ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN AND THE POLITBURO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090056-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: December 15, 1970
• Content Type: IM

 (~ A ~' ~ ed /For R~leasa~ 206/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100 005, (, ,y 25X1
pp ~C1 ~!~
llIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
D
Intelligence Memoraridurn
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and the ,Politburo
DQCUMENT SERV9CES BRAPdCN
FILE CQPY
DO NOi DESTROY
secr~~
r: rY
tr ~
15 December 1970
No. 1500/70
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090056-6
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090056-6
Wt1.RNING
'1'liis -loc?unu?ut cunt;tiiis infnrnuttiott alf'c?etiul; lhr natinn:tl
cicli?nsi? of tLc !4t-itc?cl tit;ttes, ~~?ithin tlit.r mt?anin~ ul 'I'illc?
1$, sections 7413 :uul 7J?1, ul thu h5 (;oclc?? ;ts :unt~npulsion was later endorsed by the RSFSR
Writers' Union and again by a conference .?f: the vari-
ous unions of intellectuals. Even Solzhena.tsyn's
years of imprisonment and exile--r~hich under Khru-
shchev gave him an aura of martyrdom as one of Stal.;.n's
victims--have now been turned against him with dark
hints of his "treason" in World War II.
14. Taken as a whole, Solzheni tsyn's works
present a totall;~ negative appraisal of those peri-
ods that the regime now hails as being the ones of
great achievement in the Stalin years. Moreover,
the author rejects the official contention that the
"cult of personality"--its errors corrected by the
party--is finished and should be forgotten. Solzhen-
itsyn, however, is concerned with more than specific
"errors" and "shortcomings" of Stalin; the Soviet
dictator is merely a symbcl for much larcer issues
that deeply concern him--thc~ arbitrary use of power
and the oppression of the hu~~?? spirit. This is the
yardstick against which he measures both the Soviet
past and the present.
15. In line with the great traditions of clas-
sical Russian literature, ize firmly adheres `.o the
principles of humanism and ins~_sts that literature,
regardless of the personal consequences, must faith-
fu11y reflect both the attractive and unattractive
aspects of life. By refusing to compromise with
Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090056-6
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 ~T00875R001100090056-6
J
a system intent on oppressing the human spirit,
Sol zl~enitsyn has ; ?ecomc~ an important moral f-orcc
in tlic Soviet Union L-oday. Thus 12 inmates of a
Soviet labor camp wrote to the author congratulat-
ing him on the Nobel award and expr^ssing their
"de].iyht" in his courageous work. A spokesman for
the Royal Swedish /lcademy noted that So' zhenitsyn
was selected to receive the Nobel Prize on the
basis of "the ethical. force with which he has pur~-
suPd the indispensable traditions cf Russian liter-
ature."
Preserving the "Balance" on Stalin
16. Solzhenitsyn's provocative writings and
statements have not called forth reprisals as se-
vere as those the regime hay taken against some of
its other critics. By itself, the author's presti5e
v;ould probably not have stayed the hand of repres-
sion, but combined witki his close identification
with the still highly sensitive Stalin issue, it
seems to have given the le~~dership cause to proceed
cautiously. In spite of the drift toward the re-
habilitation of Stalin.. there has been no clear
directive on the subject from the top leadership,
and the occasionally erratic course of the r.efur-
b.ishment of his reputation suggests that there is
some division within the Krem'.in. Solzhenitsyn
thus presents the leadership with a di]emma far
more complex than the conventional problem of dis-
ciplining a dissident novelist.
17. Even pro-Stalin novels rAportedly have
caused some problems in the leadership this year.
During a conservative attack on liberal intellectu-
als in late 1969 and early 1970, Ivan Shevtsov--who
is notably untalented and is not a member of the
tMriters' Union--published two reactionary, pro-
Stalin works, In the Name of the Father and the Son,
and Love and date. The novels, going to extremes
that even the party had eschewed, wholeheartedly
endorsed Stalin, justified the bloodshed of collect-
ivization and t-.he purges, and praised the workers
while portraying liberal intellectuals as dupes of
the West. The initial re~~iews~of Shevtsov's novels
were mild and totally ignored the important issues
Approved For Release 2006/05/2 5T00875R001100090056-6
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :~~~6~T00875R001100090056-6
he raised. He pic)ced up support. when the conserva-
tive RSFSR n~wspaper_ , Sovetskaya b:ossi a, w.zich is
reportedly responsive to Polifibura me er Dmitry
Polyansky, praised his work and severely rebuked
his critics. Liberal elements had been trying for
some time to gem Brezhnev to take a stand against
the books. finally they grit to Suslov instead and
per_sua~^d him that Shevtsov's works should be con-
demned because the had been hi h1 raised b the
Chinese.
I Tn the
en , a compromise o sorts was reached. Although
Pravda carried a scathing review of the novels by
itrs literary editor damning the books as "ideologi-
cally corrupt and artistically worth less," it
avoided any reference to their total endorsement
of Stalin. The rebuke in Pravda did not however
discoura e Shevtsov and his cohor 25X1
18. Solzhenitsyn's unaltering opposition to
Stalin presents to the leadership the other tide of
the Shevtsov coin, and brings equally difficult
problems. The international reputation of Solzhen-
itsyn is an additional complication. Because pu:a-
lication of Solzhenitsyn's works is already prohib-
ited in the Soviet Union, a compromise like the
Shevtsov "solution" is impassible. Severe measures
seem required to rid the leadership of Solzhenitsyn.
Agreement on such measures, however, would not only
be difficult because of his close identificaiton
with anti-Stalinism, but would have adverse psycho-
logical repercussions within the Soviet iJ~zion.
The Novel Prize: A Di.Iemma
19. The leadership was placed in a quandary
when the announcement of the Nobel Prize award was
made. The Soviet press and spokesman for the Writers'
Union denounced the decision of the Nobel committee
Approved For Release 2006/05/ - P85T00875R001100090056-6
25X1
 Approved For Release 2006/051~~'( I P85T00875R001100090056-6
are "pot; t.i.cal" ;anc] "hrovocati.vc~," but their commcn-
tary wa ~ rather mild and tuLally :icJnorcd 5olzheni t.?-
syn'.~ 8 October statcment?--pub].:i..,hed only in the
Wr:; ~--tha L- lie woul.cl like i:o accep l: the award person-
ally? 'L'he i.ndeci.:.~ivenes o,f. thi.3 reaction contrasts
:sharply with the well-orc:~cstratr_d furor that raged
in 1958 when PasL?ernak was forced to refuse the
award, and it almost certainly reflects the absence
of guidance from a pr~rplexed and embarrassed ICr.emlin.
Political Support for Solzlienit-syn?
20. Solzhenihsyn's'identificatio,i with anti-
Stalinism and the struggle for human rights iii the
Soviet Union serves both ~o incite the guardians of
~~oli.tical and cultural orthodoxy and to prevent them
from taking decisive action against him. In addi-
tion, the controversial novelist's supporters may
still have some political influence. Political sup-
poxt was clearly evident during the years of de-
Stal~.nizati.on, when Khrushchev himself approved of
Solzhenitsyn and his publisher, the liberal editor
Aleksaridr Tvardovsky, had some political influence
through his association with Khrushchev.
21. Under the collective leadership, the source
of Solzhenitsyn's support is more difficult to iden-
tify. He has continued to receive some backing from
Tvardovsky and other liberal intellectuals. Com-
poser Dmitry Shostakovich and l:he cellist Mstislav
Rostropovi..h have assisted Solzhenitsyn by providing
him with a place to live since he lost his teaching
position. Rostropovich alone has publicly defended
the nc~-~ist during the press campaign against him
in the a.ttermath of the Nobel Prize announcement.
In late October, the cellist wrote to the editors
of Pravda, Izvestia, and other newspapers defending
the author's it ght to tell the truth as he sees it
and condemning the authority of "absolutely incom-
petent people" to discredit Soviet art. This first
public protest from an internationally acclaimed
artist had more impact in the West than in the So-
viet Union, but it is possible that the letter may
also have had some effect within the leadership.
Approved For Release 2006/RDP85T00875R001100090056-6
 Approved For Release 2006/05/ ~: P85T00875R001100090056-6
23. On 27 November S~lzhenitsyn announced that
he would prefer to receive the award at the Swedish
Embassy in Moscow because he feared that he would
not be allowed to return to the Soviet Union from
Stockholm. HP also stated that Yee would "deliver
or hand over in written form" the required Nobel
Lecture within six montY.s. His statement suggests
that in the bargaining between Solzhenitsyn and the
Soviet authorities the crucial factor on both sides
was the author?s deep feeling for his homeland and
his unwillingness to start a new life abroad. The
silence or ambiguity of the authorities on permis-
sion for re-entry probably convinced the novelist
that it would be better to remain in the Soviet
Union than to risk permanent exile. Solzhenitsyn's
decision spares the regime the unfavorable publicity
that would have accompanied overt action to prevent
the novelist from receiving the Nobel Prize in
Stockholm. But it also keeps the spotlight on the
novelist and his views and may make it difficult
for the regime to influence the content of his lec-
ture.
Approved For Release 2006/ DP85T00875R001100090056-6
 Approved For Release
24. ]3ecause the Nobel Commi.t?l-.ee will permit
5olzhenitsyn to receive the award in the Soviet
Union--but after 10 December so as to avoid detract-
ing from the Stockholm ceremonies--the most impor-
tant consequence of his maneuvering may be to set
a precedent the leadership is probably anxious to
avoid. If ho does receive the award, the presence
of an outstanding anti-Stalinist holding the Nobel
Prize in the Soviet Union will be a source of con-
stant embarrassment to the regime, and it will
heighten interest in his latest novel, August 1914,
which like his other works will probably circu~e
in manus.^ript form. It will, moreover, provide
encouragement to the liberal intellectualQ who have
rec`ntly been the object of several attacks in the
Soviet press on the grounds that they lack ideo-
logical conviction. Solzhenitsyn's handling of the
present controversy confirms what one of his critics
said about him three years ago: "The works of
Solzhenitsyn are more dangerous to us than those of
Pasternak: Pasternak was a man divorced from life,
while Solzhenitsyn, with his animated, milita:zi:,
ideological temperament, is a man of principle."
-12-
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/0 =RDP85T00875R001100090056-6