to get Soviet as well as Western
help for modernization and thus be less dependent on
the West; increasing disappointment with US policy
concerning Taiwan; lingering concern that the United
States may return to a partial policy of collusion with
the USSR on arms control negotiations, which might,
for example, limit Soviet SS-20s targeted on Europe
and redirect them to Chinese targets. The most
important motive is that the Soviet involvement in
Vietnam and Afghanistan, and more generally its
attempt to encircle China, seem to have influenced
China, in its new demands in 1979, to insist that
Moscow concede to Beijing strategic hegemony in
East and Southeast Asia-something Moscow is most
unlikely to agree to. And the more powerful China
becomes, the more it will insist upon it.
A Sino-Soviet War: Most Unlikely
A Sino-Soviet general war is most unlikely. First, the
most serious Sino-Soviet border incidents, in 1969, led
to a brief, partial relaxation of tension. Second, rising
Chinese nuclear capability makes it less likely still.
But to take the "worst-case" analysis, even if such a
war did occur, it would be more likely that the Soviet
Union would be bogged down in a long guerrilla war
in China than that it would score a cheap, quick
victory. Moreover, a Soviet attack on China would
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Confidential
cost the Soviet Union tremendous influence in the rest
of the world, drive Western Europe back into the US
camp, and consolidate US-Japanese relations. Thus, a
Sino-Soviet war is (1) most unlikely and (2) by no
means necessarily contrary to US interests.
A Sino-Soviet nuclear war is also most unlikely,
because China is already capable of inflicting what
Moscow would in all probability consider unaccepta-
ble damage on the Soviet Union, and will be more
capable as time goes on. Moreover, it would hardly
end, but rather encourage, prolonged Chinese guerril-
la resistance and would antagonize the rest of the
world even more than a conventional war.
There is a somewhat greater possibility of a Sino-
Soviet limited war, such as almost occurred in 1969.
A second Chinese attack on Vietnam could force a
limited Soviet response of the kind the Chinese pre-
pared for in February 1979, when they evacuated
civilians from the Sino-Soviet border region on the eve
of the attack on Vietnam.
The Impact on the United States of a Partial
Sino-Soviet Rapprochement
A partial Sino-Soviet rapprochement would ease Sovi-
et fear of China and therefore free Moscow's hand
more vis-a-vis the United States, especially in areas
such as Western Europe, the Middle East, and Cen-
tral America, where China is not so directly involved.
It would ease Chinese pressure on Vietnam, which
could-and would-then cause US interests more
trouble in Southeast Asia. It would make China less
interested in supporting arms aid to the Afghan
rebels. Finally, it would make the Soviet Union less
likely to compromise with the United States, for
example, in arms control negotiations. On the con-
trary, because it would lower the Soviet estimate of
the Chinese threat, it vjould enable, indeed encourage,
Moscow to deploy more of its forces, nuclear and
conventional, to oppose the United States, notably in
Europe and in the southern Soviet Union on the
frontiers of the Middle East.
Consequences of US Policy Options
Options With China
Options open to the United States that would discour-
age Chinese rapprochement with the Soviets are:
? To keep the Taiwan issue on the back burner, thus
making it credible to Beijing that the United States
does not intend to increase Taiwan's military
strength but that it also does not intend to abandon
arms aid to Taiwan and thereby ensure its absorp-
tion by China. (The latter would be disastrous vis-a-
vis ASEAN and other US allies, while the former
would unnecessarily play into Soviet hands by push-
ing Beijing back toward Moscow.)
? To maintain and gradually increase US technologi-
cal aid to China but not accept any Chinese requests
for direct military assistance.
? To keep Beijing fearful of a possible Soviet-US
rapprochement but convinced that it can and must
prevent it.
The options that would encourage a Sino-Soviet rap-
prochement on the Chinese side are generally the
reverse of the above, notably the return to priority for
arms control agreements with the USSR and little
resistance to Soviet expansion, or a US military
buildup of Taiwan, or both.
Options With the Soviet Union
To discourage the Soviets from rapprochement with
the Chinese, the United States could continue
LRTNF and resume SALT negotiations, and thus
reassure Moscow that the United States does not
intend to return to a total Soviet-US cold war, but
consult with the Chinese as well as with NATO on
them, with the triple purpose of:
? Continuing to make the negotiations credible to the
Soviet Union and to Western Europe.
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? Assuring China that it will not suffer by any
agreement.
? Publicly abjuring any desire for condominium with
the Soviets and declaring that, since the USSR has
consistently violated the Yalta Agreements, the
United States formally denounces them and no
longer considers Eastern Europe an exclusively So-
viet sphere of influence any more than it considers
Latin America an exclusively US one.
The opposite of the above, or, alternatively, a total US
alliance with China against the USSR, or both, would
encourage the Soviet Union toward a Sino-Soviet
rapprochement.
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