NASIR'S DEATH: THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090046-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: September 29, 1970
• Content Type: IM

 L ~ ~/ r1 ~ /~ ~/c~c7s
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelli ~n~e,,. ,ll~~morand~.m
~~,~,~,.. .,..,L:
Nasir's DEath: The Immediate Aftermath
Secret
cp
.,
29 September 1970
Nom 1467/70
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090046-7
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090046-7
W1~_RNING
This document cantaius informatic,n alFecting the natiorril
dcfc:nse of the United St+,~ies, within the meaning of '['itlc
lb, sections 793 and 794, of the US Codo, us amcndrel.
Its transmission or revelation of its content: to or re-
ceipt }.~y an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
aaour t `
67(CI.IIUCD YHOM AUiDMATIC
DDK'N(IIIAUINA ANU
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :'CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090046-7
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090046-7
RF.(~:R FT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 September 1970
INTELLIGENCE N,EMORANDUM
Nasir's Death: The Immediate Aftermath
Problems of Succession
1. Nasir's death 'leaves a political vacuum
in Egypt that will be difficult to fill. Egypt's
provisional constitution states that if the presi-
dent dies, the first vice president assumes power
until a new president is chosen. Of late, Egypt
has had only one vice president, Anwar Sadat, and
he has been appointed interim president. Sadat
was recently reported to be under a political cloud,
but he has been a perennial figurehead in the Egyp-
tian Government .and has ,held a~.great variety of
posts -since participating with I~T,:.sir in the "free
officers" movement that ousted King Farouk in 1952.
His performance over the years has not been par-
ticularly outstanding, however; he owed his posi-
tion more to his loyalty to Nasir than to his po-
litical strength or acumen. Sadat is an ardent na-
tionalist who is reported to be strongly opposed to
domestic Communism, but he realizes the value of
both political and military aid from the USSR. Like
many Egyptian politicians, he is probably more o~:-
portunistic or pragmatic than ideologically moti-
vated. He is said to have opposed Egypt's acczptance
of the US peace initiative.
2, Sadat does not appear to carry much per-
sonal weight in Egyptian political circles, and it
is doubtful that he will fill the presidency for
more than an interim period. There are no other
Egyptian political or military figures, however,
who have sufficient stature to be in the running as
a clear-cut successor to Nasir. It seems likely,
t~ierefore, that for the short term a figurehead
Note: This memorandum was produced .' soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by ~`,~ie Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated ~v ~ th the 0 f fice o f Natic?rca Z Estimates .
Approved For Release 2006/05 P85T00875R001100090046-7
 Approved 6-7
president will be chosen, leaving decision-making in
the h ands of the group of advisers who comprised Nasir's
inner circle.
3. ,included in this group are Minister of State
Sami Sharaf, who has also been chief of presidential
intelligence; Minister cf Nattional Guidance Muhammad
Hayk al; Minister of Interior Sharawi Jumah; and Amin
Huwaydi, who is currently a minute r of state but un-
til recently was chief of general intelligence. There
is thought to have been some rivalry among these '`men,
and, although they all seemed, to share a common loyalty
to Nasir, it is not clear whe:ther or for how long they
will bury their differences :Ln order to preserve the
political stability that Egypt has enjoyed since the
early 1950s , The active rilitary leadership cannot
be ignored in this period of transition, however, and
whoever eventually. emerges on top will need at least
the tacit blessing of the armed forces.
4. There are a number of othe . men who might
swing some weight in the struggle for power that even
now will have begun behind th~~ scenes. Muhammad Fawzi,
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is not
thought to have any particular political ambitions,
but his influence with the military will be impor-
tant. Other generals may hope to play a role in post-
Nasir Egypt. Civilians who may be involved in poll ti-
cal maneuvering include Minister of State Muhammad
Faiq, former vice president Zakariy a Muhyeddin, and
National Defense council member Ali Sabri. The final
outcome of this period of flux cannot k~e predicted,
however, and some relatively obscure figures could
eventually emerge on top, even as Nasir himself did,
possibly as a result of a military grab for power.
Sovie t Reaction
5. Ahigh-ranking ~d~_legation led by Premier Kosy-
gin and including Deputy Foreign Minister Vinogradov
and Deputy Defense Minister Zakharov will attend Nasir's,
funeral. The death of Soviet Ambassador Sergei Vino-
gradov in Cairo only a month ago may hamper Soviet as-
sessments of t.~:a :,ituation in Cairo. Moscow: may try
to compensate ~by leaving Cairo a higr.-level member of
the delegation, perhaps the deputy foreign minister,
to protect Soviet interests for the time being.
25X1 _2_
Approved For Release 2006/0 / - DP85T00875R001100090046-7
 Approved For Release 2006/05/2$ ,F$3~'85T00875R001100090046-7
6. The Soviets will be gravely worried about
their long-run position in Egypt. They will play
their cards in a fashion calculated to protect this
stake, subordinating short-run concerns to their
effort to find and-back a new leadership that prom-
ises enduring value to Soviet interests.
Israeli Reaction
7.. The death of Israel's long-time enemy has
evoked a tinge of regret and concern for the future
in Jerusalem, but most senior officials have ex-
pressed some basic satisfaction. They long regarded
the 'Egyptian president as the primary obstacle among
Arab leaders both to the undisturbed occupation of
the Arab territories they now hold and to an accept-
able peace settlement, They flatly rejected Nasir's
professions of peaceful intent and were convinced
that he was devoted to the eventual extermination
of Israel as a state. They were highly frustrated
. by Nasir's resilience in the wake of two massive de-
feats at their hands and car. only rejoice in his de-
parture. A major aim of Israel's Arab policy was
the downfall of Nasir, and the deep penetration air
raids around Cairo early this year were a new tactic
to achieve that end.
8. The Israelis were convinced then--and are ???
now--that "things could only be better" in the Middle
East and for Israel if Nasir were eliminated. They'
have argued that a successor regime, which they expect
to be a military group or a civilian front dominated
by the military, would be so preoccupied with main-
taining power and s o engrossed in dome~stir problems
that it would be ineffective in foreigsl policy and
military action. They recognized that :~lasir's ex-
ternal influence had waned, but they still viewed him
as the most influential man, in the Arab world, In the
Israeli view, Nasir provided what mortar there was
among the Arab states; with him gone, they expect
considerable disarray and a further .decline in inter-
Arab cooperation that will be reflected on political,
diplomatic, and military fronts. Some Israeli news-
papers hopefully predict that no Arab leader of Nasir's
stature will emerge for ten years. Israel will closely
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/05/2 5T00875R001100090046-7
 Approved
watch developments in Egypt, but seems unlikely to
initiate any military action there to exploit the
period of confusion. Although Israeli officials
might see some military advantages ixl moving against
Egypt, during its moment of distraction, they prob-
ably regard the political disadvantages of such
action now as overriding.
Arab Reactions
9. Like the Egyptians, moss ~f the other Arab
leaders are likely to maintain a respectful silence
on the succession question until the dust has set-
tled, but the centrifugal forces in the Middle East
will be accelerated without Nasir's stabilizing in-
fluence. Libya's Qaddafi fancies himself to be cut
from the Nasir mold and he has received flattering
attentions because of his country's new-found wealth,
but the kind of leadership he could prc.>vi.de would be
largely oratorical. Syria's President Atasi and
Iraq's Bakr are probably not masters of their own
houses, and are too preoccupied with internal prob- .
lems and ideological disputes to be serious con-
tenders for a leadership role in the Middle East.
10. King Husayn of Jordan and King Faysal of
Saudi Arabia may be drawn closer together as a re-
sult of Nasir's demise, because both see themselves
threatened by radical forces during the period of
uncertainty ahead. Nasir's dying in the midst of
strenuous 'efforts to deal wi,'-.h Israel and the West
and to quell the fighting in Jordan could also re-
sult in a mindless lashing out by the Arab populace
against his supposed tormentors; e.g., the chances
of an assassination attempt on Husayn are perhaps
heightened by the increased emotionalism among the
Palestinians. Western institutions in the Middle
East and Israeli interests everywhere offer con-
venient targets for violent catharsis. Extremist
Palestinians would be the groups mos t likely to suc-
cumb to such an emotional reaction; they might react
more violently elsewhere, however, than in Jordan.
The Palestinian movement generally will have an am-
bivalent reaction; a restraining force will have been
removed, but also gone is a unifying personality who
in some meaGur~e symbolized "the cause."
Approved For Release 2006/05 P85T00875R001100090046-7
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 ~~]i (~;~~5T00875R001100090046-7
11. Nasir's death will seriously complicate
Middle East peace efforts, but its precise effect
may not be clear for some time. At least at the
outset, the new Egyptian leadership will probably
be preoccupied with domestic political concerns and
will not be eager--nor .perhaps able--t~o explore
new approaches to the 1~rab-Israeli problem. Even
if they were, they do not command Nasir's authority
in Egypt or in the Arab world and would have trouble
makin an a reement stick.
asir s successors are, however, more likely
to et existing situations alone than to take new
and possibly?diVSSive steps; this circumstance would
act in favor of an extension of the present 90-clay
cease-fire that expires in early November.
Approved Fo